

Introduction to Philosophy

By

Dallas M. Roark, Ph.D.

Professor of Philosophy

(Emeritus)

Emporia State University

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Chapter I

What is Philosophy?

Part I. Definitions

Defining philosophy is as difficult as trying to define love. The word philosophy is not much help. Philosophy is a combination of two Greek words, *philia sophia*, meaning love of wisdom. In ancient times a lover of wisdom could be related to any area where intelligence was expressed. This could be in business, politics, human relations, or carpentry and other skills. Philosophy had a "wholeness" approach to life in antiquity. In contrast to this, some modern definitions restrict philosophy to what can be known by science or the analysis of language.

In today's world there is a popular use of the word philosophy. Philosophy is a term applied to almost any area of life. Some questions may express this general attitude: what is your philosophy of business? banking? driving a car? or your philosophy of the use of money? If this popular misuse of the word were to prevail, one may admit that anyone who thinks seriously about any subject is a philosopher. If we do this, we are ignoring the academic disciplines, or study of philosophy. If this very general definition is accepted, everyone becomes a philosopher. It becomes true, paradoxically, that when everyone is a philosopher, no one is a philosopher. This becomes so loose a definition that philosophy becomes meaningless as a definition. If this definition prevailed, it would mean that a philosopher is anyone who says he is a philosopher. Because of this inadequacy it becomes apparent that we have to look elsewhere for a definition of philosophy.

Because the original meaning of the word, philosophy, does not give us much for specific content, we will turn to descriptive definitions. A descriptive definition of philosophy is that it seeks to describe its functions, goals, and reasons for existence. In the following pages a number of these definitions will be set forth and examined.

A word of warning is offered to the beginning student of philosophy. The beginner may despair over diverse definitions. Students who come from a scientific background frequently expect concise, clear, and universally accepted definitions. This will not be true in philosophy and it is not universally true concerning all issues in any science or non-scientific study or discipline. The diversity of opinion in philosophy becomes a source of embarrassment for the beginner when asked to explain to parents or unknowing friends just what a course in philosophy is all about. It might be expected that one of the oldest disciplines or subjects in academia should achieve some uniformity of opinion, but this is not the case.

Yet in spite of diversity, philosophy is important. Plato declared that philosophy is a gift the gods have bestowed on mortals.¹ This may reflect man's ability to reason about the world as well as

man's life within it. Socrates' famous statement, "Know thyself," reflects this aim of philosophy. Plato also warned against the neglect of philosophy. He wrote that "land animals came from men who had no use for philosophy. . . ."2 In light of this it might help to threaten the reader with the warning: if you don't take philosophy seriously, you will turn into a pumpkin! But more seriously, men live by philosophies. Which one will it be?

We now turn to consider several definitions of philosophy. These will include the historical approach, philosophy as criticism, philosophy as the analysis of language, philosophy as a program of change, philosophy as a set of questions and answers, and philosophy as a world-view. Along the way we will also analyze the definitions and attempt to reach some conclusions about this analysis.

A. The Historical Approach

Remember our question: what is philosophy? According to this approach philosophy is really the study of historical figures who are considered philosophers. One may encounter the names of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thales, Philo, Plotinus, Aquinas, Kant, Erigena, Hume, Marx, Hegel, Russell, Wittgenstein and many more. All are considered philosophers. What holds them together since they are so diverse in many of their views? One answer lies in their common set of problems and concerns. Many were interested in the problems of the universe, its origin, what it is in its nature, the issue of man's existence, good and evil, politics, and other topics. (This may serve as a link to another definition to be considered later.)

The argument for the historical approach is that no real understanding of philosophy can be had unless one understands the past. Philosophy would be impoverished if it lost any of the names above. Some argue that knowing the history of philosophy is required for a positive appreciation of philosophy, and necessary if one is to make creative contributions to the advancement of philosophy.

This definition of philosophy has its problems: (1) it tends to limit philosophy to the great minds of the past and makes it an elitist movement, (2) it restricts philosophy to an examination of past questions and answers only, (3) it is not really different from the study of history of ideas. This would make philosophy a sub-unit of history. (4) This definition would not describe the work of those philosophers (logical empiricists) who regard the philosophy of the past as so much non-sense to be rejected.

The value of the historical approach is that it introduces the student to the great minds of the past and the confrontation one has with philosophic problems that are raised by thinking people in all ages. This is desirable in itself even though this is not the best definition of philosophy.

B. Philosophy is the Analysis of Language

This is one of the more extreme definitions of philosophy. This definition began as an emphasis in philosophy at about the turn of the century. A growing revolt took place against the

metaphysical systems in philosophy. Metaphysical systems in philosophy explained **everything** from the standpoint of a great idea like "mind" or "spirit." The reaction was primarily against the philosophy of idealism which is a highly developed metaphysical philosophy. More of this will be forthcoming in the fifth definition. The analysis-of-language-emphasis rejected metaphysics and accepted the simple, but useful modern standard of scientific verification. Their central thesis is that only truths of logic and empirically verifiable statements are meaningful. What does scientific verification mean in this context? If you can validate or reproduce an experiment or whatever, you can say it is true. If there is no way to reproduce or validate the experiment in the context of science, there was then no claim for truth.

How do verification and language work together? Try this example. How do you know when to take a statement as referring to a fact? We can use three sentences: (1) God is love, (2) Disneyland is in California, and (3) rape is wrong. These sentences are constructed in a similar manner. But only one is factual, i.e., it can be scientifically verified. Thousands of people go yearly to Disneyland and anyone who doubts can go see for himself. But you cannot scientifically verify that rape is wrong and that God is love. I can say factually that a person was raped and may even witness the event as a fact, but how can I verify the word "wrong?" God is not seen and love is not seen scientifically. Are these statements meaningful?

The conclusion reached by analytic philosophers is that anything not verifiable is nonsense. All of the systems of the past that go beyond verification are to be rejected as nonsense. This means that the realm of values, religion, aesthetics, and much of philosophy is regarded only as emotive statements. An emotive statement reflects only how a person "feels" about a topic. Declaring that rape is wrong is only to declare that I feel it is wrong. I may seek your agreement on the issue, but again it is not an objective truth, but two "feelings" combined.

Other analytic philosophers moved beyond the limitations of the verification principle to the understanding of language itself. Instead of talking about the world and whether things exist in the world, they talk about the words that are used to describe the world. This exercise in "semantic ascent" may be seen in contrasting talk about miles, distances, points, etc., with talk about the word "mile" and how it is used. Language philosophers such as Quine spend entire treatises on the nature of language, syntax, synonymous terms, concepts of abstractions, translation of terms, vagueness and other features of language. This is a philosophy about language rather than being interested in great issues that have frequently troubled the larger tradition of philosophers.

Language analysis as the definition of philosophy changes philosophy from being a subject matter into a tool for dealing with other subject matters. It becomes a method without content.

This definition is as one-sided as the definition it rejected. The analysis of language has been an important part of philosophy from the time of Socrates and others to the present. But language connected with verification and restricted by that principle places great limitations on areas that philosophy has often regarded as important. This limitation is seen particularly in the areas of morals and ethics. Morality cannot be verified in a scientific way. But it does seem obvious that we can discuss actions and adopt some means of objective evaluation in terms of reason. Moreover, it does not seem obvious that some moral distinctions are merely "emotive

feelings." It appears quite reasonable and acceptable to most people that there is a big difference between paddling a child by a concerned parent, and the child-abusing parent whose discipline kills the helpless child. If verification is required for the statement--it is wrong to kill the child--then all moral standards are at an end, and philosophy is turned into stupidity.

C. Philosophy is a Program of Change

Karl Marx declared that the role of philosophy is not to think about the world, but to change it. Philosophy is not to be an ivory tower enterprise without relevance to the world of human conditions. A contemporary Marxist has asked:

What is the point in subtle epistemological investigation when science and technology, not unduly worried about the foundations of their knowledge, increase daily their mastery of nature and man? What is the point of linguistic analysis which steers clear of the transformation of language (ordinary language!) into an instrument of political control? What is the point in philosophical reflections on the meaning of good and evil when Auschwitz, the Indonesian massacres, and the war in Vietnam provides a definition which suffocates all discussion of ethics? And what is the point in further philosophical occupation with Reason and Freedom when the resources and the features of a rational society, and the need for liberation are all too clear, and the problem is not their concept, but the political practice of their realization.³

The criticism of Marcuse is a stinging one. But the question of change is not one for philosophy *per se*. Philosophy has no built-in demand that change be the end product of one's thinking. It seems natural that one who is thinking seriously about the problems of man that one seek good solutions. It seems natural also that one having good solutions should seek to carry them out. But it is also possible that one have good solutions and only contemplate them without any action. There is no inherent mandate in philosophy for a program of action, although it may be tacitly assumed that some good action will come forth.

Philosophy is in contrast generally to a movement like Christianity which has a built-in motivation for changing the world by the conversion of people to its cause. Traditional philosophy has concerned itself more with academic questions. But there is the underlying assumption: if you know what is right and good, you will proceed to do it.

Another view of philosophy with an emphasis on doing, or change, is that of Alan Watts. Watts describes philosophy from the standpoint of contemplation and meditation. He starts with the conclusion of the language philosophers: all language about philosophy is meaningless. If this is true, then philosophy should be silent and learn to practice oriental mysticism which is characterized as "ideless contemplation."⁴ The aim of meditation is to get to the Ground of Being. What is the Ground of Being? In a simple way it can be described as the all-pervasive Spirit that is the only basic reality of the world. Everyone is part of the Great Spirit. The aim of philosophy is not to think, but to achieve union with the Great Spirit.

The idea of change is different between Marcuse and Watts. The Marxist idea of change is to change the material world and man will be better. Watt's view of change is to forsake social change for all change is futile. The real change is to attain oneness with the impersonal world-soul. The world of the material is transient and the visible world is not the real world. Even the Ground of Being, or the Great Pervasive Spirit is changing and manifesting itself in various forms. There is a subtle contradiction in Watt's philosophy. The Ground of Being continues to produce human beings who must continually deny their own being to be able to return to the Ground of Being. This denial of one's own being reflects the fact that the Ground of Being is constantly making a bad thing come into being.

Another variation on the theme of mystic contemplation--the attempt to attain oneness with God--is seen in the thought of men such as Eckhart or Plotinus. Their philosophy encourages a contemplative role. While Eckhart or Plotinus are motivated from a religious or quasi-religious motive like Watts, they do not promote the revolutionary social change as advocated by the Marxists.

D. Philosophy is a Set of Questions and Answers

Philosophy has a long list of topics it has been interested in. Some of these are more interesting and up-to-date than others. Is the world of one or more substances? Is it matter, mind, or other? Is man only a body? Is he, or does he have a soul? Does God exist? Many other questions could be incorporated here. Some questions have several proposed solutions. This is true in trying to answer what the nature of man is. Other questions cannot be answered decisively. Does God exist? can only be answered in terms of a probability situation. No scientific proof can decide the question either way. Some questions have been answered to the satisfaction of many philosophers for a long period of time only to be raised again. One example of this is the old question of Socrates' day about man being born with knowledge, called innate knowledge. For centuries this was accepted by a variety of people. But John Locke seems to have solved the matter for many philosophers that man is not given innate ideas at birth. Hence, he must gain his knowledge through experience.

Now in contemporary thought, Noam Chomsky has raised the question again in proposing what he calls "generative grammar." He rejects the view of Locke that language is learned empirically. When we learn a language we are able to understand and formulate all types of sentences that we have never heard before. This ability to deal with language is regarded by Chomsky as innate, something we have inherited genetically. So the issue comes anew.⁵

But other questions have not met with the same success for such a long period of time. In summary, it can be said that defining philosophy as a set of questions and answers is not unique by any means. Other disciplines or studies could also be defined by the questions they seek to answer. If this definition is accepted as the only definition, one must set forth the particular kinds of questions that are restricted to philosophy. Obviously the answers to the problem of pollution are not the kinds of questions one deals with in philosophy. But the relation of man's body to his mind is one of the kinds of questions that philosophers have regarded as their own.

E. Philosophy is a World-View (Weltanschauung)

Early philosophers attempted to describe the world in its simple make-up. Thales asserted that water, and Anaximenes asserted that air, were the important materials of the universe. Many other proposals have come from other philosophers. But the main issue concerns the nature of the universe. A world-view, or *Weltanschauung*, as the Germans term it, involves more than the questions of the universe. A world-view is the attempt to come to a total view of the universe as it relates to the make-up of matter, man, God, the right, the nature of politics, values, aesthetics, and any other element in the cosmos that is important.

Such a definition was held by William James who said,

The principles of explanation that underlie all things without exception, the elements common to gods and men and animals and stone, the first whence and the last whither of the whole cosmic procession, the conditions of all knowing, and the most general rules of human action--these furnish the problems commonly deeded philosophic par excellence; and the philosopher is the man who finds the most to say about them.⁶

In spite of this definition, James is not one of the better examples of a philosopher who carried on the development of a systematic world-view.

If we accept this definition of philosophy, we are not committed to any pre-arranged conclusions. There are many world-views that are contrary to one another. Look at the following brief examples: (1) Lucretius, in his essay on nature, developed a world-view based on the atomic nature of all things.⁷ Everything that is, is atomic. Even the souls of men and gods are composed of atoms. When atoms disintegrate, things, souls, and gods also disintegrate. Only atoms are permanent. Lucretius dealt with many other facts of existence, but they are all related to the atomic nature of things. (2) In contrast to the simple atomism of Lucretius is the philosophy of Hegel which views all reality from the standpoint of mind, or Absolute Spirit.⁸ Spirit is the only reality. What looks like matter is really a sub-unit of Spirit. Hegel interpreted politics, the world, and man from the single vantage point of Spirit or Mind. (3) A middle viewpoint or hybrid example would be the philosophy of realism which asserts that mind and matter are both equally real. Matter is not mind, nor is mind merely matter in a different form. Samuel Alexander's book, Space, Time, and Deity, give an example of this third viewpoint.⁹

The three examples above are attempts at world-views. Neither example is compatible with the other. Neither thinker would accept the other's views. But all are seeking explanations of human existence that result in world-views.

The modern era of philosophy--since the turn of the century--has seen considerable rejection of the world-view definition of philosophy. In spite of this rejection, it has a time-honored tradition behind it. Aristotle has a sentence that is widely quoted about this emphasis:

There is a science which investigates being as being, and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences, for none of these treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of this part.¹⁰

Looking at the universe as a whole involves questions which cannot be ignored. The questions are not to be isolated from one another, but should be put together to form an integrated whole, or total view of the world. It is this integration that makes this definition of philosophy better than the previous one or questions and answers.

This definition of philosophy will have an appeal to the student who aims for consistency and coherence in his approach to thinking. The role of education tacitly leads to such a conclusion. If one believes in social planning as advocated in Walden Two, that belief will call for a corresponding reduction in claims for human freedom and responsibility. Similarly, if a person believes in God, and takes God seriously, there should be a concern for human rights, equality, justice, and a concern for the wholeness of man in both body and spirit. Something is wrong when a person affirms belief in God as Creator and then regards certain categories of people as sub-human.

A world-view will include views on man, social responsibilities and politics consistent with the view of man. Any discipline or study having a bearing on the meaning of man will have relevance for a world-view. This will include biology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, theology, and other related disciplines. A world-view is an attempt to think coherently about the world in its completeness.

Defining philosophy as a world-view sounds good, but it too has problems. One basic criticism is that the systems of philosophers--Lucretius, Hegel, and others--have been limited by the basic motif, or guiding principle that is adopted. The principle is too limited and when applied, it makes a mockery out of some areas of human existence. For example, Lucretius' materialism or atomism is true to some extent, but it makes a mockery out of mind and is inconsistent with freedom or denies it. Other limitations exist in other world-views. To put it positively, a world-view should be based on the best possible models, principles, or motifs. They should be set forth tentatively and not dogmatically.

F. Philosophy is Criticism

The idea of philosophy being "criticism" needs explanation. An understanding may be reached by looking at one of the philosophers who embodied this definition. Socrates is one of the earliest to engage in philosophic criticism. For Socrates, criticism referred to critical thinking involving a *dialectic* in the conversation. A dialectic, one must keep in mind, is a running debate with claims, counter-claims, qualifications, corrections, and compromises in the sincere hope of getting to understand a concept. This may be seen briefly in Plato's Republic (Bk. I). Socrates asked Cephalus what his greatest blessing of wealth had been. Cephalus replied that a sense of justice had come from it. Socrates then asked: what is justice? The conversation then involved

several people including Thrasymachus who claimed that justice was a mere ploy of the strong to keep the weak in line. Socrates rejected the tyrant-theory as irrational and the dialectic went on in pursuit of the question: what is justice?

Criticism is the attempt to clear away shabby thinking and establish concepts with greater precision and meaning. In this sense John Dewey noted that

philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in its generality; a criticism of criticism as it were. Criticism is discriminating judgement, careful appraisal, and judgement is appropriately termed criticism wherever the subject-matter of discrimination concerns goods or values.¹¹

Another example of criticism is the philosophic movement associated with the name of Edmund Husserl who is the father of phenomenology. Phenomenology is a method of criticism aiming to investigate the essence of anything. The essence of love, justice, courage, and any other idea may be dealt with critically, and a tentative conclusion reached. Such criticism is vital to philosophy as well as to other disciplines.

Criticism must not be confused with skepticism. Criticism is carried on for the pursuit of purer, or better knowledge. Sometimes skepticism may be viewed as a stepping stone to knowledge. Unfortunately, skepticism frequently degenerates to irresponsible negativism. When this happens, skepticism becomes a willful, self-serving game rather than the pursuit of knowledge.

Criticism as the activity of philosophy has been fairly popular in the contemporary scene. Robert Paul Wolff describes philosophy as the activity of careful reasoning with clarity and logical rigor controlling it. Such an activity has strong faith in the power of reason and it is an activity in which reason leads to truth.¹²

Similarly, Scherer, Facione, Attig, and Miller, in their Introduction to Philosophy, describe philosophy as beginning with an attitude of wonder. Philosophical wonder "leads to serious reflection on the more fundamental or more general questions that emerge in a variety of particular cases."¹³ This sense of wonder leads to activities in which one raises questions concerning the meaning of terms, the attempt to think things through systematically, and comprehensively, to have good reasoning in the thought process, and then evaluate various options.

Joseph Margolis suggests that doing philosophy is an art and philosophers pursue their creative work in different ways. Studying master minds of the past is done for the purpose of analyzing the ways they sought to deal with philosophical problems. Consequently, there is no prevailing way of working, to which professionals everywhere are more or less committed.¹⁴

Milton K. Munitz suggests that "philosophy is a quest for a view of the world and of man's place in it, which is arrived at and supported in a critical and logical way."¹⁵

A final example of this definition is found in the following:

. . . philosophy is a radical critical inquiry into the fundamental assumptions of any field of inquiry, including itself. We are not only able to have a philosophy of religion, but also a philosophy of education, a philosophy of art (aesthetics), of psychology, of mathematics, of language, and so forth. We can also apply the critical focus of philosophy to any human concern. There can be a philosophy of power, of sexuality, freedom, community, revolution--even a philosophy of sports. Finally, philosophy can reflect upon itself; that is, we can do a philosophy of philosophy. Philosophy can, then, examine its own presuppositions, its own commitments.¹⁶

Criticism as a definition of philosophy also may be criticized. Philosophy must be critical, but it seems to turn philosophy into a method of going about thinking rather than the content of the subject. Criticism will help one acquire a philosophy of life, but criticism is not the philosophy itself. Generally, when one asks about philosophy the intention relates to a subject matter rather than a method of approach. This would make it possible for all critical thinkers in any critical topic to regard themselves as doing philosophy.

Part II. Concluding Observations

The thoughtful reader has now probably come to the conclusion: a definition of philosophy is impossible. Another may say: why can't all of these be used for a definition? The idea of pooling the best element of each definition--known as eclecticism--has a certain appeal to the novice, but not much appeal to the philosophers. There is, however, some truth in an eclectic approach to defining philosophy. Philosophy would not be the same without criticism. No philosopher worth his salt would consider an important discussion without resorting to an analysis of the language. Neither is it strange to see a philosopher attempting to put his beliefs in practice either in the classroom or outside of it. What philosopher does not feel good with a few converts to his platform? Even though a world-view definition has been rejected by some philosophers, still others seek to understand the whole of the universe.

Part III. Divisions of Philosophy

Philosophy covers many subjects and emphases. The following divisions are important in an over-view of the subject of philosophy.

A. *Epistemology*. Epistemology is a Greek word translated as the theory of knowledge. Epistemology is a foundational area for other areas of philosophy. Epistemology involves three main areas: (1) the source or ways to knowledge. How do we know what we claim to know? How do we know certain kinds of things? (2) The nature of knowledge. What do we mean when we say we know something? If I declare I know a pin oak tree, do I know this directly or indirectly? (3) The validity of knowledge. In this the matter of truth or falsity is considered. How do I claim to know that something is true? Why is one statement regarded as true or false? These three issues will be considered in the next four chapters.

B. *Metaphysics*. Metaphysics is another Greek word which refers to the attempt to describe the nature of reality. It involves many questions such as the nature and makeup of the universe, whether the world is purposive or not, whether man is free, whether the world is eternal or created, and many other issues. We will look at some of these matters in chapters 6-8. Other metaphysical problems will be expressed in chapters on the various types of philosophies (chapters 9-15).

C. *Logic*. Logic is a term used to describe the various types of reasoning structures, the relationship of ideas, deduction and inference, and in modern times, symbolic logic which becomes quite mathematical. Logic is too technical to consider in the confines of a general introduction to philosophy. There are many excellent texts that may be consulted for a general look at logic.

D. *Axiology*. *Axios*, the Greek word of worth, is related to two different areas of worth. There is, first, moral worth, or ethics. Ethics is a discipline concerning human moral behavior and raises the questions of right or wrong. Ethics has generally been the science or discipline of what human behavior ought to be in contrast to a discipline like sociology which is the study of what human behavior is. The second area, aesthetics, is concerned with the beautiful. What is a beautiful work of art? music? sculpture? What makes a beautiful woman? a handsome man? an ugly one? Aesthetics seeks to give some answers to these questions. Ethics will be treated in chapter 16. The general area of values will also be treated in part in chapters 9-15.

E. "*Philosophies of*". Another category of philosophy is called "philosophies of" because of the term being related to various other subjects or disciplines. For example:

- philosophy of art
- philosophy of biology
- philosophy of history
- philosophy of law
- philosophy of philosophy
- philosophy of physics
- philosophy of the natural sciences
- philosophy of religion
- philosophy of sociology
- philosophy of science

The "philosophy of" is basically the application of metaphysical and epistemological questions to a certain subject area. It is concerned with the basic structures of the discipline and the presuppositions needed for the study. If the philosophy of a discipline is changed, it changes the outcome of the discipline. As an example, how should one write history? If it is written around the theme of conflict, one gets a certain emphasis; if it is written around a "great man" theme, it will give a different emphasis and interpretation. If history is written from a Marxist view it will come out differently than from a capitalist view. Look at science as another example. Biological science is today based on the idea of uniformitarianism--the idea that change has been slow and gradual in nature. Science used to have catastrophism as its basic philosophy. Catastrophism means that

changes in nature came abruptly and are related to Creation and a massive flood. Uniformitarianism leads to the conclusion that the cosmos is very old. Catastrophism can lead to the conclusion that the world is very young. The point is this: if you change the philosophy or structure of a discipline you can change the outcome, but in both cases you use the same facts.

These two examples, history and biology, indicate the importance of the philosophy behind the discipline. One may well ask the question: how should one do psychology or sociology? These are consequential questions for any study. If the student knows the philosophy of the discipline, i.e., how it works, its method and presuppositions, he is in a better position to evaluate and criticize the discipline. It is obvious that the "philosophies of" each discipline are too technical for inclusion in a general introduction. However, there will be some involvement of these ideas in chapter five, Knowledge and Method in Science, Philosophy, and Religion.

We have now dealt with six proposed definitions along with some assessments of them. Moreover, we have taken a brief look at the sub-divisions of philosophy. We can now turn to the first issue in epistemology.

Footnotes

¹Trans. H.D.P. Lee, Timaeus, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965, p. 64.

²Ibid., p. 121.

³Herbert Marcuse, "The Relevance of Reality," in The Owl of Minerva, edited by Charles J. Bontempt, and S. Jack Odell, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975.

⁴Alan Watts, "Philosophy Beyond Words," in The Owl of Minerva, p. 197.

⁵See Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility, trans. by John Viertel, New York: Pantheon Books, 1979.

⁶Some Problems of Philosophy, New York: Longman, Green, and Co., 1911, p. 5.

⁷Lucretius, The Nature of the Universe, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1951.

⁸Cf. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, New York: Harper Torchbook, 1967.

⁹Cf. New York: Dover Publications, 1966, 2 vol.

¹⁰Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003a 18-25.

¹¹John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 398.

¹²Introductory Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979.

¹³Donald Sherer, Peter A. Facione, Thomas Attig, and Fred D. Miller, Introduction to Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979, p. 8.

¹⁴Joseph Margolis, An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, p. 8.

¹⁵The Ways of Philosophy, New York: MacMillan, 1979, p. 10.

¹⁶Paula Struhl and Karsten Struhl, Philosophy Now, New York: Random House, 1972, p. 5.

Chapter II

How Do We Know?

In one of Plato's dialogues, Socrates asks Theaetetus, a budding mathematician, "What is knowledge?" That is an enormously difficult question. The answer of Theaetetus swings in the direction of bits of knowledge, such as a cobbler or a carpenter might have in his trade. However, Socrates rejects this approach. He declares that he wants to know what knowledge is *per se*, not kinds of knowledge possible. Following Socrates' example, what does it mean when a child eagerly lifts his hand in the classroom and repeats persuasively to the teacher: "I know, I know!"? Or what is meant in the statement of a financial columnist who writes that the Dow Jones standard of the market will plunge to 500, if inflation is not controlled. In what sense does he mean "I know this will be the case?"

Before turning to how we know, and other questions, it must be emphasized that epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is fundamental to any learning. If wrong or inadequate conclusions are reached concerning the meaning of knowledge, this will affect all the rest of one's philosophy as well as other areas of knowledge. If one opts for the position that one can "know" only that presented to the senses, then any supposed knowledge that is not gained through the senses become no-knowledge, or refers to nothing. This limitation would wipe out the knowledge that scientists accept concerning the atom and sub-atomic particles, or the knowledge that the theologian accepts concerning God. Thus the theory of knowledge that one accepts will determine the kinds of knowledge that are possible or not possible. Now to the first important question.

I. What is Knowledge?

There are several proposed answers to this question. They look good on the surface, but some of them have serious problems. We will look at them with the final proposal being the one advocated by the author.

A. *Opinion plus evidence equals knowledge.*

It is argued that an opinion based on evidence is equivalent to knowledge. Before the 1972 election many pollsters believe that Nixon would win the election in November. The evidence seemed adequate. On the basis of this proposed definition that would be called knowledge. But is it? Before the election takes place, there can be no knowledge of the election results. Only after the event can one speak of a fact of knowledge. One may feel that one is sure about the outcome, but that is all. Moreover, when we speak of knowledge in a popular sense, we are speaking of more than opinion only.

B. *Opinion plus probability equals knowledge.*

This proposed definition of knowledge is not as good as the first one since we are talking here of a future that is remotely related to the present. It is a future related to present achievements, rather than a polling of people's intentions expressed to pollsters. Take a look at a question like this: will there be brain transplants by the year 2030? If we view the present status of transplants and evaluate our success in hearts, lungs, kidneys and other parts of the body, we may reason on the probable success in the future of brain transplants.

This proposal has the same problem as the first. Basically there is no knowledge until something has happened to be known. Philosophers are generally skeptical about humans who claim to know the future. Even prophets have had a difficult time getting non-philosophers to listen to them.

C. Observation equals knowledge.

Observation has been so useful in the scientific arena to the extent that it has been said that when one observes, one knows. But observing something may be meaningless. There are two kinds of observation: interpreted and non-interpreted. The story of Robinson Crusoe has been used to indicate this difference.¹ Robinson Crusoe was cast upon an island after a shipwreck and eventually found another man whom he named Friday. Friday was a native and did not have the educated background that Crusoe had. One morning a ship appeared. Both Crusoe and Friday saw the vessel. Being younger, Friday probably had better vision and could see the vessel better than Crusoe in one sense (non-interpretative) but in another sense it could be said that Friday didn't really see the ship at all (interpretative). He saw something but did not know what it was. Crusoe didn't see as well (presumably) but he did see a ship and knew what it was. Friday observed but did not have knowledge, whereas Crusoe observed and did have knowledge. The difference is the two observers depended upon judgment, or past experience, or perhaps something else. But whatever the difference in the knowing of the two men, it did not depend upon the observation. Knowledge appears to be more than opening the eyes to see an object.

D. Knowledge equals opinions that one has a duty to accept.

It is argued that truth has its own attraction and must be accepted or believed or acted upon. There is a certain attraction about saying that knowledge is related to duty. One may have the duty to believe that his family is honest and faithful. But this duty of believing may be in contrast to the actual fact, i.e., they are really dishonest and unfaithful. One may counter that he can believe that his family is honest and that this belief is "knowledge" to the believing person in a subjective way. But it is not the kind of knowledge that everyone can know. In fact their knowledge is contrary to the family member's subjective knowledge. Knowledge, to be knowledge, must be open to all.

E. Knowledge is equated with the right to be sure.

If I predict the stock market is going up daily for the next three weeks and it does, then I am right and this may be equated with knowledge. But could a man do this without knowing why he is right? It appears so. Moreover, being sure may mean only that one is prepared to stand by one's

claim to knowledge. At the same time standing firm in support of one's claim is not the same as knowledge since one can witness considerable certainty on the part of other religious or political parties of the opposite views. Then again, is it possible for people to know something without being aware that they know, or why they know. Knowledge seems to imply that one knows and knows the reason why.

F. Opinion requires no plus to be knowledge.

We have pursued the definition so far on the idea that opinion is related to something--polls, probability, observation, etc. Some have suggested that defining knowledge is meaningless. When we say that we know something, all that we are really doing is to give our word on something. This means that knowing is really nothing more than one's authority that a statement is true. Nothing more is needed. But if we stop to question this view, our first question will be: "How do you know?" Why do we question? We want more than an opinion posing as knowledge.

G. A better definition.

So far we have rejected certain proposals as inadequate. It is now time to put together the best definition we can. To know means that a person accepts a true proposition to be right or correct for "the best of reasons."² The "best of reasons" will come below, but a few negations are attached to the definition. "The man who knows must not be guessing, he must not hit on the truth by chance, he must not rely on bad reasons if he relied on reasons at all."³ The definition also includes awareness or consciousness of the true belief. Knowledge implies that one knows that one knows. The "best of reasons" do not have to be one's own, but be at the basis of the claim. A reasonable proposition is one that claims our support over against withholding support or affirmation.

Knowing involves two different kinds of experiences: (1) direct experience, sometimes called the directly evident, and (2) reason processes, sometimes called the indirectly evident. The first kind of experience, the directly evident, is seen in the experience of seeing a pin oak tree. I see a tree outside of my window and I call it a pin oak. At one time someone told me it was a pin oak and every tree like it that I see I call a pin oak. The directly evident stops there. When I see it my experience leads me to say that it is a pin oak. We duplicate this experience with colors that we have learned, smells, tastes and like categories. Now if you asked: "How do you know that it is a pin oak?" I would have one of two responses ready: (1) I could say, "I know that it is. Take my word and experience for it." You might not be happy with this, and proceed to ask: "Again, I say, how do you know?" At this point I would switch to rational processes, or the indirectly evident. This means that certain questions may be asked about a knowing situation that will lend evidence for the truthfulness of one's perceptions. Three points can be made concerning the rational processes: (1) its reasonableness. My comment may be questioned for its reasonableness. Declaring that one sees an oak tree is more reasonable for Kansas than in saying one sees a balsa tree. Saying, "I see a thief" is not as reasonable or meaningful as "I see a man who is known or thought to be a thief, or who has been convicted as a thief." (2) Concurrence. Reasonable statements that are concurrent or in harmony with one another are better evidence than those that are not. "I see a pin oak" stands more sure with "there are acorns under the tree" and "the squirrels and

blue jays are eating acorns in that tree." Multiple statements of fact lend greater credence to a perception. (3) Scrutiny. Reasonable statements must survive close scrutiny and critique. To say that I see a pin oak is based on a clear perception on a clear day, granting good eye sight, and a close enough distance to really see the tree, as well as some direct acquaintance of what a pin oak is.

Given these conditions and requirements, the indirectly evident gives some basis of claiming the directly evident to be knowledge.

II. Is Knowledge Possible?

Our search for a definition of knowledge implies that knowledge is possible. However, there have been and are philosophers who have believed that knowledge is not possible. The serious kind of skeptic is that reflected in the ancient Greeks who doubted the possibility of real knowledge. They chose rather to live simply in terms of appearances rather than being tormented with the frustration of trying to figure out the nature of the real world. One of the most extreme was Gorgias (483-376 B.C.) who is said to have claimed that nothing exists, and even if it did we could not know it. Even if we knew it, it could not be communicated to others. Perhaps the most disturbing part of Gorgias comment was that of communication. The skeptic does communicate his skepticism and wishes it to be accepted as a form of knowledge.

Generally skepticism is not as extreme as Gorgias. Pascal once wrote, "I lay it down as a fact that there never has been a complete skeptic. Nature sustains our feeble reason and prevents it raving to this extent."⁴ In actuality skepticism is one of degrees and about certain alleged facts. One may be skeptical about a political party, investing in commodities, or entering business. In other ways one is not skeptical. One must live, eat, sleep, work, have friends, etc. Often skepticism has been focused on metaphysical issues like whether God exists, or if man has life after death, and related questions.

In another sense skepticism is a healthy attitude to take toward the learning process. Descartes is famous for his stance of doubting everything possible with the purpose of trying to build a firm foundation for knowledge. Normally, when skepticism is used, it is not intended to convey Descartes' sense, but the idea that no knowledge is possible. One of the real problems with skepticism centers on the comment of Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard said that the Greeks willed to be skeptics. If this be so, skepticism is a style of life rather than an issue of knowledge or no knowledge. One becomes a skeptic by an act of will. One can remove oneself from being a skeptic by a similar act of will.

The issue of skepticism begins with an either/or dilemma. Either one opts for absolute certainty in knowledge or one is left with absolute skepticism. Neither of these extremes is viable as Pascal observed. In the middle is a great amount of knowledge that has high probability that occasionally may demand revising or improving. But in any event, we must not be trapped into the either/or game.

Arguments.

What are the arguments for skepticism? Some arguments will be sketched below. Along with the arguments will be given criticisms or assessments.

The first argument is based on the unreliability of the senses. The eyes perceive the merging railroad tracks in the distance, or the mirage of the water on the road. The sense of taste is confused when sweet and sour foods are mixed, etc. Other senses are misled also. When can you ever trust the senses? If they err in these, they probably err in most other experiences. Hence one should adopt skepticism.

In reply, how do we know that the senses err? By means of the senses and reason. We know that the railroad tracks do not come together down the way, by experience of riding the train or by reason. An oar looks bent in the water, but we can follow the oar with our hands and discern by the sense of touch that it is not bent. But even knowing that the senses err occasionally, under certain circumstances, is a knowledge that is important, and is knowledge to be maintained.

Both skeptics and philosophers who are not skeptics often denigrate the senses when what is needed is a better description or report of the sense experience. One example of this concerns the star Sirius. It is said that the light that I experience began so long ago to come to us, that it is possible that Sirius has burned out, exploded, or now no longer exists. Hence, I now see what no longer exists and this is absurd. Hence, one should be a skeptic. In contrast, no problem would arise if a precise statement were made to the effect that what I now see is a light that began years ago from a star that now may not exist. But at the moment I do see something that is meaningful for my experience. Moreover, there are many hidden facts of knowledge supposed in the attempt to prove my senses unreliable. One knows the speed of light, the distance of the star Sirius, what a star is, etc. The attempt to refute the sense experience requires a base from which to operate and this simply means a certain amount of knowledge presupposed in the base.

A second line of argument questions any norm of knowledge. Knowledge is called into question because there are diverse opinions, opposite cultural standards, customs, patterns, and we are left with only cultural traditions. This is pertinent to older studies of anthropology when it came to moral and ethical issues. Few skeptics would go as far as Gorgias to say that knowledge is not possible, for this is self-refuting. It is refuted by asking if the position can be defended. If it can be, knowledge is affirmed, and if it cannot be, then the position is senseless.

A third variation is that based on the history of ideas. A look at the history of ideas shows that great diversity has existed. In philosophy the extremes of naturalism and idealism have existed side by side. These extremes in the modern setting are complicated by still other competing philosophies. Who is to say which is right? How can one conclude that knowledge is possible with any degree of certainty?

In reply, the argument supposes absolute differences between philosophies as opposed to relative differences. This means that idealism and naturalism, as diverse as they are, admit many things in common. They both affirm an existent world, mind, man, and many other entities. They

differ on the starting point of whether mind or matter is more basic. But they have many common suppositions that they affirm. As long as any appeal to history is made by skepticism, one must not overlook the fact that much has been solved in knowledge problems. While there may be many things yet undecided and uncertain, we have gained knowledge through the centuries. There is no reason to reject the possibility of future knowledge either. We must not conclude either that because we do not know specific answers at the moment to some problems that the future cannot produce these answers.

A last source of skepticism is the charge that we are prisoners of the present and cannot depend upon memory for the past or in any way anticipate the future. The memory is so unpredictable and undependable, it is argued, that we cannot know the past. History is unreliable. Only the present counts. It is true that the memory is unreliable in many ways. This is vivid in people suffering from hardening of the arteries and related disorders that affect the brain. The memory has a high possibility of being unreliable. What about memory in healthy people? If we were left to a single individual memory the argument would be more convincing. But there are collective memories of many people. Significant numbers of people remember various responses to the common event of Pearl Harbor in 1941. This can be recounted by friend and foe alike, and the practical results of a 4 year war can hardly be written off as a nightmare without reasonable remembrance. Other items of memory may not have the same degree of probability for accuracy, but neither may they be unimportant or have the result of nullifying a reasonable trust in the memory.

In concluding this section, we can say that there are some things we cannot doubt. There are others in which we must weigh the probabilities and act appropriately. In the ordinary sense of the situation we can conclude that skepticism does not have the conclusive result against knowledge that has been supposed. We have concluded in the first section that we know something when we have the best reasons for it. We are now turning to the sources of knowledge or ways to knowledge.

Part III. The Ways to Knowledge

There are many diverse bits of knowledge that we claim to know. We claim to know the tangible--a tree, cat, chair, house--but we also claim to know the intangibles ranging from number, concepts like justice and love, to persons and even a super-person, God. How do we acquire such knowledge.

The answer is found in the ways to knowledge. There is something of a tradition in philosophy that the sources of knowledge, or ways to knowledge are composed of reason, or rationalism, perception or empiricism, and perhaps intuition, or some variation. At first glance it appears that the senses are the most valuable source of knowledge. Most of what we claim to know has come through the senses. A knowledgeable man without some sense avenue to the brain is unthinkable. Yet not all knowledge is reducible to mere sense perception. This means that knowing a tree is more complicated than merely opening the eyes to see. I have to learn by some means as a child that the thing I see is called a tree. I do not get this information from the tree, or from my mind alone. Even though I receive the word from my parents that the tree is a tree, my mind is

vitaly involved in making that judgment about other trees. Hence the senses are extremely important for the knowing experience, but this is not the same thing as saying, as it has been done, "If I don't either see, feel, touch, taste, or smell it, it doesn't exist." Before we can talk about that extreme position, some word must be said about the knowledge we have from our youth up to a mature thinker. That involves the first source of knowledge.

A. *The Way of Testimony*

In his classic book, William P. Montague wrote,

We get more of our beliefs from the testimony of our fellows than from any other source. Little of our knowledge of the universe is directly tested by our own intuition, reason, experience, or practice.⁵

To survive in his society, man must acquire knowledge. Much of this so-called knowledge comes from the home environment and may be a mixture of truth and folklore. Nevertheless, children accept the beliefs of their fellows to varying degrees. At first this information stands on an authoritarian basis--it is accepted because punishment may be swift if it is not. The child may learn that spinach is good to eat because a spanking backs up the statement. Soon the child encounters other authoritarians. What happens? At a young age the parents may remain the influence, but as the early years of school make inroads on parental influence, then the teacher comes on strong as the source of knowledge. Somewhere the child assesses the qualifications of the teacher over against that of his parents, the relative intelligence of parent versus teacher, peer influence, and given other influences the influence of the parent's word may dwindle somewhat. As the child begins to question more, authoritarianism reaches a crisis.

It is at this point that we need to distinguish between authoritarianism and authority. Authoritarianism is a substitute for thinking. It involves the unquestioning acceptance of someone, or some institution, in certain matters of knowledge. Authoritarianism is bad. Authority is good. An authority invites questioning, but authoritarianism does not.

Unfortunately the use of authoritarianism does not cease with maturing youth. Some marks of authoritarianism can be seen in the following ways: (1) The attempt to transfer influence of authority in one field into another unrelated field. The letterhead stationery of many organizations indicates this. Many people assume that a physician running for public office would make a good statesman, but competency as a doctor does not mean competency as a politician. (2) The appeal to the truth of numbers is another use of authoritarianism. The old saying that "Forty million Frenchmen cannot be wrong" is an example of it. But forty million Frenchmen can be wrong. It was once believed widely that the world was flat and people were compelled to believe it to the point of death. But neither statistical count or compulsion made it so. (3) Longevity is used to support authoritarianism. Presumably long life implies wisdom and success for an idea. Long survival of an idea is often equated with truth. But longevity *per se* means nothing. A lot of false ideas have also had a long history. There is little good to say about authoritarianism.

Authority, or testimony, however, in contrast to authoritarianism, remains an important way to certain kinds of knowledge. How can the student know that Caesar crossed the Rubicon when he has not the slightest chance of meeting Caesar to find out? Current history books fare no better in the game since none of the authors are any closer to Caesar. But history is supposed to be based upon primary sources, or records written by eyewitnesses at best, or those very close to eyewitnesses. These records may eventually be affirmed with related artifacts, like coins, archive documents, and other archaeological finds. So when we speak of an authority speaking, orally or written, we presume someone who was there, who was involved intimately in the action, work, or event, and who can give a first-hand account. Anything less is hearsay or gossip. But we are dependent upon historical probability for much of our past knowledge. There is no way we can get to the past to confirm it. Our use of authorities in this context--in contrast to authoritarianism--is restricted to eyewitnesses and personal testimony.

The appeal to testimony or authority concerning the past is different than the appeal to authority concerning the present. If I told you that Oklahoma City is the largest geographical city in the world, you could merely take my word for it. If you rejected my word, you could consult a chamber of commerce claim, but if you rejected this as well as a map encyclopedia, then you could take a trip to Oklahoma to find the truth for yourself. There are many things we can confirm ourselves, but frequently we have no need to go beyond the assertion of personal testimony or authority. But if we needed personal confirmation of these items we find comfort in being able to do it.

There is another word about authority. We accept much on authority. This is true in science as well as in any other field. A student must submit himself to the authority of the scientific community. He takes the professor's word that all that has come to him from the past is true. The student had neither time, equipment or the ability to check it all for himself. This is true for any descriptive discipline. Only by accepting this authority, or testimony can one make progress in the discipline. Eventually the learner becomes a master himself, but he still accepts the authority of other scientists at face value.

B. *The Way of the Senses*

Knowledge has always been dependent upon the senses. While this has been basic to knowledge and existence, philosophy has been rationally oriented. This means that truth comes through reason. Rationalism was a dominant influence until the rise of the British empirical movement beginning with John Locke (1632-1704), when knowledge became one-sidedly sense oriented. Empiricism is the idea that "all knowledge of a substantial kind about the world is derived from experience."⁶ Locke is the father of the empirical tradition. His idea of experience generally meant that knowledge comes through the avenue of the senses. Note his famous statement:

Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word: EXPERIENCE.

All our knowledge is founded in experience, and from experience it ultimately derives itself.⁷

Empiricism began as a philosophy of sense. It has sometimes been called sensation-ism. There is no doubt that the senses are extremely important for man's knowledge. That is so obvious that no explanation is needed. What needs discussion are the restrictions placed around empiricism. With the growing influence of science, empiricism came to refer not only to observing but verifying. If you can verify your claim, your observation, then you can claim certainty of knowledge. If you cannot, then no claim is attached to your statement.

Such a restriction or limitation requires some assessment of the idea of verification. First, how can one verify a principle of verification? While verification may sound impressive, there is quite a bit of subjectivity in the idea. For example, when is something verified? In whose eyes must it be? Marxists are committed to scientific methods, but are forbidden to accept certain views in science, i.e., the second law of thermodynamics, because of political requirements. What would it take to verify that law for a Marxist?

A second problem with verification is the fact that we claim to know much that is mentally or rationally oriented. That type of knowledge is not a product of the senses *per se*. To declare that 7 plus 5 equals 12 may have been learned in school *via* the eyes and ears, but we have not seen entities named 7 plus 5 equals 12. These are concepts born of the mind, not the world outside of the mind. One may see seven apples and five apples, but the concepts of seven and five are only means of organizing the apples in groups. These are truths of logic, not the senses.

There are other important facts or experiences that we claim to know that are not empirically verifiable. The consciousness of man, or the internal experience of consciousness cannot be verified in the empirical sense. Yet consciousness is vital to an understanding of man. On another level, the senses alone are helpless to distinguish between the real and the imaginary. The senses may be complemented or supplemented by judgment borne of reason. Then we can make progress in distinguishing between the real and imaginary, dreaming and awakesness.

The question is not whether or not we learn through the senses, but do we learn only through the sense? Must we cast aside as nonsense all the beliefs that cannot be verified scientifically? Many of us would say no!

Michael Polanyi admits the important role of verification and its usefulness, but notes two points: First, some things have been verified according to the rules, and yet have been declared false later. Second, he noted,

The method of disbelieving every proposition which cannot be verified by definitely prescribed operations would destroy all belief in natural science. And it would destroy belief in truth and in the love of truth itself which is the condition of all free thought. The method leads to complete metaphysical nihilism and thus denies the basis for any universally significant manifestation of the human mind.⁸

Polanyi's thrust is two-fold: (1) Scientists have to trust the work of other scientists and one cannot begin anew in each generation to test all the accepted truths of the previous generation. Doing this would require one to spend a life-time verifying and no productive work could be achieved. (2) The idea of verification cannot be applied to the idea of truth itself and the love of truth. But these intangibles are important and without the standard of truth, science would languish.

Another issue of conflict, between strict empiricism and those who appeal to reason and other ways of knowing, concerns the nature of universals. A universal is a concept, principle or law, that is used to describe individual things. The concept of chair is applicable to many kinds of chairs. We never see the concept of chair, or chairness, but we do see individual chairs that vary in so many ways. The law of gravity would be a universal relating to a scientific description. But no one has ever seen the law of gravity. All that has been seen are falling objects. The law is an inference based upon particular events. If strict empiricism is to be held, then all that we can see is when a particular apple falls from the branch to the ground. Without reason, we cannot move from the falling apple to the unseen law of gravity which is a generalization, or a universal. But without these important laws we could hardly carry on the discipline of any science.

While too much has been claimed for empiricism, and many criticisms have been raised against it, we must not overlook its importance. The loss of one sense, sight, removes vast possibilities from meaningful experience and this would be true for any of the senses. Any theory of knowledge must have a healthy regard for the senses as a way of knowledge. In spite of the fact that we may only "see" what we are trained to see leading to the subjectivity of the senses, we must seek to transcend our training and accept a new objectivism in assessing our world and us.

C. The Way of Reason

One of the famous dictums from the history of philosophy is Aristotle's statement that man is a rational animal. Man reasons. Just what does this mean? It means that man has conceptual power of thought and through its use he can attain knowledge and truth. Reason may be contrasted to sense perception which is limited to observing a particular object, event, or act. Reason can generalize on these particulars, such as an apple falling to the ground, to the conclusion of an abstract, unseen law or universal, i.e., the law of gravity. Moreover, reason frequently is contrasted with impulsive living which means that one acts without reflection on the basis of whim. If reason is admitted to, then one can observe the possible outcome of impulsive acts and refrain from them. The view of man held by Plato and Aristotle was that reason was to dominate the appetitive and emotive elements of man's existence.

Philosophy has often made strong appeals to reason. One of the frequently quoted names in philosophy is that of Descartes, who said, "Cogito, ergo, sum." "I think, therefore, I am." Descartes hoped to establish a firm foundation for science and the model of certainty for him was mathematics. Mathematics owes nothing to perception and it served as a model of scientific endeavor for many philosophers. Yet the relative success of Descartes is still debated by philosophers and scientists.⁹

What kind of knowledge can reason give us? This cannot be answered without acknowledging that almost everything that we will set forth may be debatable to some philosophers.

First, it has been claimed that reason can give *a priori* truths, or truths that come from reason only without an appeal to experience or perception. *A priori* is a Latin phrase referring to first truths, or truths that are obvious upon their examination. This includes mathematical truths (5 plus 6 equals 11), and certain other statements that have the characteristic of necessity about them. One such example of necessity is the sentence, "Being red excludes being blue."

Another kind of statement that involves the use of reason without regard to an appeal to the senses is the analytic statement. Analytic statements are those in which the predicate is contained in the subject, i.e., white swans are white, all bachelors are male, etc. These kinds of statements relate to certain rules of logic: the law of identity which is frequently illustrated by A is A (or a cow is a cow, but not grass is green.), the law of excluded middle (either A or not A, either I am rich, or I am not rich) in which there is no middle position, but an either/or situation, and the law of contradiction (not both A and not A, or a man cannot be both in New York and not in New York at the same time).

Two questions arise in connection with the "truths of reason." It is argued that these tell nothing about reality, but are only definitions. I may define all giants as being tall, but know nothing about whether there are any giants at all. Likewise, I may know that 2 plus 2 equals 4, but are there four any things in the world? Reason alone can give few truths. Reason needs perception to know the world outside the mind. Likewise, perception needs reason to understand the world it perceives.

The second question concerns whether *a priori* statements or truths are anything more than psychologisms. This means that the mind of man is constituted so that all men think this way and this has nothing to help us to determine whether this is true thinking. If you could change the mind-set you would change the truth basis. In defense of *a priori* truths it is argued that psychologism would be at the mercy of any stubborn individual who concluded that 2 plus 2 equals 7. *A priority* is defended upon the basis of the necessity of truth. Regardless of what reason may be given for rejecting 2 plus 2 equals 4, it is commonly regarded as a necessarily logical truth.

Before concluding, we need to remind ourselves that we are treating these ways as separate and isolated ways, which they are not psychologically. We are not restricted merely to reason without the senses or the senses without reason. Our experience of knowing combines the two. In trying to thread a needle one may see the thread, the eye of the needle, and then make a judgment that that particular piece of thread will not go through the needle's eye. Much knowledge is found through the combined ways.

Reason does, in conclusion, have its limitations. It needs the help of experience or the senses in many ways. Moreover, reason can be distorted by prejudices, greed, passion, and imagination. Against these common enemies of man, reason has always had a struggle.

D. *The Way of Phenomenology*

What is this strange word? It refers to an emphasis in philosophy inaugurated by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). One may recognize some kinship to philosophers of the past such as Plato, Descartes, and Kant, but the emphasis owes its greatest impetus to Husserl and those influenced by him.

Phenomenology is a process of critical thinking about anything. It may be described as critical analysis, or a free descriptive approach to any subject. The aim of such a process of thinking is to get to a full understanding of the topic in all its essences, or its nature. Think about the example of love. In practicing phenomenology one seeks to get to the root issue of the meaning of love or charity and describe it in its essence. (That would be true for any other subject.) If one pursued this topic one might ask: how can I discover the characteristics of love? Must it be given up as indescribable? As non-existence because it is not seen? Does love apply to friends? Enemies? Can you love the one you hate? Can you command another to love? Is there a difference between liking and loving someone? What kind of love can be commanded? Are sex and love synonymous? Can love exist without sex? Sex without love? Are there different kinds of love?

One may find a remarkable example of phenomenology at work in the description of love in the work of C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves.¹⁰ Lewis speaks first of Need-love which brings a frightened child to its mother, and gift-love which moves a man to work, sacrifice, and plan for the future of his family that he may not see. Affection is the humblest of loves in which there is love between parent and child, a mother cat and kittens, and similar relationships. Affection goes beyond the parent to people, and objects, i.e., my books. Affection involves the familiar, modesty, being not overly discriminating, and not expecting too much.

The second love, friendship, is the least natural of loves, "the least instinctive, organic, biological, gregarious and necessary."¹¹ Friendship involves companionship, a common idea or a common insight or interest (or burden). Friendship may die when one of the friends declares non-interest in the object, but only in friendship for itself. Friendship "has no survival value; rather it is one of those things which give value to survival."¹² A third form of love is *eros* which includes both sex and relationships transcending sexuality. *Eros* involves desiring a Beloved, not the pleasure she can give. *Eros* transcends mere sexuality to say something about a beloved, rather than a mere fact about ourselves.

The fourth love is charity. It is related to God as Love, the creator of love, who creates man for gift-love and need-love. "Divine Gift-love--Love Himself working in a man--is wholly disinterested and desires what is simply best for the beloved . . . Divine Gift-love in the man enables him to love what is not naturally lovable; lepers, criminals, enemies, morons, the sulky, the superior and the sneering. Finally, by a high paradox, God enables man to have a Gift-love toward Himself."¹³

These are sketchy summaries of Love's work, and meaning, but the reader can see that the essence of love, the meaning of love, is described in its many features. There may be other points omitted by Lewis that could be included in the study. But he has thought and come to an understanding of the essence of something.

If the reader has understood the idea of trying to find the basic understanding of any topic, we can now look at Husserl's terminology which is fairly abstract. He wrote that phenomenology was a "science of essential Being . . . a science which aims exclusively at establishing "knowledge of essence" and absolutely no "fact."¹⁴ (This science is called an "eidetic" science which means general or universal.)

The science of the essence is in contrast, therefore, to the science that deals with facts. The contrast between facts and essences can be seen in the two columns below:

| Facts are: | Essences are: |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. individual | 1. universal |
| 2. contingent | 2. necessary |
| 3. spatio-temporal | 3. non-spatio-temporal |
| 4. psychologically perceived | 4. phenomenologically known |

The contrast between fact and essence is so great that Husserl asserted that "pure essential truths do not make the slightest assertion concerning facts."¹⁵ Thus the essence of something can be discussed apart from whether it exists or not. This possibility is seen in the example of inventions. Inventions have a mental existence (or a phenomenological basis) before they are created and exist as things. The inventor has a consciousness of a non-existing thing, or idea, and as he studies the idea, he works toward a description of its essence. Eventually, the idea may have a spatio-temporal form, but it is not necessary that it be.

We have defined phenomenology as a science of essences, or a process of thinking. A popularizer of Husserl, Richard Zaner, defines phenomenology as a method of philosophical criticism. As such it seeks to discover the presuppositions of knowledge in any field of study, and takes nothing for granted in beginning that study. This taking-nothing-for-granted is important. Zaner wrote:

The task of phenomenology, then, is the reflective-descriptive explication, analysis, and assessment of the life of consciousness, and of man, generally.¹⁶

How does one go about this reflective-descriptive-analytic method? It is achieved by "bracketing" or disconnecting one's thought from the world of existence. This bracketing is also called the *epoche*, a Greek word which means a certain refraining from judgment. The *epoche*, or refraining from judgment, is applied to the world in general and science in particular. The *epoche* means that one makes no "judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence."¹⁷ The world is still in

existence but one must remove, or bar all judgments of it and about it. In a sense this means to be aware of and remove all pre-judgments about the world.

When one brackets the world and all interpretations about it, one is brought to the remaining thing that can't be bracketed--one's consciousness. The *epoche*, in practice removes all judgments--cultural, religious, political, or any other, from our considerations, and one begins with a description of what is brought to mind.

As a simple example of the *epoche*, the "stepping back from" a subject, or the "removing-all-familiarity," from a subject, try this experiment. As you go home or go over a familiar pathway, go with the idea that you have never been that way before. As you walk down your street think of the way you saw it the first time there. Mentally recapture that attitude. The sense of dis-engagement will enable you to see things you don't notice anymore. From the point of dis-engagement, one may see the need of a paint job on a house, the height of children over what they were weeks before, the ugly spot in the corner of a yard, the flowers bursting open, etc. You can assume this dis-engaged stance and go on to describe the scene as though one were a stranger on the scene. To assume this dis-engaged stance is the meaning of the *epoche*. This dis-engagement must be sustained deliberately and systematically while critically exploring in detail and depth what is discovered in the experience. However, it must be remembered that the *epoche* is related to the essences rather than the simple experience given above.

Concerning the idea of the *epoche*, Zaner wrote:

The requirements for developing a pure critical theory of consciousness are, then, before us: I must reflect on my own consciousness, systematically disengage and remain neutral toward all prior knowledge of whatever kind, adopt a critical attitude, and engage in careful imaginative variations.¹⁸

Zaner's comments may be illustrated in a paragraph drawn from Martin Heidegger. The summary paragraph below is how Heidegger describes fear. The imaginative variations can be seen as Heidegger develops his views on the essence of fear. Fear involves

(1) "that in which we fear," characterized by threatening, detrimentality coming from a definite region, which has something 'queer' about it," a drawing close of the detrimentality to ourselves. (2) fearing as such, meaning "what we have thus characterized as threatening is freed and allowed to matter to us," (3) "that which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid--Dasein." This includes fear as a mode of state-of-mind, fearing about others, "fearing for" others, being afraid for oneself; the close proximity of the feared object brings alarm, but if the object is unfamiliar then fear becomes dread, and when dread of an object is connected with suddenness, fear becomes terror.¹⁹

Two of the major illustrations we have used are abstract in kind, love and fear. But one may also do a phenomenology of an area in science, history, or whatever. What is the essence of a tree? an atom? a cell? A study of the cell involves its nature, life-support, division, growth, relationship with other cells, things mistaken for cells, etc.

One last comment on the *epoche* and the dis-engagement attitude. The word dis-engagement might give the impression of leaving the world, or ignoring the world, or regarding the world as non-existent for the moment. Paradoxically, to become dis-engaged is to look at the world more intently and seriously than ever before. The world has not left, nor disappeared, and one does not leave off experiencing the world. But dis-engaging the world to center on essences makes it possible to know the world better.

After I have achieved a study of the essence of something, what happens then? If you read the work of Lewis, The Four Loves, you subject it to criticism. Lewis is right on many points. But he is wrong on his chauvinistic ideas about friendship and women. As you read him you accept or reject, or improve on his thought. This experience of following-after-another's thought is called inter-subjectivity. Each thinker may come to assent to the phenomenological description and verify it within his own experience. There is no substance to the idea of objectivity in science which presumes something outside the mind of man. Only inter-subjectivity exists. This does not mean that no truth exists, or that truth is personal from one person to another. There is truth among reasonable men, and if the *epoche* is practiced, men will come to the same truth generally.

In conclusion, we may note that phenomenology is important as a way of knowing. We know the world by means of essences, and it is imperative for the student of philosophy to develop a sense of *epoche* for science, politics, morals and religion. Without phenomenology we are victims of pre-judgments; with phenomenology we hope for honesty, fairness, and truth.

E. *The Way of Self-Revelation*

Self-revelation as a way of knowing is important for two kinds of knowledge: knowledge of persons and knowledge of God. So far we have related to things, logic, and ideas. How do you know persons? Is a body the sum total of persons? When you see a body, do you "know" the person?

Self-revelation suggests that knowing persons involves more than seeing bodies. The knowledge of persons also suggests some analogy for knowing God, also a person. Let us look at them in that order.

1. Knowledge of person

A discussion of persons and the possibility of knowing persons can begin with a number of alternatives. First, one may conclude with a form of behaviorism that nothing beyond bodily activity, chemical makeup, and physical evaluation can be made about man's consciousness. Behaviorism concludes that no "mental" consciousness exists apart from the chemical and physical makeup of the body. This is a "nothing-but" attitude, a reductionistic attitude to man's existence and overlooks many treasured features of man's mental life. Many important things go on in man's consciousness that are not reflected in behavior.

Second, one may adopt a solipsists position and say, "I alone exist" which sounds absurd, but carried to its extreme there are only persons or bodies when I think them into being. Any knowledge of other persons is really contrary to the solipsist's position. Why speak about other people when they really do not exist? Third, one may adopt the position that knowledge about other persons is limited. We can talk meaningfully about other bodies as we do about trees, sponges, or paperclips. Chemical and physical analyses can give us the vital statistics of a body whether it be in terms of 32-26-36 or the basic elements of chemistry. But we are not content with this knowledge. How do we get from knowledge of a body to a knowledge of other minds? This is more difficult.

One way of bridging this gap is to argue from analogy. We "look" at our states of mind, our bodily expressions, and noting that similar bodily expressions are evident in other bodies, we conclude that they have similar states of mind. At best this is an inference and if this is all we have to go on, our knowledge is quite meager. Moreover, bodily states of mind can be misleading--when a woman cries, is it because she is happy or sad?--and occasionally we find a body that is still and un-suggestive in its actions: is it dead? alive? Then what may we conclude about all this?

One may readily see how skepticism about the knowledge of persons arose. Even granting the truth of Wittgenstein who said, "The human being is the best picture of the human soul," we are not moved very far along the way in the pursuit of knowledge about other people. We have only knowledge about the things we see, namely bodies.

P.F. Strawson talks about the idea of person in its primitive sense. He noted that "the concept of a person is to be understood as the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to an individual entity of that type."²⁰ This means that persons are known through bodies, but the idea of person is more fundamental than body. The body is a key to knowing persons, but the person is not the same as the body alone.

In light of this we can talk about self-revelation which comes through the body, frowns, speech, touch, and which involves personal relationships. Self-revelation involves personal interchange along verbal lines. A man may sit motionless in his outward appearance in most of his body, but then pour out his innermost thoughts, feelings, hopes, and aspirations. As comments, questions, and exclamations fly back and forth, we come to know something of the person.

Some ideas of Martin Buber are often helpful when one talks about the knowledge of persons. Persons involve a special kind of relationship. Buber distinguished between an I-It relationship and an I-Thou relationship. In an I-It relationship there is no reciprocity. I pick up a pencil, note its length, color, eraser, and I may use it, but the pencil is essentially a manipulated object. There is no backtalk. Indeed, it is possible for a human to treat another human in a manipulated way. People are often treated as things, objects. In contrast, the I-Thou is a reciprocal relationship involving trust, respect, and self-communication. It is an encounter of one person with another, hence self-revelation. Concerning the importance of self-revelation, Hamlyn noted, ". . . a case can be made for the thesis that no proper understanding of the concept of a person can be had in independence of an understanding of the concept of human relationship."²¹ The I-Thou

relationship is not a manipulative one. It does involve verbal communication as well as any other appropriate physical response, but its chief avenue is verbal. Even this can be misused, and misleading. There is no guarantee against being deceived. A suave person can dupe almost anyone, but that is simply one of the risks of personhood. Nevertheless, the I-Thou pattern remains the most significant basis of knowing what a person thinks, believes, hopes, dreams, remembers, fears, and loves.

2. Knowledge of God

Just as there may be some knowledge learned from the activity of bodies, so philosophers and theologians have argued that some knowledge about God is available. Regardless of what one may conclude about the validity of the arguments for God's existence, whether they are valid or not, useful or not, etc., the actual amount of information concluded in the arguments is not of great proportion. The main object of the arguments is to prove the existence of God. Other possible facts may be that God is creator, is intelligent, and powerful. As far as man's religious needs are concerned, those items are meager and lead at best to worship of a near unknown. Thus, a knowledge of God that is religiously significant and useful must go beyond a "body" knowledge. If we are to know anything about God that is meaningful, it must be beyond the attempt to speak of God as a force which may be compared to the attempt to examine God in a test-tube or under the microscope. A God lower in personhood than man is hardly worth the effort and trouble. Thus, if God is, then he must be known as Person in some sense of that word. Augustine's comment about speaking of God as person is pertinent. He claimed that we speak of God as "person" not to express God's being adequately, but in order not to be silent.

Speaking of God as person immediately involves one in the complicated question when one considers all the diverse religious claims of human history. Diversity implies that all cannot be true. Is there one that is true? It is impossible to cover the complete area of religious movements, but one may generalize in this fashion. Most religious leaders claim to be sent by God to enlighten mankind. Some religious leaders seem not really to be interested in a unique God, such as Buddha and Confucius. They preached an ethical humanism designed to help people face the problems of existence in their day. Others regarded themselves interested in being a reformer or a prophet as did Mohammed.

In Christianity, however, the elements of a theory of knowledge along the lines of personhood take on different dimensions. If Jesus, the Christ, is really God in the flesh (God-Incarnate) then we have God as person communicating of himself in a form that men can understand. This means that God was not content to speak merely thru prophets, but has come Himself. Admittedly, God as person transcends our knowledge of man as person, but we cannot begin with anything less than person in common between God and man. We understand persons in self-communication and we cannot have anything less than this in knowing about God. We understand something of God's qualities of love, mercy, and communication because we have something of these qualities in humans. God speaks our language. God is said to love, forgive, help; he is said to be a companion; he encounters men and brings transformation and enlightenment

to man's ignorance; and affirms life because He created it as well as entered into human history to partake of it on man's level of understanding.

Self-revelation thus becomes important for any knowledge about God. How can one know God then? This takes a two-fold answer. First, it is historically related to a given point in human history and is called the Incarnation.²² The record of this is written in the Christian Scripture. Second, self-revelation involves contemporary encounter with the living person of Christ *via* the Scripture today. The Christian claims that men can have a relationship with God in Christ now.

Consequently, Buber's terms of an I-Thou relationship still fits here for a knowledge of God as Person. Gods may be framed in an I-It relationship which amounts to a form of idolatry. But an I-Thou relationship with God is not manipulative. God encounters man. There is a turn-about in the matter of hiding a knowledge of oneself. In human relationships we know about ourselves to a great degree, and we are searching for knowledge in the person we encounter. In the relationship with God, there is open knowledge available for all to know, but I, the knower, am given to guarding my image. Just as I can turn off or avoid other people, I can also avoid God for the time being. Just as there may be certain facts we know about people without knowing them, so it is true with religious knowledge. Knowledge about God without encounter is like knowledge about people without encounter. One cannot really say I know the person.

By way of concluding this section, it should be noted that we have not included faith as a way of knowing as some theologians do. Faith as a way of knowing is ambiguous. Faith is a requisite for another way of knowing--that of self-revelation. Faith--which means to commit oneself to another--serves the basis for an I-Thou relationship in which I commit myself to a person or to God and thereby the avenue is open for God to speak openly as well as for me to speak. Hence, faith without supposition of God as person is nothing more than faith in the unknown future. This kind of faith--without God as person--is little more than projection of one's hopes on the future.

There are many other issues in religious claims to knowledge that may be pursued, but we cannot depart on that excursion here.²³

F. *The Way of Intuition*

Intuition as a way of knowing is not only difficult to define, but also to defend. Nevertheless, intuition must not be written off completely as a way of knowing some things. Note the following example. A young man enters a room filled with people. He is introduced to many, but as he meets one young lady, meeting her is different than the others. Later as the evening progresses, her eyes meet his as they search the room for each other. Nothing is said, only a direct conclusion reached by eye contact. Later, they date, become engaged, and if you should ask either if they are loved by the other, they will respond with a positive yes. If you ask for reasons why they think they are loved, reasons sound irrational and superfluous. But they are committed to the idea of being loved by the other to the extent of making a marriage vow. If they knew Pascal's statement they would agree that "we do not prove that we ought to be loved by enumerating in order the causes of love; that would be ridiculous."²⁴

The experience of love is something known on the lines of intuition. Intuition refers to the direct non-rational experience of knowing.²⁵ Intuition is in contrast to conscious reasoning or the experience of knowing an object through the senses. Some speak of intuition as synonymous with mysticism. This is unwise, misleading, and does violence to a correct understanding of intuition. Mysticism is the attempt of certain religious groups to use methods²⁶ of concentration whereby the mind is emptied of this world's content and the persons attempt to reach a unity with a world-soul or the Infinite. Such a method is achieved through self-discipline. Self-revelation presupposes that no mystic can achieve a knowledge of God apart from God's self-revelation which is not due to man's efforts.

Intuition is not the fruit of efforts. One does not set forth a method of intuition as one does in mysticism. It is not deliberate as reason is. Pascal, who is famous for certain statements about intuition, spoke of it as a way independent of reason: "The heart has its reasons which reason does not know."²⁷ Intuition is not a sixth sense as we know it. It appears on the fringe of reason and seemingly functions when reason has reached a stalemate. You may remember a time when someone presented an irrefutable argument to you. You could not answer it, nor could you accept it. You knew that it was wrong, but you did not know why. Intuition led you to reject it. Eventually, you may have found reasons that justified your rejection, but your first ground of objection was really intuitive.

The limits of intuition are debated by philosophers. Some will limit it to the experience of recognizing a color such as "I see blue." Others will advance to the area of mathematics and logic. Still others admit the legitimacy of intuition in the area of art, love, and romance.²⁸ Yet it is admitted that intuition has played a vital role in some of the greatest scientific discoveries from the days of Archimedes to the present.²⁹

Intuition is difficult to limit in the definition and thus many things pass under the flag of intuition. A variety of people attempt to gain support for a cause under the guise that they have an intuition which may have no support whatever. When intuition is equated with the voice of God, all kinds of evils may be justified. "Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction."³⁰ A further difficulty with intuition is the inability of having other people "feel" or know the same intuition that we have. We may say that intuition lacks "public verification." Some intuitions are wild and unrestricted. If people make wild claims based on intuition we may be inclined to lock them up. But even supporters of intuition do not claim its universal value without regard for other ways of knowledge. It is frequently restricted to areas of knowledge that are of vital importance to individuals such as love, art, and creativity, or to areas in which intuition can be complemented by other ways to knowledge, such as reason, observation, and confirmation.

G. *The Way of the Apprenticeship*

A seeming contradiction is posed by Plato in his Meno in which it is asserted that either you know what you are looking for, and if so there is no problem, or you do not know what you are

looking for, and then how can you look for something you know not, and if you should find it, how would you know it? In a similar manner, Michael Polanyi asks, "How can we tell what things not yet understood are capable of being understood." He answers that "we must have foreknowledge sufficient to guide our conjecture with reasonable probability in choosing a good problem and in choosing hunches that might solve the problem."³¹

Polanyi seeks to develop a type of knowing called "tacit knowing or learning." Tacit learning means that "we can know more than we can tell."³² It also means we can learn more than we are aware of. This is particularly true in learning certain things in the area of apprenticeship. Polanyi's analysis of tacit learning involves two things: (1) focal attention or awareness which is seen in the experience of driving a nail with a hammer. My attention is focused on the head of the hammer and the attempt to hit the nail-head. (2) Subsidiary awareness is the awareness of the handle in my hand, but which is not the center of my attention, yet it is necessary for the focal awareness and is merged into it. If my attention is focused on learning a particular skill, there is both focal and subsidiary learning taking place. This operates in both the master and the learner. A master teaches more than he is aware of teaching. Because of this it is frequently true that great scientists follow great masters under whom they served as apprentices. The great research in the chemistry of carbohydrates has come from "four scientists, Purdy, Irvine, Hawerth, and Hirst, who followed each other in single file as masters and pupils."³³ The fading of apprenticeships in some areas brings a great loss to culture. While microscopy, chemistry, mathematics, and electronics have been great helps in many areas, nevertheless, scientific mechanization has been unable "to produce a single violin of the kind of the semi-literate Stradivarius turned out as a matter of routine more than 200 years ago."³⁴

In a similar vein, connoisseurship, like a skill, cannot be communicated by precept alone. A medical diagnostician, a wine taster, a cotton-classer, and a variety of scientists rely upon learning *via* a master who cannot teach everything by precept. The things we know in a tacit way are "problems, and hunches, physiognomies, and skills, the use of tools, probes, and denotative language."³⁵ Polanyi goes on to argue that all our knowledge involves a tacit dimension.³⁶

Tacit knowing calls for a revision of the myth associated with scientific knowledge. The myth traced back to Bacon is that of gathering all kinds of data and the results will fall into a pattern and discovery is born. This is false and misleading. Scientific discovery begins with discipleship, or submission to the authority of the scientific community. After the apprenticeship is served and a "feel" for the discipline has been acquired, then one can turn to exploring the unknown. As an apprentice one learns tacitly as well as focally. But how does one make a new discovery? To be a real discovery, it must be something that is accurate, profound and of intrinsic interest.³⁷ Making a discovery means looking at the unknown. What do you look for? One can only be guided by problems, a profound problem--but who alone can decide what a real problem is? How can one think what has not been thought before? How can one put together an experiment that has never been done before which will change the total way of looking at reality? Reason and hunches are the answer. Polanyi notes that "De Broglie's wave theory, the Copernican system and the theory of relativity, were all found by pure speculation guided by criteria of internal rationality."³⁸ Beyond

this there are no methods for making great discoveries. We conclude this section with a note from Polanyi:

Objectivism has totally falsified our conception of truth, by exalting what we can know and prove, while covering up with ambiguous utterances all that we know and cannot prove, even though the latter knowledge underlies and must ultimately set its seal to all that we can prove. In trying to restrict our minds to the few things that are demonstrable, and therefore explicitly dubitable, it has overlooked the critical choices which determine the whole being of our minds and has rendered us incapable of acknowledging these vital choices.³⁹

IV. Conclusion

We have surveyed a number of ways to knowledge. In a sketch such as the one presented above, it is evident that there is more overlapping than allowed for in a logical treatment of the ways to knowledge. Some of the ways are more useful for certain items of knowledge than others. The following chart may help to pull together the emphases.

| Ways to Knowledge | Things Known |
|--------------------------|--|
| Testimony or authority | the past, transmitted culture |
| Empiricism or the senses | objects before us experienced thru the senses--trees, bees, birds, flowers, bodies |
| Reason | logical truths, deductions, inferences |
| Phenomenology | essences, general or universal ideas |
| Self-revelation | human persons and God as person |
| Intuition | love, friendship, "hunch-"truth |
| Apprenticeship | skills, music, connoisseurship, etc. |

It appears that one way may have more limitations than another. The way of the senses has all kinds of uses whereas self-revelation is quite restricted. Intuition may be the most limited way.

The most serious problem of looking at the ways of knowledge is that of reductionism. Reductionism, it will be remembered, is the desire to reduce everything to a common denominator.

Reductionism here is the belief that only one way--most often empiricism--is the only way to knowledge. But simplicity is of no virtue if it ignores large segments of life and knowledge as any form of reductionism does.

In a positive way, we are led to see that some ways are more suitable for some items than others. The ways are complementary.

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Footnotes

- ¹Cf. R. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 10-11.
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¹⁰New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1960.
¹¹Ibid., p. 88.

¹²Ibid., p. 103.

¹³Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁴Edmund Husserl, Ideas, New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1931, p. 44.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁶Richard M. Zaner, The Way of Phenomenology, New York: Pegasus, 1970, p. 122.

¹⁷Husserl, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁸Zaner, op. cit., p. 137.

¹⁹Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J. Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York: Harper and Row, 1962, pp. 180-183.

²⁰B.F. Strawson, Individuals, London: Methuen and Co., LTD, 1959, p. 104.

²¹Hamlyn, op. cit., p. 248.

²²This means that God took to himself human nature for the purpose of revealing his love toward man--love initiates a move toward another--and seeking man's reconciliation to Himself. The historical questions on the integrity of the witnesses, and of the documents is too far involved for our brief treatment, but one may consult William Temple, Nature, Man, and God, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964; C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960; E.J. Carnell, Introduction to Christian Apologetics, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952; F.F. Bruce, Are the Documents Reliable?, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959; Bernard Ramm, The God Who Makes a Difference, Waco: Word, 1971.

²³For further information, see Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, Philadelphia: Westminster Press; Dallas M. Roark, The Christian Faith, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1977, chapters 1-3.

²⁴Pascal, op. cit., p. 283.

²⁵In phenomenology, "intuition" is related to the perceiving of essences, and its meaning something like "apprehending." It is a technical term in phenomenology.

²⁶Even when one talks about theistic mysticism as in western Christian thought it is permeated by the human effort of using "methods" "techniques" to climb up the ladder to God.

²⁷Ibid., p. 277.

²⁸Cf. Montague, op. cit., p. 226.

²⁹Joseph Brennen, The Meaning of Philosophy, New York: Harper and Row, 1967, p. 169.

³⁰Pascal, op. cit., p. 314.

³¹Polanyi, op. cit., p. 14.

³²Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967.

³³Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society, p. 44.

³⁴Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 53.

³⁵Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, p. 29.

³⁶Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 203.

³⁷Ibid., p. 136. Profundity and relevance are probably more important than measuring for measuring the speed of sewer water is uninteresting.

³⁸Ibid., p. 167.

³⁹Ibid., p. 286.

CHAPTER III

What Do We Know?

The table on which I am writing has a blond color to its grain with occasional stripes of dark grain running through it. To my touch it feels hard, and it has a permanence about it that has made it endure about fifteen years of hard wear. I know the table well since my wife designed it and we built it together. The table can be experienced by anyone who walks into my study. But according to modern physics the table is composed of empty space. Instead of a solid piece of wood, physicists would speak of atomic particles whipping through this empty space called a table. This view of the table casts doubt on its solidarity, its color and permanence. Obviously, this table of the physicists is not seen by the naked eye. Which is the real table? Are there two tables? Is this just two ways of talking about the same thing?¹

Another example relates to our experience of light. When I look at the sun rising in the glory of the morning, what do I see? If the sun is 93 million miles from my vision, then it has taken about eight minutes for the light I experience to come to me. When I say I see the sun, the actual sun has moved in its earthly viewing position to a different position. Thus at evening the sun has already set before I see the last direct light from it. This puts me in the unusual position of saying I see the setting sun when it has already set. The example can be more complicated in talking about stars. Some stars are said to be so far away that it takes light thousands of years to come to our vision. When light is seen by me on a dark night, can I say that I see the past? Note how paradoxical it sounds to say that I see a star that may no longer actually exist!

If we switch from the far way to the present at hand, am I really seeing the table on which I write since there is an infinitesimal gap between the light striking the table and the light being picked up by my eye?

What can we really know about the world about us? Do we really see it? Are we trapped within our mind and all that we ever "see" are images of the outside world? Does the knowing situation remove us so completely from the outside world that we can never know what it is like?

Some of these judgments are made about certain theories proposed to explain what we really know about the world. We must turn now to look at the various proposals.

A. *Common Sense Realism (naive realism)*

Common sense realism is supposed to refer to the way that the man on the street, or the common man, understands the "knowing situation." Who is this man on the street? He has never written his philosophy and so we cannot read a defense of his view. This is interesting for two reasons: (1) "anyone intelligent enough to write about the problems of perception is intelligent enough not to commit the errors ascribed to that position,"² and (2) that position is frequently

criticized in an unfair way. To see this, look at a summary of the position and the criticisms leveled against it.

Common sense realism means: (1) that we experience objects directly. When I touch the door, or see the door, I am really touching or seeing the door, not a carbon copy or sense data image of it. (2) When I experience an object, I am perceiving it independently of myself; it is not just an image in my mind, and (3) when I experience an object, i.e., a door, it possesses the qualities which it appears to me to have.

If this may be regarded as a fair summary of common sense realism, let us note the criticisms against it. The criticisms compose a general attack upon the reliability of the senses and the tacit conclusion is that since they cannot be trusted in certain illustrations, then they are generally unreliable. A few examples will serve to illustrate. Vision is indicted first. When an oar is thrust into the water it appears bent although we have just seen it as straight. Which is the true vision--the oar in or out of the water? A coin on a desk is circular, but when you look at it from a distance, it looks elliptical which is contrary to the nature of the coin. What we see from one angle contradicts what we see from a different angle, hence the conclusion--the senses are unreliable. Similarly, the railroad tracks are known to be parallel, but in the distance they appear to come together. The mirage on the highway is something that everyone can see in the car, but vanishes when you come to that point. Standing by a 747 before take-off one is swamped by the feeling of its size, but as it lifts off and climbs to a thousand feet or so, it seems quite smaller. Are we seeing the jet as it really is?

Second, the sense of touch is illustrated as unreliable by a common experience of putting a cold right hand into water and a warm left hand into the same water. The water will appear warm to the right and cool to the left hand. Which statement can I trust about the water? When a man loses an arm, he experiences a sensation seemingly located in the missing limb. In the third sense, sound, common sense realism appears to come off no better in the criticisms. At a track meet one seated at the far end of the stadium will see the runners start before hearing the firing of the gun, but the rules of the game and reason indicate that this cannot be so. Thus the hearing is deceived. The other senses, smell and taste, are also regarded as unreliable since a cold can diminish both in their ability and sensitivity. There is no need to multiply illustrations. The general conclusion about common sense realism is that the senses are unreliable.

As if this were not enough, we must say a word about the unusual, i.e., hallucinations, dreams, and illusions. Do we really see things in these experiences? A classic example is that of MacBeth and his hallucination of a dagger. One may say he "saw" a dagger but no one else saw the same dagger, for there was none to see. An elderly man suffering from hardening of the arteries may wake up in the night calling to his brothers to come help him move some boxes. To him the brothers are near and the boxes are "seen." But to an attendant the brothers are dead and the boxes are non-existent. What about the reliability of the senses again? Can we say that everything we see is there?

Are the criticisms above really destructive for common sense realism? There are philosophers who believe that they are.³ But something can be said in defense of common sense realism and in evaluation of the criticisms of the position. (1) One gets the impression that they are overworked by philosophers in an effort to make their own position look good. The use of these illustrations and the conclusions reached are questionable in many cases. Look at the illustrations of the water and hot and cold hands. Why a philosopher would conclude that the senses are unreliable on that basis appears prejudicial. The sense of touch stands up in reporting that the water is warmer to a cold hand, and is cool to a warm hand. This illustration really shows the versatility of the senses for reporting diverse situations. What would be a sense error is this: if our senses reported the reverse, colder to the cold hand, warmer to the warm hand. This would be in contradiction to what we know to be the case.

(2) The perceiving man is a total being and his senses may appear to contradict each other, but out of this seeming contradiction he gains more reliable sense knowledge. Take the example of the field event. The gun goes off seemingly after the runners had started, but the distance of the viewer and the runner is measured in experience by sight and sound together. As the runners come closer they appear larger--than when they started--and depth of perception is only gained by saying that we see things from this vantage point. Without the seeming contradictory report of our two senses in this illustration, we would have been led astray. The jet that takes off appears huge as we stand by its side before take-off, but after it has lifted off it appears vastly smaller. After lift-off, the jet is seen as an object in flight away from us, not as an object at rest. In both cases our vision is giving a correct report of the jet. We are not really seeing the same things in the two different illustrations. Without the perspective of depth and distance, which vision reports to us, we would be more readily deceived by this sense.

(3) The normal functioning of the senses must be presupposed. A color-blind man is hardly in a position to talk about colors. So likewise, a monotone in the field of music. The elderly man suffering from hardening of the arteries is obviously seeing something that is not there, but this is overlooked because of his abnormality. It may be that MacBeth's dagger would fit into this category also. But grant for the moment that the senses are sometimes deceived, no one maintains that man is an infallible interpreter of the nature of the world about him. To say that our senses mislead us in some of these examples is merely to say that we are occasionally misled, and by means of the senses we come to find out which experiences are misleading. To conclude that the senses are entirely unreliable is not only unwarranted, but proves too much for any other alternate view.

(4) Another problem with the criticisms is that they generalize too much. Either the senses are absolutely right, or they cannot be trusted at all. A common sense view would say that most of the time I see things as they are when I say I "see" it, but sometimes I am misled. Even in this I may be corrected by my senses. In a dense fog I think I see a man prowling around the house. Upon investigation I discover that there are no tracks and it was not a man at all. I did see something which upon reflection may be understood as an opening in the fog which had a darkened shape like a man.

(5) Some criticisms of common sense realism could be avoided if an adequate interpretation were given for the perception. I see the same jet on the ground and after lift-off. My description cannot be the same for both experiences--I see the jet. The jet ascending must be described in terms of its distance and speed into the depth of space. If we are inclined to look up and say, "I see the jet," which we do, then a defense of the senses, where called for, must lead us to be precise and say, "I see a jet ascending in the distance," and this is understood tacitly as a contrast to the jet we see parked on the ground. But where philosophy and accuracy are not an issue, "I see a jet" will be sufficient for anyone in both cases. An often used example centers around the star Sirius. The star may not exist, but as I look at it I see it. Thus I may be said to be looking at something that does not exist. Hence a contradiction of the senses. But if I stand out and look at the sky, I am seeing something. This "something" is a ray of light that started from Sirius a long time ago and is just now arriving in the field of my vision. I cannot conclude whether Sirius exists now or not. I can say that I see the light from a star we call Sirius.

Interpretations of experiences are frequently inadequately expressed. The familiar stick in the water appears differently than the stick out of the water. It is not just a stick in the water, but an experience of the refraction of light with a stick-in-water.

(6) If we cannot maintain that we see directly, then to interpose an image or sense data as an intermediate removes one a step further from reality. We are then in the uncomfortable situation of wondering if there is a reality beyond the sense data, or (convinced there is) wondering whether our sense images really correspond with the reality there.

(7) The problems of dreams and hallucinations are different. Both of these are unusual. Although a dream has a vivid appearance, upon waking we make a distinct difference between the dream and reality. The same holds for the hallucination. The victim of a hallucination knows this when recovery comes. In a dream we see something directly that may not exist in reality either **for us** or at all, i.e., if I dream that a bevy of beautiful girls is chasing me, upon awaking I may regret that it has no reality **for me**, although in my dream I saw the beautiful girls. Or, I may dream that I am being chased by that unusual creature of The Hobbit series, the orc, and although I see it in my dream I see something that doesn't have material existence. What shall we do? We can accept the courage of our convictions and say that dreams are seen directly and conclude perhaps they are real. This is hardly a warranted conclusion. On the other hand, we can say that man is not an infallible creature and that dreams, illusions, and hallucinations are a special problem peripheral to man's direct seeing. Thus one may say that MacBeth thought he was seeing something whereas he was not seeing anything at all. My dreams may be a product of memory, phantasy, or heartburn, but they are a production of my mind in some sense. While this conclusion may seem to hedge for common sense realism, it admits that not everything is known about either perception or dreams. Looking at other options such as regarding a dream or hallucination as an internal sense-datum, it becomes easy to conclude that all sense-data are internal and the problem of talking about the outside world is more difficult.

In conclusion, common sense realism is not the most difficult doctrine to hold in explaining the knowing situation. It regards that objects are objective and perceived directly but admits that

interpretations are subjective and need critical evaluation. At the same time it must be admitted that viewing an object from one point is not a complete way of viewing things.

B. *Representational Realism*

Representational realism (or epistemological dualism) is a position advancing beyond common sense realism by virtue of a different theory of perception. The problem of relativism of the senses coupled with the difficulty of explaining error brought a search for a better theory. The father of the movement was Descartes, but the expounder of the theory of perception was John Locke (1632-1704). The central tenet of the view is that one does not know an object directly, but indirectly, or by the object being represented by something else to the mind. The image that strikes back of the eye is what is regarded as the representation to the knowing subject. This is carried along the appropriate nerve connections to the brain. The brain then interprets the message and concludes: "apple."

Representational realism or, the more current term, casual realism,⁴ has three important elements in it: (1) an analysis of the mechanics of perception, (2) the centrality of the sense datum or image, and (3) a good measure of skepticism about the world and its interpretation. We can look at these ideas in turn. The first, the analysis of perception, relates to the way we know. For Locke, the mind is blank at birth and experience furnishes it with sensations on which it reflects. When reflection on the sensations is finished the result is an **idea**. These reflected-on-sensations are, secondly, all that we can know directly. Thus these assume a central role in the theory. What is the cause of the sensations? The answer is found in the world beyond the sensations. The world is inferred from the sensations and is mediated by means of the sensations to the perceiver. If sensations are all that we know, then they not only become all important, but also raise the questions about reliability again. This leads to the third element in the theory, the interpretation of the sense data.

Locke, the father of the movement, attempted to understand how we know things. He divided up the information about objects into two qualities: primary and secondary. The primary qualities relate to shape, size, movement, solidity, or those qualities that could be known by more than one sense. The secondary qualities of an object are those of a subjective nature, color, taste, smell, etc. The difference may be seen in looking at a cherry. We could measure the size of the cherry, and weight could also be measured. On both of these measurements we could reach unity of opinion about it. Because they are primary qualities they do not change from person to person.

The secondary qualities are not that rigid. How does the cherry taste? To me it is sweet and to you it may be sour. Is the cherry red? To my vision it may be deep red and to another it may come off a lighter red, but in either case we cannot compare our experiences to know if we see the same thing. Who is right? We cannot know. Now comes a difficult part of the view--the redness or lack of it, and the sourness or lack of it are not in the cherry, but in you and me. This is how variations in opinions are explained because taste is an intrinsically personal experience. What is the cause of the redness then? The redness is caused by the apple but it is not in the apple. When

one is not experiencing the secondary qualities, they do not exist. (This is the jumping off place for the next view succeeding Locke, that of idealism and George Berkeley.)

This view leaves us with a measure of uncertainty or skepticism about the world. It is seen in two ways: (1) the datum or image in the mind that we experience removes us one step further from the real world, and we never know if the datum and the real world correspond, and (2) much of what we see in the world involves color, taste, sound, etc., and thus a subjective analysis of much of the world is all that we have.

In looking at the causal or representative theory, a number of factors are in its favor. Remember that the theory arose to solve the twin problems of error and illusion which presumably the common sense position could not. The causal theory offers a simple explanation for illusions, hallucinations and dreams. They are really ideas or images in our mind. They do not reflect the outside world. Similarly, error can be explained in that the image of the mind does not correspond to the real world, or, there is an image and no object to which it corresponds. Using the mirage, a public response from many people would show that it exists in the mind, but not in the real world. Even a rainbow can be seen by the public at large, but it cannot be touched, tasted, heard, or smelled since it relates to secondary qualities.

Is the position an improvement over common-sense? If it is, there are certain serious problems with the position. First, it is argued that although "the perceived qualities of physical objects are causally dependent upon the state of the percipient, it does not follow that the object does not really have them."⁵ It seems foolish to argue also that secondary qualities do not exist when no one is perceiving them. An apple does not alternately turn red and "blah" depending on the presence of an auditor. Second, if the secondary qualities are divested from an object not much is left and it is arguable whether along with giving up objective perceptible color one must also give up objective perceptible figure and extension. This point can be seen in Berkeley's criticism who argued that the same arguments used to turn the secondary qualities into the subjective sphere are also applicable to the primary qualities and hence everything is reducible to an idea. Third, if all we know is ideas, we cannot get beyond these ideas to know whether a real world exists beyond our ideas. In contrast to common sense realism where error is admitted, this theory undermines all of knowledge since it cannot get beyond the datum or image to examine the world.

Fourth, a similar objection is raised by Montague which he regards as destructive to the view. It centers on the difference between perceived-objects-in-space and the real space. Since I know only the objects that I perceive by means of datum I infer a real object behind them. "The inferred table, then, exists in a space other than the space of the perceived table."⁶ But "the only space I can possibly conceive is the space I perceive--the space, that is, in which the perceived table and the other sense-data are located."⁷ The space I perceive is subjective and I must try to look behind it for the space in which the objects can exist. But this is impossible and a space beyond the perceived space is "utterly meaningless."⁸

Because of the inadequacies of this view, we must turn to the next position growing out of response to it.

C. Berkeley's Immaterialism

The view of the English philosopher, George Berkeley (1685-1753) may be designated by several terms, subjectivism, epistemological monism, as well as immaterialism. A crucial question for philosophers in his time was: "how can a material object influence a mental subject?" Other philosophers had not been able to answer the question. Berkeley does not answer it either but he rejects the necessity of the question in his solution to the knowing experience. Some of his beliefs are as follows:

(1) Berkeley gave attention to the use of words. What meaning is there in the word "existence?" What do we mean when we say that something exists? Berkeley's answer is that when we say something exists it is perceivable. If I say that a bed exists in the room upstairs, I mean that when I walk upstairs into the room I will see a bed. Thus the existence of something means that I perceive it or can perceive it. Although Berkeley's view is called immaterialism he claimed strongly: "Let it not be said that I take away Existence. I only declare the meaning of the word so far as I can comprehend it."⁹ Berkeley's famous Latin phrase has been used to state the relationship between the existence of an object and the perception: *esse est percipi*--to be is to be perceived. This is the usual formula but it is not the full formula. The above Latin statement is used concerning sensible objects or things, but the full formula (*esse est au percipi au percipere*) means that "existence is either to be perceived or to perceive."¹⁰ Thus there are unthinking objects that the mind perceives, but there are also minds that think or whose "existence is to perceive rather than to be perceived."¹¹

(2) Berkeley rejected the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as traditionally associated with John Locke. He has a famous passage saying:

I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it; and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted; it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry. Since it is not a being distinct from sensations; a cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses; which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind; because they are observed to attend each other. Thus when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, etc. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word cherry you mean an unknown nature distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its existence something distinct from its being perceived; then indeed I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else can be sure it exists.¹²

(3) What then is in existence? There is nothing in existence, for Berkeley, called matter. What we popularly call matter, "an inert, senseless substance in which extension, figure, and motion, to actually subsist" is nothing more than "ideas existing in the mind."¹³ Berkeley came to

this position by noting that if a secondary quality, i.e., color, exists in the mind only, then surely the primary qualities exist only in the mind also. He noted:

But I desired any one to reflect and try, whether he can by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body, without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must withal give it some color or other sensible quality which is acknowledge to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind, and no where else.¹⁴

Consequently, if all that we experience is ideas, we cannot get beyond the ideas to see if there is a material world. It becomes meaningless to talk about a material world when all that we experience is ideas. This is why Berkeley's view is sometimes called immaterialism.

(4) So-called things are really, then, ideas. Before the reader concludes that Berkeley rejected trees, stones, seas, and sounds, he flatly said, "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection."¹⁵ He preferred the word "idea" to "thing" because "thing" implies something "existing without the mind."¹⁶ If one wanted to call objects "things" according to popular use it would be acceptable, but the customary way of speaking must not lead to the conclusion that things exist independently of being known. The next two points are linked together.

(5) All ideas are in a mind and nothing can exist that is not in a mind. (6) The reason something is in my mind is because it is in God's mind first. Both of these ideas can be seen in the following quote from Berkeley.

. . . all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit; it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.¹⁷

It must be kept in mind that a thing does not exist because God perceives it, but God perceives it (in a creative sense) and it then exists.

Berkeley anticipated a number of objections to his views. He argues that his view is not impractical although it sounds thus at first, it is not skeptical or unscientific, nor did it reduce everything to illusion.¹⁸

Probably the most easily misunderstood point is the summary statement: "to be is to be perceived." When one applies the statement to conclude that what is not perceived by me does not

exist, then it appears absurd, particularly from the human vantage point. Berkeley would not admit that when one leaves a room and no one else is in it the room disappears. This cannot happen for there is continuity in nature and continuity is guaranteed by the Supreme Being who is the originator of our ideas as well as the Knower who causes all things to continue to be. Thus the statement "to be is to be perceived" applies ultimately to God's perception. The issue in Berkeley has been made famous in two limericks:

There once was a man who said, "God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad."

"Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd,
I am always about in the Quad
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by Yours faithfully, God."

There are two criticisms, among others, that are leveled against Berkeley's views. First, his views involve what has been called "the egocentric predicament."¹⁹ This means that I can never perceive unperceived objects because the moment I perceive them I make them automatically a part of my perceptive life. Hence I can never get beyond these perceptions to know if anything exists unperceived. Everything that I know automatically exists. Hence it is impossible to establish the statement that nothing exists unperceived.

The second criticism relates to Berkeley's appeal to God as the guarantor, foundation, or source of ideas. Berkeley avers that God can be known but it is in terms of effects. One does not see God *per se* but his effects. From the effects or activities in nature one may be said to see God. He wrote, "We may even assert, that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable, than those ascribed to human agents."²⁰ Whether this solution is adequate will depend upon the reader's attitudes toward the so-called arguments for the existence of God.²¹

In summary, we must consider where we have come. In Berkeley, the objects of knowledge are known directly in the experience of the person. In this position, there is a kinship to common sense realism in that the directness is emphasized, but they part company on the nature of matter. There is agreement between Berkeley and representational realism in asserting that objects are states of consciousness but they part on the status of what is represented to consciousness: representational realism retains its materialism whereas Berkeley opts for immaterialism.

D. *Phenomenalism*

Phenomenalism is an outgrowth of Berkeley's views. Certain of Berkeley's views are accepted although part of his conclusions are rejected. Phenomenalism arose in reaction to Berkeley. The first chief advocate of phenomenalism was David Hume who is the father of the movement by virtue of his reaction to Berkeley. Later Kant gave the movement qualified support.

Phenomenalism accepted, first, Berkeley's analysis of the knowing experience. When I say I see a table I have an idea of the table in my mind and experience. What appears to me as a table is one and the same table. One cannot get back of the sense datum and examine to see another table which would be the alleged "real" table.

Second, the view of Berkeley that "to be is to be perceived" is accepted in one sense but rejected in another. When the phrase is applied to sense data as in the eyes, it is accepted--that is, a datum or image must exist to be perceived, but when applied to the existence of an object, it cannot mean that the object's existence depends upon being perceived.

When the phenomenalist says that something exists, he means that if you set up the right circumstances, you will have the sensation of experiencing the object. The statement "there is a green station wagon in my garage" means that if you raise the garage door and look in, you will see a green station wagon.

On the other hand, phenomenologists reject certain of Berkeley's views. The idea that physical objects do not exist unperceived is replaced by the independence of the existence of physical objects. That is, they are independent of any knowing mind, even God's. Berkeley's view that reality is purely mental is also rejected for a reality that is purely physical but that is seen and interpreted mentally. The need of God in Berkeley's theory is rejected in somewhat the same category that Locke's mysterious substance behind objects was rejected. In this regard phenomenalism agrees with Berkeley that what is experienced is real and there is no attempt to get behind the sense data to something else. Phenomenologists believe that something continues to be without God as the cause of it.

Phenomenalism needs to be distinguished from certain other views previously referred to in the early parts of this chapter. It differs from common sense realism in that it claims only to see sensations or sense data, or images, but not the object. It differs from dualism in that dualism involves a gap between the sense data and the object behind the sense data. Phenomenalism defends only the sense data as the object and behind that there is no other object to be sought.

From Hume's thought one may turn to Immanuel Kant. Kant published his work, The Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Kant argued that man's knowledge of reality is limited to appearances or phenomena. Kant accepted a dualism in the knowledge situation. First, there is what we see in terms of perception and this is all we ever see. This gives his theory an empirical element. But back of what we see is a reality, described by the German term *Ding an Sich*, or translated into English as "the thing in itself," also called *noumenon*. The noumenon is never seen but is inferred from the senses related to the phenomenon. Kant wrote:

Appearances are the sole object which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves, they are only representations, which in turn have their object--an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = x.²²

Although Kant is classified as a phenomenalist by many writers, this is not the whole story, and it must not be overlooked that Kant stands in the idealist tradition. The knowing situation requires something more than a matter of perception for Kant. Perceptions not only have to be interpreted, but the mind itself takes an active role in imposing meaning on the world that is perceived in the representations. Kant regards his new approach as a Copernican revolution in philosophy. He noted:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that *objects must conform to our knowledge*.²³ (italics mine)

This moves Kant in the direction of idealism, but his distinction between appearances or representations and reality behind the representations place him in the phenomenalist camp on this point.

Various forms of phenomenism have been advocated since the days of Hume and Kant. A modern version has come to be called linguistic phenomenism. It is associated with A.J. Ayer. Linguistic phenomenists argue that perception is one rather than two in its make up. One cannot talk about physical objects versus sense data. The linguistic aspect comes in the many ways of describing what is seen. A phenomenist will maintain that

every empirical statement about a physical object, whether it seems to refer to a scientific entity or to an object of the more familiar kind that we normally claim to perceive, is reducible to a statement, or set of statements, which refer exclusively to sense-data.²⁴

Thus the linguistic phenomenist does not debate whether objects exist or not, but only about the sense-data and statements interpreting the sense data. These statements are hypothetical for the most part. Thus, if I state that an oak tree is in my backyard while I am not able to see it, I am stating a hypothesis that if you go into my backyard under normal conditions you will have a sense data of an oak tree.

The modern form of phenomenism seems to bring considerable certainty to the matter of perception, for after all, a sense datum that I have appears to be quite certain and almost infallible. But there are serious problems with linguistic phenomenism. First, while I claim certainty for my sense datum, I cannot claim certainty for my linguistic statement about it. The precision of

statements about sense data is totally lacking and there are varieties of sense data-statements about the same data in different people. Hence, it is not an answer to the problem of skepticism which is needed.

A second charge against phenomenalism is that it implies a continual regression from the statement about the sense data to other qualifying statements which in turn are in relation to other statements. When I declare I see an apple, a red-sense datum, I must declare when I sense it, where I sense it, and the conditions under which I sense it.

In conclusion, we quote Ayer in his objection to phenomenalism, a view he once held but came to reject:

If the phenomenalist is right, the existence of a physical object of a certain sort must be sufficient condition for the occurrence, in the appropriate circumstance, of certain sense-data; there must, in short, be a deductive step from descriptions of physical reality to descriptions of possible, if not actual, appearances. And conversely, the occurrence of the sense-data must be a sufficient condition for the existence of the physical object; there must be a deductive step from descriptions of actual, or at any rate possible appearances to descriptions of physical reality. The decisive objection to phenomenalism is that neither of these requirements can be satisfied.²⁵

E. *Phenomenology of Perception*

Up to this point we have been dealing often with extremes. There are two opposites. First, there is Descartes, of whom we have said little, who began with the inner self, the *cogito*, and argued that "clear and simple ideas" are certain, but these are solely within the world of mind and reason. As long as we are in the world of reason, there is certainty, but when one turns to the world of the senses and seeking knowledge through the senses, rather than reason, than skepticism gains a foothold. The senses are not reliable for certainty. They can be fooled and distorted. So Descartes gave us one side of the extreme which is called the rationalist approach.

Second, the other side is the empirical approach which was emphasized by Locke and Hume, and they began with the senses. The senses are the only source of knowledge about the world, but these philosophers were also skeptical about the senses. Since both camps are skeptical about the senses this leaves the status of knowledge in a less than hopeful situation.

This is complicated by one other twist. In Descartes' view of the self and reason, knowledge was secure as long as it was confined to the inner mind. Because of the unreliability of the senses, there was no sure route to the world outside the mind. On the other hand, the empiricists had a different kind of problem. Since they emphasized the sense approach to knowledge, they had an avenue to the mind or the self, but their sense-perception standard of knowledge would not allow them to defend a belief in a self that could not be seen by the senses. This was particularly true of Hume.

However, it seems obvious that both the body and self need one another. One modern philosopher who formulated an answer giving credibility to a body and a self is Maurice Merleau-Ponty who published his definitive work, The Phenomenology of Perception. While the title sounds formidable, it is a thorough study of perception and our knowledge-experience. Several points may be made to give something of the emphasis of his work.

1. Knowing is much more than sensationism. Sensationism is built on simple, pure sensations, like a picture coming to the film of a camera. It implies an atomistic approach to seeing one thing at a time in succession. Now knowing is much more complex. There is no such thing as a "pure" sensation and the analogy of a camera is misleading. Even if one could reconstruct an image reflected through a lens onto an object, or film, this is not like experience. This attempt at the camera analogy overlooks three elements in our knowing experience: (1) who determines what image is to be reflected, (2) what is the meaning of the image reflected, and (3) there is no basis for understanding what a "field of vision is."²⁶

Sensationism is meaningless apart from the process of interpretation which involves the idea of mind or person. A simple sensation means nothing more than I see a "something." The sensation does not tell me what the something is. Any sensation must be received by the mind which gives it a meaning. The sensation does not interpret itself. The who receiving the sensation is most important and bears no analogy to the film of the camera. The camera is directed by a mind who chooses the sensations to be captured on the film, but the film does not know what it has done and why.

A further problem arises from sensationism, or simple empiricism. If I am the collector of simple, pure sensations, there is no way to explain the identity between apparently similar experiences. For example, I see a tree. Now I close my eyes for a moment. Now I open them again, and look at a tree. Is this the same tree? My common response is yes, but this is based upon something more than the sensation itself. What was there beyond the sensation that identified the two sensations as the same? Certainly the sensations did not do the interpreting themselves. There is a continuing element in my being that is called person that receives the sensations of the two experiences of the tree. But I cannot affirm this "person" of my being by sensation. I make the judgement that it is the same tree without justifying my judgement. Hence, there is no pure sensation, and sensationism is not the place to begin for an understanding of knowledge.

2. Knowing centers around attention. Attention plays no role in the two opposite views we have described above, empiricism and rationalism. Merleau-Ponty notes:

Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for it, and intellectualism fails to see that we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, or equally again we should not be searching. They are in agreement in that neither can grasp consciousness in the act of learning.²⁷

In the common experience of a day, a person encounters many diverse objects, people, and events. Sensationism *per se*, has no rationale for giving attention to one object or another, one person over another, etc., but the fact is that attention is focused, and where it is not focused, inattention causes us to make mistakes to our regret.

Consequently, we have to describe knowing in terms of attention. Attention is related to a field. Many objects may be in the visual field of the person that do not gain his attention. Attention on an object is focused by motivation or intention. When I go into a crowded auditorium my visual field incorporates many people to which I give no response. But when my eye encounters a familiar face I respond with a smile, a hello, or a wave of the hand.

Attention and Intention can be seen in a different way. A playful boy standing in the yard is not the same for our attention and intention as a boy lying wounded near a crushed bicycle on the street. The difference of focusing our attention and intention on the two different pictures is related to the driving force behind attention and intention. That involves our third point.

3. The body is "subjectivized" or subject filled. The body is that "by which there are objects." My body, however, is never an object to me. It is the necessary condition for objects. But it is not mere body that is affirmed. Remember that empiricism could only talk about bodies, and rationalism could only talk about consciousness or mind. The point of Merleau-Ponty is that the body is filled (incarnate) with a subject--me! My body is inhabited by me. There is no part of my body which does not relate to me. Without my body I would not know the world as I now know it. Merleau-Ponty introduces the idea of "body image" which means that "I have an undivided possession of the parts of my body, for this image envelops them."²⁸

Now we must link up the idea of an embodied soul or person with the element of intention. Intention focuses upon the object or experience. Without intention, there is not much that can be known. This is illustrated in two examples from clinical studies that Merleau-Ponty relates. First, consider sexuality. Unless one can say either tacitly, or verbally, "I intend sexuality" one is impotent. This is to say that sexuality involves more than physical fitness. The clinical study of the patient Schneider shows the example of a man who had the physical ability to engage in intercourse, but who did not have the intention. He can engage in intercourse if his partner initiates it. Kissing is not meaningful to him and erotic literature has no arousing effect. In a non-clinical application, it is still true that sexual impotence or frigidity is not due usually to physical inability, but to a loss of intention. There may be many factors involved in the loss of intention but they will not be physically oriented.

The second area is speech. Schneider has a stock of words of verbal images and he has a stock of thought categories (the empiricist and intellectualist interpretation of speech respectively), but what he has lost is a "certain way of using them." In common every day experience the certain way of using them involves intention. A man may know most of the words of the dictionary but have nothing to say. If he does speak, he does not start with Aachen and end every sentence with zymurgy. If speech is to have meaning, it must convey meaning, not just words, or isolated concepts. The key to speech is the subject-filled body with intention as part of its nature.

4. The body involves synaesthetic perception. This involves several things. First, perception has been misled by the tendency in physics to isolate one sense at a time for study. This is artificial and damaging to a sound theory of perception. Instead, a synthesis takes place in perception. One sense affects other senses. Color, for example, elicits motor responses in patients. "Habitual positions of limbs are modified, movements are smooth or jerky according to whether surroundings are either blue or green on one hand or red or yellow on the other."²⁹

Second, perception involves the whole body. There may be a primary sense used, but that sense is translated to the other senses. "Synaesthetic perception is the rule" but we are unaware of it only because the physicists have influenced our organization of the experience. Merleau-Ponty said:

The senses intercommunicate by opening on the structure of the thing. One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this sound is conveyed by the visible glass. One sees the springiness of steel, the ductivity of red-hot steel, the hardness of a plane blade, the softness of shavings³⁰

The body synthesis that goes on between the senses helps to illustrate the meaning involved in a phenomenal field. My bodily being is the means to knowing things. But where there is no full synthesis of the senses, knowledge breaks down. This happens in people born blind. Tactile information has been available, but the eyes have never functioned. A blind person may know a circle by running his fingers around a circle. When vision is then restored by surgery, the patient never knows what he sees. His hand is described as a moving white patch and a circle is "seen" (comprehendingly) only when his eyes follow the outline of the circle and synthesizes the information already known by the hand.³¹ In this regard Merleau-Ponty explained:

These remarks enable us to appreciate to the full Herder's words: Man is a permanent *sensorium commune*, who is affected now from one quarter, now another. With the notion of the body image, we find that not only is the unity of the body described in a new way, but also thru this, the unity of the senses and of the object. My body is the seat or rather the very actuality of the phenomenon of expression, and there the visual and auditory experiences, for example, are pregnant one with the other, and their expressive value is the ground of the antepredicative unity of the perceived world, and through it, of verbal expression and intellectual significance. My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived word, the general instrument of my comprehension.³²

5. The visual field makes sense out of sense. The problem of depth in perception was a difficult one for traditional explanations of knowing. Since the retina can only receive a flat projection, how can depth be understood? We obviously perceive it. But the traditional theories could not explain how an object appeared so big up close and so little so far away. The object did not change in shape. One answer was that depth is just like breadth, but seen from the side, but even then it was never seen. Moreover, it didn't really explain anything.

With the understanding gained from the visual field, an answer is in the making. The visual field is the sum total of my area of perception as viewed with my eyes. When a man stands 3 feet in front of me, he occupies a large space in my visual field. He may be a large fellow and be almost all of what I see before me. But if he stands a thousand feet away from me, he occupies a proportionately smaller area in my visual field and "appears" to be smaller. Consequently the visual field gives an understanding to depth-distance that other theories could not. This removes some of the alleged contradictoriness of the senses.

6. The body subjectivized restores integrity to the knowing experience. The attack upon the senses led to skepticism. The past experience of philosophy has revolved around the either/or game of being absolutely certain or absolutely ignorant. The issue is neither extreme, but "what do I know?" Because I am an ensouled body, I am consciousness, a person. At the same time, my body inhabits space and time. I fill my body and my body is close to objects around me. "I say that I perceive correctly when my body has a precise hold on the spectacle."³³ I may be deceived momentarily (or longer depending on the experience) by thinking that phantasms or illusions are overtaking me when something looms in my visual field, but only to learn instantly that it was a fly near my eye and it was not as threatening as I thought. My body was deceived momentarily, but my body also corrected the deception.

The study of Merleau-Ponty leads to the conclusion that knowing is more direct and true than previous theories have granted. Instead of maintaining "I see an ash tray" philosophers have admitted only that one can say "I think I see an ash tray." But in the normal sense of the word "see" it must be admitted that "I see an ash tray" stands without contradiction.³⁴

Another implication of being a subject-filled-body is the possibility of extending myself through various instruments. As I sit typing, the typewriter has become a part of myself. I am not conscious of it, nor the mechanics of typing. I will, or intend to type and I do it. Very much like the movement of the hand, I will or intend the action and it happens. Similarly, the blind man's cane is an extension of his body and the cane serves the same purpose as a finger or hand.

In conclusion, it may be said that phenomenology of perception offers a whole view of man. As such it does not have the one-sided qualities of previous theories. While it appeals to classic sources for data to support its contention, it claims to have a great kinship to common sense experience. Philosophers have been inclined to one-sided views that have removed them from possibly solving the problems at hand. Doing a phenomenology of perception has retained the contributions of empiricism and rationalism without the barrenness of their restricted positions. A study of the whole man--embodied, incarnate ego--has put perception and knowledge on a firmer foundation.

Summary and Conclusions

We have traced the issue of knowledge particularly as it relates to perception from common sense realism to a phenomenology of perception. The following chart may help to organize the different views.

| | <u>What is Seen?</u> | <u>Problems</u> |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| Common Sense Realism | Objects seen directly | Error is difficult to explain; senses deceivable |
| Representational Realism | Objects seen indirectly; primary and secondary qualities of Locke | Skepticism because of the senses; skepticism about world behind images |
| Immaterialism | See objects or ideas directly; see only ideas | Requires God for foundation of ideas known |
| Phenomenalism | See indirectly because of ideas; ideas reflect the world | Skepticism about the world behind images or ideas; rejects God as cause of ideas |
| Phenomenology of Perception | See directly | Error is possible, but correctible; confidence in knowing the world |

We have seen problems in each position. Any theory of knowledge must give credence to the senses, the knowing subject, and provide a synthesis of the different facets of man's experience. A study of perception along the lines developed by Merleau-Ponty seems to do this with the greatest advantages. While this may not be completely without questions, his view helps to remove the shadowy world of unknowns behind sense data and at the same time give credibility to our knowledge of ourselves as well as objects in our world.

For Further Reading

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|---|---|
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Perry, Ralph Barton, Present Philosophical Tendencies, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912.

Footnotes

¹This is substantially the illustration of Sir Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928, pp. ix-xii.

²Cf. Capaldi, op. cit., p. 35.

³Trueblood, Titus, Montague, etc.

⁴A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956, pp. 113ff.

⁵Ibid., p. 114.

⁶Montague, op. cit., p. 262.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 263.

⁹Frederick Coopleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. V, Part II, Garden City: Image Books, 1964, p. 26.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 27.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²The Works of George Berkeley, edited by A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, London: Nelson, 1949, p. 249.

¹³Ibid., pp. 44-45.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁸Berkeley was attacked from many sides and the most famous, but unconvincing was that of Samuel Johnson who heard Berkeley preach on immaterialism. Johnson is said to have kicked a stone with mighty strength and exclaimed: "I refute it thus."

¹⁹Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 129-132.

²⁰Ibid., p. 108.

²¹Cf. chapter 18.

²²Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929, p. 136.

²³Ibid., p. 22.

²⁴Ayer, op. cit., p. 118.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 125.

²⁶Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1962, p. 5. Merleau-Ponty's work is an excellent example of one who practices phenomenology in his study.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 69. *The idea of an ensouled body, or a living soul, or embodied soul, is as old as ancient Hebrew thought. Unfortunately, Greek thought was the dominant influence in philosophical development concerning the mind-body problem. This was true even in the Christian tradition that should have known better. It is only in modern times that a recovery of this view of man has taken place in theology, psychology, and philosophy.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 225.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 229.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 223.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 235.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 297.

³⁴*Cf.*, p. 374.

CHAPTER IV

When Can We Say We Know?

Karl Jaspers has said that "the essence of philosophy is not the possession of truth but the search for truth" ¹ Admittedly the pursuit of truth must go on, but how can we know when to stop and take possession of truth that we think we have cornered. What is truth? We have already accepted a tentative definition of knowledge as the acceptance of a proposition or statement as correct for the best of reasons. Knowledge, or knowing implies the truth of what is known. But defining truth is not only difficult, but the feeling of our age is contrary to a sharp definition of truth. The virus of relativism has infected many disciplines and philosophy is not immune to this disease. Nevertheless, if a definition of truth is to mean anything it will have to go in the direction of an unchanging absolute. "Truth is never created; it is found, partly by the senses, partly by the intellect. A proposition that was not true before it was discovered could never become true by being discovered." ² Hence truth is an ideal at the base of all search and research. One may freely admit that many beliefs in science have changed in the last fifty years, but in the admission there is the tacit assumption that the beliefs of the present are "better" truths than those of the past. Admittedly, some of the "better" truths of the present may need revision in the future, but the revision will be on the basis of a closer approximation to the "truth." We are saying then that our beliefs--however justified in them we feel--do vary from time to time, but "the truth does not vary in this way." ³

Setting forth an ideal in truth must not imply that we know that ideal. Truth can exist without its being known. Truth will not change--if it is truth--with the passing of time. Unchangability is one of the necessary characteristics of truth without which it would not be what it is. In this context, truth is opposed to changing opinion.

As an example, one may look at the death of Hitler. Hitler presumably died near the Brandenburg Gate in a bunker in 1945. There was a series of events involved in his death. The actual series of events will be unchanging regardless of how reconstructions take place by historians as time goes by. We will have changing theories about his death, but this simply means we do not know the actual truth of the series. We may never be able to corroborate our theories, but the actual events will not change. If we could know the actual series of events, we would call that "the truth about Hitler."

If the reader is offended at the notion of an absolute truth toward which men work, the term of an "objective truth" may pacify. But in either case, the aim is the same. The historian searches for an account of the past that will stand any future investigation. The scientists hope for a discovery that will stand against any future challenge, and unless both of these disciplines have this as their goal, there is little use in pursuing research of any kind. Truth is not invented, but discovered. It is in contrast to what is fictitious, imaginary, counterfeit, simulated, or pretended. Even these terms imply the status of truth in that we know these things to be less than truth.

Truth must be distinguished in its nature from the means of finding it out. It may be said that truth is a relationship between what is,⁴ or is intended, and what I know about it, or a correct understanding of what is. There may be many ways of testing my understanding, but there is only one truth. It is to these ways of testing truth that we now turn.

A. *The Test of Correspondence*

The test of correspondence has been most succinctly stated by Aristotle. He wrote: "To say what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true."⁵ A contemporary writer has expounded the correspondence theory in the following way:

A belief or assertion is true provided, first, that it is a belief or assertion with response to a certain state of affairs that that state of affairs exists, and provided, secondly that that state of affairs does exist; and a belief or assertion is false provided, first, that it is a belief or assertion with respect to a certain state of affairs that that state of affairs does not exist. It is true that a given state of affairs exists provided that that state of affairs exists; and it is false that a given state of affairs exists provided that that state of affairs does not exist. And a truth, finally, is a state of affairs that exists.⁶

Very simply put, this theory is a test between what I believe about certain facts and the facts themselves. Do they correspond? Is my belief a correct summary of the fact, event, or idea? If I say "I believe it is raining" outside my window, and it is raining, then I have adequately described the events--as far as the water falling--and hence I described it truthfully.

One may see that the correspondence theory follows an empirical emphasis of comparing what is said with what is seen, or experienced sensually.

The theory of correspondence is disarmingly simple and appealing, but critics have raised a variety of objections against it. First, how can one test a correspondence in a sentence like "all centaurs have human-like heads." Since centaurs exist only in fiction, how can it be judged whether they have human-like heads or not? The problem of the nonexistent poses serious questions for the correspondence theory. Second, everyone agrees that 2 plus 2 equals 4, but how can this idea be tested by comparing it to reality? There are other concepts of the mind that have no corresponding reality. Hence, it seems that the theory is inadequate as a test for all kinds of truth. Third, how can one test the theory itself as a test of truth? An assumption must be made that correspondence is a true test of truth. Fourth, it has been objected concerning correspondence that an individual cannot compare his idea with reality.⁷ This anticipates a problem concerning the status of knowledge, but it means that one knows only his own ideas and experience of the world "out there" and thus cannot "step aside" to compare the idea in one's mind with the world "out there."

Correspondence has been attacked additionally for its implying that there is a fact for every statement about a fact. This means that every statement must have a correspondence attached to it. This is not so. Statements of fact about mathematics, ethics, religion, and many other ideas do not have visible corresponding things. Correspondence appears to be limited to the sense experience elements of truth.

Modern defenders of the correspondence theory enlarge the scope of the position. "To say that a statement corresponds to the facts is to say that the statement conforms to whatever standard of objective truth is applicable."⁸ Chisholm doesn't talk merely about facts, but "states of affairs that exist" and "states of affairs that do not exist."⁹

Correspondence does get at a test that cannot be overlooked although its past defenders may have been too narrow in their application. Correspondence may still be too narrowly defined to omit application to a variety of truths. If truth can be defined as a correct understanding of what is, then a statement should seek to correspond to reality as nearly as it can be understood.

The criticisms are not destructive to the theory and the possibility of using it. Some of the criticisms assume too much. Obviously, the objection centering on the illustration "all centaurs have human-like heads" seems to be difficult, but there is a question before this: "are there centaurs?" Since nothing corresponds in space or reality to that prior sentence then the second sentence makes no sense. If intention rather than fact is used concerning some statements, then we would understand that centaurs with human-like heads have real meaning in fiction but not in fact.

The objection that we can't get beyond the concepts of our mind is no serious objection if we recognize that advocates of other theories cannot get beyond their concepts either. But since it is possible to compare my thinking and ideas with other minds as they reflect experienced reality, then we can take courage in the mutual problem that any test of truth would have.

A problem of many theories is that the advocates tend to be reductionistic: this theory is the only way. Correspondence seems to have a field day in certain types of issues and questions, but weaknesses in others. Must there be only one test of whether something is truth? Cannot there be complementary tests? Experience would lead us to believe it to be true.

B. The Test of Coherence

Coherence has been advocated in modern philosophy by Hegel and the idealist tradition. A number of idealists have defended the view in recent times.¹⁰ Coherence as a theory "looks beyond the mere self-consistence of propositions to a comprehensive, synoptic view of all experience . . . Any proposition is true, if it is both self-consistent and coherently connected with our system of propositions as a whole."¹¹

It is admitted by coherence advocates that one cannot attain absolute coherence, but as one presses on toward that ideal the presumption is that better truth will be had.

There was a key word in Brightman's definition above that needs further amplification: "comprehensive." This word has two references. First, it has important reference to experience. Coherence applies in a comprehensive way both internally (in a mental way) and externally. If I omit the empirical from a proper understanding of the comprehensive, I am not comprehensive.¹²

The second reference of comprehensive is that of the "whole." Coherence has been regarded as a way of understanding all of existence, not only as a criterion of truth, but an important ingredient of nature. Coherence need not refer to a "transcendent metaphysical entity" as it frequently is, but "the 'whole' as a criterion is only the whole of our previous experience, knowledge, and belief."¹³ Coherence advocates maintain that coherence cannot be rejected without its being affirmed. This is not a mere formal, barren way of getting agreement to a criterion; it is fundamental to a way of human thinking and living. One is not happy with a new bit of information until it is "married" to other information.

The arguments raised against coherence as a test of truth border on misinterpretation and outright defamation. It is true that some coherence advocates are more radical and extreme than others in their use of the theory, but one must not take the bad examples only for refutation. The arguments used against coherence are as follows: (1) Coherence is regarded as unintelligible since it is a "system of interdependent judgements without a beginning or end."¹⁴ If coherence were this, the objection could stand, but experience built upon empirical learning and reason has a beginning. As a child one learns that matches can be dangerous. This knowledge may then be the basis of directing new experiences in the future. A child who knows that fire burns will not accept without great questioning the proposition that fire does not burn. As for having no end, coherence doesn't, but this is only to say that neither coherence, correspondence, nor any other theory has an absolute grasp on all truth.

(2) Objection is raised by declaring that sometimes two or more coherence systems vie for acceptance as truth. What do you do then? This objection is not insurmountable. One may have to wait until the more coherent emerges. This is not less than the problem in correspondence of waiting until the best theory comes along to fit the facts, or of waiting to know what the facts really are, as in the death of Hitler. How do we know which is the more coherent? By comparing the new system with the old.

(3) The so-called "degrees" of truth involved in coherence is regarded as the main problem of coherence by some philosophers.¹⁵ It is charged that one is always dismantling the knowledge structure that has been erected to make room for new "truths" that are now more "coherent" than the old ones. Moreover, this process will go on and not only is relativism a result, but no truth appears to be settled or final.

But in rebuttal, the re-ordering of our thinking, or accepting the "degrees" of truth does not mean that the entire superstructure is torn down to the bare foundations. Many things are certain such as 2 plus 2 equals 4. Many "truths" have stood the test of time and will not be changed but there are other "truths" that show up to be no truths at all. Correspondence is in no better position at

this point. The view that the sun revolves around the earth corresponds to our visual experience. This was believed for a period of time and it still fits our visual experience. It was rejected for a better theory--that of Copernicus--not because our sense perception changed, but because a better theory was, pardon the phrase, more coherent with everything else we know about the cosmos. Theories involving correspondence must be updated sometimes as well as the coherent theory.

(4) Perhaps one of the more interesting objections is that coherence involves correspondence.¹⁶ As long as correspondence means having a relationship to perception and experience, this is true. Coherence as it has been defined here cannot be isolated from experience. Hence the real question is whether it improves on correspondence or not. It may also be asked: are they really two different theories at all? Has there not been a misunderstanding of what is involved in the two different emphases? Correspondence really acquires and presupposes some measure of coherence: coherence requires and presupposes some measure of correspondence. As long as coherence is defined in a way to include correspondence--the empirical data--then it improves on correspondence by incorporating the area of experience, or the totality of one's experience.

C. The Pragmatic Test

Pragmatism, according to William James, is derived from the Greek word *pragma*, which means action and serves as the basis of our English words *practical* and *practice*. James credits Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) with originating the movement by means of an article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" published in the *Popular Science Monthly* for January of 1878. Peirce's ideas about pragmatism are sufficiently different in emphasis from the later popularizations of James. Because of this difference Peirce rejected the term *pragmatism* for "*pragmaticism*."¹⁷

Peirce used pragmatism first as a theory of meaning. The theory may be pointed up by asking: how can you make an idea clear in its meaning? He summed up a principle for clarifying the meaning of ideas: "Consider what effects which might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."¹⁸ He illustrated this by the idea of hardness. A thing is hard if it is not scratched or mutilated by other substances. One could hardly call a diamond hard if at a slight tap it would be shattered to bits when it was dropped to the floor.

Truth for Peirce is not the popular ideas associated with later pragmatism, i.e., truth is that which leads to action or works. Carefully, Peirce asserts, "the pragmatist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action" Truth is not made as James asserts. Peirce said, "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is real."¹⁹

As we turn to consider the better known pragmatist of the early movement, William James (1842-1910), we can see how the movement drew from Peirce, but turned in a different direction. William James popularized the idea of Pragmatism along with F.C.C. Shiller of England, and John Dewey of America.

What is the truth for James? "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons."²⁰ James develops this to include that promoting life, health, happiness, unless it conflicts with "other vital benefits."²¹ In an essay on the conception of truth, James declares that "true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot."²² Intending to reject the idea that truth is static, James asserts that "truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events."²³ He illustrates this by a man who is lost in the woods and is starving. He sees a cow path and reasons that it should lead to a farmer's house. If it does, he saves himself. For James the idea has practical results. (One may question whether this is not a better illustration for coherence since a conclusion is drawn about the cow path that is based upon previous experience and when the man follows the path his action is consistent with past experience and the reasoning based upon it.)

The fluidity of truth's nature is expressed further in James words: "Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc. are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the course of experience."²⁴

Perhaps one of the most controversial statements of James is that "we have to live today by what truth we can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call it falsehood."²⁵ This sounds like sheer relativity, but in its most acceptable sense James means no more than what is implied in coherence or correspondence. We have progressed beyond Babylonian astrology, Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, and we have come now to Einstein's theory of relativity. It may be that this will have to be discarded--in the future--for a better truth, or a better description of the facts. However, a more critical interpretation, of the Jamesian sentence above regarding pragmatism, brings the conclusion that pragmatism supports a relativity of truth position.

Looking at the opposite of truth, falsehood, James declares that "untrue beliefs work as perniciously in the long run as true beliefs work beneficially."²⁶

The stress that James placed on verification must not go unnoticed although one must not conclude that pragmatism has a monopoly on verification. Verification was important for James' theory of truth. In contrast to the traditional theories of truth involving knowing, reality, and truth, the pragmatic approach reduces this to two: reality and verification. When something is verified, it is known and it is truth.²⁷

Before assessing pragmatism, a brief look must be taken at John Dewey who preferred to call his version instrumentalism. John Dewey (1859-1952) did not like the term truth and used the term "warranted assertability." This means that any statement or judgement made now will stand the test of either past, present, or future inquiry. Thus an idea "is true which works in leading us to what it purports."²⁸

Dewey follows James in saying that truths must be made. This does not mean that I can declare truth to be what I want it to be, but it is more like an investigation that works to solve some

great problem or need. Truth for Dewey is also that which works. But not just any working truth is involved in the idea. Truth is that which satisfies the condition of inquiry.

The final basis of warranted assertability for Dewey is verifiability. This corresponds to the sense that "a key answers the conditions imposed by a lock . . . or a solution answers the requirements of a problem."²⁹ Dewey accepted Peirce's idea that truth is the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate"³⁰

What may be said about pragmatism's view of truth? A number of objections have been raised but not all of them have the same validity. For instance, relativism is a great charge against James' comment that we have to live by today's truths and call them falsehoods tomorrow. A literal interpretation of this sentence does an injustice to the reality of the statement that many changes have come in what we regard as truth, but this change has not invalidated everything we have regarded as true. The same charge of relativism can be made against the other standards of truth. Yet if we must discard the truths of yesterday, why do we do it? Several answers come. First, what we thought was truth wasn't. They were beliefs that had some truth in them, but we misnamed them truth instead of beliefs. Second, if we discard the old "truths" or beliefs, it is because we claim a more cogent explanation than the previous ones. These explanations are closer to what we know as facts, or they are more coherent with everything else we now know. So underlying James' claim to discard "truths" of yesterday is the standard of truth which seeks to escape relativism.

More serious is the question of usefulness. A truth can be useful, and workable, but not necessarily verified. Some so-called "truths" have worked for a long time and eventually were declared false. How long does a theory have to work to be true? By all reasonable standards it should always work. It is argued that Hitler used the Nordic myth for mobilizing a country and this had a workable useful place in his scheme. It worked in varying degrees from the 1920s to 1945. Was it true before 1945 and false afterwards? Its workability and usefulness are not related to verification.

Verification was indeed defined by James in these terms: if it works, it is true. However, verification generally means the workability of something without regard to time or persons involved. James' particular expression has serious problems. First, there is the problem expressed in the previous criticism that some things work for a while, but this would not pass muster as verification. A second problem is in whose eyes something is verified.³¹ For example, my wife "tries" to start the flooded car and fails. I "try" to start the same flooded car and succeed. Why could she not have done it? Two things are pointed up: "trying" something means different things to different people and may involve unobserved and unknown ways of doing it. The other thing relates to the length of trying. One may try to break a small cable by rapidly bending it back and forth and fail, while another man may try it longer and succeed. How long does one have to try an idea or project before truth or falsity can be pronounced on it? It is said that Mussolini believed that democracy was a failure in Italy before he came to power. Had democracy been tried long enough and intently enough?

Another question relates to the statement: "true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify." This seems to draw on coherence for the matter of assimilating

and corroborating, and on correspondence for verifying and validating. Is pragmatism just a sophisticated form of correspondence and coherence?

Although pragmatism and instrumentalism protest against truth as being static, some norm must always creep back into the issue, even though it may be called by some other name. Obviously, there are more warrantable assertions than others, and the reason being that some statements are more true than others. Why is this? What is the nature of the truth that is being approached? Instrumentalism seems to evade this in opting for warranted assertability. This question helps to point out a distinction that pragmatism seems to ignore--the nature of truth versus how we find it out. Pragmatism is more efficient in discerning what a specific truth is as opposed to giving an answer to the nature of truth. Another way of looking at it is that the pragmatist re-defines truth in a way different from coherence or correspondence.

Although we have tried to interpret James' remarks about changing truth in the best context, there is yet a real question about the firmness of truth. The lack of firmness has led to the question of whether one can rightfully speak of a theory of truth at all in James.³² Even its emphasis on experimentalism requires that certain things be permanent and stable. An experiment without certain elements as unchanging would be incapable of producing anything. So in the growth of knowledge there must be some things that are established upon which one can build. If there is not some permanence in the learning system one would be driven both psychologically and intellectually into skepticism.

D. The Test of Verification

A related but justifiably different approach to the issue of truth comes from the logical empirical movement which has focused upon the idea of verification. We will see something of the approach of this movement later but for our purposes here we are looking at its approach to truth.

For sake of brevity of expression we will use the term "positivist" to speak of this position. Positivists have attempted to analyze the use of language and concluded that there are two kinds of propositions: analytic and synthetic. The analytic can be tested in terms of logic. The familiar 2 plus 2 equals 4, or "all bachelors are unmarried" kind of things make it obvious they are seen to be true on the basis of logic. The synthetic is more difficult to deal with. The synthetic refers to the sense experience world. For example, "I see a pin oak tree" is a sense experience. I am saying that if you look out that direction from my house you will see a pin oak. You can reproduce the same experience. Speaking of a pin oak tree is easy, but what about a statement like: "the world is mental." This is certainly not an analytic statement. Since I am not able to see with my eyes the mentalness of the world, what can I say about this statement? If there is anything that corresponds to "mental reality?"

The positivist have their answer for this. But before we look at it, it should be noted that the traditional test of "what is truth?" is rejected by some positivists. We have been pointing up the distinction between the nature of truth and how one finds it out. For positivists, there is no "nature

of truth" where one attempts to understand the statement about something and the agreement or coherence. Something called the "nature of truth" is never seen anymore than "mental-reality" is seen by the eyes. The nature-of-truth question, therefore, is regarded by positivists as an ill-conceived and meaningless question. What philosophers have really been trying to learn, says the positivists, is the answer to the question: "what makes a proposition true or false?"³³ Or, "in other words, it is a way of asking how propositions are validated."³⁴

How is this done? Ayer answers:

The answer is that we test the validity of an empirical hypothesis by seeing whether it actually fulfills the function which it is designed to fulfill. And we have seen that the function of an empirical hypothesis is to enable us to anticipate experience. Accordingly, if an observation to which a given proposition is relevant conforms to our expectations, the truth of that proposition is confirmed.³⁵

Ayer admits that there is no certainty in this operation. If the experiment comes off according to expectations then creditability has been enhanced. There is no question that it will be repeated. If it does not, then questions about the experiment may be raised; if it is successful again, greater probability of being true is attached to the statement.

Ayer holds out the possibility of a new test of rationality in the future, but since science has been so successful with verification, it appears to be the best way for now.³⁶

Since there is much in common with pragmatism and its view of verification and positivism we will not rehash the problems and difficulties of verification as a single criterion of truth. Moreover, more will be said about it in the chapter on Science, Philosophy and Religion.

E. The Performative Theory of Truth

The performative theory refers to the experience of agreeing with someone who has made a statement. It is not a statement about a statement as in "It is true . . ." "that the car is green." When I say that "it is true" I may be agreeing, accepting, endorsing, granting, admitting that someone has said, encouraging, answering, reminding someone, warning or reproving someone. Thus "it is true" may mean many things other than as a test of truth.

The correspondence theory of truth has been the most widely accepted theory of truth in this century. But it has come under attack from certain people, notably, P.F. Strawson (1919--) a prominent British philosopher associated with what has been described as "Oxford Philosophy."

Strawson attacked the correspondence theory as needing "not purification but elimination."³⁷

Strawson attacked the traditional correspondence theory on the following grounds: (1) Correspondence does not apply to many kinds of statements. "It does not apply to negative, general and existential statements, nor straight-forwardly, or hypothetical and disjunctive statements."³⁸ An

example of a brief sentence for which true does not apply is "Bring me an orange." Yet another kind would be "Do you like to play the piano?" There is no object called "like to play" that is objective for a checkup with correspondence.

(2) Correspondence requires a statement with something to which it refers in the world. Strawson wrote, "And it is evident that the demand that there should be such a relatum is logically absurd; a logically fundamental type-mistake."³⁹ He goes on to say:

For while we certainly say that a statement corresponds to (fits, is borne out by, agrees with,) the facts, as a variant on saying that it is true, we never say that a statement corresponds to the thing, person, etc., it is about. What "makes the statement" that the cat has mange "true" is not the cat, but the condition of the cat, i.e., the fact that the cat has the mange. The only plausible candidate for the position of what (in the world) makes the statement true is the fact it states; but the fact it states is not something in the world.⁴⁰

Strawson further noted that when one says "that's a fact" one is also saying "that's true." One would not continue to say "that's true, it is a fact." If we continue to examine a statement like "I am alarmed by the fact that kitchen expenditure has risen by 50 per cent in the last year," it becomes apparent that it is not a question of truth criteria that is being set forth, but the attempt to convey a feeling and alarm for securing sympathy in the matter, or relief from inflation.

Another example is that of the welfare state in which there is only a hypothetical consideration. "It is true that the general health of the community has improved (that p), but this is due only to the advance in medical science."⁴¹ That kind of statement is meaningful and performs a function in discourse, but one does not have a statement-with-reference as the correspondence theory requires.

Strawson's essay on Truth points up some of the weaknesses of the correspondence theory. But to call for its elimination may be extreme. It seems to have application to some kinds of statements and may need better description concerning its application. The simple experience of checking a statement with the fact is what has given it a continuing appeal. Theorists who claim a universality for it on all kinds of statements make it vulnerable.

Application and Conclusion

We have looked at several ways of testing whether a statement is true. The first two, correspondence and coherence, deal more precisely with the nature of truth. Pragmatism and verification deal more with the tests of certain kinds of statements, or the application of the statements. The performative view describes the function of the word "true" in some of its usages, but not its nature.

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Footnotes

¹Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954, p. 12.

²The Ways of Knowing, p. 125.

³Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., p. 1966, p. 17.

⁴Some confusion abounds in distinguishing the nature of truth as what is and a correct understanding of it, from the correspondence theory which seems to say the same thing. But the correspondence theory is a comparison between my belief and what is. The first one may be truth and the second a statement about the truth.

⁵Metaphysics, 1011b.

⁶Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

⁷Edgar Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, Third Ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, p. 67.

⁸Hamlyn, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁹To which objection is made. Cf. Capaldi, p. 100.

¹⁰Brand Blanchard, Edgar Brightman, F.R. Bradley, Bosanquet, A.C. Ewing, etc.

¹¹Brightman, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

¹²C.F. A.C. Ewing, "If we take coherence as meaning mere internal coherence irrespective of experience, then it is inadequate as a criterion, but that is not what is meant by the leading advocates of the theory." Idealism, Strand, Eng.: Methuen and Co., p. 243.

¹³Ibid., p. 247.

¹⁴Capaldi, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

¹⁵Elton Trueblood, General Philosophy, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 65.

¹⁶Capaldi, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

¹⁷Cf. his essay "What Pragmatism Is" in Pragmatism, ed. by H. Standish Thayer, New York: Mentor Books, 1970, pp. 101-120.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 97.

²⁰Essays in Pragmatism, edited by Alburey Castell, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1959, p. 155.

²¹Ibid., p. 156.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 160.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 161.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 168.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 170.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 174. For other grave criticisms of pragmatism one may consult F.H. Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1914, pp. 65-149.

²⁷Cf. Thomas E. Hill, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, New York: Ronald Press, 1961, p. 307.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 304. (Quotes from Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*.)

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 343. (Quotes from *Problems of Man*, p. 343.)

³⁰*Pragmatism*, p. 97.

³¹Cf. the problem of verification in Chapter V, *Science, Philosophy, and Religion*.

³²Cf. Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

³³A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, New York: Dover Publications, 1936, p. 90.

³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 99.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 100.

³⁷P.F. Strawson, "Truth," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Vol. XXIV (1950), pp. 129-156; reprinted in *An Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry*, edited by Joseph Margolis, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, p. 557.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 573.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 560.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 560-61.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 558.

CHAPTER V

Knowledge and Method in Science, Philosophy, and Religion

The reader may feel a little uncomfortable about the linking together of these three disciplines. One may feel that there is little in common between the three. Moreover, there are prejudices that divide adherents of each community of study. The prejudices may be linked to the myths that opponents help perpetuate about rival disciplines. A common myth about religion is that it fosters a closed mind to new ideas, intolerance toward those who disagree, and authoritarianism (accepting beliefs for which no reasons are offered).

A famed example that illustrates the myth about religion is the church's treatment of Galileo. The church was wrong about Galileo and there have been other instances of wrongs. However, the church needs to be credited with its contributions also. It preserved manuscripts when no one else seemed interested. These manuscripts have been a veritable repository of learning which would have been lost without the monastic library. At the same time, the church spawned the university which has been a benefactor of mankind. In spite of this, the church has gained the image of opposition to new learning, particularly in the realm of science.

The myth about the church is well known. But less has been said about the myth associated with science and often perpetuated by scientists. The myth about science is that it is always open to any new idea, asks no presuppositions or first truths or principles, and has no personal motivations in the on-going of science. Two brief examples may illustrate the contradiction of the myth. These relate to persecution of people within the scientific community by scientists. In Germany in the 1880s mathematics was dominated by a Professor Kroeneker who was able to bar a Professor Canter from promotion in all German universities as well as preventing him from publishing in German mathematical journals.¹ A near contemporary example is seen in the reaction of the scientific community to the work of Immanuel Velikovsky. Velikovsky published Worlds in Collision in 1950. His book was denounced by prominent scientists who never bothered to read it. Pressure was brought from the scientific community on the publisher to cease publishing it. Another publisher was found that did not succumb to the academic pressure. Velikovsky has not been proven wrong in his predictions. Many of his predictions have been accepted by astronomers and other scientists, but little credit has been given to him.² Science, like religion, does have its skeletons in the closet.

Philosophy does not emerge much better off. Philosophers are among the most narrowly opinionated, biased people in the world, but their myth is that of openness, rationality, and reserve on passing judgments until all the evidence is in. The unofficial rumors indicate that a man would not even be considered seriously as a professorial candidate if he were not of the "right

philosophical school." For, after all, what has positivism to do with idealism? Or, idealism with existentialism?, etc.

Our goal in this chapter involves three aims: (1) to treat some of the unfortunate fictions or myths that exist about these disciplines, (2) to set forth presuppositions that are basic to some of the disciplines, and (3) to treat the methods involved, particularly in science and religion. As usual, an assessment will be made in summary with criticisms.

A. *Science*

1. *What is the scientific method?*

Science is a word derived from the Latin *scire*, meaning "to know." This gives us no meaningful use of the term as far as the modern scientific community is concerned. We commonly attribute the term "science" to many diverse disciplines ranging from physics to psychology. But our interest here is not in the disciplines that are called scientific, nor the body of information commonly pigeon-holed as sciences, but the method or methods whereby information is gathered in the various disciplines. Some writers insist that there is no single method for science, but several methods. They speak of one method or a single method more applicable to a discipline, but this would not bar the use of other methods in a minor way.

What, then, is the scientific method. David H. Killeffer³ describes two different approaches to research in answering this question. The first model is that of Bacon-Edison in which one makes large numbers of "experiments or observations from which one draws conclusions and a theory." The other model of the scientific method is called "the Aristotle-Bancroft approach, based on forming a theory first and then seeking to prove or disprove it by experiment."⁴ The two models or methods may be used alternately or in hybrid mixture of the two methods.

The scientific method may also be described as a way of going about research. Killeffer lists two sets of steps one may follow in dealing with a problem.

1. Consciousness of a problem;
2. Stating the problem;
3. Assembling the elements of a solution;
4. Choosing from these and combining them into a solution; and finally
5. Subjecting our solution to a trial to prove whether or not it is a valid solution.⁵

The other set of steps are:

1. Recognition;
2. Definition;
3. Preparation;
4. Incubation;
5. Inspiration;

6. Confirmation; and
7. Remuneration.⁶

John Dewey called this the method of reflective thinking and his analysis involved five steps.

1. Problem;
2. Intellectualization;
3. Hypothesis;
4. Reasoning;
5. Testing the hypothesis.

A simple illustration will indicate its application. Suppose my car will not start. That is my problem. Asking why is my second step. Posing alternate hypotheses: (1) the battery is dead, (2) the battery cable is corroded, (3) the starter is broken. Reasoning and reflecting on these alternatives leads me to reject (1) because the battery is new, and the lights work, and other things work, while (3) is rejected because it has not given any trouble, and (2) is accepted because upon looking under the hood I discover the acid buildup on the battery. The hypothesis is tested when the cable is removed, cleaned, replaced, and I can now start the car.

This method is only a guideline. The above situation happened to my car. However, recently with a new car just two months old the same reasoning took place, and (1) was the case. The new battery was a "lemon" and this came to light only after other alternatives were explored.

In attempting to answer what is the scientific method? other writers assert that there is no single method employed by all sciences alike. "There is no such thing as the scientific method."⁷ Agreeing with Conant, Harold Titus lists four other approaches that he designates scientific methods: (1) Observation. Related to astronomy, botany, one observes with the senses and draws conclusions or relationships. (2) Trial and Error. Edison's search for filament for the light bulb involved over 6000 different "tries" until he was successful. (3) Experimentation. Physics has expanded its body of knowledge through controlled circumstances in which many factors of investigation can be manipulated. (4) Statistics. The collection of "sample" opinion, or sample "data" is used for making inferences that serve as the basis of making general conclusions.⁸

One may develop more detailed procedures within the four categories above. But each of them is designated as a scientific method by some authors.

The sciences have grown in volume of information related to the fruitfulness of the scientific method. Life today is better because of this growth. There is no question about the benefits of science. We must pause, however, to focus on the problems as they relate to science and its method.

Problems

1) Science as science, and the scientific method are a-moral. In an important little work on science,⁹ Norman Campbell declared that "though science helps us in controlling the external world,

it does not give us the smallest indication in what direction that control should be exercised." The choice of ends or goals must come from outside the scientific discipline. In the presidential address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in 1959, Herbert Feigl said that "once we have decided what we ought to do, science may be able to tell us what means will be the most effective and with the least interference with other morally authenticated purposes enable us to do it." Then he asks,

How could science demonstrate that mankind ought to perpetuate its existence rather than terminate it? That wars of defense are justifiable, that parents ought to feel responsible for their infants?¹⁰

There are many other moral issues but the basic point remains: how can science or its methods tell us what ought to be done in each case?

Putting all of this together, an a-moral method of research and discovery has produced a system so efficient that it demands a certain uniformity of the society for the efficiency of the "system" to continue. This efficiency cannot tolerate deviation, and all of life appears oriented to continuing this efficiency. Education is geared to passing on scientific knowledge and culture so that in turn more scientific knowledge may be gained. Can man survive in freedom and individuality amidst the surge for conformity?

Lundberg's book, Can Science Save Us? appeared to regard as insignificant the question of a normative look at man's existence. For him, what people are doing is what they want. He dismisses the normative element--what people should do--as a semantic trick to get people to do what someone else wants.¹¹ Such a process of thought can be used to devastating ends. Welfare, impersonal factory work, ghettos, and many other things are what people do. Following Lundberg's reasoning we can conclude that this is what they want. Acquiescing in what people do holds little promise for reforming society. If we lose sight of a meaningful existence for man, we have lost all but the hollow machinery. We abolish man as man.¹²

2) Science has had a terrible temptation to be reductionistic. In many instances, it has succumbed. Reductionism is the tendency to interpret complex data from the vantage point of a single item, or idea. A reductionistic view of the world is eventually applied to man's existence and nature. We can say that matter is atomic in nature. But is man only a conglomerate of atoms? Reductionism plays loose and easy with man's existential life in considering man as a total being. A chemical view of man's nature leaves man's personhood without meaning. It is man's personhood that is the most significant part of his existence.

3) Scientists should be guarded in their public disclosure on the popular level. Less use of "it has been proven" and more of "it appears to be" statement should be made in journals and newspapers. Science offers probable evidence. Each generation comes to see that some of the things it regarded as "proven" are rejected in light of better evidence. One grows weary of all the "provenness" in science as it is given to the public media.

A few years back, the anthropologist Leakey was featured in the National Geographic concerning one of his finds which was regarded as the oldest man fossil in existence. Dated in 1.75 million years ago, this "man" was a sensational find. A few months later, Time magazine had a half-inch blurb stating that Leakey's find was not a man, but a gibbon. This is not only misleading to the general public but it is also careless scholarship.

4) Science is limited by its method and instruments. You do not transcend your instruments. When Gregorian, the Russian Cosmonaut declared that he didn't see God out in space he was only propagandizing, not acting as a responsible scientist within the bounds of his method. It had no relation to scientific technique. He did not have the method nor the instruments to see if God were out there.

Our methods and instruments are frequently limited. We can measure the heartbeat, but there is no device for measuring love. We can measure bodies, but not persons. We can measure intelligence, but no instruments have been devised for measuring God, the essence of love, and other intangibles. We should not conclude that because they cannot be measured, they do not exist. We can admit that the scientific method is limited and affirm the existence of love, persons, God, and other intangibles on some other basis.

One of the implications of the problem expressed here in this context is that much bullying has been associated with the scientific methods. People have been brow-beaten toward atheism because science cannot prove the existence of God. A true perspective on the scientific methods is that they are not capable of doing this positively or negatively. It may be possible that eventually some technique may be originated for answering the question in a scientific fashion on whether God exists or not. It may also be that nothing will ever appear to solve the question scientifically.

5) Summary. These problems are evident when the scientific methods are misused, or when the claims for the methods are too extreme. The scientific methods have a valuable role in knowledge and will continue to play a significant role.

2. *Scientific Fictions* (special issues in science)

1) Verification. Scientific verification means (1) that a theory can be proven by some means, and (2) that this means can be repeated by other scientists. The last point is related to objectivity. Verification is vital to science and has kept science on a fairly down-to-earth basis. This discussion is not intended to bring a new definition of verification or to discard it. However, there are misleading claims about verification. In his attempt to downgrade popular fallacies on why people believe as they do, Norman Campbell wrote concerning scientists:

If they are really men of science, intimately acquainted with their study by the actual practice of it, they cannot have failed to learn how dangerous it is to believe any statement, however, firmly asserted by a high authority, unless they have tested it for themselves.¹³

However, as a matter of experience scientists everywhere accept all kinds of information and data that they never test for themselves. They do not have the time, resources, or the desire to test everything for themselves. In many matters scientists must trust the honesty, integrity, and correctness of the journals they read.

Another statement, this one from Kemeny, also relates to verification:

The scientist holds his theories, tentatively, always prepared to abandon them if facts do not bear out the predictions. If a series of observations, designed to verify certain predictions, force us to abandon our theory, then we look for a new or improved theory.¹⁴

Kemeny states it as it ought to be. But in actuality theories are not abandoned when a few stubborn facts do not fit. Rather, a theory may be held in faith that the contrary facts will be cleared up, be irrelevant, or eventually go away and be ignored. There may be good justification for this stubbornness and it may be vindicated. But it is contrary to the easy abandonment suggested by Kemeny. Michael Polanyi wrote that "Quantum theory of light was first proposed by Einstein--and that upheld subsequently for twenty years--in spite of its being in sharp conflict with the evidence of optical diffraction."¹⁵

An implication arising out of this discussion is that verification is not as simple as it sounds on the surface. Put together the powerful criteria of verification, reproducibility of results, agreement reached by independent methods of determination, and yet there are instances of things appearing to be verified, but later turn up to be false.¹⁶

Verification as a criteria of science is yet limited by Kemeny when he noted: "the key to the verification of theories is that you never verify them. What you do verify are logical consequences of the theory."¹⁷ Concerning conceptual schemes on a large scale as they relate to science, Conant admits that "few if any hypotheses on a grand scale are conceptual schemes that can be directly tested."¹⁸

Other people have raised questions about the requirement of verification. Bertrand Russell rejected the positivistic form which asserted that "what cannot be verified or falsified is meaningless."¹⁹ If science insists on everything being verified, it stands in the awkward position of accepting a proposition that cannot be verified--namely, the verification principle. In sum, science that is bent on rejecting unverified truths accepts one as the basic ingredient of its position.

The requirement of verification in science may be inapplicable to certain areas. Scientists speak of electrons in a meaningful way, but it is questionable whether one can ever really know what an electron will do because an electron is so small that even light cannot illuminate it. It is smaller than the smallest wave length. "It is obviously impossible to see a body that is smaller than the wavelength of the light by which it is illuminated."²⁰

One last question concerning verification relates to the subjective response of the scientists. This is like asking: when is something verified? In whose eyes is it verified? Why have Marxist

scientists usually rejected the theory of relativity while western scientists have usually accepted it? What would it take to convince a Marxist of his error? When would verification be?

Verification has had a large role in science and will continue to do so, but it must be understood as more subjective than the fiction about it suggests.

2. *Objectivity*

There is a fiction that science is objective, that it works only with the facts "out there." Bunge defines objectivity in the following way:

Empirical and rational supports are objective in the sense that they are in principle susceptible of being weighted and controlled in accordance with definite and stable standards.²¹

Israel Scheffler wrote concerning objectivity:

A fundamental feature of science is its ideal of objectivity, an ideal that subjects all scientific statements to the test of independent and impartial criteria, recognizing no authority of persons in the realm of cognition.²²

He further elaborates the standard view concerning science:

It (the standard view) understands science to be a systematic public enterprise, controlled by logic and by empirical fact, whose purpose it is to formulate the truth about the natural world. The truth primarily sought is general, expressed in laws of nature, which tell us what is always and everywhere the case. Observation, however, supplies the particular empirical facts, the hard phenomenal data which our lawlike hypotheses strive to encompass, and for which it is the ultimate purpose of such hypotheses to account.²³

These comments lend support to the popular notion that science is concerned with the "facts" out there, those facts which are seen by everyone and held in common agreement. Scientific facts are said to be known by minds, but not shaped by minds. Hence, science is objective.

This view of science, here labeled as a fiction, has come under increasing criticism in the last two decades. Two of the leading critics are Michael Polanyi and T.S. Kuhn. Kuhn's work will serve as the model of criticism of this view labeled "scientific fiction."

Kuhn sees science as beginning when a paradigm comes into being. A paradigm is a model or pattern. A paradigm means also an understanding of a particular set of events, facts, or problems. Before a paradigm begins or is completed, only a set of unrelated problems or questions are in existence. Gradually an understanding of these problems emerges around a particular viewpoint and a paradigm is born.

The paradigm gains its status because it is successful in solving problems that the researchers are regarding as acute. It may not solve all the problems, but a paradigm does at least three things: (1) it dictates what the real facts of the problems are, (2) it dictates what future research will be carried out within the parameters of the discipline, and (3) it brings into being new instruments for testing the research based on the paradigm. Many instruments of science would not exist if a different paradigm had been held.

Once a paradigm comes into being, people are recognized by their adherence to it. Those who cling to older or different paradigms are "simply read out of the profession, which thereafter ignores their work Those unwilling or unable to accommodate their work to it must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to some other group."²⁴

Once a paradigm is accepted, scientific work goes on within the paradigm's definition. Normal science is resolving problems within the paradigm, not creating new paradigms. New paradigms only arise when increasing dissatisfaction arises over the old paradigm's inability to solve certain problems. Science is puzzle-solving within the paradigm. Kuhn notes, "Once a first paradigm through which to view nature has been found, there is no such thing as research in the absence of any paradigm. To reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself."²⁵ But the paradigm is so important for directing the course of research that where scientists have different paradigms they engage in different laboratory manipulations.

Since a paradigm is a certain way of looking at the world, a paradigm will enable one to see things he would not otherwise see. A layman looks at a chair without the paradigm of science and sees a hard piece of metal or wood. A physicist may look at the chair and through the help of the paradigm "see" the atomic structure of the chair involving a lot of empty space of the atomic nature of the chair. Without the paradigm the physicists could not reach that viewpoint.

The crucial implications of this change of paradigm, or no paradigm, is seen in Kuhn's statement:

As a result, the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a redefinition of the corresponding science. Some old problems may be relegated to another science, or declared entirely unscientific. Others that were previously non-existent or trivial may, with a new paradigm become the very archetypes of significant scientific achievement. And as the problems change, so, often, does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word games, or mathematical play.²⁶

Kuhn's interpretation of science may be seen to stress the priority of the rational over the empirical. The empirical becomes important within the paradigm, and in establishing the paradigm once the rationality of the paradigm is conceived.

One other charge of Kuhn is that science known for its insistence on the facts, actually goes out of its way to twist the facts. This is noted on the use of textbooks as a method of teaching the profession of science. Kuhn noted

The depreciation of historical fact is deeply, and probably functionally, ingrained in the ideology of the scientific profession, the same profession that places the highest of all values upon factual details of others sorts.²⁷

The reason for the re-writing and twisting of the history of science in textbooks used by students is to give the impression that scientists of the present are working on the same problems as scientists of the past. This creates the impression that science is a cumulative effort, rather than one related to revolutionary changes in paradigms, which is the actual historical fact. The cumulative appearance is wrong, argues Kuhn, for many of the "puzzles of contemporary normal science did not exist until after the most recent scientific revolution. Very few of them can be traced back to the historic beginning of the science within which they now occur."²⁸

Changing paradigms, therefore, make for changing ways of viewing the same events, facts, and things. Hence there is a problem of objectivity. A better substitute term is probably intersubjectivity in which one person follows another person's thinking, agreeing or disagreeing because their views make more sense in interpreting the present problems, puzzles, and questions about the world. But a new paradigm may be in the making to bring about a different and presumably better understanding.

3. *Presuppositions.*

Science has maintained for itself the image that it has no presuppositions, that it begins with work on the raw materials of nature and the universe. In contrast to other studies, particularly religion, science has viewed itself as asking no sacred beginning points. This is a fiction, or a myth. It is false and misleading. Instead, science requires--as does all disciplines--presuppositions.

What is a presupposition? There are different words used by different thinkers. Some speak of presuppositions, others of assumptions, still others of principles or premises. We draw no lines of distinction between these terms for our purpose here. There are different kinds of suppositions and some of them are more debated than others. It is important to know that if presuppositions are changed, the interpretation of the data studied will also be changed.

Survey the brief list that Conant describes as "common-sense assumptions."

1. We assume the existence of other persons.
2. We assume we can communicate with other persons.
3. We assume a three dimensional existence of objects.
4. We assume the existence of objects independent of the knower.
5. We assume the uniformity of nature.
6. We assume the reproducibility of phenomena.²⁹

In many works on the philosophy of science not much is said about any of the above assumptions except for number five. The assumption of the uniformity of nature is debated in contemporary literature. Philosophers from the time of Mill to Bertrand Russell in his book, Human Knowledge, have answered that there is uniformity in nature. Many others argue against the premise of the uniformity of nature. But even when it is rejected something else is put in its place. Stephen Toulmin rejected the principle and declared, "So it is not Nature that is Uniform, but scientific procedure; and it is uniform only in this, that it is methodical and self-correcting."³⁰

Presuppositions vary in different world views, or one may say that world views vary and change as time moves on. During Galileo's time it was assumed that the universe could be understood in mass-in-motion terms "governed by laws of mathematical dynamics."³¹ With Newton it was assumed that all phenomena could be reduced to "mechanics of some ultimate constituent particles." The twentieth century has been influenced by Faraday and Maxwell to assume a universe of electrical properties. No one knows what the future may bring in new world-view presuppositions.

Having talked about the importance and place of presuppositions let us turn to examine some types of presuppositions.

Type I. Presuppositions basic to knowledge.

1. I exist
2. Other people exist
3. Reciprocal communication can take place
4. Nature exists independent of the mind
5. Discourse depends upon forms of logic

Type II. Additudinal presuppositions necessary for continuing development of science.

1. The desire to observe, organize, measure, and experiment is vital to science.
2. The activities described in II.1, are of value and produce meaningful knowledge.
3. In the pursuit of discovery, men must make choices and the choices determine the knowledge he may or may not derive.
4. The scientific endeavor depends upon the integrity and honesty of the scientist.

Type III. Presuppositions concerning nature and methodology.

1. Nature is real, not an illusion.
2. There are orderliness and regularity in nature.
3. Nature is understandable, and knowable.
4. Nature can be expressed in mathematical terms.
5. Measuring something gives us knowledge of that item.
6. Natural laws are not affected by time.

(Some of these presuppositions are rejected in the Islamic world. Consider the contrast between Jewish and Muslim scientists in terms of Nobel awards in science. One interesting contrast involves the Nobel prizes in various disciplines such as Physics, Medicine, Economics, Chemistry, literature and world peace. There were 182 awards to Jewish scientists and only 9 of them were awarded to Muslims. Why the big difference?

The answer is in education and the kind of education that exists in the Muslim world and the different educational outlook in the non-Muslim world.

The type of educational system has to be traced from the beginning of Islam as well as the rise of science in Europe. Islam inherited a great cultural achievement and had advantages over the West until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It made scientific progress in astronomy, medicine, and mathematics.

What makes science possible? Robert Merton has suggested some norms for science to develop. First, universalism. This involves the idea that knowledge should be judged without regard to the person advocating it. It is knowledge that stands on its own. It also involves the fact that everyone should be admitted to the world of science. Second, communalism means that knowledge is to be shared with the community at large. It is not to be kept secret by the discoverer. Third, disinterestedness, the quality of seeking knowledge for knowledge sake, not personal profit or gain. Fourth, organized skepticism. All claims are to be open to criticism and evaluation. A problem arises immediately in considering the fact that Muslims will not allow the views of Mohammed to be questioned. I have been told that if I were a Muslim I would not ask doubting questions about Mohammed, the Qur'an, and Islamic practices. To obey is better than to question. This is also one of the problems why early Chinese science did not develop further than it did because one should not question one's father who is always right.

While there have been conflicts between science and religion in the West it is precisely the philosophical and theological ideas of Christianity that have made science possible.

The idea that the world is rational and orderly, the world is like a machine, the world was created by a divine being – all were themes of Christian clerics, philosophers, and theologians. Moreover, the idea that man had a sense of conscience was related to man's sense of rationality. More on this later. Moreover, the dissemination of knowledge made possible by the printing press did not happen in the Muslim world. The printing press was banned in the Muslim world until the 19th century.

To repeat, Arabic science was the most advanced in the world from the 8th to the 14th centuries. The Arabs had access to the Greek scientific heritage which was lost to the West after the fall of the Roman empire. The great works of Greece and other cultures were translated into Arabic. Along with this the Arabs borrowed the Hindu numeral system

What happened to Muslim science?

A division was made between Islamic sciences and "foreign" science. Islamic sciences related to the Quran, the traditions of the Prophets (hadith), legal knowledge (fiqh), theology (kalam),

poetry, and the Arabic language. Arithmetic was useful for dividing inheritances, astronomy was useful for prayer time computations, and there was a purpose for medicine. But beyond these areas Arabic science did not break through to the modern era of science.

Toby Huff declared,

"This means that the modern scientific world view rests on certain assumptions about the regularity and lawfulness of the natural world and the presumption that man is capable of grasping this underlying structure. In addition to subscribing to the notion of laws of nature, modern science is a metaphysical system which asserts that man, unaided by spiritual agencies or divine guidance, is single-handedly capable of understanding and grasping the laws that govern man and the universe."¹

In the Arabic-Islamic world in the late 800's and early 900's there were a number of philosophers who were very liberal in their thinking, so much so that they can be described as "free-thinkers" suggesting that philosophical knowledge was the most noble and some suggested that religion was "little more than superstition."² By the 12th and 13th centuries a change had taken place and thinkers were criticized for religious arguments that might lead ordinary believers astray.

Ibn Qadama wrote "no one is ever seen who has studied speculative theology, but there is a corrupt quality of his mind."³ He had some severe words of punishment to be meted out to those who took up speculative theology. Departing from the Qur'an, the Sunna, and the Islamic sources was regarded as a tainting enterprise. Consequently, philosophy and natural science went underground. One would not like to acquire the reputation of being an impious person which could threaten your life.

In the midst of these ideological developments came the educational system of the Islamic world. The madrasas began to have influence in the 11th century and dominated intellectual life. A major feature of the madrasas was its curriculum. Instruction was centered around the religious sciences exclusively, while philosophy and the natural sciences were ignored.

Some teachers did consider the natural sciences and gave private instruction in their own homes.

After a student had mastered the subjects in the madrasa he was given an *ijaza*, a certification to teach others. The student might collect *ijazas* from a number of teachers. These were individual teachers, not a joined faculty as in a college. This was a very personalistic approach without regard to a certifying body. In learning about the natural sciences one had to travel from city to city to find scholars outside of the madrasas. Since the natural sciences were excluded from the madrasas this naturally gave a negative view toward the natural sciences. The lack of a joint effort in teaching the natural sciences prevented "the efficient cumulation of knowledge by bringing scholars versed in the ancient sciences together in one place."⁴

A further complication for intellectual life in medieval Islamic life was the division between the learned and the ignorant. While there were various reasons among different thinkers for doing so, they all shared "the sentiment that ordinary citizens (the masses) are not capable of grasping the

higher truths of philosophy" or the scripture. "In some cases it was simply asserted that if a person were 'a believer' he will know that to discuss those (philosophical) questions openly is forbidden by the Holy Law."⁵ This doctrine of concealment ran against the whole ethos of scientific development in terms of universalism and communalism.

In contrast, the Reformation in Christianity stressed the priesthood of the believer in which the common man was open to all knowledge. Moreover, the Reformation made use of the printing press to bring the Bible into the language of the people.

Consequently, the exclusion of the natural sciences from the curriculum of the madrasa leaves the conclusion that they were marginally significant. "Thus within the Muslim world of the late Middle ages, the utility and usefulness of knowledge is narrowly construed to mean knowledge useful in a strictly religious context."⁶

There are several inferences to be drawn here. Where science was practiced as in astronomy there was little advance beyond what was religiously useful. The Muslim scientists did not make a break through to modern science even though they were close to it.

There was also an absence "of the rationalistic view of man and nature, most thoroughly exemplified in Plato's Timaeus, which played such an important role in the philosophical thought of the European Middle Ages. Instead, the view that stressed the need to confine intellectual inquiry to those spheres that coincided with and aided the religious regulation of life carried with it the important theological view often referred to as Islamic occasionalism, a view which denied that the natural order was a rational order governed solely by laws of nature. The orthodox Ash'arite position was rather than the world was a continuous flux of moments, recreated each instant, but with a habitual pattern of continuity, knowledge of which was implanted in the believers' mind by God. For anyone to declare otherwise would be foolhardy at best and life-endangering at worst."⁷

Another impediment to science was the "dominance of the extended kin family which worked against the formation of guilds and associations of disinterested non-kin professionals."⁸ Knowledge was passed on individually and there was no meeting of the minds to debate the truth of what a teacher taught. A student gained the ijaza which empowered one to teach the same subject, not necessarily advance knowledge. Without the guilds and associations there was no protection for people who could propound new and innovative ideas and theories.

In the West a different ethos developed. The Greek had a great faith in reason and the rational understanding of the world. The recovery of the Roman legal tradition along with the recovery of the Greek traditions in philosophy and science brought about a renaissance in Europe. Philosophy, theology, law and scientific inquiry were affected by the influence of the Greek literature. Moreover, colleges and universities were founded to bring about a new era of learning. The Christian elite were at the forefront of this movement.

Timaeus, by Plato, gave the movement its rationalist strength. Huff wrote,

"What most impressed the European thinkers of the early modern period about the Timaeus was the image of nature as an orderly, integrated whole. The natural world was portrayed as a rational order of causes and effects, while man, as part of the rational order of things, was elevated by virtue of his reason."⁹

Nature could be studied apart from theology and exhibited orderliness and lawfulness. Eventually the world was described in terms of a machine, running in a cause and effect manner according to laws.

Man was a part of this rational order and his rationality was taken seriously. His rationality was reflected in viewing the world as a rational place. Huff explained,

"Accordingly, Christian philosophy and theology in the twelfth and thirteen centuries unequivocally declared man to be the possessor of reason, and this capability enabled him to decipher the most mysterious puzzles of God's creation. It also enabled man to decipher the mysteries of the divine word itself unaided by revelation and without the need for prevarication."¹⁰

Alfred North Whitehead in his **Science and the Modern World** describes one of the ingredients of science being "the inexpugnable belief that every details occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles."¹¹ What is the source of this belief? "... there seems but one source for its origin. It must come from the medieval insistence on the rationality of God, conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher. Every detail was supervised and ordered: the search into nature could only result in the vindication of the faith in rationality."¹²

In contrast, in the Muslim world thinkers did not embrace the well-ordered universe concept. Instead, the Ash'arite view of man and nature was based on Islamic atomism (known as occasionalism). Occasionalism rejected cause and effect in the cosmos and "believed that there were a continuous flux of moments, recreated each instant, but with a habitual pattern of continuity, knowledge of which was planted in the believer's mind by God."¹³

God holds the world together moment by moment by his personal will. What God has willed is then acquired by the mind of man.¹⁴

Again, in contrast to Islamic law which sought to limit reason and illuminate reason as a source of law, the European and Western law developed in another direction. Given the belief that the world is rationally understood and man is a rational creature with intelligence they drew from the Greeks as well as the New Testament the concept of conscience (Greek: synderesis).

The book of Romans says, "For whenever gentiles, who do not possess the law, do instinctively what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that what the law requires is written in their hearts, a fact to which their own consciences testify, and their thoughts will either accuse or excuse them on that day when God, through Jesus Christ, will judge people's secrets according to my gospel." (Rom. 2:14-16)

Conscience was not viewed merely as a moral feeling when one has done something wrong, there was also the idea knowing what is right or wrong regardless of action. Somewhere Plato spoke of the eye of the soul in which a person weighs an idea and knows that it is true or false.

The Christian medievalists "ascribed to man a conscience that implied the existence of an inner cognitive agency which allowed the individual to arrive at moral and ethical truths and to judge moral states of affairs."¹⁵ "The Greek and Christian idea of conscience (synderesis) was unknown to the orthodox Islamic legists as well as to philosophers."¹⁶

Rather, "the greatest philosophical thinkers in Arabic-Islamic civilization after al-Ghazali never failed to cast doubt on the powers of human reason and to disparage the virtues of demonstrative logic; they insisted instead on the priority of faith (fideism) or on the unsurpassed authority of tradition (the Shari'a and the Sunna). Reason for the orthodox was little more than common sense, and there was no acknowledgment of the idea that reason could reach new truths unaided by revelation. Innovation, in matters of religion, was equivalent to heresy."¹⁷

The practical application of the difference is that the Muslim was to obey. Lacking the concept of conscience to question the Qur'an, the Shari'a, and the Sunna one needed only to obey. This may explain some of the contemporary news stories of fathers who killed their daughters in so-called honor killings and appear before the judges – when caught – and say, "I have done nothing wrong." Seemingly, there is no sense of conscience alive in the person.

There is one more ingredient that was necessary to bring about the scientific revolution in the West which did not arrive in the Muslim cultures. Muslim astronomy was on the verge of the breakthrough to the Copernican theory but failed to arrive there. In reality Muslim science went into a state of decline.

The ingredient was the university. The university and the Madrasas are quite different.

The legal system of the West developed the concept of a corporation which stands alone in society, has certain protections, and is free from outside control. Madrasas were controlled by the religious authorities and most often the natural sciences were rejected as part of the curriculum. Moreover, there was no standard curriculum in the Madrasas as there came to be in the university where a faculty existed, common curriculum was developed, disputations were held and tests were given. The universities were "centered on the values of universalisms, communalism, organized skepticism, and disinterestedness."¹⁸

The lack of success in science in the Islamic culture "hinged on the problem of institution building. If in the long run scientific thought and intellectual creativity in general are to keep themselves alive and advance into new domains of conquest and creativity, multiple spheres of freedom – what we may call neutral zones – must exist within which large groups of people can pursue their genius free from the censure of political and religious authorities. In addition, certain metaphysical and philosophical assumptions must accompany this freedom. Insofar as science is concerned, individuals must be conceived to be endowed with reason, the world must be thought to be a rational and consistent whole, and various levels of universal representation,

participation, and discourse must be available. It is precisely here that one finds the greatest weaknesses of Arabic-Islamic civilization as an incubator of modern science."¹⁹

Science demanded the freedom to pursue truth wherever it led, and Islamic culture shut down this freedom.

There are some practical questions that arise here. First, the Islamic drive to secure an atomic bomb is to admit that western science is right and that the Islamic view of reality is false.

Western physics can build a bomb, but occasionalism as a view of physics did not. It is sad that the desire to build the bomb is the goal of what have been called rogue states. What is threatening about this attempt to build nuclear bombs relates to the Qur'an's command to kill the infidel.

Second, the quest to obey the Qur'an, the Hadiths, and the Sunna rather than question them is equally a problem in moral issues, as well as science. There are a number of practices in Islamic cultures that are morally wrong. The circumcision of women, forced marriages, marriage of young girls to old men, and honor killings are issues in which the conscience of parents should be greatly concerned. The claim is made on some of these that the Qur'an does not support them, and where this is true Muslim men should rise up in rebellion against such destructive practices and eradicate these evils. One other fact is that modern medical science has shown conclusively the sperm, from only the father, bears either the X or Y chromosome, which is the sole factor determining the sex of the child.. People around the globe have blamed the mother for not having a male child. Many in Muslim cultures still blame the mother if a boy is not born. Muslim imams, teachers, preachers need to correct this grave error so that women will not be blamed.

Third, the madrasas need to be overhauled to rid the curriculum of hate of the infidel.

If Islam were a religion of peace, its people would regard as abrogated all the commands to hate and kill the infidels.

Footnotes

¹ Toby Huff, **The Rise of Early Modern Science**, Cambridge U. Press, 1993, p. 65.

² Ibid., p. 67.

³ Ibid., p. 68.

⁴ Ibid., p. 77.

⁵ Ibid., p. 82.

⁶ Ibid., p. 87.

⁷ Ibid., p. 88.

⁸ Ibid., p. 88-89.

⁹ Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 105.

¹¹ Alfred North Whitehead, **Science and the Modern World**, New York: Macmillan Co., 1925, p. 19.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Huff., op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 109.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 202.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 212-213)

Type IV. I-Believe Statements.

1. Space is infinite or finite.
2. The second law of thermodynamics is true when applied to a closed system, or it is not true.
3. The future is determined on a cause-effect model, or, it is not.³²
4. The model of scientific expression is physics or, it is not.
5. All meaningful knowledge is a product of the scientific methods, and knowledge derived without said methods is pseudo-knowledge, or there is meaningful knowledge to be had in other ways than scientific methods.
6. I believe that evolution explains the origin of life, or, I believe it does not.
7. I believe that Vitamin C is the answer to the common cold, or I believe it does not.
8. I believe that cholesterol is the cause of heart problems, or I believe it is not the cause.

The four types of presuppositions listed above bear some comment. Types I-III can be accepted without much difficulty though one may find people who have questioned and rejected some of them. Type IV relates to the theoretical dimensions of science. The I-Believe statements relate to views that are not established firmly in science. As an example, George Gamow advocated a "big bang" theory of the origin of the universe. Fred Hoyle advocates a "steady-state" view. Each bases his views on data, reasoning, and each has his supporters. Their conclusions are not irrational, although they oppose one another. Their conclusions are probability conclusions. But their views are categorized as an I-believe position because they are not firm as an accepted law in science. A fifth category might be listed in terms of generally accepted laws of science.

The first three types of presuppositions seldom receive much consideration from men of science. Philosophers of science are often interested in category III. The fourth type relates to that dimension of science that is yet up for grabs, as it were, or always open to question. It is an area that lacks finality.

There are two basic conclusions to be drawn from the list of presuppositions. First, the myth or fiction that science has no presuppositions is false. Science, as well as any other study, has many presuppositions. Second, changing presuppositions makes a change in the treatment of data. The

change of presuppositions affects the conclusions drawn from the same data. There is a small controversy that will illustrate the significance of presuppositions. Critics of evolution argue that present biological theory is based on slow, small, almost imperceptible views of change. If life changes so slowly in its development it requires up to 2 billion years to explain. These critics of evolution suggest that another model be used, a paradigm of catastrophism, or great cataclysmic changes that require little time to explain. One paradigm makes the world billions of years old, the other paradigm makes it quite young. Each paradigm attempts to use the same data as the other, but the presupposition, or model, or paradigm used to interpret the data leads to different consequences.

Consequently, presuppositions are important to know. Different kinds of history are written on different types of presuppositions. Different kinds of psychology arise out of different presuppositions. Presuppositions are important and should not be avoided. Man must order his life (another presupposition) and make sense out of the universe. Life becomes easier if we are aware of the presuppositions from which we and other people operate. The real clashes in disagreement in many disciplines are clashes based on presuppositions that differ. Then some presuppositions are better than others. Some are too reductionistic. Others ignore part of men's existence as a total being. Resolution of differences have to take place in the larger setting of man's rationality.

In summary, we have looked at the methods of science, some fictions associated with science, and presuppositions needed for the progress of science, as well as criticisms related to these topics. We are now turning to the second heading of our chapter, Philosophy.

B. *Philosophy*

The second part of our chapter title, Philosophy, may appear to be short-treated. The brief treatment may give the impression that philosophy is not important. The reader must keep in mind that the total book is related to philosophy, its problems, issues, and answers. With this in mind we can turn to the two relationships.

1. *Philosophy and Science.*

The early philosophers were the first scientists. Thales seems to have been one of the first to combine an interest in science and philosophy. He predicted eclipses, determined distances from ships to shore, and coined the word *cosmos* which refers to an ordered, rational understanding of the world. Other philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and others, followed in their attempt to understand the world. Eventually philosophy was baptized into the Christian tradition and one of the earliest to synthesize these studies was Clement of Alexander, and later Origen. Yet later a close relationship existed in which theology was regarded as the "queen" of the sciences and philosophy as a subordinate step-child. With the coming of the enlightenment, philosophy separated itself from its close relationship with theology and eventually committed itself to the new science that was emerging from its domain. So today we can say that philosophy secures much of its intellectual building material from the sciences. For better or worse, some philosophers will not

speak on certain issues until science has spoken. Others will not speak unless there is a precedent for verifying their remarks by means of some scientific method.

But the influence of science on philosophy has not brought unanimity by any means to philosophy or science. Some may argue whether psychology is a science, but it serves as an example of a discipline appealing to the methods of science. However, psychology has within its fold a number of competing schools. In the more traditional sciences, the "hard sciences," there are sufficient "I-believe" statements that affect world-views. Examples of this would be accepting or rejecting the indeterminacy principle, or the second law of thermodynamics. Here a philosopher can pick and choose according to his mind set.

Just as there are myths or fictions in science and religion, it is true in philosophy. Most philosophers would like to be thought of as even-minded, open, tolerant people. Unfortunately, there are no completely objective philosophers, who arrive at the un-garnished truth without biased beginnings. The philosopher is a bundle of attitudes, rebellions, sensitivities, biases, moral failures, and criticism by the time he arrives at philosophy and begins to formulate his own views. Rather than starting from "scratch" in discussing the limitations of philosophy, its lack of method, the problems with the scientific methods, or alternative world views, he may seek material to support his own intellectual idiosyncrasies. In many cases he may regard his view as the "objective" one while opposing views are nothing more than sentimental nonsense.

There may appear a strong urge on the part of a philosopher to appeal to scientific beliefs as a basis of undergirding his own philosophical viewpoint. An example of this is Corliss Lamont who appeals uncritically to evolutionary theory and writes that science has proven that God did not create the world. Because evolution is proven by science, therefore, humanism--Lamont's philosophy, is a proven philosophy. Philosophy may appeal to science both for facts and a "snow-job."

While philosophy draws upon scientific data, the scope of philosophy is, by definition, broader than science. Academic disciplines are often narrow with such divisions as biology, physics, chemistry, psychology, and others. It is only in recent times that cross-disciplines research has been stressed. We can now speak of a bio-chemist, or an astro-physicist. Philosophy is interested in all of these areas at those points which information relates to a comprehensive view of reality. Unless philosophy is geared to a rejection of metaphysics, or the study of reality, philosophy seeks information from the sciences to be the building blocks of its world-view.

Philosophy and science differ in another regard. We have seen that science, as science, is amoral. As a scientific endeavor, a scientist is only interested in building a better hydrogen bomb. His role as a scientist cannot dictate how this product is to be used. He may violently oppose war as a private citizen, but he does it on other than scientific grounds. Thus many types of philosophies take up where science has to stop, namely the area of people and values. Philosophy is concerned, in many ways, with values, and values are not generally related to scientific methods.

Philosophy and science also part company regarding a method. Science prides itself on its method of investigation. Philosophy has no method of its own. Some philosophers have smarted under this lack and have renounced the traditional interest of philosophy and metaphysics for the advocacy of a method for philosophy, namely, language analysis. Not only does this limit philosophy greatly, but the interest attached to the traditional philosophical questions is transferred to other disciplines, religion, psychology, or psychiatry.

As for science, it pays little attention to philosophy. Since the days of Hume, "the fashionable scientific philosophy has been such as to deny the rationality of science."³³ Alfred N. Whitehead quotes Hume:

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause; and the first invention or conceptions of it, *a priori*, must be entirely arbitrary.³⁴

Whitehead concludes that if the cause is the invention which is entirely arbitrary, then,

it follows that science is impossible except in the sense of establishing entirely arbitrary connections which are not warranted by anything intrinsic to the natures either of causes or effects. Some variant of Hume's philosophy has generally prevailed among men of science. But scientific faith has risen to the occasion, and has tacitly removed the philosophic mountain.³⁵

Whitehead concludes by saying that science has been a predominately:

anti-rationalistic movement, based upon a naive faith. What reasoning it has wanted, has been borrowed from mathematics which is a surviving relic of Greek rationalism, following the deductive method. Science repudiates philosophy. In other words it has never cared to justify its faith or to explain its meaning; and has remained blandly indifferent to its refutation by Hume.³⁶

Strangely enough, while philosophy is ignored by science, Whitehead maintains that science has arisen in western Europe as opposed to Asia or India where long histories of civilization have flourished, because in Europe there has been the medieval insistence on the rationality of God, "conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah, and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher."³⁷

The strange paradox arises in the midst of science as surveyed by Whitehead--anti-rational in its technique but admitting the rational nature of nature. The religious matrix for the birth of science is especially significant in spite of the traditional warfare of science and religion. The enmity of blood brothers is often serious and deep, but the two need each other.

2. *Philosophy and Religion.*

Some philosophers are sympathetic to the issues in religion. But the present climate is perhaps one in which religion is regarded by many philosophers as a bag of pseudo-questions and answers. Religion often looks upon philosophy as a prodigal son at best and an atheistic antagonist at worst. Nevertheless, both disciplines have much to offer each other when dialogue is taken seriously.

This is particularly true in the area of metaphysics, or the nature of reality. Philosophy, building upon knowledge of reality drawn from science, is directed to the conclusion that reality is physical, atomic, chemical, or electric, etc. While this is meaningful knowledge, it is a restricted type of knowledge. Suppose that the basic fact of reality were person or spirit. Philosophy directed by science would have no method now of coming to that knowledge. If the whole of man is more important than his components, we have to think in terms of persons rather than electrons, chemicals, etc.

If there is another dimension to reality other than the scientific, religion may offer a key to knowing about it. Our most meaningful knowledge about other persons comes through self-revelation, not empirical investigations. Our investigation on the body speaks little about the person. Likewise, if we are to know anything about God, the most meaningful knowledge will come through self-revelation. Only God can speak for God. This is a prime idea in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. There is a quality of reality transcending the physical which is the cause of the physical. God as creator is known because of self-revelation. The idea of the Incarnation--God became man in Jesus Christ--sets forth an understanding of reality which science cannot deal with, nor philosophy achieve in its own right. Science and philosophy have neither the method or the general desire to deal with these kinds of religious issues. But religion poses a solution for an understanding of reality that transcends both disciplines.

Philosophy and religion have something in common in the matter of a method. Philosophy has no method, and religion has no method of searching out God. Philosophy professes to receive information from science, and religion professes to receive in terms of God's self-revelation.

Philosophy may reject a relationship to religion. It may accept either atheism or a rationalistic theism, or some hybrid. Yet in a positive way, philosophy and religion may be regarded as complementary. Paul Tillich wrote of this:

Philosophy is that cognitive endeavor in which the question of being is asked . . . The question of being is not the question of any special being, its existence and nature, but it is the question of what it means to be."³⁸

Tillich poses a correlation between philosophy and religion. Philosophy asks the questions about the meaning of being, and religion, depending on the realm of the question, gives a transcendent answer. This would appear only possible when religion is admitted as having the revelation of God.

In summary, the relationships between philosophy and science, philosophy and religion, have been changing through the centuries. There is no reason to believe that things will be different

in the future. We must not be deceived by these relationships. Philosophy is not science, nor religion. Religion is not science nor philosophy. Each has its own way of looking at the world. Philosophy is concerned with criticism, questioning, doubting, examining, and Socrates is the prime example in this area. Philosophy makes its case primarily on the ground of reason. Philosophy, unlike religion which takes its source in authority of Scripture, takes its case to the high court of reason. All questions, even unanswerable ones, are treated from the standpoint of reason.

C. Religion

1. What is Religion?

Religion in this context of science, philosophy, and religion is predominantly a relation of western thought. Consequently, we are thinking primarily of the Judaeo-Christian influences rather than dealing with all religions. There is no single definition of religion that will fit all religions. What must be undertaken is the definition of a particular religion. Even this is not without its critics. Our example in this context reflects biblical theism rather than institutional organizations, denominational biases, or rituals. What we aim for is Biblical religion without the trappings of cultural conformity or innovation through different periods of its history. Beneath the veneer of present Christianity, there yet stands the Bible, often ignored, demythologized, or relativized. No defense is made of many practices, failures, or distortions of various Christian movements. One should frankly admit that religion in general and Christianity in particular has a history, at times, that is morally shameful. Moreover, religion has been and will yet be used by men who are unscrupulous, greedy, and selfish. Pascal noted that "men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious convictions."³⁹ But these bad elements are all alien to the nature of Biblical faith.

The Christian claim or view of religion is that God has spoken of Himself, revealing himself as a person in many ways to many people, but in a pre-eminent way in Incarnation. Christians claim that they have an answer to some problems or shortcomings of science and philosophy when it comes to a certain type of knowing about the nature of reality. Some religions speak about the nature of reality but their claim of knowledge is based on intuition, or inner meditation. Christian faith involves the claim of a different approach--God's self-revelation. Without the event of self-revelation, there can be no meaningful knowledge of God. A purely rational approach to ultimate reality gains little. Intuition or inner meditation does not get beyond man's psyche.

Without the idea of self-revelation, we can argue for God who is a conclusion, an abstraction, or an impersonal force, or an It. But none of these things can speak. If God is an It, it might be possible for man to know God, but not for God to know man. But persons speak and reveal themselves. If this claim is true about God, then it has a dimension for metaphysics that overcomes some of the limitations of science and philosophy in their search for total reality.

2. Religious Fictions.

There are some fictions or myths perpetuated about religion that need some measure of exposing.

1) All religions arose out of fear.

It is imagined that primitive man was frightened by some phenomena of nature, perhaps lightning, and came to attribute the forces of nature as some form of punishment by an angry god. Religion thus began with fear, or in the attempt to placate the anger of the displeased god. One must consider two beginnings of religion. The first beginning relates to prehistoric man. How primitive or prehistoric man began to be religious is unknown. There are no written records of that beginning. One may just as well conclude that his religion began because he knew God directly, or because he had a sore toe, or whatever. Without records, anybody's theory is as good as anyone else's. As long as evidence is not possible the myth cannot be disproven, nor can it be proven.

The second beginning of religion that is more important concerns the historic religions. Certainly Christian faith did not begin in fear, nor did Islam or Judaism.

There is another wrinkle in the statement worth pursuing. Grant for the sake of argument that religion did arise from fear. Does this mean that it is nothing more than a projection of man's psyche? Is religion therefore not related to a transcendental reality? Even on these grounds, one might draw an analogy from mathematics in which case mathematics is a pure creation of the mind, but it corresponds to the reality outside of one's mind. It might be argued that man had an adequate cause for postulating a deity. Instead of projection of purpose on the world about him, man recognizes rather the purpose and design of the world. This kind of argument could probably be held equally as well as the "all-religions-arose-from-fear-idea" but it too lacks pre-history documentation.

As far as primitive man goes, we are really left with two alternatives: ignorance (in which case we must pass off our theorizing as fact), or revelation (in which case the first persons knew God because he created them and revealed himself to them).

2) Religion is rationalistic and not empirical.

This fiction implies that religion uses reasoning for its proof rather than turning to "things" that can be manipulated, and in the case of experiments, reproduced. It is true that religion does not deal in things. But one may argue for a reproducibility of experiences. The missionary enterprise of Christianity and other religions is based on it. A Christian enters a new culture, encounters complete strangers, declares the Gospel of what God has done, and what they should do, and when they respond in faith their lives are changed; they become new people having a sense of peace and forgiveness within themselves and toward one another. They in turn go to others and a chain reaction takes place. Reproducibility of experience occurs again and again. In this way, Christianity is existential, not rationalistic merely; it is experiential, not empirical. As long as we limit verification and empiricism to the lab, then religion has neither of these. But for the man whose life has been changed then the results are the verification.

We are not arguing here in a closed system. One may document people who have "tried" Christianity and failure crowned their hopes. One may glibly say that failures were not sincere in their trying. We don't intend that at all. Rather, there are many deep uncoverable reasons why some people can't make a commitment to have the same reproducible results in their lives. But in all kinds of data like this, the variations are small compared to the myriads who have proven the rule. The variations are not sufficient to break down the reasoning. This relates to credibility and probability and is unlike the laws of physics in which one failure voids the law.

As far as rationalism goes, we have seen that there is more rationalism in scientific verification than the fiction admits. The Christian religion says something about reason and its role in the world-view of man. We have seen that relativity was accepted, not because of its verification at that time, but because it was more reasonable, and made more sense than did the older Newtonian world-view. It was more compelling, more appropriate, and more reasonable.

In the same way, Christian faith argues that the human mind sees the Eternal God as the Creator and sees this as a more appropriate, compelling explanation of the origin of life and man, than a fortuitous explanation that life comes from non-life. Mind as an explanation for creativity is acceptable to mind in a way that chance is not acceptable to explain the appearance of mind.

3) Religion is subjective.

This means merely that spiritual reality cannot be measured by traditional scientific methods. This is like saying that ideas that cannot be empirically verified are subjective. Ideas, however, are compelling although they cannot be measured. Sometimes the statement that religion is subjective is intended to mean that nothing objective about it exists. Thus religion is nothing more than a mental fiction, a self-deception. How can one prove such a statement? It is obviously made by the non-religious. The burden of proof has been cast upon the religious. The non-religious is asking for an objective proof along scientific lines, and this religion has never professed to be possible. But it is also not possible to prove on scientific grounds that it is purely subjective. What must be recognized is the limitation of science concerning that which relates to religion, values, art, aesthetics, and the whole area of the intangibles.

3. *Presuppositions of Religion.*

Like science, there are a number of presuppositions that religion accepts. The types parallel those discussed above in science.

Type I. Presuppositions basic to all knowledge. This type remains the same and the reader can refer back to that section on the presuppositions of science.

Type II. Attitudinal presuppositions necessary for the continuing development of religion.

1. The desire to observe, organize, and conceptualize are also vital to religion.

2. The activities are of value and produce meaningful knowledge.
3. Man must make choices, and these choices will determine the knowledge he may or may not derive.
4. The survival of religion, like science, depends upon the integrity and honesty of its people.
5. Here a difference emerges: science measures, while religion is interested in worship and prayer.

Type III. Presuppositions about the nature of spirit.

- 1 "The realm of the spirit . . . is real."
2. "The realm of the spirit exhibits orderliness, regularity, and cause and effect relations."
3. "The realm of the spirit is intelligible."
4. "The realm of the spirit is religiously explicable."
5. "When we worship we gain spiritual insight."
6. "God is real and can be known."
- 7 "God and the realm of the spirit are basically unchanging."⁴⁰

Type IV. "I-Believe" statements.

Following the model of Schilling, we can use the Apostle's Creed as an example of "I-believe" statements. The first part of the creed may be used, not for its authoritativeness, but because it reflects in a nutshell many Biblical statements.

I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ His only begotten Son, our Lord; who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary ??

The Apostle's Creed sets forth in summary fashion what is said in many places in the Biblical record.

The Biblical record, however, points up the recorded account of what certain men had experienced. That record declares in a very natural way,

That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon and touched with our hands, concerning the word of life--the life was made manifest, and we saw it, and testify to it, and proclaim to you the eternal life which was with the Father and was made manifest to us (1 John 1:1-2)

And the word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; and we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father. (John 1:14)

The disciples of Jesus had a unique experience. They saw unusual events of men being healed of blindness, deafness, and being raised from death; they heard his teaching, they saw his crucifixion but most important, his resurrection. He was seen alive on numerous occasions by numerous disciples under differing circumstances. To all of this they bore witness, and the Apostle's Creed is

nothing less than a summary of their experience as recorded in the Biblical record. It does not represent dogmatic pronouncements borne of mere imagination. It represents their experience.

No historical record can be repeated as scientists can repeat experiments in physics. Historical documents are judged in two areas: (1) the integrity and reliability of the documents in terms of the authors and other contemporary or near contemporary witnesses; (2) our scientific or philosophical bias. The latter is important here. The documents can be regarded as reliable, integral, honest accounts in which no motives of fraud, deception, or dishonesty can be seen. One may question the resurrection, the central issue, on the basis of whether one believes that a resurrection is possible or not. Naturally, one does not see this kind of event occurring now, and it is concluded by some that all stories of resurrections are regarded as fables. If this were a mere man, this tendency would be justified. But Jesus admitted himself to be the Messiah, the Son of God, and thus one may be surprised if the resurrection did not happen.

We must not stray too far away at this point. We have spoken of "I-Believe" statements comparable to scientific creeds in the first section. Not everybody accepted the Gospel. There were those who regarded Jesus as an apostate Jew. No amount of argument, miracle, or otherwise, would convince them differently. One can only present the evidence as it stands. One cannot proceed further. The same was true for the scientific dimension. Using the previous example of George Gamow, he makes a strong case for the "big-bang" theory of the origin of our planetary system, but it is not absolutely convincing. There are those who dispute it, but he makes a good case. What is evidence for one, may not be good evidence for another. At this point we reach an impasse. The answer may lie in the existential realm. Kierkegaard noted his experience in objections against Christianity were not due to intellectual doubt, but in and to rebellion. This is not an *ad hominen* argument, but a serious area to consider.

We may summarize that science and religion have credal statements. Both are offered out of experience. Both may be impressive, but not universally convincing.

4. *Religion and Methodology.*

Christian faith has no methodology for investigation that is peculiarly Christian. It recognizes that knowledge about God is impossible unless God reveals himself. This fact is not something a group of churchmen got together and voted on. This fact is what started the movement called Christianity. It means that God, who is hidden from physical eyes of men, has now come near, indwelled (incarnated), a specific body that he commanded to be named Jesus. In Jesus, mankind can see what God is. The summary verses of John 3:16 designates what God in Jesus, the Christ, is all about. God is holy love seeking to make a new covenant with man, forgiving man's sin, restoring him to a right relation with himself, giving him eternal life which begins in a faith commitment to God in Christ.

The lack of methodology comparable to science, and the stress on the analogy of person has been given currency by Martin Buber in a little book, *I and Thou*. Persons are *thous* but they may

be reduced to an it. But where persons are admitted as person, they are known only through grace, permission. The thou, "is not found by seeking. The Thou meets me. But I step into direct relation with it."⁴¹

God is not reached by our seeking, but we encounter Him as persons encounter other persons, by grace, permission. There are many other biblical assertions that could be pondered, but that would go beyond our purpose here. Unless people speak we know nothing meaningful of them. Unless God has spoken, we know little of value about Him. If the biblical record is true, then we may organize the material recorded there, deal with it systematically, and use it in fashioning a philosophical world-view.

If the record is true, we have the only reliable account of what ultimate reality is like. It is a seeking Person who reaches out to mankind, and in love, commands mankind to reach out to others. Anything less than Person is not worthy of man's worship. Anything less than Person would be less than man and would be the beginning of idolatry. The problem of man without God is that he commits himself to the most subtle idolatry: the worship of himself.

5. Limitations.

Religion in general, and Christian faith in particular have limitations. The Bible has many different subjects that it touches on, but it was not to be a textbook on every facet of knowledge. While there are certain ideas about man's nature, his selfishness, etc., that would relate to an economic system, there is no Christian economics *per se*. It gives no information on the kind of house people should live in, nor how the city streets should be laid out, or the appropriate number of pupils in a kindergarten class, and a host of others. The Bible only offers a record of God's self-revelation so that man may be renewed in his relationship to God. In light of this there is no specifically Christian mathematics, physics, or botany, etc.

Religion has the tendency to be overly simplistic. Sometimes it is said, "If one would only believe in Christ, then all his troubles would end." This is incorrect. Jesus never promised that his followers would have an easy time. He did indicate that his followers would be persecuted, and for some, trouble begins when they become Christians. The statement above is meant to say that if one commits his life to Christ, he can gain a new perspective on his problems, to see himself, as he really is, and find help from God to go through his problems.

Another problem for religion is that many are as unguarded in their statements as their scientific counterparts have been, and probably more so. There is a false image that floats around concerning Christians. They are not pious, holier-than-thou creatures who never make mistakes, or he who makes them, doesn't admit them. Rather the Biblical Christian is one who knows how far he has fallen from God, recognizes that he is fully human, and above all needs God's help and grace.

Conclusion

We have seen a number of parallels and contrasts between the three disciplines, science, philosophy, and religion. We have tried to speak of the nature of science, philosophy, and religion, methods involved were relevant, misconceptions or fictions about the disciplines, and finally, the place and role of presuppositions.

The acceptance of presuppositions, or paradigms, involves an acceptance of the community. A particular set of presuppositions will dictate where one goes in research and what problems can or cannot be dealt with. No one has a private faith of their own unless they are seeking to bring about a new revolution in their areas. One is generally related to a community that is quite objective though not perfect.

One might well adapt the saying of Anselm to the modern era, "I believe, that I might understand" because one does this with a particular set of presuppositions. Given the model or paradigm, a view of reality emerges and a certain understanding comes forth from it. Given another paradigm and another view comes forth. Some of life's great choices involve which paradigms or presuppositions that one will accept or reject. One has to set about this making of choices on the basis of the aesthetic rationality of the paradigms.

In any case, the set of presuppositions are often related to the view of the world, or metaphysics. It is to this subject that we now turn in our next chapter.

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¹Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 190.

²Alfred DeGrazia, ed., The Velikovsky Affair, New Hyde Park: University Books, 1966.

³David H. Killeffer, How Did You Think of That?, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969, p. 24.

⁴Ibid., p. 24.

⁵Ibid., p. 6.

⁶Ibid., p. 6.

⁷James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951, p. 45.

⁸Statistics has its problems and critics. A new word has been coined: statisticulation--the art of lying with statistics. Some of the problems inherent in sampling has led some humorist to note that "if all statisticians were laid end to end, it would be a good thing."

⁹Norman Campbell, What is Science?, New York: Dover Publications, 1952, pp. 160-61.

¹⁰Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (ed.), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1961, p. 16.

¹¹George A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us?, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1961, p. 70.

¹²Cf. C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947.

¹³Campbell, op. cit., p. 171.

¹⁴John G. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks at Science, New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1959, p. 86.

¹⁵Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 29.

- ¹⁶Ibid., p. 30.
- ¹⁷Kemney, op. cit., p. 96.
- ¹⁸Conant, op. cit., p. 74.
- ¹⁹Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1948, p. 447, cf. 448.
- ²⁰Susan Stebbings, Philosophy and Physicists, New York: Dover, 1958, p. 179.
- ²¹Mario Bunge, Metascientific Queries, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1959, p. 81.
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- ²³Ibid., p. 8.
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- ²⁵Ibid., p. 79.
- ²⁶Ibid., p. 103.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. 138.
- ²⁸Ibid., p. 140-141.
- ²⁹Conant, op. cit., p. 33.
- ³⁰Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960, p. 148.
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- ³⁴Ibid.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 12.
- ³⁶Ibid., p. 22.
- ³⁷Ibid., p. 19.
- ³⁸Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 5-6.
- ³⁹Blaise Pascal, Pensees, New York: The Modern Library, 1941, p. 314.
- ⁴⁰Schilling, op. cit.
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CHAPTER VI

Metaphysics: Definitions and Issues

Part I

A simple issue in metaphysics may be seen on a biographical level: A man had pushed himself to gain fortune and in the process his wife died of pneumonia. He missed riding the ill-fated Titanic. Wealth has become empty to him. Out of these events he came to ask himself: why do I exist? This simple but profound question brought about a change in the outlook in the life of J.C. Penney. This simple question--why do I exist?--is a question of metaphysics. Metaphysics raises a number of other questions, however. One of the more interesting ones is that of Martin Heidegger who began his work with the question: "Why are there essents (existences, things that are) rather than nothing?"¹ Why should there be anything at all? Obviously, if nothing existed there would be no one to know it, but just why is there something at all?

Before we turn to the selected issues of metaphysics, the student should note that the reputation of metaphysics has sagged during the last several centuries. This is particularly true on the modern scene. Metaphysics is now sometimes associated with the occult, or the far eastern fads, and there is nothing so damning as to criticize an author's work as "too metaphysical" which means that it lacks scientific verification. But this is quite a superfluous way of considering metaphysics, for the rejector of metaphysics is merely playing a sleight-of-hand trick in supporting metaphysical systems in a "non-metaphysical" way. Where metaphysical issues are rejected as useless or irrelevant, the rejection generally means a substitute form of metaphysics.

1. Metaphysics, a definition.

A beginning definition of metaphysics involves the word itself. Meta-physics is Greek for "after-nature." Thus metaphysics is concerned with the question of what exists beyond nature, or

does something invisible support the visible world? For example, we do see part of the world before us. Is this all there is to it? Is there more that we cannot see? If so, how can we know about it?

Metaphysics is far more complicated than asking the question of what exists beyond nature. It is interested in the nature of nature, space, time, number of basic elements in the world, motion, change, causality, and other issues.²

One of the early definitions of metaphysics was that of Aristotle, who wrote:

There is a science which investigates being *qua* being and what belongs essentially to it. This science is not the same as any of the so-called "special sciences"; for none of these sciences examine universally being *qua* being, but, cutting off some part of it, each of them investigates the attributes of that part, as in the case of the mathematical sciences.³

Aristotle proceeds to talk about being as distinct from various disciplines. Similarly, metaphysics has been called "the science of sciences"⁴ because it is not merely interested in the accumulation of facts only, but in systematic reflection on these facts uncovered by various scientific disciplines. The inadequacy of traditional discipline lines is indicated by the crossing of the lines such as biochemistry, biophysics, astro-physics, and others.

Metaphysics has overtones of another discipline, religion. Religion is also interested in what it means to be, and whether there is reality beyond the natural world. However, religion suffers severe criticism from a number of modern metaphysicians. A.E. Taylor, who is quite sympathetic to religion in many ways, claims that metaphysics deals with ultimate questions "in a purely scientific spirit; its object is intellectual satisfaction, and its method is not one to appeal to immediate intuition or unanalyzed feeling, but of the critical and systematic analysis of our conceptions."⁵ Taylor's view relegates all religious thinkers to the level of romantics or irrationalists. Heidegger similarly rules out an appeal to the God of the Bible, because "a believer cannot question without ceasing to be a believer."⁶

In both Taylor and Heidegger there is the feeling or presumption that believers are not thinkers. But what about the atheist who begins his thought with only nature and after examining the alternatives concludes that the God of the Bible makes more sense in his attempt to understand the metaphysical issues? Neither Taylor nor Heidegger are true to the spirit of metaphysics. They rule out beforehand a possible answer that might be of great help.

One of the traditional criticisms against metaphysics is that it demands too many presuppositions to begin. The ideal is always to begin without presuppositions. Can metaphysics be systematic and conclusive if it omits an area of investigation for help? Metaphysics is not religion, but if metaphysics is to seek an understanding of the totality of nature, it would seem that it should not deliberately ignore religion. If metaphysics is to be the science of the sciences, or the

science of being, then nothing should be ruled out and everything will be examined with equal fervor.

2. *What is Being?*

Men in the past who were perceptive came to different conclusions about the basic building elements in the world. Thales (6th cent. B.C.) concluded that all is water ultimately. Pythagoras reasoned that all is number. Others concluded that being is composed of air, or fire, and Heraclitus was so impressed with the changing elements in the world that he concluded that all things flow and nothing is constant. Democritus concluded that the world is composed of atoms, while others reasoned that *nous* (or reason) was the integrating element. Later it was fashionable to believe that some mysterious "substance" lay behind what is visible.

The answers given to what is being? are many and would require more space and time than many readers prefer to give. Thus a general outline may be useful.

A. *Being is unknowable.*

Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, made two points that are important in maintaining that being is unknowable. First, reason can never tell us anything about the ultimate world. Reason has no way of getting to the outside world, that is, the world beyond the mind. Reason is dependent on the senses for its information. If the senses give information to the mind, then reason can work with it, but essentially reason is captured within the framework of man's being and cannot get out to do investigation apart from the senses. Kant gives a resume of the Critique in "that reason by all its *a priori* principles never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience, and even of these nothing more than can be recognized in experience."⁷

The second point is that the senses provide only representations or images of the world in which man lives. Thus the images or representations are one step removed from the real objects. On Kant's ground one can never compare images to know if one is seeing correctly. Since one is only dealing with representations, then one is really in ignorance about the real world. Thus Kant concludes that all we know is about phenomena, and that is not very secure knowledge, while we can never get behind phenomena to what Kant called Noumena. This leaves a measure of skepticism around the world.

This part of Kant's view has come to be called phenomenism. It has been subjected to various criticisms⁸ and there is no need to rehash them here, but two points may be remembered. Whenever a philosopher asserts that we cannot know being or reality, he is still asserting a knowledge about it. He is saying that it cannot be known because . . . which is a claim about being or reality. It may not be much, but it is information about why this or that is not reality or being, and why we cannot know it.⁹ The second point is that Kant's views on the mechanics of knowing are out of date in comparison to a full scale phenomenology of the senses and perception as seen in the work of Merleau-Ponty.¹⁰

B. Being is Knowable.

The claim that being is knowable involves diverse theories of being. The only common element is the claim that knowledge of being is possible and that we can know something about being. Since the knowledge of being and the definition of being are quite related we will turn to the different definitions of being and involve the questions of how being is known also.

(1) Being is limited to what can be seen. Men who hold a philosophy of naturalism, in its various forms, argue that the visible world is all there is. What can be seen, touched, etc., is, and what cannot be seen, touched, etc., doesn't exist. This way of looking at nature may be called monism, or a monism of matter, in which all reality is reducible to nature, or atoms. This is a "nothing-but" philosophy. Reality is "nothing-but" matter, or atoms, or cause-effect mechanisms. Whatever the form of naturalism it is limited to and by sense verification.

Questions may be raised about this definition of being. (a) If man is considered, his mental powers must be reduced to chemical or electrical explanations which are inadequate, or treated unjustly. The appearance of mind in a naturalistic world is as difficult to explain as the appearance of life. (b) Naturalism treats the "laws of nature" in a superficial manner. Laws are interpretative, but non-existence devices for explaining events and happenings in nature. Laws are a key to understanding and scientific progress. Thus science would not exist without mind and reason, and these should take precedence in importance in explaining the physical. (c) If nature is to be known by the scientific methods, the method is restricted to knowledge that relates to a physical or chemical type. Can it be that there are other ways of knowing reality that can take one beyond the merely visible? Is there more than the physical world? Our next view presumes so.

(2) The "two-worlds theory" A.

The term, "two-world's" was first introduced into philosophy by Lask¹¹ and refers to two different theories.

The first type of the two-world's theory is that there is a higher world than the visible and the visible is not the real world. It is only an appearance. Man is essentially a unitary part of the world. This identity of man and the world or man and the world-soul--the Spirit back of the appearances--makes it possible for man to claim that when he knows himself he knows being. This view is accepted in various degrees by idealists such as Plato, Whitehead, Taylor, Browne, Hegel and forms of Hindu thought associated with transcendental meditation, and Christian Science, to mention only a few.

We can look briefly at a philosophy on the contemporary scene who incorporates some of these ideas. Karl Jaspers is a philosopher who believes that being is manifested in objects, but is not defined by means of the objects. There are two kinds of beings in the world--subjects and objects. But being is bigger than both of these. The cliché that the Whole is greater than the parts is true here. Jaspers calls it the Comprehensive.¹² The Comprehensive is manifested in objects, but

objects do not explain or expose the Comprehensive. Hence one cannot, by means of philosophy, get to Being. This can be done only indirectly.

Then how can being be known? Jaspers points to mysticism as the answer. The mystic is the person who transcends "the subject-object dichotomy and achieves a total union of subject and object, in which all the objectness vanishes and the I is extinguished. Then authentic being opens up to us, leaving behind it as we awaken from our trance a consciousness of profound and inexhaustible meaning."¹³ Jaspers comments that being is indescribable and being that can be communicated is not being. But he claims that "the mystic is immersed in the Comprehensive."¹⁴

All of this sounds very romantic and appealing, but it doesn't give us much information about being. The true mystic cannot communicate and being cannot be seen. How then can we describe being? How can we know about it? What does the mystic really see? Can we say that Being or the Comprehensive is related to God? Jaspers does this in some sense, but says that "God is reality, absolute, and cannot be encompassed by any of the historical manifestations through which he speaks to men."¹⁵ This would tend to make our small knowledge of God even smaller. Thus, if we cannot regard the knowledge of God in philosophy or theology as meaningful, how can we know that the mystic's is? How does one know when one has found Being?

The introduction of a mystic's path to being needs further comment for the mystic is not an easy person to define. The mystic comes in two breeds. The first mystic claims that the journey inward through meditation leads to oneness with Being. Being is found within. It is claimed that I am one with the World-Soul. Since there is a union between me and the world soul, the only obstacle to knowing Being, is in me. If I transcend my personal identity in meditation, I come to Being. Rooting out the ego leads to the depth of internal being.

The second breed of mystic is the one who seeks a union with God which is outside himself. By means of meditation, purgation of the soul, and prayer, the mystic seeks to achieve a union with God who is outside or external to man's being.

The mystic's path to Being is questionable. Neither of these two forms asks the obvious question: why is Being (God) hidden? We don't see "Being" as we see the truth, neither do we see God in the same way. If we equate man and God and seek a knowledge of Being or God inwardly, then we change theology (knowledge about God) into anthropology, or a knowledge about man. The distinctions between man and God are blurred and probably meaningless. If we follow the second mystic's route of trying to achieve union with a God who is outside of himself, then what is the basis of our trying to achieve this? This is the better model of mysticism, but who calls for this type of practice and can man by searching, find the hidden God?

Man can certainly suspicion, or intuit that God is about, but can you know a Being (Person) who does not allow Himself to be known? On the other hand, granting that God does reveal Himself, the "means" of the mystic then are superfluous.

(3) The "two-world's theory" B.

A competing theory of being comes from the influence of religious thought. This form of the two-world's theory is described as a contingent dualism: i.e., the material world is dependent upon God. The previous view was essentially a spiritual monism in which the physical world is a secondary part of the theory. Man must transcend the physical and live in the Spirit alone. While it advances beyond naturalism to include the Spirit, it has little use for the physical ultimately.

This two-world theory now combines the visible and the invisible. Augustine's City of God develops something of this. Part of the differences between these two-world theories can be seen in the following contrasts:

| A | B |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| God is identified with the world. | God creates the world, but is not identified with it. |
| Ultimate Being and Man are one. | Ultimate Being and Man are not one |
| Nature and God are external | God is eternal; nature is not . Nature is created. |

This form of the two-world's theory involves the following. God is creator. The material world exists because He spoke it into existence. Its continued existence is dependent upon his will. Thus, we have a contingent dualism in which matter is dependent upon Spirit, but is not the same as Spirit. Matter has its being or existence in God, but is not a part of God, or a manifestation of God. How does man get to know Being? He can know one part by means of the senses, the physical part. How can he know the other part? Ultimately, God cannot be known unless God is Personal and reveals himself and his nature. At best there may be hints of this expressed in nature, but as it stands, the world does not have perfection. Even if by means of nature the conclusion is reached that God is, there is no means of bridging the gulf separating man from God.

It is at this point that Being or God must be viewed as personal. Anything less than personal could not communicate with man, nor man with it. Christians claim that the Incarnation event gives a way in which man can come to know Being. God became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. He was true-God and true-man. He was the embodiment of the visible and invisible. He combines the temporal and the eternal. Granting this view as an explanation, one is able to have a knowledge about God who seeks, who reveals himself.

In summary, man's search for being has lead to various conclusions. Philosophers with a restricted scientific outlook have been satisfied to stop at nature. Others have found this empty and have sought a spiritual dimension to the world. Yet others in the Christian tradition have not only argued for a spiritual dimension, but have felt that ultimate reality can be known only in the way of Incarnation.

Part of these differences may be seen in the comment of Kant who wrote:

There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: This is metaphysics; here you can find the noblest object of this science, the knowledge of a highest Being, and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason.¹⁶

The influence of Kant has been strong in dissuading metaphysical activity. But the last phrase would be inapplicable to those who seek a religious metaphysics. The Bible does not attempt to "prove from principles of pure reason." But Christian philosophers would argue that the Christian option for some answers in metaphysical questions is still open. Here is where you find out about the Highest Being and a future Existence. If it is not in the last alternative, then philosophy *per se* has not taught it, nor has it the tools to do so.

We seem to be shut up to some alternative: either we know Being by means of self-revelation, or we are pushed toward meager or skeptical knowledge about being.

We now turn to a different type of issue in metaphysics.

3. *What are space and time?*

If I could come to the edge of space, would I be able to stick my arm through it or not? If I could not, what would prevent my doing it? If I could, then, have I come to the end of space. This question was raised in antiquity by Archytas, a Pythagorean. His questions are profound since it is quite difficult to view space as either finite or infinite. Equally difficult is the question of the nature of space. Is space something? Filled space obviously has something in it, but what is empty space.

Space as a term refers to several meanings. **Conceptual** space is the space of geometry. It exists when man thinks about it, and ceases when he stops thinking. **Perceptual** space is related to our sense of touch and sight. A man sees a new car parked by the curb and then walks over and views it closely. In the process he traverses space and experiences a three-dimensional perception of an object in space. **Physical** space is the space dealt within astronomy and physics. It is described as public space which can be measured by all observers. **Absolute** space is a Newtonian concept that there are unmovable measuring points on the edge of the universe. The appearance and acceptance of Einstein's theory of relativity made absolute space an obsolete idea.¹⁷

Three different issues exist for us to treat briefly. What is space? Is space Infinite? What is curved space?

First, what is space? Early thinkers conceived of space in terms of something called ether, a substance through which light travels like a fish needs water to get from one part of the pond to another. Ether was conceived as necessary since a vacuum is a relatively late discovery. Another analogy used for space was that of a container. This illustrates where you place a chair in a room, in that "space" by the window. On a larger scale, space is what the world is in. But in neither of these

cases is space really defined. Nor does it appear to be possible to give such a definition. It was difficult for early philosophers to conceive of empty space, for how can one talk about a "nothing." Even if you conceive of it as a material called ether yet one never experienced space ether because they did not have the technology.

Later, philosophers beginning with Descartes spoke of space and extension as being identical. Objects could be measured for their extension. Take away the object from that particular space and the dimensions are still measurably "there." Since a vacuum was impossible in their belief system, space ether was important to give form or room to space. For Descartes, space was objective. Later, for Kant, space was regarded as subjective, that is, that space is a product of the mind rather than as a result of "experiencing" space as a result of sensory perception. Space is imposed on objects.

Perhaps the problem of definition centers on trying to make space a thing. Things go in space, but space is not a thing. Space is unique, one of a kind. Then, if space is not a thing, we must think of it as a relationship between things. As such it is depth, width, and length.

Second, is space finite or not? Given the definition of space so far, we can say that philosophers of antiquity as well as those up to the 20th century have held both views--that space is infinite and finite. The Greek atomists, Democritus and Lucretius, among others, believed that space was infinite. Gorgias, an ancient skeptic, was the first to argue that space was finite.

Neither of these conceptions are imaginable. What would the boundaries of space be? Infinite space seems to be the easier of the two ideas because we don't have to imagine what boundaries of space would be like, and what would be on the other side. As far as modern data goes we can only talk about stellar bodies that are on the edge of our telescopic distance.

The infinity of space has implications for the idea of curved space. Space is no longer conceived as a linear movement infinitely away from a point. Space is now described as curved. Albert Einstein has contributed to new ideas in space theory in terms of his theory of relativity. This removes the idea of linear infinite space from being meaningful. A misleading, but useful analogy may help the novice to understand the idea of the curvature of space. The planet earth does not move in a straight line. Its orbit circles around the sun. Why is there a circular orbit of the planets? The old answer is that the gravitational pull of the sun keeps the planets in orbit. However, on the modern theory of Einstein the planets circle because the phenomenon of gravity is "merely the effect of the curvature of the four-dimensional space-time world."¹⁸

The other part of the question, about time, may be similarly outlined as in space. **Conceptual** times relates to the "abstract attempts to study time and motion."¹⁹ This is the time that exists only in the mind. **Perceptual** time is the time experienced by a person as he encounters the events of the day one after another. **Physical** time is the public measuring device as reflected in the repetition of the earth in orbit which may be subdivided into months or days or the movement of the

pendulum. **Absolute** time is the mate to the absolute space as proposed by Newton who assumed that a universal time exists that was stable very much like absolute space.

What is time then? The early Greeks thought of time in relation to motion. Aristotle wrote, "And so motion, too, is continuous in the same manner as time is; for either motion and time are the same, or time is an attribute of motion."²¹ As an example, time is the motion experienced in the movement of the sun from rise to sunset. On these grounds, time is also linked to matter. If there were not matter in motion, there would be no time. Hence Plato and others viewed time as subordinate to eternity and only semi-real. Augustine, famous for the question, "What is time?"²² regarded time as "extendedness" which is experienced in the mind itself. Later, Kant also regarded time as subjective but in the sense that the mind organizes experiences in sequential order.

Contemporary philosophers tend to reject the idea that time is an entity that moves, or that it is through time viewed as an entity that one moves. Time is not like a river that flows from point to point. This is why time is difficult to measure if it is regarded as real. Is there an absolute beginning point for time? If one answers that time has always been, then there is no beginning point or a point of departure for measuring it.

If one cannot speak of time as an entity, or time flowing like the analogy of a river, what is proposed to replace such descriptions? The answer is: time is a way of describing before and after events with reference to our speech. The phrase "token-reflection" is used to describe what is meant here. A token is a statement or utterance. Reflection refers to oneself or the statement that is made by one. If I say Harry Truman was elected president of the U.S.A., this means he was (past) elected sometime before I made the statement (which is present). Past or future are in reference to the present statement. "George will mow the lawn this afternoon" refers to an event that will take place after my statement is made and is regarded as a future event.

Thus, there is no entity called time. It is used with relating events in terms of their chronological order. When I say that I have lived 46 years, there is a superficial time sequence involved, but these resolve down to periodic changing of the seasons, a series of events relating to growing up, older, and progressing to changes in my body. But time as a thing does not exist. The conclusion of the event-experience approach to time is that when I no longer experience events, I am dead.

There is another dimension to time's subjectivity. If I am in a hurry and have to wait quite a while in the doctor's office, time appears to "move" slowly, while if I am enjoying a victorious ping pong tournament, "time" goes so rapidly I hardly notice that the hour for the evening meal has come. Translated into the previous terminology, the delay in the doctor's office keeps me from the next event, while the ping pong game is filled with a continuation of events.

There is yet another sense in which time is used. One may say, "Time is heavy on my hands and I would rather die." Or, "I have lived 75 years and it has been a delight." In these cases, time is synonymous with life. My life has been wretched by its events, or my life has been filled with wonderful events.

We can now consider an idea that has the mystery of space fiction. When we put space, with length, height, and width, and time together we get the fourth dimension. The added dimension can be seen in the following example:

An army plane lost in the fog crashed into the 79th floor wall of the Empire State Building at 35th St. between Fifth and Sixth Avenues, New York City, at 9:30 a.m., July 28, 1945.²³

This example gives a very simple application of time to the other three dimensions. But there is a more complicated application. It is used in physics and astronomy when travel is related to the speed of light. "The physical theory of relativity suggests, although without absolutely conclusive proof, that physical space and physical time have no separate and independent existences" ²⁴ Consider the following:

If one could travel at 99 percent of the speed of light,

your wrist watch, your heart, your lungs, your digestion, and your mental processes would be slowed down by a factor of 70,000 and the 18 years (from the point of view of people left on Earth) necessary to cover the distance from Earth to Sirius and back to Earth again, would seem to you as only a few hours. In fact, starting from Earth right after breakfast, you will just feel ready for lunch when your ship lands on one of the Sirius planets. If you are in a hurry, and start home right after lunch, you will, in all probability, be back on Earth in time for dinner. But, and here you will get a big surprise if you have forgotten the laws of relativity, you will find on arriving home that your friends and relatives have given you up as lost in the interstellar spaces and have eaten 6570 dinners without you. Because you were traveling at a speed close to that of light, 18 terrestrial years have appeared to you as one day.²⁵

If one could travel at a speed faster than the speed of light, it should theoretically turn back the clock. Gamow has a limerick:

There was a young girl named Miss Bright
Who could travel much faster than light,
She departed one day
In an Einsteinian way
And came back on the previous night.

But the truth of the issue seems to be that, now, nothing material can travel with the speed of light. It must also be remembered, if truth relates to verification, then all that we have said about space-time is pure theory. Any rocket ship that could accelerate to the speed of light would need enormous amounts of fuel, not to mention a fantastic technology to create such an engine.

Although time, space, and space-time have interests for philosophers as well as scientists they are not as close to human existence as our next metaphysical issue.

4. Is this a purposive world?

The question of purpose (or teleology) in the world needs careful examination and definition. No one will deny that there are "small" purposes in the world. A student may declare, "My purpose in life is to make money." This goal may be fulfilled anywhere from making five dollars to five million, or more. But is that student's life related to any better or greater purpose in the cosmos? To come at the question another way, does purpose really exist? Is purpose something that anybody can make up without any relationship to a larger or cosmic purpose? When a man lives decently, morally, and justly all of his life, often against the milieu of society, does this have meaning beyond his own human achievement? Is the universe in any sense a moral or purposive universe?

Obviously, the question cannot be answered from observing matter only. There appears to be nothing morally purposive anywhere except in the human community. If man's moral purposiveness is to be related anywhere, it must be found above him rather than below him.

So what about it? Is there purpose, teleology (a Greek word for goal or end) or design that seems to penetrate to the core of the universe regardless of where you look for it? It is easy to conclude that the world does seem teleologically oriented. The cosmos--from the atom to the solar system--is a world of complexity that is orderly, precarious in balance, magnificent in relationship, much of it scientifically explicable, but awesome on any grounds.

Granting this, the real problem comes: so what? What will be concluded from the world's design and harmony? This is where the argument begins. Note the following problems:

(1) Concluding for a designer.

From Aristotle to Aquinas as well as to modern philosophers, thinkers have argued that the design and purpose in the world is the expression of a designer which may be called God. An English philosopher, William Paley, popularized the argument in Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity. Paley used two examples among others, to reach his conclusion: a watch and the eye. When an intelligent man picks up a watch--as he examines it--he is led to the conclusion that its craftsmanship and intricacy were the result of a purpose. Paley argued that there cannot be a design without a designer. Everything about the watch leads to this conclusion. The same conclusion was reached in the second example, the eye. Paley knew nothing about the theory of evolution in his day, but he would probably have agreed with the argument used by Edgar Brightman who wrote concerning the marvels of the eye:

When one takes into account the fact that the eye is a complex organ, that each part of it is adjusted to the function of the whole, and that the parts are useless except in combination, it is difficult to understand the result on a mechanistic basis. If the developed eye is the outcome of gradual successive variations, there is no explanation of why the rudimentary variations would survive before all of the necessary variations had occurred in combination.

Or if it is the outcome of a sudden mutation, there is no explanation of why all the necessary parts should appear at once in mutual coordination. On either horn of the dilemma, the similarity of structure and function in the two types of eye is an effect without an adequate cause, a mysterious miracle. There is no explanation unless it is granted that there is at work in nature a power that is non-mechanistic and that realizes ends.²⁶

The conclusion is that there is some power or intelligence in the world that realizes ends or goals.

Moving beyond Paley and the modern illustrations of Paley's point by Brightman, there are two other kinds of examples and arguments that have been used for the conclusion that a designer exists.

(2) Man experiences purpose. Purpose in this sense deals with planning for and achieving goals in the future. The future is contemplated in the form of "if this, then that," or "if not this, then that." Explanations of these activities cannot be understood on either chemical, neural, or physical bases in the body, for these parts of man's makeup are not forward-looking.

(3) Natural laws suggest purposive content in the cosmos. Light is an example. Traveling at 186,000 miles a second, light is uniform everywhere. Light can be artificially slowed down, and then after it passes through a slowed state, it picks up its original speed. Why is this? One might say merely that that's the way it is. But why light behaves this way might also point to rationality in the cosmos, and hence design.

The idea of purpose is rather alien to the scientific community. Cause and effect have had a large place in the science while the question of why, or an ultimate cause, has had little place. Why is there a world? Why is there life? These questions cannot be answered by looking at only parts of the cosmos. An auto has many parts working in a mechanical relation. Each part works but makes little sense apart from the purpose of the machine which transcends the parts. The purpose is beyond the parts working in harmony. The fact seems to be that once there was no life. Then the world seemed prepared for life. Was it merely chance? Or was there loaded dice and a "cheater" somewhere rolling? It appears to make more sense that the world was prepared and shaped for life. So the modern ecologist seems to be saying. If we don't act intelligently--pursue the seeming design and harmony in nature--we are going to destroy ourselves.

Purposiveness seems to relate to the fabric of human existence in another way. Victor Frankl has done much with his use of logotherapy for people with problems. People have mental crises because they have no purpose. The will to purpose has become a key difference between living and dying. While Frankl does not conclude that God is the cause of the purpose, yet purpose has more meaning if it is related to God. Serving mankind is purposive activity, but one may do this and yet conclude that "life is a tale told by an idiot" and without meaning. But serving mankind has significant purpose in that it is related to the total meaning of life as proposed by God.

(2) Is the designer finite or infinite?

The argument doesn't say. All that is necessary is that the designer be sufficiently powerful and intelligent to get the job done. But the presumption is that the Designer is all-wise, infinite in power and goodness, and has done the work well.

If the designer is infinite, certain objections are raised against this conclusion. (1) Arguing by analogy, a finite world would not require an infinite God, and thus one could only argue by analogy and cause and effect, that since the world is finite, the designer need only be finite. (However, if the world were infinite, then an infinite cause could be required. Thus the question becomes one related to physics and astronomy, as well as the argument from cause and effect.)

(2) The problem of evil mars the perfection implied in the design. The tacit assumption is that this world is either perfect or all good. But there appears to be evil in the cosmos and this needs an explanation. The argument doesn't deal with the matter of evil. One might argue that the Creator or Designer is both good and evil, or indifferent. It is also conceivable that some things called evil may ultimately be found to be good, but the argument doesn't provide for this problem. David Hume raised various objections against the teleological argument such as the analogy of a bungling carpenter who does his work with a bit of trial and error.

The objection of the lack of perfection in the world stands in contrast to the perfection of the Designer. If the Designer is perfect, what has happened to the world? This leads to other questions. Was the world once perfect and then corrupted? This may be a possibility. But philosophically, all that we can now say is that it is not a perfect world as we understand the world, and there is yet considerable design manifested in it. One may seek a solution by an appeal to religious viewpoints, namely, that the world has been corrupted by sin from a once perfect state, but philosophically, the argument by itself has some problems.

If the option that the world reflects a finite designer be maintained, the fact still holds that there is design. We can argue over the degrees of design, or the relative perfection of the designer rather than the absence of design totally. The ideas of purposiveness may not be infinite but yet be a major fabric of the cosmos.

The finite designer conclusion tends to cast aspersions on the idea of God. But in spite of this, even if this conclusion were accepted, an enormous intelligence is expressed in the cosmos. Consider the enormous amount of knowledge that we know about the cosmos. Contemplate the future discoveries that man will make. A being who designed the world would have to be enormously precocious. It would not require too much of a leap of faith to conclude for infinite intelligence. This is especially true in light of the unknown "knowledge" of the future that shall be uncovered. If what we know reflects finite intelligences, the limit of our knowledge makes it possible to consider infinite intelligence. But even if we do this, we have yet to come with an explanation for the difficult question of the presence of evil in the world that has purpose.

In fact, the case against teleology almost boils down to one argument, the existence of evil. There are other arguments against teleology, but they are insignificant in comparison to the problem of evil. For example, (1) it is argued that teleology is a human projection on the experience of man in the world rather than a valid conclusion drawn from the world. Admittedly, there are people who

fantasize and live in a world all their own, but is this true for the common core of people who are quite realistic in their life styles and beliefs? To say that man generally projects would require a general psychological study of man. No such study has been done. Moreover, if it were found true that men did project their feelings on the world, this would require an adequate explanation. Is man's mind so framed that he sees purpose where none exists? This would raise the credibility of the rest of his knowledge. Does man generally come to acknowledge teleology because he is driven to that conclusion because of the actual possibility of seeing a teleology in the world? What is an adequate explanation for man's projection of purpose if it could be proven to be mere psychological projection?

(2) Another minor objection comes from Darwinism and its varieties. Instead of design and teleology, we now have with Darwin the ideas of natural selection. Some organisms are better adapted to survive than others. This survival value is not due to any Creator or Designer. The wide acceptance of evolution is due, in part, to the rejection of non-tangible explanations such as a Designer or God. Darwinism alone does not abolish teleology. The problem of the origin of life, arising from inorganic to organic, has yet to be solved adequately. But explanations based on genetics and mutations themselves may be seen as expressions of complex rationality. Adaptation may likewise be viewed from the standpoint of teleology as well as the struggle for existence. In reality we have come to substituting words for the same ideas. We may say that "nature has equipped Canadian geese to fly south with the coming of winter." Nature is a scientific substitute term for God. Nature sounds more scientific and less mystical, but nature offers no explanation. But "nature has equipped" says the same as "God has equipped" but in reality is not as meaningful, for nature does not have intelligence whereas God is supposed to have it. The problem may be whether one believes in God or not.

(3) The Problem of Evil.

At this juncture we turn to the real problem of maintaining belief in purpose, the problem of evil. If we are informed by ancient philosophy we are faced with the following alternatives:

If God is good and all-powerful, there should be no evil. Since there is evil, either God is not all-good, or all-powerful.

This has led some to say that evil brings one to atheism, or a rejection of God completely. Others have argued that God is good, but not all-powerful. God struggles against evil and will one day overcome it.

But the quotation above bears some closer examination. Take the phrase "all-powerful." This is a philosophic, but not a religious term. Under its philosophical meaning there have been debates over questions like: "Can God make a square circle. Can God make something to exist and non-exist at the same time? Can God make an object so big He couldn't pick it up?" These questions reflect gravely on the idea of God involved. But who is this God of the argument? How does philosophy come to a knowledge of an all-powerful, all-good God? The either/or alternatives

of the ancient philosopher should not come up in a genuinely religious concept of God. For example, a religious view of God based on revelation would require a meaningful sense of rationality attributed to God, not a sense of absurdity and contradiction. God is said to be rational and in a context of rationality the absurd is not seriously considered. In this there is truth in Pascal's statement that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (or the God of revelation) is not the God of the philosophers.

The view of God that one maintains has much to say concerning the solution to the problem of evil. Edgar Brightman, for example, came to conclude that God is good and finite because of the problem of evil. He noted: "Can one believe in a God who willfully permits evil to exist?" Brightman's solution is no solution. One can ask the question: "can one believe in a God who does not willfully permit evil to exist?" The difference? Do you want a divine policeman or a God of mercy? If the Divine policeman prevails then the first act of transgression would mean the abolition of man. Unless mercy prevailed, no one would exist.

In the long run, the question of what kind of God do you want to believe in? is not the right question. The real question is: what kind of God exists? What is the solution to the problem of evil? Can an infinite God of goodness and power allow evil to exist? Are the ancient alternatives correct in analyzing the question of God and evil? Many would argue no.

The problem of evil has called forth a variety of proposed solutions. The following may be used for outlining them.

I. Non-theistic solutions

1. Good and Evil are subjective concepts; the universe is neutral. (Spinoza)
2. Evil is the ultimate principle of the universe. (Schopenhauer)
3. The real problem is to overcome evil, not theorize about it. (Dewey)

II. Theistic Solutions

A. Solutions Calling for the correction of attitudes

4. Evil is unreal, resulting from misinterpretation of the world. (Christian Science)
5. There is no answer for man; the subject should be abandoned for more fruitful discussions. (Theodore M. Greene)

B. Solutions justifying God's Intentions

6. Evil is sent by a totally transcendent God whose holy power is beyond questioning. (Job in the end)
7. Evil is punishment for sin. (Job's friends)
8. Evil is sent as a test of faith. (Satan in the Job story)
9. Evil is provided as a contrast so that good will be appreciated more. (a popular lay view)
10. Evil is allowed as an obstacle making for moral growth. (Josiah Royce)
11. Evil serves some unknown purpose. (Aquinas, in part)

C. Solutions placing the Source of Evil Outside God

12. Evil is the work of a devil. (Luther, C.S. Lewis)
13. Matter is the cause of evil. (Manichaeism)
14. Evil must be possible if nature is to be governed by laws of orderly process. (F.R. Tennant)
15. Evil results from the fact that created beings must be finite. (William Temple)
16. Moral evil, at least, results from free human choices. (Most theologians)
17. Delegated creativity in everything makes novelty possible, and with it, evil. (Whitehead, Berdyaev)²⁷

There are two types of evil generally requiring some solution. First, there are evils perpetrated upon man by man. Poverty, war, robbery, rape and mass murder are the kinds of evils traceable to man. They are products of greed, lust, and hate. The second kind of evil is the natural phenomena of floods, earthquakes, disease, famines, and other natural calamities. Is there a solution to these evils? This is the more difficult one. Some reject these as real moral issues and regard them as part of the struggle for survival in nature. Certainly one does not have to live along the river bottom when floods come with regularity. But disease is different. We don't choose to have cancer or multiple sclerosis. Is freedom any kind of answer here, as it appears to be in the first form of evil? Is there an analogy between the tyranny of man over man and the tyranny of bacteria over man? Harmonious bacteria in man's body is necessary for digestion, health and life. But alien bacteria is detrimental to his health. Freedom and rebellion may be significant motifs for explaining man's existence and his environment with reference to teleology.

Regardless of whatever solution one chooses for attempting to give personal satisfaction to the problem of evil, one must at the same time realize the struggle that philosophers have had with the problem. It is not an easy problem. And in the course of time some answers have emerged as more aesthetically satisfying than others.

So far in this brief introduction to metaphysics we have looked at the issue of what is being? what are space and time? and is there purpose in the cosmos? While these matters are sketched in bare detail with the problems associated with them, the student can start to feel the depth of the problems that philosophers have faced in various ages.

We are going to turn now to two questions that are both metaphysical and religious in their content. These questions are further compounded because there are widely accepted scientific views on the subject of origins: our world and our life.

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Footnotes

- ¹Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961, p. 1.
- ²Cf. A.E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, London: University Paperbacks, 1903, p. 43.
- ³Aristotle's Metaphysics, trans. by Hippocrates G. Apostle, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966, p. 54.
- ⁴Another word, ontology, was introduced in the 17th century by Christian Wolff, and it basically means the science of being. Some philosophers prefer it to metaphysics since metaphysics implied something behind nature, while being or ontology begins with nature. Cf. Gottfried, Martin, General Metaphysics, trans. Daniel O'Connor, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968, p. 19.
- ⁵Taylor, op. cit., p. 5.
- ⁶Heidegger, op. cit., p. 6.
- ⁷Immanuel Kant, Prologomena to any Future Metaphysics, Chicago: Open Court, 1902, p. 134.
- ⁸Cf. Chapter four.
- ⁹Taylor, op. cit., p. 11.
- ¹⁰Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception.
- ¹¹Martin, op. cit., p. 212.
- ¹²Karl Jaspers, The Way to Wisdom, New Haven: Yale University Press, trans. by Ralph Manheim, 1954, p. 30.
- ¹³Ibid., pp. 33-34.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 34.
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- ¹⁸George Gamow, One, Two, Three . . . Infinity, New York: Viking Press, 1964, p. 109.
- ¹⁹Jeans, op. cit., p. 57.
- ²⁰Reader's Digest, January, 1978, p. 110.
- ²¹Aristotle's Metaphysics, p. 202.
- ²²"What is time? If no one asks me, I know. If I try to explain it to someone asking me, I don't know." Confessions, Baltimore: Penguin, 11, XIV.

²³Gamow, op. cit., p. 78.

²⁴Jeans, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

²⁵Gamow, op. cit., p. 102.

²⁶Edgar Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, Third Ed., revised by Robert N. Beck, New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1964, p. 235.

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CHAPTER VII

Metaphysics: Origins

Part II

Scientists describe our universe in enormous terms. The distance that light travels in a year at 186,000 miles per second is about six trillion miles. The distances in space are so great that a new term, mega-light-year, is introduced to convey one million light years. Our sun is no longer regarded as the center of the center of the Milky Way galaxy. Instead, the center is some 30,000 light-years distant. One astronomer has estimated that there are 10^{20} stars in the universe.¹ The nearest galaxy is Andromeda which is a mere 800,000 light years away but this is a drop in the astronomical bucket in comparison to quasi-stellar objects (quasars) that are believed to be 8 billion light-years from the earth.

Given any number of facts about the world that we view on a clear night, one cannot help but stand in awe and ask about the origins of it all. Heidegger's question, "Why are there existents rather than nothing?" becomes a staggering question. This kind of question is answerable only in general, provisional ways. We must resort to "I-believe" statements in the final analysis since we cannot return to the events for a re-run and verification. Nevertheless, the questions are important philosophically, scientifically, and religiously.

The question of origins is a restricted question although it seems to be a question about the origin of all things. The question of origins begins with the origin of matter in space. The origin of space is difficult to question. It seems impossible that there be nothing in the absolute sense of the term--including no space--and then something come to be. Space--even space without anything at all in it--seems to be a necessary concept. Thus, our discussion of origins will begin with the origin of matter/energy, and then we will discuss the important question concerning the origin of life.

I. The Origins of the Universe

There are only two basic views that are advocated although variations and hybrids may enlarge the competing positions.

A. The Universe is eternal

In ancient times Democritus is listed as an example of one who believed that the Universe was eternal. He is quoted as saying that "the causes of what now exists have no beginning, but from infinitely preceding time absolutely everything which was, is and shall be, has been held down by necessity."² Lucretius was another example of one who held an atomic view of the eternity of the cosmos. Both Lucretius and Democritus rejected the reality of God, but Aristotle and Plato taught a different doctrine of the eternity of matter. Aristotle believed that the heavens are eternal but he also believed in God as a first mover.³ God's presence has an influence on matter, but God is not at all concerned about the presence of matter.

Modern philosophers who accept the eternality of matter adopt the view as a basic presupposition of their system, or as an act of faith. There is no way to prove eternity of matter. Among people who believe in forms of pantheism, i.e., God is all and all is God, eternity of matter is implied. If the world is part of God, then matter has always been related to God. While this seems dualistic at first, what actually happens is that matter is not accepted as ultimately real, but as an illusion that covers up the real spiritual nature of the world.

One of the more unusual variations on the theme of the world's eternity is that of English astronomer Fred Hoyle. Hoyle argues for a qualified eternity of matter. He advocates what has come to be called the steady-state theory of the cosmos. There is matter that has always existed, but there is matter that will come yet into existence in the future. Rather than accept a once-for-all beginning of the cosmos, as seen in the next theory, Hoyle believes that every atom has a beginning, but not all of them at the same time. Thus there is no beginning or end for the Universe.⁴

Hoyle notes, "we shall suppose that matter originates as hydrogen atoms,"⁵ and later explains, "There must it seems to be a clear-cut reason why it is hydrogen that originates and not other elements. Why this reason is we do not know."⁶

The picture may be seen along these lines. The universe is expanding beyond a half million parsecs away (a parsec is the distance that light travels in three years). The further the expansion away from us, the faster is the expansion. To fill up space as expansion takes place new matter is coming into being. In turn the appearance of matter causes the universe to expand.⁷

What can we say in evaluating Hoyle's view? Critics raise certain problems and questions. The first centers around the discovery of quasars. Before talking about them we must note that Hoyle declared that if the expansion of the universe does not increase in speed on the outer reaches of space, then his theory has its problems. Well, in 1960 Maarten Schmidt discovered quasars that

are the farthest known objects in space, quasars. As the quasars have been studied it was found that they are slowing down, not picking up speed as Hoyle requires for his theory. Then the number of quasars appears to have been larger when the universe was younger and they seem to have disappeared in the course of time, and this is a further difficulty for the steady-state theory. A second center of criticism comes around the age of the moon, the earth, the oceans and what may be postulated about the expansion rate of the universe, points to the conclusion that there is a definite age to the universe rather than an eternity of the past. Third, Hoyle mentions the test of observation and verification as important. Do we have observations of hydrogen atoms coming into existence from nothing? Do we have observations of galaxies coming into existence by means of originating hydrogen atoms? Can we really claim any more than this: "it is there" or "it is not there?"

One last problem is that the steady-state theory seems to operate against the widely accepted law of entropy, or the second law of thermodynamics. This means that the available energy in the universe seems to be moving from available to unavailable forms. Burned out stars, the prediction that the sun will burn out in so many millions years, and the slowing down of the expanding universe tend to illustrate and give credence to the second law of thermodynamics on a cosmic scale, and if it is true, then it is an argument against the steady-state position.

B. The Universe had a beginning

Three different disciplines have an interest in advocating this position. The oldest is the biblical. The Bible begins: "In the beginning God created . . ." Obviously, there were no human eye-witnesses. Two points are involved: (1) God Exists and (2) God has revealed his creative activity. If creation is to be known, then only God can tell about it. Not only is this claimed as true, but it is claimed that what is known about the universe, its expansion, etc., synchronizes with the Biblical record of a beginning. As such, creation is a *sui generis*--an event one of a kind!

The philosophical support comes later and has a relation to the religious view. The kind of argument used may be seen in the contingency argument. Thomas Aquinas argued that there is nothing that we see that is necessary. Everything is dependent on something else. Since nothing visible--matter--can originate itself, then there must be something or someone on which matter is dependent and this we may speak of as God--who is a necessary Being, and who is eternal.

It is objected that the argument from contingency commits the fallacy of composition.

This fallacy consists of arguing from the properties of the parts, taken separately, to a property of the whole, taken together. Because sodium and chlorine are poisonous, it does not follow that table salt, which is composed of these elements, is equally poisonous.⁸

The analogy of the two elements is misleading. The combination gives a new quality, but the quality of various combinations in the universe is not eternity. No amount of combining of elements, or recombining them will move the elements from the category of contingency to eternity.

(2) Big Bang Theory No. 1

The scientific interest in the question comes mostly from astronomy and physics. One of the most popular expositions of the view called the "big-bang" theory is found in The Creation of the Universe, by George Gamow.⁹ Gamow argues that the present universe is the result of a catastrophic explosion that took place 6 to 10 billion years ago. At that time all the matter in space was found in a gaseous stage in which enormous contracting was taking place. This contracting reached a point in which it rebounded in elasticity and flung gases into space which would eventually condense into matter in various stages so making up the diverse forms of the galaxies, planets, supernovas, etc.

There are some important features supporting the theory. (1) The data derived from (a) the radioactive decay of atoms or uranium, (b) the age of rocks, (c) the age of the oceans, (d) the age of the moon, (e) the age of the sun and other stars, (f) the age of galactic clusters, and (g) the age of the Milky Way, points to approximately the same answer for the age of the universe. (2) The big-bang theory gives a rationale for the outward thrust of expansion of the universe.¹⁰

Moreover, the discovery of quasars and their slowing down on the outer reaches of space supports the big-bang theory as well as the second law of thermodynamics. As one can see, arguments marshaled against the steady-state theory are frequently arguments for the big-bang theory.

Gamow's theory is probably eclipsed now by the following theory of the Big Bang. Never the less we have the problem of not having a reproducible phenomena. The big-bang theory is an event one of a kind.

(2) Big Bang Theory No. 2

While Gamow's theory stops with a huge conglomerate of energy some 6 trillion miles in scope, the big bang theory no. 2 goes even further in density and compactness. In the beginning of the universe, the theory requires that the cosmos begin as the size of a pin-head. At a 10^{35} second later the observable cosmos expands to the size of a baseball. It is 10^{60} times denser than the nucleus of an atom. As great amounts of time pass, expansion takes place and our cosmos ultimately comes forth.

Where does the beginning come from in this theory? Science can only theorize. One theory is that the cosmos sprang into existence from little or nothing, a quantum fluctuation, a bubbling up of the vacuum of space. This sounds a little like something coming from nothing, and if so, that is accepted.¹

The Big Bang theory poses problems for the atheistic position. Atheism has depended upon the Greek view that the cosmos is eternal. The Big Bang requires a beginning point and an explanation concerning how it started. Some thinkers accept the Big Bang but then admit that science cannot penetrate back of the big bang.

The theory seems a bit like Genesis except for the "mechanism." In the Genesis story it is God who brings something from nothing, and here an intensely dense big bang erupts from a vacuum.

C. Oscillating Universe

This is a big-bang theory modified by the gravitational pull involved in the expansion. The universe will expand outward for 40 billion years in which time expansion will slow to a stop and then contract for 40 billion years to a new dense state for another big bang. This is postulated as a never-ending cycle.

D. Assessment

In brief assessment, the big-bang theory has a good edge over its competition. But any theory must be regarded as only a theory when it comes to requiring verification. Hoyle dismisses the big-bang theory as an item beyond observation and laden with suspicions because it is assumed. But at the same time he must assume lesser creations that took place in the past and are to take place in the future. These are non-observable, and imply something coming from nothing--a case of which we have no known examples. But at the same time this criticism is raised against Hoyle on the lesser creations, neither the big-bang theory or the oscillating theory are better off in accounting for the appearances of the gases to be blown out to become matter. But how did the big-bang become possible? The big-bang theory must tacitly assume the eternity of matter or gases, or conclude for an Eternal God who brought it into being. The steady-state theory has problems both as a theory--against the present evidence--and in supposing something coming from nothing. While neither theory likes to resort to the supernatural as an explanation for the primeval beginning, yet God conceived as the eternal Creator brings to the explanation the creative and rationally satisfying role of Mind. Although this may appear like substituting one mystery for another, the necessary eternal existence of a rational, creative God is not as mysterious as presuming something coming from nothing, or the appearance of mind from inanimate matter.

II. The Origin of Life

In spite of all that has been done to research, theorize, and guess about it, the origin of life--like the origin of the universe--is a unique event. Regardless of the attempts to simulate what may have been samples of how life began, even when successful, we can only say--it might have been that way. There is no possible way of returning to it apart from some science fiction time machine.

Nevertheless, it is both interesting and desirable to look into the origins of life. This form of cosmology is relevant to our views about a philosophy of man. What we think about man--his past, present and future--will relate to how we treat man. Questions of origins can be very relevant, if relevancy is a necessary demand.

The proposed answers to the origin of life are diverse. We will attempt to summarize the general theories held by thinkers of the past and present. These views are: (1) life came from another planet, (2) life arose via spontaneous generation, (3) life evolved from a few original species, (4) life was created, and (5) theistic evolution, a hybrid view.

1. Life came from another planet or galaxy.

Periodically, some physicist or chemist will come up with the suggestion that the origin of life is to be explained by life dropping in upon the earth some 500,000,000 years ago. Often this suggestion comes as an alternative to evolutionary theory. Fossil remains date from the Cambrian age (500 million) and appear suddenly with the major orders appearing together.

As interesting as this proposal sounds, it doesn't answer the question of how life started in that distant unknown planet. It is further complicated by the lack of knowledge about life anywhere in the universe. If there is life it is believed to be in existence only in terms of probability. Given the existence of billions of planets the presumption is that the odds hold for life somewhere. But until we have definite communication and facts we cannot depend upon this as a meaningful answer.

2. Life arose via spontaneous generation.

This is one of the oldest views held by mankind. Advocated by Aristotle, Lucretius, and others all the way to modern times, it was believed that nature spawned the various forms of life. Given the basic format of light, water, air, and earth, it just occurred that the earth "girdled its hills with a green glow of herbage and over every plain the meadows gleamed with verdure and with bloom." Trees then happened along, followed by furry and feathery creatures. Lucretius, in describing this, continued:

The animals cannot have fallen from the sky, and those that live on land cannot have emerged from the briny gulfs. We are left with the conclusion that the name of mother has rightly been bestowed on the earth, since out of the earth everything is born.

Even now multitudes of animals are formed out of the earth with the aid of showers and the sun's genial warmth.

Here then, is further proof that the name of mother has rightly been bestowed on the earth, since it brought forth the human race and gave birth at the appointed season to every beast that runs wild among the high hills and at the same time to the birds of the air in all their rich variety.¹¹

Thus mother earth appears like a fertile womb giving birth to life of all kinds.

Spontaneous generation in some form or other was accepted for centuries until the 19th century. It was regarded as an alternative to any form of creationism involving God. Apparently through the centuries spontaneous generation had slowly been questioned concerning flies, maggots, and similar creatures, but the origin of bacteria was still believed to arise spontaneously. Then in 1860, a controversy came to a head centering around Louis Pasteur. Pasteur seemed to

prove that bacteria did not originate spontaneously but was introduced into decayable materials by the air. In other words, foods cooked and sealed in sterile containers did not decay. On April 7, 1864, Pasteur addressed an audience at the Sorbonne using some flasks as examples of his work. He declared:

And, therefore, gentlemen, I could point to that liquid and say to you, I have taken my drop of water from the immensity of creation, and I have taken it full of the elements appropriated to the development of inferior beings. And I wait, I watch, I question it!-- begging it to recommence for me the beautiful spectacle of the first creation. But it is dumb, dumb since these experiments were first begun several years ago; it is dumb because I have kept it from the only thing man does not know how to produce: from the germs that float in the air, from Life, for Life is a germ and a germ is Life. Never will the doctrine of spontaneous generation recover from the mortal blow of this simple experiment.¹²

And William Beck comments by adding a historical note to Pasteur's words, "And it has not. Today these same flasks stand immutable: they are still free of microbial life."¹³

Now the issue seems to be closed on spontaneous generation. But note what Beck has to say. Although we regard the downfall of spontaneous generation as complete, "we must not forget that science has rationally concluded life once did originate on earth by spontaneous generation."¹⁴ Evolutionary theory is committed to spontaneous generation for a beginning at least. Once started, evolution has no need of further generations. This poses a serious problem for the nature of science and the status of theories. Beck admits the exception, but when exceptions are granted in theories, the exceptions destroy or greatly modify the nature of the theory being defended. As seen previously, Fred Hoyle rejected the big bang theory of the universe because he regarded it as arbitrary and superseding the laws of physics for an explanation.¹⁵

Can it be that Pasteur's evidence is applicable only in the 1870s and not in the primeval beginning? Was spontaneous generation ever true? The answer to this question brings us to the next theory in which it plays a vital part.

3. Life Evolved from a few original species.

The history of emerging evolutionary theory to the time of Darwin is interesting, but for our purpose here we will sketch the outline of evolutionary theory as it appears in contemporary works on biology. Before doing that however, the theory of evolution, it should be noted, involves a basic motif of scientific explanation: uniformitarianism. This means that changes take place gradually and require vast amounts of time for erosion to carve out canyons, the oceans to become salty, and changes in species to take place. Before 1785 when James Hutton, a Scottish farmer, presented the doctrine of uniformitarianism to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the prevailing viewpoint of change was some form of catastrophism. Catastrophism viewed changes as taking place quickly and dramatically. Thus if there are two million species today, on uniformitarian grounds it will require enormous time for this diversity to take place. If catastrophism were the basic philosophy of

explaining the Grand Canyon, perhaps an earthquake, or flood, or other explanation would be given, but the amount of time is of little consequence. Now the biology.

To begin, "most biologists believe that the first living things arose through the accidental conversion of non-living into living matter."¹⁶ Given enough time the statistical averages are used to speculate that life was bound to develop. Note the following:

The first cells came into existence, presumably, through the spontaneous aggregation of complex organic molecules already present. Most biologists now believe that before cells came into being, there abounded in the waters of our planet, at least in certain places, a variety of carbon compounds, forming a sort of rich organic soup. Simpler than the typical cellular constituents familiar to the modern biochemist, these primitive carbon compounds may have united spontaneously to form droplets. If we assume that some of these formations were able to absorb material from their medium, grow, and fragment to form "daughter" units, we have something that may be tentatively regarded as the ancestors of the first actual cells.¹⁷

It should be also noted that the relatively complex organic substances required for the beginning of life are not "found in nature except those that owe their origin to some living thing."¹⁸ It is presumed that the supply was limited and was used up, or disappeared. But it is reasoned that these earlier forms of primitive life came into existence "because their descendants live today."¹⁹

From the time of Darwin, evolution in some form has become accepted as a scientific fact. The comments that follow are based upon an important distinction. There are in fact two theories: a major theory and a minor theory; or what might be called evolutionary faith and evolutionary fact. The minor theory or evolutionary fact poses no problems philosophically. The minor theory describes the development within one species to another to produce hybrid varieties. This is seen in corn, birds, wheat, hogs, cows, dogs, and a host of other forms of life. The minor theory poses no problems either for religious questions.

However, the major part of the theory, or what may be designated as evolutionary faith is laden with questions for scientific, philosophical and religious communities.

The theory of origins as sketched above can only be designated as a state of faith, not fact. It is the example of a scientific paradigm that has had enormous acceptance in spite of serious problems. Standen describes it in the following way:

By far the most sweeping and by far the best of the great generalizations of biology is the Theory of Evolution. It can be called a theory that has by no means been tested by experiment.²⁰

Thus, in the final analysis, it will probably be seen that evolution is accepted on the grounds of preferring one faith over another rather than for the scientific or philosophical grounds. Philosophers like Corliss Lamont and Bertrand Russell see in evolution (the major theory) an escape from the need for theism, or belief in God. Lamont regarded evolution as much as a sure fact as two

plus two. It appears to furnish a scientific alternative to creation in which an unscientific God appears as the key factor in starting life. Russell regarded evolution as fact and explained the change factor as a result of "sports" or mutants. He wrote, "It is these sports that give the best opportunity for evolution, i.e., for the development of new animals or plants that descend from old kinds."²¹ Russell's solution of "sports" or mutants is not one that is satisfying to many biologists. "Mutations do not produce new species. The mutants of *Drosophila* (fruit fly) are still flies which belong to the same species of *Drosophila* to which their ancestors belonged."²² Moreover, there is no evidence for large mutations, or sports, which is what Russell would need to make his theory work.

At this point we need to describe the problems and issues relating evolution to science, philosophy, and religion.

(1) Science and the issues in evolution.

There are certain questions that are yet unresolved in accepting the major theory of evolution. (A) The origin of life from non-life poses the first problem. Was Pasteur wrong? Can life come into being as the biological description above has it? If this is so, must we not ultimately conclude that the categories of non-living and living be broken down so that we can accept an evolutionary beginning? And if this is so, then we must re-evaluate our idea of nature and conclude that nature is more alive than we ever thought. But this borders on **vitalism**, which most biologists and other scientists reject. Moreover, if there is an exception to the law or theory of the beginning of life--life comes from life--can we conclude that other exceptions might exist elsewhere in physics, chemistry, and other areas.

(a) Evidence.

It is freely admitted that nothing remains previous to the Cambrian Age. No fossils remained presumably because there were no hard parts. What evidence stands for evolution between the Cambrian Age of 500,000,000 years ago and the presumed beginning of two billion years ago? According to biologists and other scientists, none! Evidence is lacking and faith takes its place. Evolution is accepted as having occurred in the half billion years, and it must be imposed on the longer duration from 500 million to 2 billion years ago. In this case the theory of the known is projected on the unknown. Normally, theories are postulated on evidence, but where there is no evidence, one must infer what the theory demands. Dobzhansky concludes that evolution did take place in the period before the Cambrian Age, but "this enormous time span has left almost no fossil records . . . It is possible that the remains of the most ancient life are lost forever."²³

Thus we must endeavor to separate the minor theory which is factually supported from the major theory which lacks evidence. Polanyi's comments on the matter of evidence is instructive: "Neo-Darwinism is firmly accredited and highly regarded by science, though there is little direct evidence for it, because it beautifully fits into a mechanistic system of the universe"²⁴

The evidence for Darwinism has been under attack for a long time. But the desire to prove Darwinism was so strong on the part of Ernst Haeckel that he drew a fake drawing to “prove” the similarity of the embryos of a fish, salamander, tortoise, chicken, hog, calf, rabbit and human side by side at three stages of growth. They were first exposed around 1860 but were kept in biology textbooks for over a hundred years.

With the discovery of the electronic microscope major discoveries have been made in understanding the cell which Darwin did not know about, and the complexity of the cell, the information required for the cell, and the awesome little machines in the cell. There is considerable evidence for a different interpretation of the origin of life and it can be seen in intelligent design.

Darwin wrote, “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down.” (Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (New York: New York University Press, sixth edition, 1998, p.154)

In criticism of Darwin, Michael Behe has proposed the concept of the irreducible complexity. As an illustration he used the mousetrap. On a mousetrap you have a platform, a metal hammer, a spring, a catch, and a metal bar. All of these are necessary if one is to catch a mouse. Any object missing makes the trap useless. You can't have a mousetrap by gradual modifications. This was the argument made a long time ago by Brightman and others concerning the eye. All the parts have to be there for it to function. Behe's exposition of cilia, the bacterial flagellum, and blood clotting, for example, point up a world of complexity never imagined by Darwin. Moreover, the information needed to construct these objects is mind boggling.

Behe, along with others, speak of intelligent design as opposed to naturalistic Darwinism. Information does not come from materialism.

While there is an orthodoxy within the academic biological community and one may be afraid to depart from the dogma, in other disciplines some feel freer to raise questions. Paul Davies, a prolific writer in the area of physics wrote:

“It is hard to see how a molecule like RNA or DNA, containing many thousands of carefully arranged atoms, could come into existence spontaneously if it was incapable, in the absence of proteins, of doing anything (in particular, of reproducing). But it is equally unlikely that nucleic acid and proteins came into existence by accident at the same time and fortuitously discovered an efficient symbiotic relationship. The high degree of improbability of the formation of life by accidental molecular shuffling has been compared by Fred Hoyle to a whirlwind passing through an aircraft factory and blowing scattered components into a functioning Boeing 747. It is easy to estimate the odds against random permutations of molecules assembling DNA. It is about 10-40,000 to one against. This is the same as tossing a coin and achieving heads roughly 130,000 times in a row.” (Paul Davies, **Are We Alone?** New York: Orion Publications, 1995, p.27)

While Davies does not renounce Darwinism, his view makes Darwinism impossible intellectually. In **The Cosmic Blueprint** he wrote:

As we have seen, all life involves cooperation between nucleic acids and proteins. Nucleic acids carry the genetic information, but they cannot on their own do anything. They are chemically incompetent. The actual work is carried out by proteins with their remarkable catalytic ability.; But the proteins are themselves assembled according to instructions carried by the nucleic acids. Even if a physical mechanism were discovered that could somehow assemble a DNA molecule, it would be use useless unless another mechanism simultaneously surrounded it with relevant proteins. Yet it is hard to conceive that the interlocking system was produced spontaneously in a single step.”

A couple of pages later Davies noted:

“It is possible to perform rough calculations of the probability that the endless breakup and reforming of the soup’s complex molecules would lead to a small virus after a billion years. Such are the enormous number of different possible chemical combinations that the odds work out at over 10-2,000.000 to one against. This mind numbing number is more than the chances against flipping heads on a coin six million times in a row.” (Paul Davies, *The Cosmic Blueprint*, Simon and Shuster, 1988, p. 116ff)

In the early states of science, the ideal was to follow the truth wherever it led. Science broke from philosophy and theology to pursue the truth it could discover. In the modern climate of naturalism many scientists will not allow themselves to follow the truth where it leads. There is a dogmatism around Darwinism that will not allow for deviation. This may be seen in the examples of several extremely productive scientists who have been denied tenure at various universities because they have been driven to the conclusion that Darwinism does not explain reality in the way that Intelligent Design does. Freedom to pursue the truth in the university often means pursuing the truth accepted by the tenured faculty who are often naturalists.

(b) Status as a theory.

The major theory, we have said, should be regarded as a belief-system. Undoubtedly as a theory a better alternative is needed. Kemeny declares:

The great difficulty in evaluating this theory lies in its incompleteness. It is more of a qualitative description than a precise scientific theory. The proponents of Neo-Darwinism claim that there is no known instance of evolution which they cannot explain. This is actually untrue. What is true is that no such instance clearly contradicts their theory but this is not surprising when we realize how little the theory actually states. To say that the known changes could have been brought about by the described machinery does not explain the changes. We have seen that an adequate explanation is one which would have enabled us to

predict the outcome before it took place, but none of the present evolutionary theories enabled us to make such predictions.²⁵

Had Darwin lived fifty million years ago and predicted how the horse would evolve, then the theory would be meaningful. But biologists do not know what the next evolutionary step will be, nor is it known how to bring about the next step in true evolutionary style. This again raises the issue concerning "laws" of science. A law has predictability. An experiment centering on some law can be repeated endlessly and correctly. But not only do we admit an exception of the law--life arising from non-life--but we must admit ignorance on where life is going.

(c) The problem of logic.

The larger theory of evolution sits precariously on the principles of inference and analogy. Is it not dangerous to conclude from the particular to the general especially when the general adds up to two million species? When it is admitted that fossil remains are extremely meager--the further back we go the more meager they get--can we justify the vast generalization that all of life has evolved from a single species some two billion years ago.

Standen gives an example of the inferring that some biologists have done, although they speak of it as homology.

A human fetus shows clear analogies to a fish, and by a more vigorous exercise of the imagination, a biologist can see part of the human ear in the jawbone of a fish. This analogizing, this fine sweeping ability to see likenesses in the midst of differences is the great glory of biology, but biologists don't know it, and they praise themselves for the wrong reasons.²⁶

In a similar vein there is confusion regarding the two different theories--the major and the minor. Proof for the minor is not proof for the major. Development within species is quite different than development across species or larger units of life like the phyla. The inadequacy of the big theory led Polanyi to opt for another way. He wrote:

It is obvious therefore that the rise of man can be accounted for only by other principles than those known today to physics and chemistry. If this be vitalism then vitalism is more common-sense which can be ignored by truculently bigoted mechanistic outlooks and so long as we can form no idea of the way a material system may become a conscious responsible person it is an empty pretence to suggest that we have an explanation for the descent of man. Darwinism has diverted attention for a century from the descent of man by investigating the conditions of evolution and overlooking its action. Evolution can be understood only as a feat of emergence.²⁷

(d) The problem of verification.

The evidence for the origins of life are lost. We cannot do a re-run of the beginning. A substitute is offered for the beginning of life by what may be regarded as a simulation of what might have occurred. Various experiments have been achieved in the laboratories for the creation of amino acids--the building blocks of life--and the conclusion is then inferred: "that is what may have happened in the beginning."

Is this a valid inference? Note some of the complications of this inference. If we say that the lab experiments reflect what happened in the beginning of life, then we must conclude that Pasteur was wrong. No one wants to do this. But if we argue that the possibility that the conditions at the beginning of life were different from the lab simulations, then we have made no progress toward a mechanistic explanation. If the latter is the case, we have to confess practical ignorance about early beginnings. All we can say is that this may have been the case and in no wise do we have "what happened" except what happened in the lab. The origin of life lies beyond verification. But even if it could be simulated in a lab, we have one ingredient added that biologists dismiss in the first beginning of life. That is intelligence. The lab depends upon mind, but science in its method of investigation rules that out in the first instance because it seeks a mechanistic explanation for the origin of life.

(2) Philosophy and the issues in evolution.

Nietzsche was one of the first atheists to reject Darwinism. As an atheist he should have welcomed it, but he saw in it an ominous implication for any view of man, and man's nature. Nietzsche's atheism made it impossible to link man's status and being to God. On the other hand, if evolution were true what can be said about man's uniqueness. In simple biological terms there would be no uniqueness of any consequence. Man is one with the animal creation. There is a line of continuity running from the first protocell to man. How could he be different significantly? Man is obviously a different species, but he is kin to everything else in the biological tree.

The issue may be put another way: why shoot rabbits and not people? Biologically, there is no good reason for not shooting people because they are animals like other species. One might actually argue that an open season would be a good way to depopulate the earth. There is no sacredness of man in biology. If man is sacred in any way, it must be found, or defended from another viewpoint than biology *per se*. Nietzsche sought an answer in his idea of the over-man, or the fact that man can transcend himself.

A legal outgrowth of the sacredness of man may be seen in the Nurenberg trials held after WW II to convict the Nazis of atrocities against humanity. The underlying reasons for the laws, on which these people were tried, is to be found in the view that man is sacred, made in the image of God. As a unique creature it is wrong to murder other human beings. However, if we are to think of man being special in any other way than an animal, it will have to come about on philosophical or theological grounds.

Some biologists have felt the criticisms of past and have rejected the older theory's implications that man is "nothing-but" a complex of physicochemical processes.²⁸ A general proposal to the problem of man's uniqueness is to add "mystique" to man's existence. But even if this is done it cannot meet with the criteria of observation, verification, and science as a hard-line discipline.

There are, therefore, definite implications for one's view of man drawn out of biological evolution. These implications are related to our ideas on the nature and use of law, war, civil rights, social reform as well as the traditional questions of goodness, sin, and God. For example, if man is merely another animal, what justification is there, apart from some aesthetic feeling, for social reforms to recover people from ghetto existences?

(3) Religion and evolution.

Unfortunately, science and religion have fought one another frequently out of misunderstanding. Some religionists have taken unnecessary positions in defending the Bible. For example, a defense of creation taking place at 4004 B.C. on an October afternoon is not required by the Bible. There is no date implied in the Bible. But even Charles Darwin was surprised to learn that 4004 was not part of Scripture.²⁹ This date was the work of Archbishop Ussher and it has been accepted because it was printed in the margins of Bibles. The Hebrew text does not give a date.

Another problem is that the biologist deals with a pseudo-problem in thinking that religion must defend special creation of individual species.³⁰ Two points need to be remembered about special creation and individual species. First, fixity of species is an influence that came from Aristotle. Aristotle believed in unchanging forms and his influence was so impressive and great that interpreters of the Bible came to believe that God had created each species individually. Second, the Bible does not require that specie-creation be defended. A species is often defined as an organism that will mate with one another. When they will no longer mate, then they are regarded as a separate species. The Bible itself records the fact of selective breeding to gain stronger sheep.³¹ The story of creation does not mention species at all, but a term that is broader in scope. Genesis 1:24 says:

And God said, Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their kinds: cattle and creeping things and beast of the earth according to their kinds. And it was so.

There is no attempt to give a run-down on how many "kinds" of animals were in existence, nor the relationship of these animals to one another with reference to species. The central point is that God created the various levels of life. No length of time is given except the story is told in six days. There are no boundaries drawn on the kinds, no static species are mentioned, no fence around families that prohibits development within their kinds.

In summary, all that we can say about the major theory in evolution is that life appeared in the Cambrian Age. We cannot say how it got there. There were no human observers. The faith of the evolutionist declares that it evolved at that point. But the Cambrian Age witnessed the

appearance of most phyla and even the phyla are not "in the order which would be expected as 'natural' on the basis of increasing complexity . . ." ³² But progressive complexity can be seen in the phyla. This becomes one of the key issues in the major theory: is there evolution across phyla, or only in phyla? Evolution within phyla poses no great problems religiously or philosophically, but evolution across phyla would, and one of the important questions centers around the sacredness of man in contrast to other creatures.

4. Life was created.

This is a religious view for the most part although one might possibly reason to it philosophically and scientifically. Who did it? God. How is it known? Only by revelation. It is maintained, in the Bible, that creation is the work of God who is personal. If it happened that way, God was there to tell the story.

This view is simple to express, and it begins with the assertion, "In the beginning, God created . . ." Broad outlines of the story are only given. God created the world, matter, and then living things and finally man. In bare detail the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms are created. The record of Scripture goes on to say that not only is God the Creator, but the sustainer also. Life continues to be, because God is and wills it. Life is good because God created it.

The progressive complexity of life has a broad agreement with a geologic table of life which is more detailed, but essentially the same in order. So when a scientist declares that life originated in the Cambrian age, a man of faith declares: "God created." When man appears on the scene the man of faith in God says, "God created man."

Creationism has some problems. There are no fingerprints of God left behind, but there is a very complex system of life indicating a designer. However, creationism depends upon self-revelation of God. There are no *a priori* arguments against the possibility of God's self-revelation. Revelation is not measured by scientific devices. What is involved here is the credibility of people, the confirming of what has been said by the God who acts.

There are some lesser issues in creationism. There is no necessity to adhere to the 4004 B.C. date for creation. Some theologians have argued that the genealogies in the Bible are not concerned with the **time** of descent but the **line** of descent. The lineage is important for tracing the heritage of the Messiah, not the figuring up of man's age.³³ There are many gaps in the genealogies and there is no way of knowing how many generations are supposed to be from the first man to the days of Jesus. However, the genealogies would not allow in their intent a broad use to include millions of years.

Second, as stated above, it is not required that the creation of species be defended. Genesis does not give details except for the important general items of a Hebrew's life--cattle, vegetation, fruit trees, and the significant fact that human life is a creation of God. He also created the elements

that make life's continuation possible. Beyond this, there is no word on the varieties of animals, birds, bees, etc. Only that God created.

Third, there are theologians who argue that God did not create the Cosmos in six consecutive days. The Genesis story is told in six consecutive days concerning God's past creativity. We really are not told to whom the story was told, but let us suppose, for the sake of illustration, that the story were told to Noah. At one point the story is told on six successive days about how God created and the order of events in his creation. P.J. Wiseman supports such a view in his Creation Revealed in Six Days,³⁴ and argues that it was customary in ancient Babylon to write the account of creation on six tablets.

There are some very satisfying features in creationism. God is continually active in upholding the world. The complexity of the world and its systematic inter-dependence within living things as well as outside of living things reflects tremendous creativity and intelligence. It is more aesthetic to conclude for God's creativity than mere chance. This leads us back to the first question of metaphysics: why is there something and not nothing? Eternal God is more appealing than Eternal Nothing.

5. Theistic evolution, or God and Evolution.

A hybrid view called theistic evolution is the attempt to give independence to biological evolution as well as retain belief in God. Theistic evolution means that evolution is to be accepted as the biologist describes it with one or two exceptions. One of the better known advocates of theistic evolution is E.L. Mascall who wrote:

Evolution is but the *modus operandi* by which the ideas or forms or universals are realized in the animal and plant world. God as the cause of all motion is the spiritual and intelligent force behind evolution, and evolution occurs solely because there is a God.³⁵

Hence the first exception to the evolutionary theory is the introduction of God who starts and directs it. Why is there evolution? God started it! Why does it keep on? God keeps it up. How does God get into the picture? The answer comes from religion, not science.

The second exception concerns man. Mascall wrote:

Even if we hold that the production of man's body is a matter of "pure chance" . . . the production of man is not a matter of chance, if it involves the direct and deliberate action of God. In the language of Genesis, "The Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," and however the original writer understood his assertion, there is nothing to prevent us from taking the "dust from the ground" as denoting one of the higher anthropoids. The production of this anthropoid may indeed be a matter of chance, like so much in the evolutionary process, but need that worry us? Suppose that God uses just this method of "chance" to produce here and there the occasional physical

organism which, by its organic adaptability and its cerebral complexity, is an adequate counterpart for a rational and spiritual soul.³⁶

These comments incorporate the uniqueness of man using evolutionary concepts as far as they go.

There are some questions to be raised about theistic evolution. First, it incorporates exceptions that are scientifically undetectable. God and the spirit of man are not measurable from the standpoint of science. As such it is another, but limited version of creationism. Second, it is something rejected as another version of the old idea, "the God of the gaps." This means that God is appealed to for special purposes, but after the process is started, God is no longer. Man fills in the gaps of missing knowledge. In it also is seen another form of deism in which God is the first cause, or originator of things, but then has no function or interest in the world thereafter.³⁷

Last, it appears that theistic evolution plays a little loose with the Biblical record concerning man's being a direct creation of God. Theistic evolution has both the problems of naturalistic biology as well as the problem of being true to the Biblical record.

Summary

We have looked at two questions of origins: the world and life. These are difficult, complex, but important questions. There could be little significance in the questions were it not for the way they touch on man's understanding of himself. Is man living in a hostile world or a friendly cosmos? Does something awesome, wonderful, and personal transcend man's existence as William James described it? Or, is man only a chance creature that happened on this little planet that will one day die and that will be his only end? Is man a high grade simian or the creation of God? Western man has believed that man is made in the image of God. As such a creature his life is sacred and should be preserved above all other creatures. Murder is a crime against the image of God. Atheism is not only the denial of God's existence, but also the special significance of man's nature in contrast to other creatures.

Man becomes the focal point of philosophy and man alone seeks to understand his world and himself. We now turn to our next topic involving more of the issues of man's existence: what is man?

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- ³Aristotle's Metaphysics, p. 204.
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- ⁵Ibid., p. 287.
- ⁶Ibid., p. 310.
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- ¹⁰Ibid., pp. 4-18.
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- ¹³Ibid., p. 104.
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- ¹⁵Hoyle, op. cit., p. 282.
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- ²²Theodore Dobzhansky, Evolution, Genetics and Man, New York: John Wiley and Son, 1966, p. 83.
- ²³Ibid., p. 288.

²⁴Personal Knowledge, p. 136.

²⁵Kemeny, op. cit., p. 199.

²⁶Standen, op. cit., p. 98-99.

²⁷Personal Knowledge, p. 390.

²⁸Cf. Overman, p. 161; Julian Huxley, Evolution in Action, pp. 76-97. G.G. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, pp. 294-337.

²⁹Overman, p. 23.

³⁰Cf. Hall and Moog, "Historically evolution has posed not one problem but two. (1) Have existing species evolved out of other species, or were they individually created? (2) If they evolved, by what mechanism did they do so About the first question there is no longer any scientific doubt whatsoever," p. 437.

³¹Genesis 30.

³²Simpson, op. cit., p. 31.

³³Cf. Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1948.

³⁴P.J. Wiseman, Creation Revealed in Six Days, London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1949.

³⁵E.L. Mascall, The Importance of Being Human, New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

³⁶Ibid., p. 14.

³⁷Cf. Overman, p. 137.

CHAPTER VIII

Man: Mystery and Wonder

Man is yet a mystery in spite of great penetration into anthropology, psychology, sociology, and biology. Even yet when all our studies are complete--if this were possible--man may continue to be a mystery. Socrates' famous dictum "know thyself" still stands as one of the greatest needs of man. It appears easier to put a man on the moon than to explore the depths of man's being. Even where we have been interested in knowing about man, man is not always the object of study. Animal studies--white rats, rabbits, and other creatures--are used to infer applications to man. The proper study of mankind is "man" has not always been accepted as true or relevant.

The mystery of man is compounded even more by the choice of standards. What is man? is hard to answer. Vital statistics like 6'5" at 190 pounds offers little in determining what man is. Søren Kierkegaard raised this question in an existential fashion. One may grow to proper heights, marry, beget children, and live to old age without asking the question, "Am I a man?"¹ One might well imagine the chagrin and bewilderment of a husky football player if asked in dead seriousness: are you a man?

What is it to be a man? Obviously, manhood is more than having a body, begetting, working, eating, and sleeping. Most animals do this. Is man only an animal? Is there a basis for talking about man as a qualitatively different being from other animals? There is a strong and influential tradition in philosophy that affirms man to be unique and qualitatively different from other animals. But modern science, on the other hand, appears to answer the question of man's nature more in similarity to the lower animals.

We will now turn to consider these traditions, the scientific, the Greek view, and the Judaeo-Christian.

I. Views About the Nature of Man

A. A Scientific View of Man.

There is no single scientific view of man. Man may be studied from the vantage point of many disciplines. To the physicist man has shape and occupies space, he can be measured and described in mathematical terms of space and time. To the chemist man may be studied as a conglomeration of the earth's components. But perhaps the most significant contribution to the study of man comes from biology. The modern biologist fits himself in the category of objective science while the ancient biologist was often the philosopher, like Aristotle.

Several points can be made as the biologist sums up the meaning of man.

1. Man is an animal that is akin to all forms of life.² Obviously he is closer to primates than he is to a tree, but there is a kinship that is born of the continuity from the most primeval form of life to the present. Science has its own myth, or saga, or paradigm, or epic for explaining the origin of man.³ Man is the result of mechanistic evolution that is entirely without help as implied in a Creator.⁴ Simpson notes: "Man is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that did not have him in mind. He was not planned."⁵ Purpose is only real when man is already here; only man has purpose.

Biological science stops at the point of the origin of life. The basis of life--matter, atmosphere, elements, and the necessary ingredients for supporting life--are beyond the range of biology to explain. Simpson affirms that "the ultimate mystery is beyond the reach of scientific investigation and probably of the human mind. There is neither need nor excuse for postulation of nonmaterial intervention in the origin of life, the rise of man, or any other part of the long history of the material cosmos."⁶ But in spite of this fortuitous beginning of man, Simpson and others make a great deal out of the rise of man and the long history of the cosmos.

2. How did man come to be? Organic evolution is the answer in which the basis for life existed and in the unknown past of two billion years ago, life spontaneously happened. It developed to the point at which a million years ago the creature that would be man took an independent turn away from its brother and ancestors and ultimately became man. The following gives a good example of the reasoning: "If we go back far enough in time, we find a period in which no human form existed. It is evident, then, that man as we know him today has emerged from earlier, nonhuman forms."⁷ In a similar fashion, Dobzhansky says, "But the evidence shows conclusively that man arose from forebears who were not men, although we have only the most fragmentary information concerning the stages through which the process has passed."⁸

3. The unique thing about man in the scientific view is that man thinks. But why does man think in a superior way to other creatures? The implication is that man's brain size, his erect posture, and the position of the brain account for it. The size of modern man's brain averages about 1350 cubic centimeters, although Jonathan Swift's brain measured about 2000 cc. and Anatole France was only 1100 cc. Earlier creatures such as the Java Man (*Pithecanthropus*) had brain sizes between 750 to 900 cc. The Peking man (*Sinanthropus pekinesis*) was larger at 900 to 1200 cc. The Neanderthals had about 1450 cc. and the Cro-Magnon came up to 1650 cc. While it is easy to see that the larger, later brainy creatures were more intelligent, "it does not follow that significant correlations may be drawn between brain size and intelligence . . . There is indeed no evidence that persons having large brains are either more or less intelligent than those having smaller brains."⁹ But Dobzhansky says:

However incomplete our knowledge of human ancestry, there is scarcely any doubt that the development of brain power, of intelligence, was the decisive force in the evolutionary process which culminated in the appearance of the species to which we belong. Natural selection has brought about the evolutionary trend towards increasing brain power because brain power confers enormous adaptive advantages on its possessors. It is obviously brain power, not body power, which makes man by far the most successful biological species which living matter has produced.¹⁰

The natural question arises: does size produce quality? How does one go from brain size to brain power? Does brain size mean higher intelligence? At this point also we might indicate an important question concerning man's knowledge. Is his knowledge and ability different in quality or only in quantity from other animals? This question will be considered later.

4. How does man acquire values? Sensitive biologists who are frankly mechanistic do argue that man has arrived on the scene without design, but nevertheless, man is not merely a creature. The idea that man is "nothing but" an animal is rejected by many biologists. There are actually two kinds of biologists at this point: theistic and non-theistic. A theistic biologist would incorporate God's involvement in evolution and God would be the originator of values. But we are interested in the non-theistic view here because science is supposed to be descriptive and therefore God must not be appealed to in the biological mode.

Using Simpson as an example of the biologist's position, he does claim that "man is a moral animal . . . all men make judgments of good or bad in ethics and morals . . . It requires no demonstration that a demand for ethical standards is deeply ingrained in human psychology. Like so many human characteristics, indeed most of them, this trait is both innate and learned."¹¹

Simpson describes some of the diverse ethical systems that were developed by evolutionists. The first grew out of Darwin's followers and is called by T.H. Huxley "the gladiatorial theory of existence and concluded that the evolutionary ethic must be, first, every man for himself, then every tribe, every nation, every class, and so on, for the `struggle for existence.'"¹²

This is rejected by Simpson because (1) struggle is only one aspect of evolution, (2) struggle is not the same as natural selection, and (3) the inherent ruthless competition was morally repugnant to sensitive people.¹³

Later, after Huxley, Herbert Spencer proposed a "life ethic" in which it is reasoned that life is good because evolution has brought it about and what promotes life is therefore good. Actions that do not promote life are not good. This is criticized as a variation on the survival ethic which was rejected above. If life is good, every man is for himself again.

Another example was "aggregation ethics." In this, evolution has brought about different levels of existence, with increased complexity and perfection on each level. The levels are (1) the protozoans, (2) the metazoans, and (3) the hyperzoans. In this latter level man emerges as an individual but is part of the whole. As a part of the whole he exists for the whole rather than for himself. But this is rejected as bad biology for it is evident "that merging of the individual into a higher organic unit is not a common trend in evolution and, specifically, is not at all a trend in human evolution."¹⁴

These attempts at creating a biological ethic are rejected by Simpson because (1) they are related to all of life, while ethics is limited to a human endeavor, (2) because there is no way of finding out what evolution is up to as a standard, and (3) evolution itself has no basis for giving us a standard of human conduct.

What then is the basis of an ethical adventure? Since the old evolution up to man is a-moral, and since "evolution has no purpose, man must supply this for himself."¹⁵ The first ethical affirmation is knowledge and its spread.¹⁶ Simpson admits that the old claim that science is free of value judgments and should make none is false. "Science is essentially interwoven with such judgements."¹⁷ The scientist must evaluate the knowledge he acquires and then transmit it to others.

In addition to knowledge, there is responsibility. Responsibility is primarily personal but has sweeping implications for the community, nation, and world. On this, it is "good, right, and moral to recognize the integrity and dignity of the individual and to promote the realization or fulfillment of individual capacities."¹⁸ This is true for the individual as well as the social group and all mankind.

Simpson justifies these two points, knowledge and responsibility, because they are rooted in man's nature. They have "arisen from and are inherent in his evolutionary history and status. Responsibility is something that he has just because he is human and not something he can choose to accept or to refuse."¹⁹

Simpson's attempt to construct a value system along evolutionary lines is commendable. But there are some problems. First, why adopt these two criteria of knowledge and responsibility? Knowledge is useful for good or bad reasons, but knowledge is related to something else-- preserving and upgrading the quality of life. This means survival again. In this proposal, it is

arguable whether Simpson has advanced beyond the systems he has rejected as untenable. Even responsibility can be treated in the same fashion--I am responsible to whom and why? To preserve life again? What other reason!

Second, there is the problem of intangibles. Can there be such a thing as evolutionary ethics? If there cannot be meaning in evolution, how can one argue that evolution lends support to purpose, meaning, and morality in the human realm? Simpson does claim that man is the only ethical animal. "The ethical need and its fulfillment are also products of evolution, but they have been produced in man alone."²⁰ Can a blind, non-purposive system produce the purposive? It is difficult to see how it could, and no indication is given how it did.

These are only two points of criticism. Dobzhansky criticized the numerous attempts, like Simpson's, of sketching evolutionary ethics, saying, "Evolutionary ethics have not been formulated yet, and one may reasonably doubt that they can be made scientifically convincing or aesthetically satisfying."²¹ Many critics would concur.

We now turn to the second tradition.

B. *The Greek Tradition.*

The Greek philosophical tradition is a broad spectrum but what is usually intended is the influential movement initiated by the three great patriarchs of philosophy: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. For brevity sake, Plato will be used as a model with some additional comments from Aristotle. Several elements make up the view of man.

1. A High God or Eternal God created lesser gods who are then given the responsibility to create man. This work of the lesser gods is fashioned on His model, but it removes the direct link between man and the high God. This is consistent with the Platonic disdain for the body which will be evident below.

2. Man, without women, is created and within man is placed a divine element or material that is immortal. This may be described popularly as man's soul which is akin to deity and alien to the body.

3. The first men lived cowardly or immoral lives and were subject to rebirth in the "second generation as women, and it was therefore at that point of time that the gods produced sexual love, constructing in us and in woman a living creature itself instinct with life."²² This bit of cosmology may explain why homosexual love was accepted in Plato's *Symposium* as superior to heterosexual love. It is also the intellectual background in western thought for arguing that sex *per se* is in some way evil. The fact that evil men became women is carried further in its logic by Plato in saying that "Land animals came from men who had no use for philosophy."²³

4. Bodily existence is second-rate. There are two emphases about the body in Plato's thought that appear contradictory. The first may be called "body-culture" which is related to our

olympic tradition. This is seen in the Republic in which the development of the body is a good thing. This will be elaborated on in our next point. However, here we can note that the body is deprecated considerably. Plato wrote in the Phaedo:

For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to disease which overtake and impede us in the search after true being; it fills us full of love and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact as men say takes away from us the power of thinking at all.²⁴

The thought is pursued further that the purification of the soul comes only in the separation of the body. The body is compared to a chain that holds on to the soul keeping it from better things. This negativism toward the body eventually is accepted in Neo-Platonic influences that later regard the body as evil. This flowed into the monastic tradition in which normal desires of the body are rejected, i.e., the marriage relationship.

5. The wonder of man is reason, and this relates to his deliverance from the body life. Reason is the divine in man. Man is described as a creature of body and soul, on the one hand, and as a tri-part creature on the other. In the Republic, much emphasis is given to the three-fold elements of man's nature: the rational, the courageous, and the appetitive. The courageous and appetitive are mortal while the rational is immortal. Each element is important in its rightful place. Interaction takes place between them, but it is meant to be a harmonious, not a tyrannical interaction. The rational has a desire for truth, requires courage to follow the truth, but chaos can reign in man and he can be a coward, or ruled by lust, or love of food. However, if justice reigns in his existence he will act properly, make the right choices, and live the good life. If there is injustice--each part of man's existence not getting its rightful demands--then there will be strife in the person and he will not be a just man, nor temperate, nor courageous.

6. Death does not resolve man's problems. Souls of men who have not given up their craving for body existence will be punished and imprisoned in another body.²⁵ Because the soul is immortal it can be released from bodily existence by "attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom."²⁶ This means that the body's loves and lusts must be forsaken for the intellectual goals of the mind. If not, a system of destinies is indicated in Plato for those who persist in their unjust and immoral lives. People guilty of gluttony and drunkenness return to life as asses and animals of that sort. The unjust, the tyrants and the violent men "will pass into wolves and into hawks or kites."²⁷

This system is based upon the idea that only the pure will be allowed in the presence of the gods. Who are these people? The lovers of knowledge who are the philosophers.²⁸ The true philosophers are those who "abstain from all fleshy lusts, and hold out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them . . . because they dread the dishonor or disgrace of evil deeds."²⁹ Death is feared only by those who are lovers of the body or money, or power but who are not lovers of wisdom.³⁰ Death to the philosopher is really a liberation from the downward drag of the body.

7. Since man's highest good is reason, the way of deliverance from the problems and temptations of life is related to the intellect and contemplation. Socrates affirmed: "But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education."³¹ Aristotle is true to this tradition when he pleads "rather ought we, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality and to leave nothing un-attempted in the effort to live in conformity with the highest thing within us." He then concludes, "Applying it, we shall conclude that the life of an intellect is the best and pleasantest for man, because the intellect more than anything else is man. Thus it will be the happiest life as well."³²

8. Freedom is given a paradoxical treatment. Rationality implies considerable freedom and equality. But the views of Plato and Aristotle were elitist views in which the leisure class, for the most part, carry on the great intellectual life. Slaves, women, and lesser people do not have the same freedom. Freedom is not to be identified with democracy which is denounced by Plato and Aristotle as one of the worst forms of government. It was the democrats who put Socrates to death. In contrast to the emphasis on freedom, the utopian city that Plato envisions is a city where people perform as nature has equipped them and as education recognizes their ability. People who are talented as cobblers and carpenters do not have the right or freedom to rule the state. If this came to pass, then the state exists in injustice--each one is not doing what he is equipped to do.

9. Virtue is acclaimed by all three patriarchs of ancient philosophy. The four virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, receive considerable treatment in the works of these masters. Since man is rational then his thinking should be like the gods and this gives some measure of approval to his ethical thinking. Some things are condemned as outright wrongs such as "malice, shamelessness, envy, among feelings, and among actions adultery, theft, murder."³³ Little is said about sex since sex was regarded as a natural biological phenomenon like eating and drinking. There is no extended discourse on the subject in the Ethics of Aristotle, although the Symposium of Plato assumes homosexuality to be the highest form of expressing love. Aristotle condemns homosexuality³⁴ although later he seems to accept it.³⁵

10. Conclusions: There is much appealing in the ancient Greek view of man. Man's rationality must not be denigrated. But the limits of reason need recognition, but to abrogate the mind as is the tendency in modern Oriental mystical groups is to deny nature. That part of Greek thought which denigrated the body was negative and tragic. The body does have problems with requirements for food, sleep, lust and other desires, but the element in Platonic thought that the body was a prison of punishment led to the harsh views that the body is evil, all material is evil, sex is evil, and flagellation of the body is the extreme logic of that particular emphasis.

The dichotomy of the body and soul as radically taught by Plato and later Descartes created philosophical problems that extend into the present. Particularly since Descartes philosophers have struggled over questions concerning the relationship between two radical entities like the soul which is immaterial and the body which is material. How can they interact? Platonic influence in Christian writers also created these same issues. We shall see that the Christian view stood in

contrast to the Platonic although Christian writers "baptized" Plato and Aristotle to their own uses later.

C. The Judeo-Christian View.

The Judeo-Christian view has affinities to the Platonic, but the differences are consequential and important.

1. God created man and woman. The Genesis account of the Bible speaks of God--directly--not indirectly--creating man in his own image. In a real sense the human creature is man--male and female although our language does not carry this distinction anymore. In the recapitulation of the creation story about man in Genesis 2 man is made first, but it was not good for man to be alone. The animals were not suitable companions to be with man. From the side of the sleeping man, God created woman. She is designated companion to man. Husband and wife become one flesh, one union. This is one of the reasons that homosexuality is regarded as an abomination in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. It is against the order of creation. Sex is not an afterthought. It is not a punishment. Sexual relations have boundaries in the Christian view, but the sexual act is good and children are a gift of God. Children were regarded in the Old Testament as a sign of God's favor. Matrimonial sexual pleasure is one of the basic facts of the Bible. Contrary views are alien to the Bible.

2. Man is a living soul. Theologians and philosophers frequently talk about body and soul, but in a real sense this drifts in the direction of the Greek influence and makes man a dichotomy. Man is a living soul so that his existence is a unitary one. He is not two things, but one. This unity is expressed in the statement of Barth:

I am not only my soul; I am my soul only as I am also my body. I am not only my body; I am my body only as I am also my soul. Hence it is certainly not only my body which has awareness, and it is certainly not only my soul but also my body which thinks.³⁶

Barth's comments reflect the Hebrew-Christian view of man. Had philosophy followed this view of man rather than the Platonic it would not have had the struggles of trying to deal with the problem of interaction between the two diverse entities.³⁷

As a living soul, man is not to be liberated from his body. In contrast to the Platonic view of the immortality of the soul, the transformation of the body with man's renewal as a total being is the Christian view of the future life after death. Death is considered a great tragedy in the Christian view because a living person ceases to be. The immortality of the soul ignores the fact of death. Berdyaev declares:

The doctrine of the resurrection recognizes the tragic fact of death and means victory over it--which is not to be found in any doctrine of immortality, whether Orphic or Platonic or theosophical. Christianity alone faces death, recognizes both its tragedy and its meaning, but at the same time refuses to reconcile itself to it and conquers it.³⁸

3. Man is created in the image of God. The Genesis account says, "Then God said, Let me make man in our image, after our likeness." As God is spirit, the image cannot be a physical image. Many statements in the Bible are anthropomorphic statements like "the arm, eyes, and ears of God." The Psalmist even talks about resting under the everlasting wings of God. The image of God in man consists in man's rational, moral, and spiritual existence before God. Man is rational in a way that animals are not, he is moral and responsible, and as a spiritual creature he is related to God in worship and communion. One other implication relates to the concept of the Trinity. The Christian concept speaks of God as three persons in one eternal essence. Thus, there is a sense of community in unity in God. These may be seen reflected in the human race in which man, woman, and children live in community. Remember that an image is a faint reflection and does not do justice to the concept of the Infinite God. A finite image is only an image.

But the Christian view of man involves something more. The standard of man is not the first man, Adam, who squandered his innocence, but the new man, Jesus, the Christ, who is God become man, or the God-man. Christian thought can talk about what man once was, but is no longer. It can talk about what man now is, in contrast to paradise, but it goes one step more. Man can become like Jesus through his salvation. He is not merely a model, but a redeemer. He is not a teacher of deliverance, He is deliverance. Jesus is the image of God incarnate.

4. Man, though created by God, is alienated from God. A gap exists between man and God and Christian thought lays the blame on man's shoulders. The first man disobeyed God's command and in that disobedience alienated himself from the intimate relationship he had with God. The chaos and misery that man feels within himself is related to that primeval event. Various explanations have been offered to explain man's problems: lack of wealth, bad environment, poor institutions, lack of education, culture, and others, but the Christian view of man's condition is that he is involved in sin which is disobeying God. Sin destroys man's relation to God, his relationship with others, and is self-destructive. Yet in spite of this, man is still the objective of God's love and concern. Man still finds his purpose and fulfillment in the God who created him. Augustine's response to God was "Thou hast made us for thyself, and we are restless until we rest in thee."³⁹ This sums up man's need of God in Christian thought.

5. Man can only be man in relationship to God. The Bible underscores this in many ways. Jesus said, "I am come that you might have life and have it more abundantly" (John 10:10). This analysis is made in another way by Kierkegaard when he says that man is body and soul with a relationship to Spirit. Man can exist without God, but not live without him.⁴⁰ This is why there has been a strong missionary tradition in the church fed by the desire to reconcile all men to God through Jesus Christ.

6. Christian virtues are somewhat different from the Greeks. Virtues in the Greek tradition imply a potential for self-deliverance, a salvation by achievement and goodness. The Christian view of man is that he is helpless to achieve reconciliation with God. Reconciliation is related to crying to God in helplessness. Reconciliation comes when one turns from one's own model of seeking God, and turning to God in faith which is commitment to Christ. Once there is commitment by faith, conversion takes place, and in this conversion God gives a new beginning and new

direction. This conversion or new beginning implies a new being, and after this a new lifestyle is called forth. Once there is a new beginning of spiritual life in Christ, faith then becomes supplemented by "virtue, knowledge, self-control, steadfastness, godliness, brotherly affection and love" (2 Pet. 1:7). The fruit of God's Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control" (Gal. 5:22-23). The basic Christian theme is *agape*--love that is not an emotion, but an attitude of concern for all--even one's enemies.

To shift contexts for a moment, there is in Greek philosophy, in Confucian, and other humanistic views, some talk about the "good man" or the "superior man." In these non-Christian views the good man is the goal of achievement of one's own strength. The Christian answer to the "good man" is restricted to Jesus: a person regarded as morally perfect. Such perfection is not achievable by anyone else. Because of the sinful deeds of man, Christians talk about salvation or deliverance which begins now and will be completed in the presence of God when his work is complete and man is transformed to the standard of Christ.

The Christian view takes a different look at the problem of evil in contrast to the Greek. The Greeks assumed that if one knows to do the good, he will do it. The Christians saw that man may know to reject an evil action, but will do it anyway because of selfishness, a manifestation of sin. Many people know the commandments, thou shalt not steal, commit adultery, etc., and believe that these are basic ethical principles apart from religious implications. The knowledge is only intellectual, or it is rejected because of selfishness or lust. In no ordinary sense of the word would the Christian say that knowledge brings virtue. Knowledge could bring virtue, but knowledge plus willful sinning only increases the degree of guilt.

7. It is an article of Christian thought that all men are equal before God. All men are creations of God. To deny this is to affirm practical atheism. History shows all kinds of inequities and justifications for these differences. Aristotle noted that "there can therefore be no friendship of a master for a slave as such, though there may be for him as a man." The slave has nothing in common with the master--"he is a living tool."⁴¹ Paul, in contrast, expressing the Christian ideology, wrote Philemon that the slave Onesimus was sent back to him "no longer as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother" (Philemon 16). Ultimately the Christian attitude was to free the slave, but the practice lagged behind the ideology.

8. Assessment. Probably the greatest criticism of the Christian movement is not its philosophy, but its practice. But this can be leveled against the Greek tradition also. The philosophical utopias have never been seriously attempted. One of the good features of the Christian view of man is that it "alone deals with the whole man, with his origin and destination."⁴² The Christian position regards personality as one of the greatest facts in the cosmos. The Biblical view of man takes a positive attitude toward the body-existence of man in a way that some of the Greek views could not. The scientific view of man neglects the personality side of man because of the limitation of its method.

We now turn to one of the controversial problems in the philosophy of man.

II. The Mind-Body Problems

The body exists. Anyone can see this. But is there more than the body as the Christian and Greek views claim? Much depends upon the answer. The quality of life expected by man is measurably different if he is considered a responsible being who has a measure of self-determination. If man is only a body directed by stimuli coming to him, then it appears he cannot be too responsible. In fact, if this is all man is, one wonders how the idea of responsibility came into being in the first place. Is it a fiction? Is it part of man's real life?

The claim that there is more to man's life than the human body needs definition. It is called the traditional view of the self or mind, and it may be summed in the following ideas: the self is a created continuing substance of a spiritual nature, related mysteriously to the body, it is active, free, and immortal.⁴³ In some fashion or other this view has been averred by such different people as Plato, Aristotle, and the Christian tradition, up to the modern times. With this short introduction, we can now turn to the basic question: does a self exist?

A. Does a Self Exist?

Any controversial question has at least two sides: yes and no; we will look at the negative side first.

1. No. There is no self as conceived in the traditional sense of the term above. Even people who reject the idea may use the word self or mind in a popular or customary sense without contradicting their opinion. Our philosophical considerations are restricted to the western culture primarily although the orient provides paradoxical examples of people denying and affirming the self at the same time.⁴⁴ We turn now to consider persons and emphases that reject the existence of a self.

(1) David Hume. Probably the most widely printed quote on this subject, the non-existence of the self, comes from David Hume. He wrote:

There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF: that we feel its existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration both of its perfect identity and simplicity For my part, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity.⁴⁵

As one of the big three patriarchs of the empirical tradition, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, Hume could never observe with his senses a self as a thing or substance, or object within himself. Thus the self did not exist. But by the same token he never observed his brain either.

But Hume did talk about himself. What did he mean? The self was an association or conglomeration of these different experiences that came through the senses. Various sensory impressions are received by the senses and the "I" is related to them in terms of order and seems to have some relation in cause and effect and resemblances of stimuli. The association involved is consistent with his claim that if no perceptions came he would be said not to exist. Hume's views have been influential in both philosophy and psychology.

Ironically, Hume came to confess skepticism about his position to the appendix of his work. He confessed:

But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. (He continued . . .)

But having thus loosened all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connection, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective

In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent: nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding.⁴⁶

Several problems are raised against Hume's position. First, a no-self view makes continuous identity impossible. How would Hume know that he is the same person that he was the day before? For that matter the hour before without some perception that he is the same. Then is sameness a perception? For once he had slept the night and no perceptions came to him, he had been annihilated. When he rises, how does he keep the same identity consciousness. Second, the same applies to memory. The years pass and many memories stand clearly in our minds although we do not have even a remote chance to be continually furnished with those lost perceptions. My memory of swimming in the Dead Sea is fresh, but my remoteness to the sea is distant. How can it be part of my "memory" today if there is not a continuousness about my being to retain such memories? Can an "annihilated self" in Hume's terms know the continuing memories to be mine? Third, value judgments become difficult on a non-self view. If the "self" is a summary of perceptions, how does one choose between those that are true and the false? Or, the good and the bad? Why not accept all perceptions for truth? Or, good?

Hume's empiricism has a long shadow of influence in philosophy and psychology. To some of the variants we will now turn.

(2) Materialism. Materialism rejects the existence of a self as defined above. The modern materialist adheres to physical phenomena only and words like "thought, reasoning, and love" must reduce themselves to physical phenomena. Various explanations have been given for this activity of reductionism, or the process where these concepts are stripped of their original meanings. (A) The unintelligibility thesis is that words like "thought, wishing, feeling" should be dropped from use because they have no real meaning. The mind or self refers to nothing. The unintelligibility thesis has never been influential because it is difficult to show that there are no thoughts, feelings, etc. To rid ourselves of these words would be to weaken our powers of expression and communication. (B) The avowal theory explains thoughts, feelings, wishes, in terms of behavior, and not in terms of statements. When one remarks that he is bored, he is expressing an inner behavior in a verbal way. This theory would make sense if I stated that I am bored, but it cannot be used to refer to someone else, like "she is bored." It cannot be used to refer to her inner behavior accurately. Moreover, I can lie in making false statements but what behavior illustrates lying?

(C) Another attempt is to admit that these words, thoughts and feelings are meaningful, but must be explained in physicalistic terms, or in behavior terms. If I say I have a sharp pain in my leg, do I have the behavior that supports the claim? The problem with behaviorism here is that we can imagine the behavior without the pain actually being there.

(D) The identity theory is the most widely accepted attempt to answer the problems of materialism. It seems

that thoughts, feelings, wishes, and the rest of the so-called mental phenomena are identified with, one and the same thing as, states and processes of the body (and, perhaps more specifically, states and processes of the nervous system, or even of the brain alone). Thus the having of a thought is identical with having such and such bodily cells in such and such states, other cells in other states.⁴⁷

The identity theory means, then, that a mental and physical state are not really two different things, but one. When I say I love someone in a verbal way, this is really nothing more than a description of a physical attraction. In practice, according to the identity theory, the verbal description is merged into the description of a body state.

The identity theory may be criticized for a number of reasons, but we will consider only two. First, there does really exist the enjoyment of ideas that are unrelated to physical existence. A discussion of abstract theology is carried on for its own sake without regards for a physical stimulus to the body. People seem to glory in ideas. Second, the theory is based on the important fact that the identity has to coincide in space and time. Insufficient evidence precludes the discussion of time, but the area of space is open for discussion. The example of hunger may be used.⁴⁸ Where does the thought of hunger occur? Not in your big toe, kidneys, lungs or leg, but in your head. In another example, it makes sense to point to your leg and cry that it has an intense pain "there" but you would not point to your head and say "my leg aches." The objection arises against the identity theory that an ache in the leg does not occur in the same place that the thought "I have an ache"

occurs. Thus, it doesn't make sense to talk about identity in space since the physical pain occurs one place and the mental event occurs in another.

(3) Epiphenomenalism. This is another variation on the theme that a self does not really exist. The word was introduced by T.H. Huxley. On the subject of consciousness he wrote,

The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the mechanisms of their body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any power modifying that working as the steam whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery. Their volition, if they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical changes, not a cause of such changes.⁴⁹

What Huxley says about brutes is applied by him to men. Epiphenomenalism appears to be a type of dualism admitting mental events or an apparent self, but it is a dualism that is greatly qualified if we can use the term at all. Mental events are caused by physical events, but mental events cannot cause physical events. It is a one way street in which the traffic flows from the physical to the mental.

The appeal of epiphenomenalism comes from the great influence of science in explaining phenomena in physical terms. We predict rain on the basis of air masses colliding rather than the rain dances of Indians. Fertility of the soil is increased by fertilizer and there is no use of fertility rites. The conclusion reached is that all physical phenomena--including the human body--can be explained in physical terms. This physical interpretation of the world and the self leaves no place for a real spiritual self or any real non-physical entity. As an illustration, a cut creates nerve waves to the brain, not mind, which causes a body to wince and to feel pain. Beginning with the physical cut to the reaction arising from the physical brain, the series of events has been without reference to a Mind or self. It is only an illusion that mental events have effects.⁵⁰

Certain problems are raised against epiphenomenalism. The logic involved in the position is that the Golden Gate Bridge was built without a single thought. Sending astronauts to the moon would not be the result of thinking. The history of man as written under the terms of "decision, emotions, thoughts, and sensations" would be in error.⁵¹

The extremeness of this charge is modified some by the claim of the epiphenomenalist that the building of the Golden Gate bridge and the space program still require activity, only it is an activity of the physical brain, not a non-physical mind. The brain takes over the many functions usually attributed to the mind, thinking, wishing, deciding, etc.

In assessing this, the question may be posed: although the brain is a necessary physical condition required for "thinking, wishing, and deciding," is it the sufficient condition for explaining these items? Obviously, one cannot think, as we know it, without a brain. But is there the need of more than a brain--say a mind? The current interest in bio-feedback gives some illustration of the

power of thought over the body. One can raise the temperature of the finger by means of thinking of it.

Another problem of epiphenomenalism is the semantical switch in describing our experiences. What was once called "mind's activities"--thinking, wishing, deciding, etc. are now called activities of the brain. The activities remain the same, but the source and cause are different.

The common ordinary experience of man seems to indicate that epiphenomenalism is wrong. People seem to make plans, mentally prepare a daily schedule and proceed to carry it out. The experience that common people, and all people, have in making judgments moves beyond the cause-effect world of epiphenomenalism. The fact is that people hesitate, worry, reflect on what is right and wrong, and eventually make a rational decision. Moreover, our way of knowing the world may be described from the standpoint of general ideas. We perceive a particular tree but we know and understand what that meaning of tree is by our general understanding of the idea of tree-ness. This holds true for the laws of physics, i.e., gravity, in which case we understand a particular object falling to the ground by a non-perceivable general thought about the law of gravity.

While epiphenomenalism makes a strong appeal to the physical sciences, it is not without its problems. Therefore we turn now to the alternate side of the question.

2. Yes, the self does exist.

In the opening of this section we talked about the idea of a self involving a spiritual nature that is related mysteriously to the body, active, free, and immortal. We now turn to the elaboration of this view from the standpoint of two different philosophical sources.

(1) Plato and Descartes.

The view of the self as taught by Plato and Descartes has been labeled extreme immaterialism. This will be in contrast to the position of Aristotle and Aquinas which will be labeled moderate immaterialism. The body-soul problem in Plato and Descartes involves the following. The soul is a radically different substance from the body and is in fact alien to it. The body is united to the soul to punish the soul. Its union with the body is temporary and unnecessary. The soul can exist and function without the body. The union of these two opposites may be likened to the relation between a motor and a chassis. It is functional but the motor doesn't need the chassis to run (in place) whereas the chassis needs the motor. Similarly, the body is not at all necessary for the functioning of the mind; being liberated from the body would be an improvement for the mind.

This extreme view has come under criticism in the modern era since Descartes particularly, and as stated before, it suffers from a lack of empirical evidence. But the views of Descartes raised a question about the soul that needed solving and it is a question over which much time has been spent. The question: how does a radical substance like Spirit or soul have a relationship with a body and vice versa?

If you do not believe in a soul or self as we have seen in Hume, materialism, and so on, then the relationship-problem doesn't exist. But if there are two diverse entities as in Plato and Descartes, how do you solve the problem? Descartes proposed a solution related to the pineal gland--a hybrid gland of the two diverse elements--but this was unsupportable. It only moved the problem one step backwards. We shall look at two of the attempts to solve these problems.

(A) Parallelism.

The greatest philosophical name attached to the view of parallelism was Leibniz (1646-1716) who thought in terms of the body and mind acting independently of one another, but always in harmony with one another. The usual illustration is that involving two clocks so well made that they keep time in harmony with one another. They tick, strike and move parallel to one another, and the reason they can do this is found in their pre-established harmony created by their designer, the clock-maker. So man in body and soul has been designed with such accuracy that man's body will always have the physical accompaniment of the mental thought. Later parallelists used illustrations like debits and assets in the loan of money relating to the same transaction, or the convex and concave sides of a line that describe a line from two different ways.

Parallelism does not have the historical appeal of interactionism because of severe problems. First, our problem has been in understanding body and spirit. In Leibniz the solution makes an appeal to God's pre-established harmony which then makes the solution outside of man's natural existence. We could then ask the question of how God as Spirit works on a body. This pushes the problem further back from man and into an area of no hope of settling because of God's distance from man. Second, questions like "if one clock stops, will the other keep going" arises. There seems to be no good answer to these riddles.

(b) Interactionism.

Since Descartes' day interactionism has been assumed and accepted widely, but has been widely attacked also. It means that body/soul interact and effect one another. Epiphenomenalism is a one-sided doctrine in which the body effects the mental, but interactionism is a two-way street of the mind effecting the body as well. Advocates of interactionism argue that mental events do effect physical events. Such examples as worry causing ulcers, fear causing the quickening of the heart-beat, anticipation leading to physical activity, the joy of winning causing people to jump up and down and other examples are used to indicate this truth. Claims are made that even hypnotism can raise blisters on the skin without heat.

Interactionism is at a disadvantage in proving its case concerning mental events effecting physical events. It is argued that if one is pricked with a needle and jumps and says "ouch," "how could it be known that it was the mental event of feeling pain rather than the brain events concomitant with the consciousness of pain which produced the wince?"⁵²

Further, one of the problems of interactionism is trying to separate actions related to the brain and actions related to the mind. Epiphenomenalism and materialism argue for brain events at best, but not mental events. Interactionism does make a distinction between the brain and the mind and argues that the mind or self is the cause of physical events. There does appear to be examples of clinical patients who are disturbed by problems of ethics and this ethical disturbance causes physical disabilities. A bookkeeper is asked by his boss to introduce procedures that are illegal and false. His ethical character makes it impossible to do this and keep his job. He developed a pain in his arm disabling him from work. The psychiatrist who is ultimately asked to deal with the issue makes the man face up to his boss, and the shady business practices, but in so doing "regains" the use of his arm.

Putting aside the criticisms of interactionism for the moment, the interactionist is not able to explain how mental events effect physical events except that they do. Some interactionists accept it as such and treat the unanswered question as an "open question."⁵³ The inability of answering the last detail of how the mind effects the body may be like the problem of evil--it will always be around staring us in the face, but all the theories do not come off neat and tidy.

So far we have viewed the issue from the standpoint of extreme immaterialism with two proposals for explaining the relationship of the two extreme entities. We turn now to a view that accepts the reality of the self, but without its radical immaterialism.

(2) Aristotle and Aquinas.

Aristotle did not accept the extreme view of the spirit that Plato had. For Plato, man's soul could exist and think outside of a body, but Aristotle taught that the good of the soul is to be united to a body so that it can think and exercise its abilities. Adler notes, concerning Aristotle,

In this view, the soul is inseparable from the organic body of which it is the form, just as the seal impressed in the wax is inseparable from the wax; and this applies to the human or rational soul just as much as it applies to the sensitive souls of brute animals, and to the vegetative souls of plants. What is true of soul as the form or act of the organic body as a whole is also true, with one exception, of the parts of the soul, i.e., each of its various powers is the power of the body, a living organ. Thus the power of digestion is embodied in the stomach, the power of vision or imagination, in the brain; and so on.⁵⁴

The idea of soul is more generalized in Aristotle than modern use and may be translated into a term like life force, or principle. In different species there are different life forces and forms. Plants are living, but do not have the qualities of animals which are sensitive and mobile. Humans have yet another life principle that incorporates much of that common to the lower forms of living, but also some differences.⁵⁵ Since each living form has different powers due to their different life principles, man also has a different power; *nous* or mind. Soul then becomes "the entelachy of the body, so that the two form one substance."⁵⁶

The result of this is that man has more in common with the lower animals than the Platonists would admit, but neither could Aristotle admit that man was merely a body and brain as the modern epiphenomenalists claim.

Oddly enough, this distinction found in Aristotle and Aquinas is not widely known and used. Much of the debate centers in the extreme position of Plato and Descartes. Such an issue would have been a no-issue for Aristotle. This is not an Aristotelian solution because in Aristotle "there can be no mind-body problem."⁵⁷

The reasoning involved in this unique position known as moderate immaterialism can be summed in the following statement by Adler:

- (1) Bodily events or processes, particularly brain states or processes, are a necessary--an indispensable or *sine qua non*--condition for mental acts, such as the acts of forming and using concepts, or making judgements and inferences
- (2) But brain action is not the sufficient condition or sole cause of the aforementioned mental acts (of man)
- (3) The additional cause required for the explanation of these acts is the mind or intellect conceived not as an immaterial substance, but as a power possessed by man differing from all of his other powers in one respect and one respect only; namely, that it is an immaterial power not embodied in a physical organ, such as the stomach, the eye, or the brain.⁵⁸

The significance of the third proposition is that one must grant an immaterial power to explain mental events that are an exclusive experience of man. The unique capacity of man lies in his ability to frame completely abstract universals. Abstractions of this kind are never seen and cannot be explained in neurological terms, or physical terms.

The brain experiences only the individual object in the world, but the immaterial power or reality of man's existence enables him to think abstractly about the individual object. This kind of thinking distinguishes man from other animals who also can think. Thinking in animals can be that of

learning from experience, generalizing, discriminating, and abstracting, solving problems by trial and error, or by insight The evidence is both plain and ample that they can think in all these ways. But it is equally plain from the observation of their behavior, in the laboratory or in the field, that they cannot think in any of the following ways: They cannot think about objects that are not perceptually present as well as about those that are; and with regard to objects of thought, present or absent, they cannot make judgements or engage in reasoning (i.e., think that such and such is or is not the case, or think that if such and such is the case, then so and so is not).⁵⁹

In somewhat closer agreement with the identity theory, Aristotle and Aquinas believe that "acts of perception, sensitive memory, imagination and cogitation are acts of bodily organs."⁶⁰ But in **contrast** to the no-self theory of the identity theory,

only conceptual acts--such as the acts of understanding or concept-formation and the acts whereby concepts are used in judgement and inferences--cannot be merely acts of the brain, though they never occur without acts of the brain, since the exercise of the sensitive powers is empirically discovered to be an indispensable condition for man's exercise of his intellectual or conceptual power.⁶¹

Thus an immaterial power is not necessary to explain perceptual acts, but only conceptual acts. For example, a puppy can see the light without an immaterial power just as I can. But the puppy cannot reason to the law of gravity as man does.

The argument leading up to the conclusions above is related to the following two propositions and a conclusion:

The First proposition asserts that the concepts whereby we understand what different kinds of classes of things are like consist in meanings or intentions that are universal.

The second proposition asserts that nothing that exists physically is actually universal; anything that is embodied in matter exists as an individual; and as such it can be a particular instance of this class or that.

From these two propositions, the conclusion follows that our concepts must be immaterial. If they were acts of a bodily organ such as the brain, they would exist in matter, and so would be individual. But they are universal. Hence they do not and cannot exist in matter, and the power of conceptual thought by which we form and use concepts must be an immaterial power, i.e., one the acts of which are not the acts of a bodily organ.⁶²

The argument from Adler appears abstract and we will try to give some concreteness to it. We understand specific things by general ideas. There are a number of objects in my house called by the word "chair." Each of these are different. No two are alike, but I call them by a term that is conceptual--chair. The visible chair is specific and particular, but the conceptual "chair" is a general or universal term, and does not exist in a physical sense. Since I never see the concept of chair-ness we speak of this as an abstraction. Abstractions are the result of immaterial power of conceptualization which man has and these are not the result of seeing the abstraction. Another example relates to the idea of gravity. We see one apple fall from the tree. My only experience is one apple after another. But there is something about my existence that enables me to reason from the single experience of a falling apple to the law of gravity. The law of gravity is never seen; it is a generalization, an abstraction.

That is why Aristotle and Aquinas insisted on the self as an existent reality with immaterial power of abstraction. In a sense, the argument has been like our thinking about the atom. No one has seen an atom, but our thought about the atom is the result of a hypothesis and is useful in

explaining the reality of nature. Here, the immaterial power of the self is required to explain the nature of conceptual thought.

III. What is the Significance of One's View of Man?

We might begin with: what difference does it make? If man is what the scientific view says he is, and that only, one is led to conclude that the traditional ethical, religious, and philosophical questions are empty. Simpson believed that man is not just an ordinary animal and argued for ethics because life in the world demands something ethical. But he saw no place for values related to God. A similar stance is taken by other writers.

Others have argued that man's nature and origins are important. If man is not a unique creature created in the image of God, then man is nothing but a sophisticated animal and there is no meaning to his value system or his spiritual exercise.

There are significant implications growing out of one's view of what man is. Consider the logical implications of the materialistic evolutionary view of man. Man is involved in the continuity of life stream from the lowly amoeba to the crown of the stream, man. Man is a product of blind evolution and is different from other forms **only in degree**. If man is one with other animals, is there any way of saying that killing off people is any more wrong than killing off rabbits? How do we establish that man should not kill man? We do it by law, but if over-population becomes too big a problem, would it be wrong to rescind the law? On what principle would it be wrong?

We are inclined to say that man should not kill man because man is something special. This view of man's uniqueness as a special creature has been generally maintained from Greek philosophy to modern times. It is not a picture of the victor or the stronger over the weaker. Man commonly condemns the slaughter of the innocent regardless of where it takes place.

Along with this uniqueness is man's involvement in meaningful ethical and moral choices. This is to say that man is differed in kind, rather than degree. Animals do not have such moral power and ability. If man is one with animals and explained only as a creature of an usual material brain, then what happens to moral choice and freedom? What basis is there for it?

There is an implication for spiritual values. The scientific method seems to preclude the possibility of God. But if reason prevails then God becomes a rational alternative. If the moderate immaterialist's solution to man's nature is correct, it gives rational credence to the possibility of understanding and accepting a rational view of God. If an immaterial power is part of man's existence, the idea of an immaterial Being (God) would not be unusual. If the materialist view is true, then if one desires to believe in God, it must be as fideists, a person who accepts a truth about God without requiring any reasons--which in this case, there would be no good ones.

The philosophy of man is crucial. The contemporary world is divided over man, his abilities, hopes, and aspirations. The Marxist world cannot be understood without knowing something of its philosophy of man. The Christian view cannot be appreciated without knowing its philosophy of man. The conflict between secular society and Christian thought is related to conflicting views of what man is.

We now turn to a review of six different philosophies and in each of them we will note their interpretation of man.

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- ¹³Ibid., pp. 298-99.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 306ff.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 310.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 311.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 312.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 315.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 319.

²⁰Ibid., p. 309.

²¹Ibid., p. 378.

²²Phaedo Plato, Timaeus, translated H.D. Lee, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965, p. 120.

²³Ibid., p. 121.

²⁴Phaedo in The Portable Plato, New York: Viking Press, 1948, pp. 203-204.

²⁵Ibid., p. 227.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 264-65.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 228-29.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 228-29.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., p. 206.

³¹Ibid., p. 264-65.

³²Aristotle, Ethics, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1953, p. 305.

³³Ibid., p. 67.

³⁴Ibid., p. 34.

³⁵Ibid., p. 234.

³⁶Barth, Church Dogmatics, III₂, p. 400.

³⁷Only in modern times has the Biblical view emerged in influence theology as well as receiving independent expression in the work of Merleau-Ponty. Cf. his Phenomenology of Perception.

³⁸Nicholas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960, p. 258.

³⁹Confessions.

⁴⁰Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, Garden City: Doubleday, 1941.

⁴¹Aristotle, op. cit., p. 249.

⁴²Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 53.

⁴³Alburey Castell, The Self in Philosophy, New York: the Macmillan Co., 1965, pp. 50-52.

⁴⁴For example, in Buddhism, the definition of the self that we have formulated is rejected, but nevertheless, there is some permanence to the self as it is related to endless reincarnations. But at the same time there is a dissolution or break-up of the self at death.

⁴⁵David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section VI, as quoted correctly in Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, edited by Smith and Grene.

⁴⁶Hume, op. cit., pp. 233-36.

⁴⁷Jerome Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 42.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 44.

⁴⁹From an essay "On the Hypothesis that All Animals are automata, and Its History," quoted in Castell, p. 73.

⁵⁰Shaffer, op. cit., p. 69.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., p. 72.

⁵³Castell, op. cit., p. 94-101.

⁵⁴Mortimer J. Adler, The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967, p. 219.

⁵⁵This distinction precludes Aristotle from accepting the idea of reincarnation held by the Pythagoreans who believed that one could return as a lower animal.

⁵⁶Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. I, Part II, Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, p. 71.

⁵⁷Adler, op. cit., 218. Copleston also concurs in this position, Cf. p. 71.

⁵⁸Adler, op. cit., p. 212.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 136-137.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 215.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 220-221.

CHAPTER IX

Naturalism

In an elementary way, naturalism may be defined as the philosophy that nature is the sum total of reality. There is nothing that is beyond nature with regard to a Supreme Being that is unseen. To adapt a phrase, what you see is what you get. But the definition above is too simple. Naturalism includes diverse modes of thought that range from materialism (the idea that matter only exists) to humanism (the view that man is the model of explaining reality). The diversity of philosophical modes is complicated further by the changing terms. For example, in ancient times a form of naturalism was called materialism and this meant that matter was composed of atoms operating in a cause-effect way. Even modern naturalists look with disdain at the ancient materialism because it was rather crude. But some modern philosophers call their naturalism "modern materialism" but do not mean the same as the ancient views.

Consequently, as we look at different types of philosophies beginning now with naturalism as one of six types, the reader must be aware that there is no single accepted definition of naturalism. Some naturalists admit freedom, others deny it; some admit the existence of gods in a qualified sense, others deny them. Thus there is always a problem of insisting upon one person or one type of philosophy as the adequate representation of the tradition in philosophy.

As a result, we are committed to giving at least two and then sometimes three or four examples of a philosophic tradition. In naturalism we will look at four examples of forms of naturalism: materialism, modern scientific naturalism, humanism, and dialectical materialism. We now turn to our first model.

I. Materialism

The ancients held many views in common and we will draw upon Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius to give us a credo of naturalism which is basically materialistic in content. ***Materialism*** is the simple view that all objects are composed of atoms. The following may be considered a summary of these emphases in materialism.

A. Reality.

Basic reality is atomic in nature. Atoms were always in existence. Atoms have existed from eternity. The atoms have no qualities in themselves but they make up the material world. When the atoms collide with one another they form matter. Different arrangements of matter are the result of differing combinations of atoms. When these combinations break up the atoms disperse and join with other atoms to form new combinations. What causes these combinations to begin with? Democritus believed that atoms fell through infinite space and collided resulting in a build-up of various realities. The atoms are not directed by any power or intelligence. Moreover, the early materialists conceived of the world as somewhat deterministic, i.e., things are as they are by necessity. They could not be any other way. Later materialists elaborated on this view that the world must be understood on the analogy of a machine involving cause and effect relations. Machines operate on a cause-effect situation. When I turn my key in the car a whole series of effects take place and continue until I turn it off. The world may be viewed in the same cause-effect sequences only there is no being who turns on the key. Another analogy may explain the cause-effect situation. Imagine the world and its events in domino fashion in which one domino (or event) causes the other domino (event) to move. In a sense the materialist world is one big domino exhibition in which one fall leads to the next fall and that on to infinity.

B. Man.

What is man in a materialistic philosophy? Man is composed of the same type of atoms as the rest of the world with one exception. The early materialists spoke of a soul in man consisting of finer, smoother, more supple atoms. The soul is yet of atoms but a distinction in quality was accepted. Epicurus affirmed a soul, but in truly atomistic form he believed that when the body is dissolved, the soul is also dissolved. Although a soul concept sounds different or inconsistent with materialism, it was not for them inconsistent because it too was atomic.

Later materialists rejected the concept of a soul altogether. Julien Offrey Da La Mettrie (1709-1751) spoke of man being a machine in which the body was pictured more in mechanical/hydraulic terms. Still later, materialists viewed man from the standpoint of stimulus-response psychology in which man is reduced to a mechanistic basis.

C. God.

Some materialists believed in gods, but god in an atomic world view is only another conglomerate of atoms. The gods are not basically different from humans: they too decompose. The gods are similar to man in form. They are divided sexually, they eat and breathe as men do. The gods may be honored for their excellence but fearing them is unnecessary and worship and sacrifice is not required. Ethics is not necessarily related to the idea of god. Many materialists spoke critically of God and religion. Lucretius regarded religion as a product of terror and superstition. He believed that "true piety lies rather in the power to contemplate the universe with a quiet mind."¹ Much later materialists regarded religion as the chief source of all human corruption.

D. Values.

It is important to remember that the logical conclusion of the atomistic world view does not allow for values. If cause and effect govern the movement of all things, freedom is an illusion. But one must observe that neither Lucretius nor Democritus carried their views to their logical conclusions. Lucretius taught that "one is led after pleasure by 'the will of the individual'" who "originates the movements that trickle through his limbs."² Democritus gave sage moral advice that sounds like he was the most ardent advocate of freedom of choice. "It is best for man to pass his life with as much cheerfulness as possible and with as little distress. And this he would do, did he not find his pleasures in mortal affairs."³

We must turn to later philosophers to see the logical conclusions of materialism. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) gives us some comments that indicate the extent that values were regarded only as useful fictions.

For these words good and evil are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of objects themselves; but from the man, where there is no commonwealth.⁴

Thus the materialist view emerges as a philosophy in which there is no meaning in a cosmic sense, no purposive agent creating it, and values are not real, but useful fictions to describe what I approve.

E. Criticisms.

The criticisms will be considered shortly, but a word is necessary to see where materialism went in the history of philosophy. The earliest materialistic views were incorporated into the development of the physical sciences after the fifteenth century. Matter in motion in the atomic view of things seemed to make a lot of sense to the forerunners of modern science. Mechanism--viewing the world as a giant machine--seemed to explain much of the universe and machines began to contribute to man's life. It was easy to conclude that since mechanism combined with materialism can account and explain so much of the universe, why not push it to its logical conclusion? Why not make it the complete principle of interpreting the whole of the universe including man? The body-soul relation and the problem of accounting for an interaction between

the body-soul is dismissed. There is no soul to account for. This form of naturalism enabled man to jettison moral responsibility, religion, God and values. It is no wonder that emerging forms of atheism were drawn to and found support in materialism with its new acceptability in science.

The strength of materialism is that it centers on one of the most evident elements in the world--matter. A study of matter is important. Probably the real source of contention comes when the materialistic views are applied to man, God, and values. Several criticisms may be raised on all levels. (1) The term "materialism" as understood by the ancients sounds very modern when it involved "atoms" but their knowledge of the atom was only hypothetical. With the advent of modern nuclear physics we have not only split the atom, but atomic physicists now talk about omega-minus particles and "quarks." The search for the basic substance of reality continues beyond and below the atom.

(2) The analogy of a machine, or mechanism is also a debatable term for explaining our world. Instead of a precise machine like world, as understood by earlier scientists, modern terminology involves the "potentiality, possibility, and the all-important relative viewpoint of the observer." The analogy of the machine is no longer the best way of talking about reality. Mechanism involves precise predictability. One may talk about the behavior of a million electrons and declare that 400,000 will react in a given way. One does not declare that 400,193 will react that way. Predictions of electrons is not concerned with a few variations but is based upon the behavior of millions. As a result the analogy of the world as a machine is only useful to a general degree, and cannot be generalized to give an explanation to everything in existence.

(3) Materialism has difficulty with consciousness. Man is not merely a bundle of nerves, sensations, and neural stimulations. These are important, but are not adequate to explain reflection, purposeful, and forward-looking planning. Moreover, it will be recalled that it was argued earlier (chapter 8) that the power of generalization appears to require more than the brain. The jump from matter to thinking matter is enormous. The neural system is necessary, but it is not the sufficient explanation of thinking.

Moreover, the materialists confuse the priority of matter's appearance before mind with the priority of the value of mind. Matter, as man has come to know it, existed long before man appeared on the scene. Well and good. But to assume that matter is eternal is nothing more than an affirmation of faith. Competing with this view of materialism is the belief that mind is prior to matter. If we are looking for a key to understanding man it will not be in matter, but in mind.

(4) Materialism, if consistently held, forces the rejection of values whether conceived of in terms of freedom, morality, or of religion. The alternatives are: either reject these things as subjective products of the mind, or endow matter with personal attributes of goodness, love, and truth.

(5) Materialism based on the model of the machine, or the mechanistic view of the world is a crude form of reductionism when applied to the world as a whole. Certainly mechanisms have

value in many realms, but to conclude that everything--including all of man's acts--must be so explained is a generalization that has little warrant.

(6) Finally, the analogy of a machine is an unfortunate choice. The materialists spoke of the world as a machine. There are no machines without a designer, inventor, or creator. The analogy actually gives meaning to a world involving the great Designer--God.

II. Modern Scientific Naturalism

Modern scientific naturalism was a philosophical movement arising out of the 19th century which viewed man within nature as opposed to his being against nature. Previous materialism was regarded as erroneous (1) in its reductionism of all reality to indestructible matter in motion as in the atom, (2) its quantitative view of "substance" rather than a qualitative view of reality,⁵ (3) its emphasis on the physical rather than the biological sciences, and (4) because it failed to explain "human knowing as a natural achievement."⁶ The new naturalism was greatly influenced by Darwin as well as the social factors in human development. The new naturalism accepted the "naturalistic principle" which meant that one must inquire into a set of facts by means of the verification principle in science and this was meant to bring objectivity to it. Moreover, the scientific method was to be applied to all areas of knowledge. One must not "advance any theory that is contrary to any established scientific fact."⁷ Thus, the scientific naturalist purports to make the scientific endeavor a part of his approach to philosophy.

We can now turn to the four ingredients of this philosophy.

A. Reality.

Nature is the basic category of scientific naturalism. "Nature is the mother of mothers."⁸ By no means does this imply that nature also had a mother, but rather nature is the matrix out of which all things emerge. Naturalism now speaks of "events, qualities, and relations (or process and character, or essence and flux)."⁹ This modified the old mechanical world view of past materialism.

Nature or reality is thus in a process of becoming. There are no permanent entities that exist forever. Reality is not of one kind and its actions are not simple, but complex.¹⁰

The becoming aspect of naturalism is nowhere seen more comprehensively than in the **naturalistic** theory of evolution. Krikorian declared: "The most important single event in the history of modern naturalism in America . . . was the publication . . . of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species . . ."¹¹ Special emphasis is given to the term "naturalistic" because evolution may be interpreted from many other philosophical stances. Nevertheless, evolution was seen as the key to a non-supernatural understanding of how reality is involved and developed from the inorganic to the organic with its great achievement in humanity. Evolution involves chance rather than a mechanical view of the older materialism. The use of evolution for philosophy is most relevant in the doctrine of man to which we now turn.

B. Man.

In the evolutionary picture of man, man is regarded as a continuity from sub-human species. Then what is special about man? Man is an animal that thinks. Man has a "mind." But what is mind? Philosophers who have not been naturalists regarded mind as an immaterial or spiritual principle in man. But the spiritual or immaterial cannot be subjected to scientific techniques. Thus the naturalist has to develop some explanation for man's thought life. How do you explain what appears to be spiritual by a non-spiritual device? Various suggestions are offered. (1) Some said that the brain is the seat of consciousness and some allowance is made for non-material symbols "as though it were an immaterial" operation of thought; (2) others regarded mind equal to behavior. Behavior can be examined experimentally, but mind cannot. Mind is then defined as "response to the meanings of stimuli."¹² (3) Still others regarded mind as something that nature does. "Man thinks because nature is intelligible."¹³ This appears to personify nature and create some form of nature-mentalism, or mysticism.

In any case, thinking is regarded as the highest function of nature. Mind, if it exists in any meaningful way, is a product of the brain or some merely natural explanation.

C. God.

Naturalists come with diverse responses to God and religion. On the one hand concession is made that the existence of God is too freely dismissed from the scene. This dismissal is unfair to both theism and naturalism. For if there is a cosmic ally to man, he should be welcomed as we welcome the friendship of other men.¹⁴ But on the other hand, naturalism stands or falls with the scientific or empirical method, and this method cannot prove God's existence.¹⁵ Again, it is freely admitted that belief in the supernatural aided progress in the "childhood" of the race, but now belief in the supernatural does not have value.¹⁶ Man has become the conqueror of nature and does not need the aid of gods anymore.

Naturalism rejects God, the supernatural, and life after death because these beliefs cannot be proven by the scientific method. Moreover, naturalism regards the gods as a product of fear.

Naturalism's attitude toward religion is more benign. Religion needs reforming and criticism, it needs to be made more humanistic, but it serves a worthy place in man's existence. Religion is the place for the "celebration, consecration, and clarification of human goals."¹⁷ Yet one must not be misled in the lauding of religion that belief in eternity and divinity are encouraged. These are only aspects of man's vision and imagination. Religion serves man's human functions: (1) it helps bring unity to man in the midst of nature's pluralism,¹⁸ (2) it brings personal integration in which there is a connection between impulse and conduct, desire and aspiration, wonder and wisdom, and (3) it helps conserve values that are not strictly scientific.

D. Values.

Scientific naturalism rejects the caricature of the materialistic ethic of the past. Moreover, hedonism, or the ethic based on pleasure, often called Epicurianism, is rejected. Modern naturalists are modified epicureans in that they affirm values of the mind and body because man is a whole. Man's life is in nature. Thus his values will be found there, and not beyond nature. Certain ideas may be listed to indicate the direction of the naturalistic theory of values, or its axiology.

(1) Man has freedom to choose. The act of choosing is regarded as the essence of the ethical act. The reasons given for a choice are not as important as the fact of the choice.²⁰ Freedom is the most recent of nature's developmental process. Its late appearance does not reduce its priority in importance.²¹ This emphasis on freedom liberates naturalism from the embarrassment associated with the older materialism and its machine-like world view in which freedom was an impossibility.

(2) Naturalistic ethics is statistically oriented. One must make a headcount to decide how many Americans are divorced each year. One can only assert that "divorce is wrong" after one has sampled opinions and attitudes, studied stress on families, the society and other factors.²² There are no principles of ethics that could be accepted beforehand.

(3) Scientific naturalism tends to be paternalistic in its social outlook. The older materialism was harsher and for a while naturalists linked the biological motif of the "survival of the fittest" with a competitive ethic. Men must struggle with one another in surviving. However, the naturalists on the modern scene tend toward some form of socialism. Seeley rejects competition in the economic sphere because it creates antagonism and strife between people.²³ In addition, he delegates individual health to a national matter and urges the state to "prevent unhealthy practices, including the excessive use of alcohol, tobacco, and other things that injure health."²⁴ He also advocates a compulsory health examination given by the state on a periodic basis.

If we have over generalized about the creeping socialism of some modern naturalists, other naturalists advocate an "ethical democracy." This means that all people should have equal opportunity, meaningful work, and peer relatedness.²⁵

E. Criticisms.

The first criticism relates to all types of naturalism. How far can we generalize on the validity of the scientific method? Perry wrote of a maxim that "he that will believe only what he can fully comprehend, must have a very long head or a very short creed."²⁶ Might this not have application to the scientific method? Is it possible that in spite of our tremendous foundation of knowledge gained from the scientific method that there are yet realms of knowledge to be gained where the scientific method is of no use as we now know it? Is it possible to conceive of an entirely different method of ferreting truth now unknown in different dimensions? The scientific method is limited to the tangible. Another dimension of existence might require another method of research. Does not the naturalist attitude toward the adherence to the scientific method involve a reductionism of the first order? (Reductionism in this context means that the scientific method is the only way without exception to legitimate knowledge.)

Perry speaks of this circularity in the naturalistic emphasis on the scientific method: "A certain type of method is accredited by its applicability to a certain type of fact; and this type of fact, in turn is accredited by its lending itself to a certain type of method."²⁸

A second criticism of naturalism involves its view of man and values. We have seen that naturalism regards man as an animal that thinks. Is this a sufficient ground for building a meaningful ethic? It can be remembered that Aristotle built an ethic on rationality, but in his ethic man was special. In the modern naturalism man is not special, but has great similarity to other creatures of life. Are there any good reasons for saying that man is so special that one should not kill him, exploit, or tyrannize? Given the naturalist's view of man and the world, it is hard to find good reasons beyond expediency. Fortunately, the humanism of many naturalists is better than their philosophy. They denounce war, fight for better living conditions, and offer humane proposals to pressing problems, but this appears to go beyond the consistency of their world view.

III. Contemporary Humanism

Contemporary humanism flies under various name-flags. One might read of scientific humanism, democratic humanism, naturalistic humanism, or religious humanism. Regardless of the label, this specie of naturalism takes "human-ity" as its point of emphasis. Humanism does not attempt the reductionisms in other systems in which human motivation is reduced to simple economic terms, or to the sex drive, or to pleasure-pain alternatives. Humanism defends a genuine altruistic possibility, i.e., actions done for the sake of other people without selfish motives. Thus, humanists reject the materialistic approach of ancient naturalism.

Humanists view their philosophy as the philosophy enabling man to achieve happiness, integration of personality, the fulfillment of one's potential as well as the happiness of mankind. "The watchword of Humanism is happiness for all humanity in this existence as contrasted with salvation for the individual soul in a future existence . . ."²⁹ The good life for the individual is attained by "harmoniously combining personal satisfaction and continuous self-development with significant work and other activities that contribute to the welfare of the community."³⁰

It may be said fairly that humanism is the most attractive form of naturalism. What are its tenets? To that we now turn.

A. Reality.

Reality is conceived in pluralistic terms by the humanists. Nature is a term for the multi-verse. Man, the planets, and space are parts of the multi-verse. A reality beyond nature, that is, a super-natural being involved in reality, is rejected by the humanists. Not only is Nature all there is, but it is "a constantly changing system of matter and energy which exists independently of any mind or consciousness."³¹ Humanism does not affirm any purpose in the cosmos other than what man can create for himself and achieve. This enables him to by-pass the problem of evil.

The humanist concept of reality has been influenced by two items: the scientific method and the theory of evolution. We will look at both of these.

(1) The scientific method. The humanist believes that through the aid of reason and the scientific method man has the tools whereby he can know reality and achieve the good life. The scientific method emphasizes the verification principle and once verification has taken place anything may be accepted as truth. Other forms of knowing, intuition, rationalism, and authority, are rejected for they have no room for empirical verification.³² Some humanists accept the pragmatic approach to truth that if something works it is true, but if it does not work it is not true.³³

If there is a reality beyond the discernible by the scientific method it will not be known and the humanist rests content in the assertion that no such reality exists.

(2) The theory of evolution. The humanist believes that evolution serves as the catch-all explanation for the origin of life. Evolution is used to explain what once was reserved for the role of God. Lamont declares:

To begin with, biology has conclusively shown that man and all other forms of life were the result, not of a super-natural act of creation by God, but of an infinitely long process of evolution probably stretching over at least two billion years. In that gradual evolutionary advance which started with the lowly amoeba and those even simpler things marking the transition from inanimate matter to life, body was prior and basic. With its increasing complexity, there came about an accompanying development, and integration of animal behavior and control, culminating in the species man and in the phenomenon called mind. Mind, in short, appeared at the present apex of the evolutionary process and not at the beginning.³⁴

Lamont enthusiastically writes of Haeckel as showing "conclusively that the mind as well as the body of man has evolved from animal species."³⁵ Evolution appears to give an explanation of life's origins that deletes God as a significant explanation of its origins. Any attempt to insist on God as the directing force of evolution, as advocated by some theologians, falls on the deaf ears of the humanists. No such attempt is needed or desired. Lamont does admit that the biologists have not solved the problem of explaining how inanimate matter could give birth to living forms. The humanist begins with the fact that reality is, and does not need further explanation. Life in nature is simply evolution. Matter is considered dynamic, versatile, and having potential. This is said to remove any mystery attached to life. God is not a part of the origin of life.

B. Man.

The humanist is also influenced by evolution in his understanding of men. It is agreed by many humanists that Darwin and others have shown that "no wide and impassable gulf exists between Homo Sapiens and the rest of Nature."³⁶ Where does mind and reason enter? No explanation seems necessary except that the life form of man has evolved wherein a larger brain is

possible. With a larger brain capacity, thinking and rationality are possible. Humanism rejects dualistic views of man whereby man is considered body, brain and soul, or the latter being an immaterial part of man's total existence. Lamont sums up the idea:

Humanism, drawing especially upon the laws and facts of science, believes that man is an evolutionary product of the Nature of which he is part; that his mind is indivisibly conjoined with the functioning of his brain; and that as an inseparable unity of body and personality he can have no conscious survival after death.³⁷

Man is then, the thinking animal. But in spite of his rationality he is yet molded by his environment. This influence need not limit his capacity to transcend or change it.

The *Humanist Manifesto*, first published in 1933, affirmed the path that man should take. The eleventh proposition said:

Man will learn to face the crises of life in terms of his knowledge of their naturalness and probability. Reasonable and manly attitudes will be fostered by education and supported by custom. We assume that humanism will take the path of social and mental hygiene and discourage sentimental and unreal hopes and wishful thinking.³⁸

Man by reason and cooperation, according to the humanists, has unlimited potential. Rejecting an acquisitive and profit-motivated society the *Manifesto* advocated a "socialized and cooperative economic order" thus seeking a "free and universal society in which people voluntarily and intelligently cooperate for the common good. Humanists demand a shared life in a shared world."³⁹ Humanists will argue that a collective, cooperative society harmonizes with the basic aspect of man's gregarious nature. An isolated, individualistic man is not a "full" or integrated man.

Man is the highest creature. Nothing surpasses him. He alone is the savior of himself while at the same time he alone is the destroyer of himself. Reason will direct him to the first and not the second.⁴⁰

C. God.

God and religion receives unusual treatment at the hands of different humanists. The *Humanist Manifesto* rejected creation, allowed the possibility of realities yet unknown, but in general affirmed that theism, or belief in God is out of date. In cases where the word God is retained, as in Henry Nelson Wieman, the idea of God is redefined. In his case God seems to be the basis for the realization of values. That appears fuzzy, but it seems to mean that values are God.

More generally, God is regarded as a projection of man which originated in the primitive mind along with "man's deep desire and longing for a continuation of life after death for himself and for those he loves."⁴¹ Rejecting God and the supernatural, many humanists redefine the facts of a religious life in new clothing. The *Manifesto* declared, in proposition seven:

Religion consists of those actions, purposes and experiences which are humanly significant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, science, philosophy, love, friendship, recreation--all that is in its degree expressive of intelligently satisfying human living. The distinction between the sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained.⁴²

Similarly with Huxley, religion is "a way of life, which follows necessarily from a man's holding certain things in reverence, from his feeling and believing them to be sacred."⁴³ John Dewey in A Common Faith, rejected religion as a unique quality in human experience but maintained that any experience may be religious in quality. He noted: "Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal and against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality."⁴⁴

God is not needed because evolution is regarded as presenting a comprehensive explanation of life. Huxley concluded, "If animals and plants have slowly evolved through hundreds of millions of years, there is no room for a creator of animals and plants"⁴⁵

Huxley has one of the more thorough-going attempts to create a secular, humanistic religion. He uses the Trinity as a motif for interpreting religion without revelation.

`God the Father' is a personification of the forces of non-human nature; `God the Holy Ghost' represents all ideals; and `God the Son' personifies human nature at its highest, as actually incarnate in bodies and organized in minds, bridging the gulf between the other two, and between each of them and everyday human life.⁴⁶

Dewey's attempt at religious content is more shallow. A Common Faith has specious conclusions such as since religions do conflict and not all of them can be true, therefore, none are true. While he abolishes God the Supernatural, he is reinstated (for all practical purposes) in the Natural. This shows up in the idea of adjusting to the universe in much the same way one man adjusts to God's will. His criticism of religion is dated. While believing that literary criticism, anthropology and history have all but exploded Christianity, the irony of such studies from the standpoint of archaeological history has given the Judeo-Christian tradition more historical support. Dewey criticizes Supernaturalism as inimical to democracy because its idea of the elect and non-elect divides mankind. But is it not significant that democracy has prospered in countries where the Judeo-Christian faith is strongest, particularly, those of the Reformation variety?

Many of the criticisms of humanism are directed to corruptions that have entered Christianity either in terms of tradition, or spiritual decadence, and there is justification for some of these criticisms. Lamont attacked, among other things, the idea of the resurrection of the flesh which he understands as a molecule for molecule resuscitation. While this may be the impression received and taught at times this is a straw man as far as Biblical Christianity goes. The Christian idea of the resurrection means that a new bodily existence is in man's future and this is called in the New Testament a "spiritual body." It has a continuity of identity with the old existence, but a

discontinuity in its nature. The same type of misunderstanding can be found also in Dewey and in Huxley.

There is an interesting problem in the use of sources to explain the meaning and origin of religion. Huxley quotes naturalistic writers to give a "true definition" of religion. However, if one is not a naturalist or a humanist a different definition would be in the making. But Huxley presumes the naturalistic definition to be correct because it agrees with his naturalistic way of thinking.

We have strayed into a partial assessment of the humanist attitude toward religion because we will not have opportunity to return to it in the general criticism of humanism. The attitude of Huxley and others about religion is interesting for Huxley rejects complete skepticism, on the one hand, and supernaturalism, on the other. Yet he feels that religion fills certain emotional and aesthetic needs of man.

D. Values.

Perhaps the humanist view of values should begin with affirming personal freedom of choice.⁴⁷ The humanist rejects the determinism of either materialism in its machine-like forms or religious predestination. Man is free and can make meaningful moral decisions in spite of limitations on certain aspects of his existence. Man is not free to choose his skin-color, but he can choose what kind of attitude he is going to have toward color.

The humanist does not believe in ultimate values as found in systems accepting the existence of God. Nor does the humanist advocate a system of relativism, or skepticism in ethics. Rather, "the good man is one who not only has good motives and acts according to reason, but who is also effective in the successful adjustment of means to ends."⁴⁸ Some humanists admit that reason without compassion can be cruel and exploitative and they hasten to insist that actions be related to humane ends and standards.⁴⁹ Thus the social good may be summed up in several headings:

Health, significant work, economic security, friendship, sex love, community recognition, educational opportunity, a developed intelligence, freedom of speech, cultural enjoyment, a sense of beauty, and opportunity for recreation.⁵⁰

The pursuit of these with their fulfillment will bring happiness or the supreme good of the humanist.

Judgment is passed on various actions from the standpoint of an act's consequence. The ethic is consequence-oriented. Proposed actions must be viewed from the effect that it will have on the individual as well as the society in which he lives.⁵¹ Humanists center down on reason as the means of formulating consequences rather than being directed by conscience, a document like the New Testament, or simple intuition.

Man can be described as ethically neutral. He can move in the direction of goodness or he may corrupt himself. Altruistic acts are considered possible. To reject altruism and to affirm that

man is always selfishly motivated on the basis of profit motive as reflected in the philosophy of Ayn Rand is to affirm another expression of the idea of original sin. Humanists reject both of these views. "Humanism, then, follows the golden mean by recognizing that both self-interest and altruism have their proper place and can be combined in a harmonious pattern."⁵² Man needs to be trained in the area of his motives and emotions. If this training can be achieved he will have social empathy and compassion for others. Social conditioning can do for behavior what it has done for Madison Avenue advertising.

A good bit of space is spent by many humanists in rejecting God, ultimate values, and other religious beliefs. One particular doctrine is the idea of original sin. Humanism wants to make clear that it affirms man's goodness, his capacity to know and do the good, and nothing but man himself can help him in achieving the good. If he is thwarted in this goal it is because he is not using his reason. In summary, values are man-created, man-centered, and rationally recognized.

E. Criticisms.

The humanist's great respect for the scientific method, his appeal to evolutionary theory will not be criticized again here. Previous chapters have already evaluated these two themes. It is sufficient to remember that much faith is involved in accepting these two views.

Our first criticism concerns the humanist chronicle of how mind appeared. In this the humanist concludes that since evolution is true, there was no mind before evolution brought it forth in man. Obviously man's mind is a late comer to the cosmic story. To conclude that there was no Mind master-minding the appearance of man's mind is another unwarranted generalization of humanism.

Evolution at best is a description of when life forms appeared and not how they appeared. The humanist faith about the past is not a different kind than the faith of the theist who says, "I believe God created life and man's mind is a reflection of the mind of God."

Second, those humanists who attempt to redefine religion to retain its value may be killing it off. Can religion survive if God is dumped? Those who wish to retain religion without God are usually sensitive aesthetic people like Huxley who view ritual and liturgy as a warm, meaningful, aesthetic experience and who would miss it if it should die. But the common man is not bound by ritual and if God is rejected he can see immediately that the game is over.

The last criticism relates to the humanist view of values. The humanist sense of values are not unrelated to Christian values, but without the religious views. Can it be that the humanist is really parasitic in this? Is not the humanist too idealistic in his view of man's perfectibility? Is man really the reasonable creature that humanism makes him out to be? Can humanism survive without its close relationship to Christian values? The common man with whom philosophy must also deal has not been philosophically oriented, nor has the common man had a history of being a humanist. The future of humanism may depend upon its close relationship in a cultural setting to Christian values.

IV. Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical materialism, existing in one form or another, is the official philosophy of the Soviet Union, China, and many satellite countries. The fathers of dialectical materialism are Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx is a paradoxical person who lived in near poverty at times and practiced financial parasitism on Engels who inherited considerable wealth. Indebted to Engels, Marx spoke of his literary works as "our theory."

The world of Marx and Engels was one of rising industrialism challenging a rural past. It was also a Romantic age. The Romantics were concerned with (1) a sensitivity to human beings, (2) a sense of man's alienation from "nature," (3) a sense of optimism of what man could be, and (4) an attempt to understand the evolution of history, man, social ideas and institutions.⁵³ Understanding the Romantic background motif one can see many of the same feelings and emphases in Marx and Engels. We now turn to our four topics.

A. Reality.

The Marxist world-view begins with a basic materialism, but with a twist. The world of man and things is interpreted along three lines: (1) the dialectic of Hegel applied to a materialistic view of the universe, the interpretation of history, economic conflict, and truth, (2) an economic theory of labor and monetary value which serves as the basis for conclusions relating to economics, politics, government, and class struggle, and (3) a theory of revolution.

In considering these three we must first answer the question of the dialectic. What is the dialectic? The word comes from the Greek word *dialego*, to discourse, or debate on a subject. It is a form carrying on a discourse in an attempt to gain truth. It was used by Plato in discussing various topics like justice. One position was advocated, an opposite position was set forth against it, and then a synthesis began to take place to find a common ground. In Plato and following thinkers it was applied to ideas. In Hegel, who is best known in modern philosophy, apart from Marx, for the use of the dialectic, it was applied to reality. He believed that the Absolute was unfolding dialectically, that history was to be understood dialectically, and he believed that a unified Germany was the result of dialectical process. The dialectic steps may be seen in various patterns but each has the three familiar terms.

The first example gives the story of Absolute Being becoming concrete and the world in a state of becoming. The second in an application of the dialectic to history with the conclusion that the German monarchy is justified as the outgrowth of the dialectical movement in history.

So much for its use in Hegel. Marx reversed the dialectic. The world is not idea or Spirit as in Hegel, but matter. Marx's view of matter is not greatly important. The world is accepted as real in a common sense realism sense. What takes place in the world and how it takes place is much more important. This is why dialectical materialism is sometimes called historical materialism. This means simply that the dialectic is applied to history. History is interpreted as a struggle from

one part (thesis) of the dialectic to the opposite (antithesis) to the synthesis, and over again. The class struggle in history was interpreted in dialectical terms by Marx. Marx reflected upon the primitive societies presumably having all things in common. When private property was walled off this led to class divisions. Class divisions eventually create conflict. As an example, the middle age feudal system (thesis) gave way to capitalism (antithesis) and hopefully, with the revolution brought about by the un-class conscious proletariat, a new age (synthesis) or classless society will be ushered in. By the nature of the dialectic, the classless society should become a new thesis starting the process over again, but in Marxist thought this is where it stops because a classless society has no basis for continuing conflict.

Second, the economic theory of labor and value is really a "theory of exploitation, not of value, designed to show that the propertied class has always lived on the labour of the non-propertied class."⁵⁵ A man works in a factory and in six hours produces enough to maintain himself. However, he must work an additional six hours because he is paid by the day or week rather than by his output. The additional six hours Marx called surplus labor which "will realize itself in a surplus value and a surplus produce."⁵⁶ The capitalist creams off the surplus, for which he has not worked, and pockets the profits. This system reduces the worker's position to one of sheer dependence and all that he can do is reproduce himself in his children who in turn become exploited.⁵⁷ Marx concluded that "rent, interest, and industrial profit are only different names for different parts of the surplus value of the commodity, or the unpaid labour enclosed in it . . ."⁵⁸ A system demanding man's time, labor and life reduces man to a machine and Marx believed that capitalism will remain true to its past and continue to degrade man in the future.⁵⁹

The alternative to capitalism and the exploitation it brings was set forth, in part, in the conclusions to the *Communist Manifesto*. They are as follows: (1) Abolish the wage system. Marx did not adopt the slogan of a fair wage for a fair day's work. (2) Abolish capitalism; (3) nationalize the means of production; (4) abolish private property; (5) nationalize the banking and economic structures; and (6) control of agriculture and education.⁶⁰

Marx and Engels were right to be concerned with exploitation. Their proposal ignores other alternatives such as (1) broadening of capital to include the laborers through shareholding, (2) the powerful bargaining position of unions to defend the rights of labor and to gain a leisure producing wage and working hours, and (3) the broadening of the middle class as the dominant class in the capitalist society.

Because these options were not regarded as viable alternatives, Marx was driven to the third element in our discussion--revolution. Capitalism was regarded as self-defeating in the long run by Marx. But it would not die without a struggle, nor would capitalists give up power without force. No group in history has given up power without struggling to keep it. But the economic collapse must come before the political revolution.

If the revolution came and the bourgeois state is brought down, then the dictatorship of the proletariat would take its place. The term "dictatorship of the proletariat" appears only a few times

in Marx and Engels but was popularized by Lenin. It appears that the intent was a state ruled by the proletariat and involving a real democratic approach to government with frequent and open elections. It did not mean to Marx or even Lenin before 1917, "the dictatorship of the party over the proletariat and the rest of society."⁶¹ Both Marx and Engels regarded revolution as taking place around the world with the general destruction of capitalism when the time was right in each state. The ultimate aim of the revolution and the new society is the ultimate "withering away of the state."⁶²

The subsequent development of Marxist thought under Lenin and Stalin is without doubt a corruption and modification due to power struggles. Stalin later wrote that the "Dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline."⁶³ The Party is the "vanguard of the working class,"⁶⁴ and for all practical purposes this is the dictatorship of the Party in the name of the Proletariat who do not know what is good for them. Under Lenin further refinement of the view came and the dictatorship of one man came about with the expelling of deviationists.⁶⁵

B. Man.

Marx's view of man was eclipsed by his interest in class conflict and economics. The work of the young Marx reflects interests in the individual, particularly the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. These and other manuscripts were overlooked and did not appear in German until 1932. Given the romantic background of thought involved in Marx and his concern for revolution, it brings forth a strong commitment to individualism. Man is not an entity viewed in the abstract, for man in the abstract does not exist. The famous statement of Aristotle that man is a rational animal is rejected by the Marxists for this views man in isolation. The unique thing about man is that he works, labors. Marx wrote:

Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, or by anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are directly producing their actual material life.⁶⁶

Man's existence is explained biologically in which it is said that he evolved from the ape⁶⁷ but his physical existence is not the only thing about man's nature. It is important to note that man creates man, not in biological, but in social terms. The primary unit is society and not the individual man. "Man is a product of society . . . it is society that makes him what he is."⁶⁸

Because man is a product of society, it is immensely important to determine what society is going to be like. Man can determine this and this will in turn determine what people will be like. In Marx it is the proletariat, but in later Marxism it is the party that dictates what the society is going to be so that individual men will be reflections of society. Full personhood can be achieved presumably only under a Marxist society.

Because work determines what kind of being man will be, there is a great emphasis placed on the morality of work. Those who do not work are considered immoral parasites and those who live off the labors of others also fit into this category. The good man in the Marxist framework is a builder of communism, one who is a hard worker and in whom there is reflected society at large, the communist society. He is one who has cast off the bourgeois capitalistic traits of the past and is concentrating upon bringing about a communal society with its emphasis upon the society rather than the individual.

It is not to be presumed that the ideal man in Marxism is in existence. He is to be produced. Not only will work contribute but other factors also such as education and/or propaganda. The communist man is an immature man and must be created, or brought to maturity. Grant this and it easily follows as in later communist thought that the immature man must be guarded against error or deviation. Or, one may by necessity use force to insure conformity.

The place of labor in distinguishing man from other creatures is very important. Engels has a comment that labor

brought men in the making to the point where they had something to say to one another. The need led to the creation of its organ; the modulation, the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed . . . and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate letter after another.⁶⁹

Engels seems to be saying in this passage that need is the mother of evolutionary development.

There seems to be a gap between the views of Marx and later Marxists or communists. The dialectic implies opposition in the search of the truth, but later Marxists rule out opposition politically and intellectually because deviationism is at stake. Political dissent has been a problem in Marxist countries. Marxist astronomers and philosophers have been committed to rejecting any form of a universe theory that accepts the second law of thermodynamics, i.e., the idea that the world is running down, or energy is moving from available states to unavailable states. To commit themselves to this theory would be almost admitting a theory of creation. Similar impositions of scientific dogmas have held true for other disciplines.

C. God.

Perhaps the best known comment on religion from Marx is that religion "is the opiate of the people."⁷⁰ Marxists have been intensely critical of religion and God. Marx wrote:

To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself . . . The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme being for man. It ends therefore with the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being . . ."⁷¹

One ingredient in this rejection of God involved the church's role in the status quo. The church in Europe generally involved a state-church relationship in which the church was used for comforting but not bettering the conditions.

Recent developments illustrate the lack of necessity that Marxism be atheistic. The phenomenon, known as the Marxist-Christian Dialogues has taken place in the 60's and indicates some new insights. Roger Garaudy, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Poitiers, was also a ranking member of the French Communist Party before being dropped for his criticism of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. Garaudy finds in Christian thought much that is important and which complements Marxist views. The criticism of religion is maintained, but the criticism is directed toward those strange imported elements from Platonism, or Aristotelianism which are alien to the Biblical faith. Garaudy finds in the New Testament Gospels a "good news," a word for man's future. He declared:

Man is able at any moment to begin a new future, to free himself from the laws of the world, of nature, and of society. The resurrection of Christ is the paradigm of this new liberty. Death, the very final frontier determining our inexorable finitude, death itself has been vanquished.⁷²

Garaudy also finds in the Biblical creation the alternative to necessity. Because the world is not necessary, freedom is a possibility. "Breakaway and freedom are only possible by an act of creation, and one that is not inevitable."⁷³ Garaudy also finds a link between Christian ideas of love and the humanism of Marxism. Just how far Garaudy can go in advocating creation, freedom and love will remain to be seen, and indeed, the whole movement appears to be languishing. However, it is an interesting possibility to see a positive relation between Marxism and Christianity.

Such a dialogue is only a drop in the bucket. The normal views of Marx have not been officially or unofficially changed.

D. Values.

It is difficult to sketch the ethic of dialectical materialism because there has been no great attempt to work out such. Neither Marx, Engels, or Lenin worked out an ethic to any degree. There are a few ideas that will help to see the direction that morality would go.

First, it was believed by Marx that morality tends to defend the economical system, or the class system. Customs of an autocratic system reflect the autocrats, democracy makes rules and laws reflecting a democracy, capitalists make laws and codes reflecting capitalism. Naturally a classless society should make morality conform to a classless society.

The rejection of unchanging principles may be seen in the comment of Engels on the commandment, thou shalt not steal.

Does this law thou shalt not steal become an eternal moral law? By no means. In a society in which the motive for stealing has been done away with, in which at the most only lunatics would ever steal, how the teacher of morals would be laughed at who tried solemnly to proclaim the eternal truth: thou shalt not steal.⁷⁴

Engel's comment about the lack of static principles may be seen in another context, that of the dialectic. The dialectic, with its sweeping back and forth, affirming, negating, and synthesizing, cannot admit an eternal, fixed principle. There can be no immutable laws or right or wrong based on the dialectic.

Second, there is some emphasis on the moral view that the end justifies the means. This arises out of the view that the interests of the proletariat are a higher level of morality. A revolution would bring to pass improvement for the proletariat. Thus what promotes revolution for the improvement of the proletariat would be good. Whatever the party does to promote the common good would be good.

Ironically Marx was much better personally than his theory would appear. Even Lenin later was rather prudish in many things and his private life was disciplined.

Because of the lack of development in this area, later communism attempted to fill in the gap. A code of action was drawn upon in 1961 which expresses the current view. The code is teleological in nature, i.e., it is directed toward a goal, the Marxist state.

The party holds that the moral code of the builder of communism should comprise the following principles: devotion to the communist cause; love of the socialist motherland and of the other socialist countries; conscientious labor for the good of society--he who does not work, neither shall he eat; concern on the part of everyone for the preservation and growth of public wealth; a high sense of public duty; intolerance of actions harmful to the public interest; collectivism and comradely mutual assistance; one for all and all for one; human relations and mutual respect between individuals--man is to man a friend, comrade, and brother; honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, modesty and unpretentiousness in social and private life; mutual respect in the family, and concern for the upbringing of children; an uncompromising attitude to injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, careerism and money-grubbing; friendships and brotherhood among all peoples of the USSR; intolerance of national and racial hatred; an uncompromising attitude to the enemies of communism, peace, and the freedom of nations; fraternal solidarity with the working people of all countries, and with all peoples.⁷⁵

In his work on Marxism, DeGeorge comments that the moral code has five basic features to it: (1) "the ultimate guide in guarding morality is the Communist Party; (2) Communist morality is essentially a work morality; (3) it is an exclusively social morality; (4) it is a completely externalized morality; and (5) it is an inherently provincial morality."⁷⁶

In summary, the Marxist ethic is one in which theoretical freedom is allowed, but since class struggles dictate what man is, freedom is more a contradiction. Morality that is only "provincial" cannot have the appeal of the universal mind of man.

E. Criticisms.

The dialectic first, is an artificial device for interpreting history, class conflict, or whatever. Why should it stop at the classless society? What is the proper historical point to begin? History does not show a progressive betterment of man and society, but is mixed in its development.

When applied to truth the dialectic only relativizes truth unless one is to stop it arbitrarily at a future point. In reality, the Marxist stops the dialectic on the issue of his own truth. If applied to science, the dialectic would make it impossible to hold laws in physics and other areas.

Second, dialectical materialism's anti-revisionists' attitude fosters an anti-intellectualism. Marx himself could argue with his foes but he did not take opposition as a way to the truth. He broke with people and wrote violent attacks upon them. When Marx could not control completely the International Working Man's Association in his opposition to Bakunin, Marx had Bakunin expelled from the organization and moved it to New York where it was beyond his enemies' reach. This anti-intellectual tendency is seen in the words of Ignazio Silone, a former Italian communist and it expressed the attitude of many former communist intellectuals:

What struck me most about the Russian Communists, even in such really exceptional personalities as Lenin and Trotsky, was their utter incapacity to be fair in discussing opinions that conflicted with their own. The adversary, simply for daring to contradict, at once became a traitor, an opportunist, a hireling. An adversary in good faith is inconceivable to the Russian Communists.⁷⁷

Growing out of this is the Marxist view of education which is for transmitting the beliefs compatible with Marxist rather than free-inquiry.

Third, the judgment has been made that dialectical materialism is really a secularized form of Christian eschatology.⁷⁸ Christian eschatology refers to the idea of Kingdom of God, and one element is that of heaven. Heaven is sometimes caricatured as a class-less, property-less, poverty-less, hungry-less state of being. When it is viewed in this fashion it is not greatly related to God. What is suggested by this comment is this: heaven is not something "by and by" but it is now available in the Marxist hope of the state. It is classless, property-less, hungry-less, and poverty-less. It is regarded by the Marxists as a heaven on earth, and in this sense it is a secularized form of the Christian hope.

Fourth, there is the problem of realism. The romantic view of man in Marxist though is naive. Sin and crime did not just enter the world through capitalism. Even education will not root out the selfishness of man. In a sense Marx acknowledged the idea of universal sin in admitting the role of the capitalist society in his dialectical view of history, but the issue is: can men be

transformed by propaganda and education to bring about a classless society? It has not been done yet, and its likelihood gets less all the time.

Fifth, Marxism has been in a dying state since the 1990's. The Soviet Union has broken up, the Chinese have moved toward capitalism in some economic zones in China, North Korea is starving itself today, and while there are yet Marxists who long for the return to strict communism the judgment of the present is that it is dying.

V. Summary

We have looked at four types of naturalism beginning with ancient materialism, modern scientific naturalism, humanism, and dialectical materialism. The four varieties give considerable range to naturalism. We have also looked at various topics, reality, man, God, and values. The simplified chart may help in making comparisons.

| | Reality | Man | God | Values |
|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|---|
| Materialism | Atomic | Composed of atoms | Atomic or atheistic | Alien to logic of atomism |
| Modern Scientific Naturalism | Flux and becoming | Animal that thinks—behaviorism | Atheism | Statistically oriented—reflects culture |
| Humanism | Evolution | A product of evolution | Atheistic | Rationally recognized, man created. |
| Dialectical materialism | Conflict in classes | A product of society | Atheism | Party oriented class conduct |

This has been a summary of one of the two great contrasts in philosophy, the other being idealism. In a sense all types of philosophy can be related to either an idealist or naturalistic outlook. We now turn to the second type, idealism.

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Footnotes

¹Lucretius, The Nature of the Universe, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1951, p. 208.

²Ibid., p. 67.

74. ³Quoted in Frederick Mayer, A History of an Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Boston: American Book Co., 1950, p.
- ⁴Alburey Castell, An Introduction to Modern Philosophy, New York: Macmillan Co., sec. ed., 1963, p. 112.
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- ⁸Yervant H. Krikorian (ed.), Naturalism and the Human Spirit, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 124.
- ⁹ibid., p. 270.
- ¹⁰Cf. Sterling P. Lamprecht, The Metaphysics of Naturalism, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967, p. 202.
- ¹¹Krikorian, op. cit., p. 347.
- ¹²Sellars, op. cit., p. 103.
- ¹³Lamprecht, op. cit., p. 187.
- ¹⁴Krikorian, op. cit., p. 30.
- ¹⁵Ibid., p. 36.
- ¹⁶Seely, op. cit., p. 13.
- ¹⁷Krikorian, op. cit., p. 358.
- ¹⁸Lamprecht, op. cit., p. 194.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 195.
- ²⁰Krikorian, op. cit., p. 69.
- ²¹Lamprecht, op. cit., p. 193.
- ²²Krikorian, op. cit., p. 81.
- ²³Seely, op. cit., p. 37.
- ²⁴Ibid., pp. 56-57.
- ²⁵Krikorian, op. cit., p. 49.
- ²⁶Perry, op. cit., p. 9.
- ²⁷A story attributed to the philosopher Royce concerns a little boy who asked his older brother, "What is the sky?" With a tendency toward reductionism the brother answered, "There ain't no sky." After looking intently at the immense space above the boy asked, "Yes, but what is it what ain't?" Krikorian, op. cit., p. 295.
- ²⁸Perry, op. cit., p. 81.
- ²⁹Corliss Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1965, p. 227.

- ³⁰Ibid., pp. 12-14.
- ³¹Ibid.
- ³²Ibid., pp. 195-196.
- ³³Ibid., p. 221.
- ³⁴Ibid., p. 83.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 42.
- ³⁶Ibid., p. 36.
- ³⁷Ibid., pp. 12-14.
- ³⁸Ibid., p. 287.
- ³⁹Ibid., p. 288.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. 283.
- ⁴¹Julian Huxley, Religion Without Revelation, New York: Mentor Books, 1957, p. 18.
- ⁴²Lamont, op. cit., p. 287.
- ⁴³Huxley, op. cit., p. 20.
- ⁴⁴John Dewey, A Common Faith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934, p. 27.
- ⁴⁵Huxley, op. cit., p. 28.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 37.
- ⁴⁷Lamont, op. cit., p. 159.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., p. 235.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 225-226.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., p. 251.
- ⁵¹Ibid., p. 232.
- ⁵²Ibid., p. 245.
- ⁵³Francis B. Randall, in the introduction to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, New York: Washington Square Press, 1964, pp. 12-14.
- ⁵⁴From Henry B. Mayo, Introduction to Marxist Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 35.
- ⁵⁵R.N. Carew Hung, The Theory and Practice of Communism, New York: Macmillan Co., 1951, p. 60.
- ⁵⁶Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in Two Volumes, Vol. I., Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950, p. 387.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., p. 388.

- ⁵⁸Ibid., p. 391.
- ⁵⁹Ibid., p. 398.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 94.
- ⁶¹Mayo, op. cit., p. 158.
- ⁶²Ibid., p. 164.
- ⁶³Joseph Stalin, Leninism, London: Lawrence and Wishart, Lt., 1940, p. 80.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., p. 70.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 82.
- ⁶⁶Adam Schaff, Marxist and the Human Individual, trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, New York: McGraw Hill, 1970, p. 75.
- ⁶⁷Richard T. DeGeorge, The New Marxism, New York: Pegasus, 1968, p. 59.
- ⁶⁸Schaff, op. cit., p. 64.
- ⁶⁹Quoted in Gustav A. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, trans. Peter Heath, New York: Friedrich A. Praeger, 1958, p. 472.
- ⁷⁰Quoted in Robert Freedman (ed.), Marxist Social Thought, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968, p. 230.
- ⁷¹Quoted in Schaff, op. cit., p. 168.
- ⁷²Quoted in Paul Oestreicher, ed., Roger Garaudy, "Creative Freedom," The Christian-Marxist Dialogue, New York: Macmillan Co., 1969, p. 148.
- ⁷³Ibid., p. 150.
- ⁷⁴Mayo, op. cit., p. 237. Quote from AntiDuhring, Handbook, p. 248.
- ⁷⁵The Road to Communism; Documents of the 22nd Congress of CPSU, Moscow, 1961, pp. 556-567, quoted in Richard T. DeGeorge, The New Marxism, pp. 159-60.
- ⁷⁶DeGeorge, op. cit., p. 109.
- ⁷⁷Andre Gide, The God that Failed, Richard Crossman (ed.), New York: Bantam Books, 1952, p. 102.
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CHAPTER X

Idealism

A philosophical idealist is one who insists that only ideas,¹ spirit, or mind are real. The first and foremost explanation of the universe is that it is spirit, mind, or idea. This is in contrast to naturalism which begins with nature, matter, or atoms as the basic entity of reality.

Idealism means that there is more to life and the universe than surface appearances. Idealism as a philosophic term must be distinguished from the popular definition. People who claim to be idealists in the popular sense are often convinced that the world is beautiful, everybody is good, and you can adopt high ideals and adhere to them. The popular sense of the word is not unrelated to philosophic idealism, but there is much more involved in the philosophic sense. In fact, many popular idealists would probably not call themselves philosophic idealists.

The idealist tradition is rather broad and includes such diverse people as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Royce, Bradley, and A.C. Ewing. Many more names could be included.

Idealism is a term used in different ways as seen in Plato who spoke of the real world being that of Ideas or Forms; or in Berkeley who relates ideas to perception and the matter of knowing things. Consequently, it becomes obvious that each philosopher must be read for the way in which

he defines his philosophy. We will see some of the range of use of terms as we look at the three examples of idealism. We will sketch the views of Berkeley, Hegel, and the personalist movement. Berkeley gives us the extreme view of immaterialism, or subjective idealism. Hegel serves as an example of objective idealism, and Brightman and Flewelling serve as sources for personal idealism. To these we now turn.

I. Subjective Idealism (Immaterialism)

The least accepted form of idealism, and one of the most misunderstood, is that of George Berkeley (1685-1752). His last name rhymes with "darkly." Berkeley is often listed as the second great member of the empiricist tradition which includes Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. While sharing some ideas on the theory of knowledge, Berkeley is not a skeptic in the sense that Hume and the empirical tradition were. Berkeley is famous for his views on vision which became the "accepted" view of his day, but his philosophical position was not so acclaimed. His principle works for philosophical consideration are Principles of Human Knowledge and Dialogues Between Hyles and Philonous. Berkeley never achieved acceptance to create a tradition or a following but his philosophy raised questions that required answers from a variety of traditions yet to come. We will now turn to his views.

A. Reality

Berkeley's view of reality may be briefly summed in his statement: "From what has been said it follows there is not any other substance than spirit or that which perceives."² How does Berkeley come to this position? Several steps may be seen in his thinking. First, Berkeley reviews the different attitudes held in the past concerning the analysis of an object, for example, a cherry, and how it was known to a person. At first it was thought that "color, figure, motion and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents did really exist without the mind" in something called matter.³ Thus the roundness (or primary quality as Locke called it) is in the cherry as well as the redness (or secondary quality as Locke called it). Both of these qualities were believed to be supported by something known as a third quality called the Substratum. This may be called "matter." This view or analysis above was modified by Locke when he believed that the primary qualities exist truly in the substratum and outside the mind. They were not subject to variations of size or shape from person to person. They were objective. But in Locke the secondary qualities became subjective and existed only in the mind. They are related to the object but not in it. The redness of a cherry cannot be compared because of color subjectivity.

Against all of this, Berkeley concludes that if secondary qualities are only in the mind, then primary qualities are also only in the mind. Moreover, a big thrust of Berkeley is directed against the tertiary quality, the substratum.⁴ It does not exist at all. Matter is never seen as Berkeley speaks of it. Consistence must be maintained about how we know secondary and primary qualities. Both of them must ride in the same boat. Either all of them are "out there" in the objects, or all "in here" in the mind.

Now as a matter of fact, according to Berkeley, matter does not exist--that is, the substratum or tertiary qualities. What exists then? **Only ideas exist.** Berkeley's use of the word "idea" as a substitute for "matter" is a little unusual. An idea sounds vacuous and non-existing. But he prefers the word because it does not have the idea of something that exists which is not seen--namely the substratum. An idea is something that is perceived and exists in the mind. An idea is real; it is seen, felt, tasted, touched, and smelled as in the experience of perceiving a cherry. All other real "things" or ideas are perceived in the same way. Berkeley allows that ideas may exist unperceived by himself and he may live and die without ever perceiving them, but for them to exist, they must be perceived by someone.

It may seem that Berkeley is playing down perceiving in the human experience, but actually the big thrust in his view of reality is to trust one's senses. One never perceives the substratum, or matter, and hence it is absurd to believe in it.⁵ What one does perceive is an idea of the cherry's roundness, color, moistness, and tartness.

This raises the question of how we know. Berkeley maintained that we do know and do perceive.⁶ No philosopher in Berkeley's day knew how to explain how a material object--if it existed--could affect a mind. If material objects did exist they would be powerless, inert, and have no ability to cause anything to happen. Moreover, objects do not know other objects--that is, a cherry does not know another cherry. Thus an object cannot cause itself to be placed in the mind. Thus our knowing is related to ideas which are impressed upon us from outside mostly. We can imagine, naturally, but the bulk of our perceiving comes from outside of the mind. Since matter does not exist, then the ideas must be caused by something spiritual and active.

At this point, the reader may become confused. Berkeley declares that ideas do not have existence outside of a mind that perceives them. This tends to be quickly read to a conclusion that nothing exists unless I perceive it. We have seen above that Berkeley admitted the existence of things that he did not personally perceive. Berkeley's full explanation must be carefully observed. The real cause of ideas "is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit."⁷ The main source of our ideas is the Author of nature, or God.⁸ We can have ideas in our mind as we will them in dreams and the like, but most ideas come from God who sustains the creation from alternately being there and then disappearing when I sleep and awake. Nothing in creation is changed from the laws of nature because of Berkeley's views. He noted, "Ideas imprinted on the sense are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny, but we deny that they can subsist without the minds which perceive them."⁹ This quotation may give some context for understanding Berkeley's most famous quote: "To be is to be perceived." In other words, if someone (ultimately God) does not perceive it, it doesn't exist.

In summary, Berkeley uses the analysis of knowing to show that matter in the philosophic sense of his day did not exist. What is experienced is ideas which are spiritual in nature, produced by either my mind, your mind, or God's. Berkeley does not deny that we perceive bodies, trees, seas, or bees. But what we perceive is an idea, and an idea reflects the realm of the spirit, not matter. Berkeley used this argument based on a theory of knowledge to argue against materialism

and atheism in his day. Although it was very difficult, if not impossible to refute, very few philosophers have followed Berkeley in these views.

B. Man.

There is no reason to suppose any extraordinary view about man in Berkeley's thought. In his stress on common sense he "thinks with the learned, but speaks with the vulgar." The common man expresses common sense in his observation of life. As a Bishop, Berkeley held to the view of God's creation of man. But he follows the views of his day incorporating some aspects of Greek philosophy. He spoke of man's soul as being "indivisible, incorporeal, un-extended, and it is consequently incorruptible."¹⁰ Although death comes to the body and changes take place as aging comes, "the soul of man is naturally immortal."¹¹

There is a further Greek flavor when he contrasts God and man in their knowing. God is not affected by anything. God knows and things are; man knows because God has made them. Man is limited by a body or as Berkeley puts it, "We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions."¹²

There is an important point of view concluded from Berkeley's view of perception. "The universe undoubtedly appears to be anthropocentric."¹³ Berkeley lived in a time when important scientific revolutions were taking place in the new astronomy of Copernicus and the works of Newton. The revolution meant that man was no longer the center of the universe, but now a mere spectator in a world whose center had shifted far away from him. The new views have continued to the modern era in which man is a child of nature and is intermeshed within nature. Man's arrival is just a fortuitous event in the history of the planet.

But Berkeley did not accept a fortuitous explanation for man's existence. Common sense and common observation still keep man oriented in the direction of anthropocentricity, or the idea that man is the center of the universe.¹⁴

In his work, Alciphron, Berkeley stresses the importance of man's freedom. Like many other philosophers before him, he declares that freedom is the foundation of morality and religion. Without freedom man is not accountable for his actions. With freedom responsibility becomes a meaningful term. Guilt in any sense of the word is only useful with the term of freedom of man.

C. God.

God is very important to the system of Berkeley. The nature of God is not so much expounded on as the relation of God to his system of immaterialism. Berkeley speaks of God as "A being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power, and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things"¹⁵

God is important for He is the explanation of how we know. Since matter does not exist to cause perceiving, the perceiving must come from a spiritual being who is active and powerful. As

the source of ideas that we perceive, "God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves."¹⁶ Berkeley proceeds to argue that God's existence is much more readily seen than man's existence. The reason is that man is limited and small in comparison to the great number of ideas that man perceives other than man. Each idea that he perceives is another bit of evidence that God exists. Remember ideas come from God.

Berkeley used an analogy to speak about seeing God. When we say we see a man we do not see a being who perceives and thinks. What we see is a creature who has a body like us and we conclude that it thinks and perceives. In a similar manner we analogize for God because "we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of Divinity; everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense being a sign or effect of the power of God; as in our perception of those very motions which are produced by man."¹⁷

Ideas are creations of God. Ideas existed before I was born or even the whole human race. It necessarily follows that "there is an omnipresent, eternal mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules as he himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the laws of nature."¹⁸

Berkeley did admit that we have no absolute knowledge of God. He wrote:

For all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections . . . My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Further, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do by an act of reason necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things in the mind of God.¹⁹

D. Values.

Berkeley did not develop a work on ethics but there are indications of his interest in the area from his extant works. Berkeley divided truth into three categories: natural, mathematical, and moral, and this is reflected in three areas of knowledge: natural philosophy, mathematics, and ethics.²⁰

Empiricist that he was, he believed that ethics involved abstract ideas which, like justice, gratitude, or mercy, are not perceived with the eyes, but are abstractions from particular acts that involve justice, gratitude, or mercifulness.

Berkeley was impressed by mathematics in his day as were other philosophers and he hoped to produce an "algebra of ethics." Most other philosophers of the 17th century felt that mathematical treatment of ethics was possible. If this proved to be successful it would vindicate the separation of ethics from a religious connection with the church. But unfortunately, no one could produce a mathematical version of ethics. Such an attempt would have its problems. In mathematics most everyone agrees that 2 plus 2 equals 4. There is universal agreement on the use

of math signs. It was Berkeley's hope that a universal dictionary of ethical terms might be produced. "If, then, the meaning of words were settled, propositions in ethics could be demonstrated as readily as propositions in mathematics."²¹ Such a dictionary has never been written and could not be. Berkeley seems to have given up the hope of it as he grew older.

What then serves as the basis of ethics for Berkeley? He started with the basic postulates-- God, freedom, and immortality. They are grounded in the natural which is not only rational, but the rational is related to the divine, or an expression of divine rationality in nature. Thus values are related to the laws of nature which are expressions of God's rationality and reason discovers the laws which are valid in all times, places, and among all men.²² Berkeley's argument for rational moral rules makes him an opponent of impulse, or situation-oriented ethical systems. The latter was opposed for it is too time-consuming and impractical to try to compute the consequences of an action. Moreover, if a situation ethic be accepted, there is no possibility of a system of ethics. If the situation determines whether an act is good or bad, then there is no distinction between good and evil at all.

Berkeley believed that good and evil are related to the overall goal of happiness; that is, good tends to promote happiness; and evil tends to subvert it. Happiness is a legitimate goal of man's existence.

But the summum bonum, or highest good, is not strictly a sense of pleasure. The greatest good cannot be merely a temporal happiness. It can be the greatest good only with reference to God. Only God can guarantee eternal happiness. Consequently, morality requires the existence of God just as Berkeley's theory of knowledge requires God. If happiness is to be achieved, it will be related to doing the will of God.

Berkeley's essay on Passive Obedience makes mention of the mathematical model for ethics, but the work itself may be described as a Christian form of utilitarianism, or the view that God wills the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. He affirms that certain principles are evident to reason and may be described as laws of nature. These principles, for example, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," are to be "taken in a most absolute, necessary and immutable sense."²³

Since God is a "being of infinite goodness, it is plain the end He proposes is good."²⁴ The universal scope of Berkeley's view is seen in his comment that the good is not something private, or national, but the "general well-being of all men, of all nations, of all ages of the world, which God designs should be procured by the concurring actions of each individual."²⁵ Hence, like mathematics, ethics should deal with universal principles. They are called laws of nature since they are regarded as universals.²⁶

Berkeley may be regarded as holding an extreme view of idealism, particularly regarding his theory of knowledge. We now turn to a more widely known form of idealism, which is called objective idealism.

II. Objective Idealism

Two questions confront us immediately in seeking to understand objective idealism. First, what is it and second, how did such a position arise?

The first may be answered somewhat in contrast to Berkeley. Berkeley believed that all we know is spirit or idea. The conclusion of Berkeley is that matter does not exist and all so-called "things" are products of God's knowing. From Berkeley's view, it is evident that all reality is mind dependent, and it is known in our mind only.

In contrast, the objective idealist begins with the problem of knowing *a priori* truths or concepts which are known in the mind only. He reaches the ultimate conclusion that there is one single explanation of the world--Spirit, or the Absolute. The Absolute or Whole is manifested in the parts or sub-units and in that way become concrete. Spirit is all there is, and it becomes concrete in nature, or in man. The term "objective" means "necessary being." Spirit is necessary being while what is called matter is in a state of becoming and process.

How did such a position arise? Objective idealists trace their origin to Immanuel Kant who was not an objective idealist. Kant sought to bring a Copernican revolution to philosophy in explaining the way we claim to know the world. Traditional philosophy before Kant was based on a certain way of perceiving objects in the world. It was assumed that one's knowledge conformed to or reflected the object that is "out there" or outside of the mind. In this sense man is a receptor of stimuli. Kant reversed the traditional view. He assumed that the objects must conform to our mind. In a simple sense this means that I (my mind) order the world, or the objects I experience.

There are more complicating factors in Kant's view, but one may say he distinguished between subject (ego) and "thing-out-there." For Kant, the thing-out-there being termed "thing-in-itself" is unknowable.

This led to skepticism about the world, or the thing-in-itself, and did not satisfy some philosophers after Kant, particularly Fichte, who rejected this distinction and made all dependent on the mind itself. What happened in the process was the breakdown of the distinction between subject and object, and only absolute subject remained.

Hegel pushed all of this to its greatest extreme and glory. My rationality or mind is now a manifestation of the Absolute, or the Absolute made concrete. The Absolute becomes intelligent in man, and intelligent man is part of the Absolute. For Hegel, the real is rational, and the rational is real.

Hegel serves as our model of Objective Idealism. Georg W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) wrote a brilliant but long 800 pages of difficult, wandering prose.²⁷ He is one of the most comprehensive of modern philosophers in that he attempted to work out a full philosophy of the world--a *Weltanschauung*. His work achieved considerable fame and influence in the 19th century. With this brief introduction to Hegel we turn now to look at basic ideas.

A. Reality.

We can begin with a few statements from Hegel. He wrote:

Spirit is alone Reality. It is the inner being of the world, that which essentially is, and is *per se*; it assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself--it is externality (otherness), and exists for self; yet, in this determination, and in its otherness, it is still one with itself--it is self-contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once. This self-containedness, however, is first something known by us, it is implicit in its nature (an sich); it is Substance spiritual.²⁸

Another statement:

The world, however, is not merely Spirit thus thrown out and dispersed into the plentitude of existence and the external order imposed on it; for since Spirit is essentially the simple Self, this self is likewise present therein. The world is objectively existent spirit, which is individual self, that has consciousness and distinguishes itself as other, as world, from itself.²⁹

How does Hegel arrive at the conclusion that Spirit alone is real? Our explanation will be overly simplified but it begins with an analysis of perceived objects. The senses seem to give direct, certain knowledge, but upon examination there is less certainty than at first appears. Looking at an unfamiliar object tells you little about it. What is required is understanding and this is not to be found in the object alone, but with the aid of reason. Moreover, when you analyze the whole situation, there is, in addition to the object, a subject or knower. When the knower reflects, he knows that he is seeing the object, and he knows that he knows. Consequently one arrives at a self-conscious being rather than a merely conscious being.

Hegel moves from self-conscious being to postulate other self-conscious beings. With the recognition of other self-conscious beings he declares that "we already have before us the notion of Mind or Spirit."³⁰ Near the end of his work Hegel wrote:

Spirit is known as self-consciousness and to this self-consciousness it is directly revealed, for it is this self-consciousness itself. The divine nature is the same as the human and it is this unity which is intuitively apprehended.

Here, then, we find as a fact of consciousness, of the general form in which Being is aware of Being--the shape which Being adopts--to be identical with its self-consciousness. This shape is itself a self-consciousness; it is thus at the same time an existent object; and this existence possesses equally directly the significance of pure thought, or Absolute Being.³¹

In these quotes it is important to note that Reason is the highest type of human experience possible. Moreover, reason is common to ourselves and other humans. There is nothing higher

than reason and reason operates the same in finite minds and reason *qua* reason must operate the same in Infinite Mind.

So far little indication has been given about the place of the material world or the "thing-world" as Hegel speaks of it. Spirit is the producer of Nature. Spirit is the explanation of both man and the world. Spirit "empties itself of itself and becomes self-consciousness," hence man comes into being. Again, Spirit "empties itself of itself and makes itself into the form of 'thing'"32 One may also say that Spirit objectifies itself in nature. As a matter of chronology, Spirit causes Nature to be and then man is Spirit made self-conscious.

The implication of all this is that Spirit is the creator of all. Moreover, Spirit is all. Absolute Spirit in general makes itself concrete or particular and the world becomes what it is.

B. Man.

Hegel wrote, "The simple substance of spirit, being conscious, divides itself into parts."³³ Hence, we can begin with man as a sub-unit of the Absolute. But since this is true for all humans, then all humans have a "spark" of divinity in them. This spark of divinity is housed in a physical surrounding, the body, which is analyzed by Hegel as he works his way to the real subject of the body, self-consciousness. Different manifestations of the Spirit in nature produce differences in races, characters, and other distinctions. Man is analyzed in terms of his change of physical characteristics from childhood, through youth and manhood, to old age. His body gives rise to an analysis of sensibility which is often ambiguous and contradictory. Yet the body is not as profound as the Spirit in man. Hegel's great work, Phenomenology of Mind, is an attempt to give description to the consciousness of man. Man's senses relate to things, but this is ambiguous. Hegel concludes that the real truth in knowing is not the object itself, but our selves mirrored or reflected in the object. In knowing objects we find our own selves, and this is self-consciousness.

In his commentary on Hegel's work, Stace notes that man is estranged from God as seen in the following:

My particularity and finitude are precisely the factors which constitute my lack of identity with God. This is the meaning of the doctrine that man is by nature evil, a far profounder truth than the shallow view that man is by nature good. For evil is simply particularity. I do evil when I persist in my particularity when I follow my particular ends instead of identifying myself with universal and rational ends. Man is evil, is estranged from God, just because he is particular and finite spirit.³⁴

But estrangement is not the last word about man's condition. This reconciliation takes place by means of man's returning from his individualism to the universal. When man negates his negation of the universal, he rediscovers his oneness with the universal.

Such a view gives one a very optimistic picture of man. Man has a vital relation to the infinite and little is required beyond rationality to make him aware of that relationship.

C. God.

Hegel developed his thinking on religion from a historical and logical viewpoint. In the primitive religious ideas one must begin with magic which involves the control of nature. Higher up in the scale are the religions of substance involving Chinese, Hindu, and Buddhist religions. Using Hinduism as an example, it is a religion of substance which means that substance is illusory, for it returns to the One.

A third step involves fragmentary elements in which some religions grope for certain truths of the higher religions. In Zoroastrianism, God is good, has absolute power, but is one-sided since Ahura Mazda is opposed by Angra Mainyu, or the evil one.

The highest religion, for Hegel, is Christianity, which is described as a revealed religion. He noted:

This incarnation of the Divine Being, its having essentially and directly the shape of self-consciousness is the simple content of Absolute Religion. Here the Divine Being is known as Spirit; this religion is the Divine Being's consciousness concerning itself that it is Spirit In this form of religion, the Divine Being is, on that account, revealed. Its being revealed obviously consists in this, that which it is, is known.³⁵

Hegel does not stop with the incarnation and death of Christ, as a unique thing for one person in history. He generalizes the ideas for all people. He wrote:

Death then ceases to signify that it means directly--the non-existence of this individual--and becomes transfigured into the universality of the Spirit, which lives in its own communion, dies there daily, and daily rises again.³⁶

In a general way, the incarnation reflects that fact that all men are incarnations of Spirit and the death reflects the fact that reconciliation has been made for all men. In concluding his chapter on Revealed Religion, Hegel wrote:

The world is no doubt implicitly reconciled with the essential Being; and that Being no doubt knows that it no longer regards the object as alienated from itself, but as one with itself in its love. But for self-consciousness this immediate presence has not yet the form and shape of spiritual reality.³⁷

God appears to be all there is--in the form of Spirit. This sounds like pantheism, but Hegel is defended from the charge of pantheism, by Stace, in maintaining that pantheism involves saying that all things, rocks, trees, and whatever makes up nature, are items that make up the geography of God. In Hegel all items of creation are manifestations of God, the highest form is in consciousness and self-consciousness, but this does not exhaust the totality of Spirit.

Man's relation to Spirit is paradoxically expressed. On the one hand, man has been "created" good, but on the other, the nature of man is that he is a particular being--over against Being--and this is evil. "I do evil when I persist in my particularity, when I follow my particular ends instead of identifying myself with universal and rational ends."³⁸ While I can live in mental adjustment to the rationality of the Universe, the ultimate reconciliation comes at death in which the particular (man) returns to the general (God).

Hegel's attempt to amalgamate his philosophy and Christianity has had wide influence in the 19th and 20th centuries. Although his influence permeated the church, yet many critics are inclined to agree that Hegelianism--as an ally of Christianity--was "an enemy in disguise--the least evident, but the most dangerous."³⁹

D. Values.

Values begin with persons in Hegel. The general principle is: "Be a person and respect others as persons."⁴⁰ What distinguishes persons from animals is self-consciousness. Hegel speaks of rights to property which an individual has by possession and property relates to non-personal items, such as things, tools, houses, and goods. Man can use or relinquish them. One's own life may be regarded as property, but this does not mean one can relinquish life--by suicide.

The right is related to the universal will, the rational. The universal will is not a popular vote on issues, but that related to universal self-consciousness. Wrong is a negation of the right, and if the wrong is negated, or abolished, there is no more wrong, but only right. If my will coincides with the universal will then my will is good, and if it opposes the universal will, it is wicked.

What does the universal Will will? Acting rationally does not give content to the sense of duty. Hegel turns to social ethics to fill out the meaning. Social ethics arises when subjective conscience and objective will meet. Social institutions arise out of the reason and will. Social institutions are conceived as reasons objectified.⁴¹ Thus Hegel argues that the state, the family, and other ancillary institutions like the police and corporation are borne from the universal.

As an example, marriage is first a duty. One may receive pleasure in marriage, but it must not be entered into with pleasure as a first requirement. One does not marry for "love" but for duty arising out of reason. Love may arise in marriage, but it is not the basis of it. Because marriage is serious, divorce should be difficult to achieve and should be regulated carefully by the state.

When children grow up, the family is disrupted and society becomes a group of individual people breaking away from the corporate life of their families to start new families. Their turning to independence apart from their parent family introduces the idea of particularity which is contrary to the universal and until the universal is accepted there is a rejection of the ethical.⁴²

The independent person views his life in a very personal way and is concerned for his own needs and wants--food, clothing, housing, etc. Wants relate to dependence upon others, labor to

gain wants, and the possible accumulation of wealth. The various kinds of wants require certain class vocations such as agriculture, industry, commerce, and governing.

Having begun with the idea of persons being related to values, we can turn to that idea concerning persons and rights. Because persons have rights it requires the existence of laws and justice for the guarantee of the rights of individuals. These laws govern the external relations rather than internal relations of people. External relations relate to crime, marriage, property, while internal relations relate to intimate relations of husband, wife, and children.

Hegel's ethic, like other aspects of his philosophy, have a certain vagueness that makes comprehension difficult. Various criticisms have been raised against his views ranging from the lack of empiricism to the criticism that everything is swallowed up in the absolute. This is particularly true as it relates to the individual human. Because of these and other criticisms, other idealists have turned to yet another variety of idealism which they feel is more important for individualism. To that we now turn.

III. Personalism

In antiquity Heraclitus was the first Greek to argue that the person has a focal place in the world of things. Socrates certainly stressed the high role of the individual. Among the Hebrews the prophets stressed the importance of personhood as did the later Aristotle. Personalism has always struggled against absolutisms whether it be the state, church, technology, or philosophy. Modern personalism wages a war with two enemies that take varying disguises: material and spiritual monisms. Material monism--matter is all there is--denies the realm of the spirit and is characteristic of the scientific endeavor. Spiritual monism--Absolute Spirit is all important--denies real individualism which is often characteristic of the forms of pantheism. Personalism affirms both the realm of the spirit and individualism. With this brief introduction we turn to the main headings of personalism.

A. Reality.

The atomic age has revolutionized our thinking about matter, and has made it more difficult to be a materialist than it used to be. Matter is not conceived as "lumpishness, weight, or objectivity, but rather as force, as activity, even more, as self-activity."⁴³ The atom may be described as a "figment of the mind, a symbol to assist the imagination" in the same fashion that we use symbols in math to express an unknown.⁴⁴ Consequently, "reality is to be seen then as primarily, activity, activity infilled with purpose and intelligence, and for that reason bearing meaning to all intelligence."⁴⁵ The older materialism of inert, static, and dead matter is untenable in light of the new physics of the twentieth century.

Moreover, the world in which matter or energy exists is a world filled with design and purpose. In short, it is a world of intelligence that is understood by intelligence. If there is no Cosmic Intelligence "we have thrust upon us the unbearable burden of explaining how disorder can produce order, or how unintelligence can produce intelligence."⁴⁶

Personalists are inclined to raise questions even about the evolutionary theory of biology. Issue is raised about how chance or accident can bring order into being. Both the questions of origins and the direction of evolution are questioned. Concerning the origin of life, it is argued that non-life plus other non-life doesn't equal anything living. It makes more sense to speak of an Eternal Creator than it does to talk about non-living things plus vast amounts of time equaling life.

The other issue of the direction of evolution is related to the seemingly non-personal, non-intelligent ways evolution is described. Terms like "the survival of the fittest," "natural selection," "adaptation" and others appear to camouflage the fact that development is from the simple to the complex and reflect an essential goal or purpose. Simple mechanistic laws of evolution do not explain the plethora of life in existence. What passes under the heading "nature does this or that" would make more sense if "Creative Mind" or God were substituted for "Nature."

Reality is too complicated to explain in mechanistic terms alone. Matter can be studied, but needs the "existence of a Supreme Being in order to ground the universal system of change and reality."⁴⁷

B. Man.

Persons are the most important beings in the world. Science has had a major impact in depersonalizing man. The emphasis on facts, scientific methods, verification, and objectivity has overlooked the fact that man is the being, the person who does all of this. "Persons and values cannot be swept aside without at the same time sweeping out the sweeper."⁴⁸ Thus to say that persons are the most important beings in the world is not unimportant. What meaning does anything have apart from persons to value them?⁴⁹ Moreover, things do not satisfy persons; only persons do that. A person is:

a field of energy in which certain activities are known to take place. Activities of human genius, insights, discoveries, conquests of animal instincts, mastery of will, spiritual values, these cannot be denied without the denial also of that which distinguishes human from animal existence.⁵⁰

There are certain elements of personhood that personalists feel are important. First, man is free, not absolutely, but within certain bounds. Man is free "to do right, to fulfill the normal functions of the organism, and in man this means that freedom can be fully realized only as he fulfills the higher demands of the human spirit and consciousness."⁵¹ Man is not free to do wrong although in a sense he is. As wrong is chosen one's freedom becomes less. Wrong corrupts man and the more he permits himself to be dominated by evil he betrays and imprisons himself. Choosing the right is expansive. Right builds upon right choices. Right is the only real choice open because a double life--combining good and evil--is a self-deceiving life.

Disloyalty in his social life, in his heart life, in his emotional life, disloyalty to those over him, introduces inner conflict which bring inevitable deterioration and keep him back from

the fullest success. In the long run, the external and the internal life must be in harmony or the secret one will become the master of the other.⁵⁴

The choices that we make are related to self-respect. "Unless I can keep or regain when lost, my self-respect,, I am done for as a person, for I must live with myself forever."⁵³ The secret life can ruin self-respect.

Second, freedom is related to God. God is described as an audacious person who has linked his goals for the cosmos with that of free persons. This audacity is more apparent when God is seeking to achieve his goal working with the freedom of man, granting freedom to man, and being threatened with man's exercise of his freedom to be uncooperative in achieving moral goals.⁵⁴ In the highest sense man is a co-worker with God in creating and building a better world.

Persons are necessary for other persons. There is no personality apart from persons.⁵⁵ A baby raised in isolation from persons cannot grow up to be a true human being. In a similar way man is related to God who is the Father of spirits. Flewelling notes:

Without God, man is a truncated pyramid, and a very lowly one at that. He must reach out beyond himself and the day's thoughts and achievements into an infinitude of possibilities. This he cannot do without the God concept and faith. Man's highest nature is also his truest nature, and this truest nature is one with Divinity itself, a manifestation in time of the Eternal God, the measure of all things.⁵⁶

Since we have come to the relation between persons and God, we will now look at the personalist's view of God.

C. God.

God receives several different treatments in personalism ranging from the view of McTaggart in which persons, not God, are eternal, to the finite view of God as seen in Brightman. Here we will look briefly at the more traditional personalist's view with an additional look at Brightman's concept of a finite God.

First, the traditional view. Related more to the Christian view of things, this view rejects atheism as well as the Absolute of Objective Idealism. The Absolute, expressed in pantheistic religions and philosophies, tends to negate personality and individualism. If the person--and this is the goal in pantheism--is absorbed into the World Soul, it would mean that his whole moral life is brought to an end, and his role as an individual is illusory. Moreover, it is argued, if a person ceases to be a person, the destruction of energy takes place which would be contrary to the scientific principle of the conservation of energy.

In another way believing in an Absolute would be compromised if one believed in creation of time and space and the world. Creation is the expression of one's self and the making of the world would be an act of voluntary self-limitation. This may be related to another objective of the

personalists about the Absolute. The Absolute or World Soul is usually regarded as lacking in personality, and to become like the Absolute is to become "completely depersonalized, unhuman, unrelated to the world of sorrow and experience."⁵⁷ If this be the case, then a judgment about personality is made: The Absolute has caused it to be--which the Absolute has not--and if the Absolute has made a mistake, it is evil. If it has not made a mistake and personality is good, why do Absolute-ists denounce personality as an obstacle to union with the Absolute?

Rejecting an impersonal absolute, personalists affirm that God is a living God. He is not identified with the world; it is created, He is the Creator. He is a moral being concerned with the moral sensitivity of man. Flewelling noted:

He lives and his life is manifested in ceaseless creative activity, and this immanent and transcendent God survives the welter of time and change through the possession of an enduring self-consciousness and self-direction. Either God is a Person, a Supreme continuum, or that lonely and solitary pilgrim of the spirit, man, alone of all created things possessing the consciousness of freedom and moral responsibility, but with his sense of failure mingled with undying hope, is the greatest God there is.⁵⁸

Man is certainly ruled out as being God or the originator of God by personalists. God must not be regarded as a fiction of the mind anymore than the atom is a fiction of the mind. The "consciousness of God is vindicated in terms of the works that follow" just as the atom is vindicated by its results.⁵⁹

The personalist may be inclined to relate his view of God in the direction of Christianity since the Incarnation of God in Christ is an expression of God's self-limitation. If moral freedom is real--and personalists affirm it--then it means a self-limitation that God imposes on himself.

Second, Brightman's view of a finite God. Edgar Brightman, along with others in philosophic thought, i.e., James, Schiller, Plato, has argued that God is not infinite, but finite. The reasons center around the problem of evil. Brightman does not want to argue that the universe is morally neutral, or that evil is an illusion or wrong thinking as in Christian Science or some oriental religions. The latter argument--evil is an illusion--would also make good an illusion. Instead of these options, Brightman seeks to understand evil as really evil and good as really good.

In so doing he deals with the issue of God's nature: is God infinite or finite? If God is infinite, then evil is more difficult to deal with. If God is infinite, then evil is related to God in some way since He is all there is or was at any time. If God is finite, then evil can have some kind of existence or beginning apart from God who would not be blamed for its existence. In antiquity Epicurus poses the issue in the following way:

God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or he is able, and is unwilling; or he is neither willing nor able, or he is both willing and able. If he is willing and is unable, he is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God . . .⁶⁰

Although Epicurus concluded that God is indifferent or evil, Brightman doesn't agree. But a reasonable explanation must be given about the relation of God and evil.

While opting for a finite God Brightman points up that there is much in common between a finite and an infinite view of God. In both God is a person, worthy of worship, responsive to man, is in control of the universe, and both agree that there is some limitation of God either in terms of no self-contradiction in God's rationality or in self-limitations concerning man's freedom and ability to sin.⁶¹ This self-limitation means that God does not keep man from sinning and alienating himself from God.

Brightman argues that God is not infinite and does this basically on the problem of evil. We cannot confess ignorance about the problem of evil and at the same time argue that God is infinite. If we **know** that God is infinite, we ought to have an answer for evil consistent with that knowledge. Moreover, if God is absolute or infinite, he becomes the cause of evil. And he further argues that since everything is related to the Absolute, evil must be regarded as only apparent, which then raises suspicions about the reality of the Good or reduces values to skepticism.

In addition to the element above, Brightman speaks about God as having a certain "Givenness" about Himself. He is eternal but there are conditions which he did not create. The evils in the cosmos are not due to God's self-limitations, nor are they a part of his nature. This gives a form of dualism called "dualistic personalism." Brightman describes it as follows:

God is personal consciousness of eternal duration; his consciousness is an eternally active will, which eternally finds and controls the Given within every moment of his eternal experience. The Given consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of reason and also of equally external and uncreated processes of non-rational consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects (qualia), disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of surd evil.⁶²

Brightman does acknowledge that he is advocating a God whose will is finite rather than a finite God. The limitation of power makes it possible to speak of God struggling with evil and being frustrated temporarily, but not totally or ultimately defeated.

The problem of evil is real and Brightman was struggling with the issue of whether one can believe in a God who allows evil to exist. One might well ask the question whether one can believe in a God who **doesn't** allow evil to exist. The issue is what is God like: a divine policeman who zaps people when evil is done; or a merciful being who seeks in patience for man to return to himself.

In spite of whatever criticisms that may be raised against his view, Brightman poses a question about the philosophical term and use of "absoluteness" or "infiniteness." The problem is compounded when it is developed logically and leads naturally to the issues raised by Epicurus. But

if you answer the question as a religious question--which it certainly is--then one will have to say that the Bible does not teach the absoluteness of God. That comes from Aristotle. The Bible teaches that God is able to achieve his purpose and that purpose is not expressed in syllogistic form. There is a self-limitation in the Bible as expressed in creation, man's freedom and finally in the Incarnation of God which is the greatest expression of self-limitation for the sake of achieving a purpose of love and redemption.

D. Values.

The personalists are very much value oriented. This is one of the unique features about the emphasis on persons rather than on things, or the impersonalism of the Absolute. Great length is taken to indicate the poverty of science in demonstrating the validity of values. The methods of science have nothing to do with values either pro or con.

Man is the only creature who makes moral choices. This is true because man is a living soul. Values are related to man's using and choosing. If values are not exercised, then they are meaningless.

Man has a relation to a value-world. "Whoever finds the complete harmony of inner integrity discovers the whole universe fighting on his side. The forces with which he learns to cooperate, cooperate with him."⁶³

Values require a sense of self-discipline. A double-minded person has already been condemned in the section on man. Life demands discipline. The first act of a person who is to be a moral creature is to control his imagination. Evil begins with--out of the heart proceed murder, lust, adultery, hate, etc. Unless control of the imagination is gained, all is lost. Thinking on that which is good, pure, holy, and just is the alternative to imagination run riot with destructive tendencies for personhood. "The man who dallies with evil thoughts or imaginings is never safe. Indeed he may so corrupt the subconscious bases of action that the power to resist wrongdoing is all but lost."⁶⁴

Choosing values involves weighing their goodness. Like moralists of all ages, personalists believe that doing a lesser good than a greater good is wrong and destructive of self-control.⁶⁵ Being untrue to the mandates of the Spirit, makes one a slave to something less than good.

Personalism's values on persons means that one reveres both himself as well as the personhood of others. Surrendering an ideal for a friend debases both oneself and the respect of the friend. The same regard for persons means that one cannot be indifferent to the needs and problems of others. If there is a human being suffering, then I too am suffering. If my children are hungry and impoverished in ignorance, then my child and those after us are imperiled.

Values, finally, are related to God. Man has a relation to God, the Supreme Continuum, as long as he seeks to realize the values in his life that are consistent with the Supreme Continuum.

The consciousness of continuity with the Supreme Continuum within and behind the universe is the great need of our day. Society suffers from individualism, an isolationism

which cuts itself off from the general progress in the search for personal advantage at the expense of others In the Supreme Continuum alone can we realize our brotherhood of all mankind, the communion of the saints. A realization of the place that each man is privileged to take in the range of cosmic life, raises man to a position of new grandeur and importance.⁶⁶

IV. Summary

It is difficult to conclude a survey of such different perspectives as we have seen in Idealism. The student may feel that personalism has many advantages over the other types of idealism. This is related to the personalist's emphasis on the individual as contrasted to the Absolute of Hegel, or the subjective mental orientation of Berkeley. Personalism's stress on the individual keeps man from being swallowed up in the absolute or lost in subjectivism. It is on the philosophy of man that the key emphasis comes. In other areas God is the Supreme Person in a community of persons. But man has freedom to oppose God without the threat of being swallowed up in God. Man is significant but not at the expense of God. God comes out a bit more rational and knowable in personalism in contrast to Hegelianism.

The following chart may help pull together some of the ideas for comparison sake.

| Idealisms | | | |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| Immaterialism | Obj. Idealism | Personalism | |
| A. Reality | Only ideas exist | Spirit is alone reality | Persons are most real; reality expresses intelligence |
| B. Man | Body/soul | Man is Spirit made concrete; semi-divine | Man is free, necessary for other men |
| C. God | Important for knowing | Close to pantheism | Important as Person |
| D. Values | Related to God, freedom, immortality | Values related to the rational | Values are related to man and God |

Previously we commented that idealism and naturalism are the two great contrasts in philosophy. We now turn to our third philosophy which appears as a hybrid philosophy. In realism, our third philosophy, we see the importance of both mind and matter.

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Footnotes

¹Idealism is really "idea-ism"; the latter "I" being added for easier pronunciation.

²The Empiricist, Garden City, New York: Dolphin Books, n.d., p. 153.

³Ibid., p. 180.

⁴Ibid., p. 155.

⁵Ibid., pp. 273-74.

⁶Cf. Chapter III.

⁷Ibid., p. 161.

⁸Ibid., p. 163.

⁹Ibid., p. 187.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 209.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 284.

¹³Ibid., p. 124.

¹⁴Gavin Ardley, Berkeley's Renovation of Philosophy, The Hague: Martinus Nihjoff, 1968), pp. 124-132.

- ¹⁵The Empiricists, op. cit., p. 300.
- ¹⁶Ibid., p. 211.
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- ⁴²Ibid., p. 413.
- ⁴³Ralph F. Flewelling, The Person, Los Angeles: The Ward Ritchie Press, 1952, p. 107.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., p. 146.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 107.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 144.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 199.

⁴⁸Edgar Brightman, Persons and Values, Boston: Boston University Press, 1952, p. 10.

⁴⁹Flewelling, op. cit., p. 232.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 324.

CHAPTER XI

Realism

A philosophic realist--in contrast to the popular meaning of the word--realist--affirms that objects exist independently of being known by any particular person. What we see is real, what we touch has reality, and to top it off, we can know these things directly. Before any qualifications begin that is the simple platform of realism.

Descartes may be regarded as the father of modern realism. He set forth one of the basic propositions of the movement: the independent existence of the object.¹ After Descartes, philosophers like Locke, Reid, and others introduced an idea that eventually lead to subjective idealism. This idea has been called representationalism, and refers to the view that objects existing outside of mind are not known directly but by means of representations. This is based on the analysis of vision; object to subject via the sense or image in the eye. As such it involves an uncertainty about the real world back of the image. It means that one must infer that the world beyond the sense datum is like the sense datum that is represented by it.

George Berkeley, after Locke, argued that the images are in a mind, or Mind, and that nothing exists without the perception of it. The formula, "to be is to be perceived," stressed the importance of the mind. Eventually in the nineteenth century, idealism--as a general term--came to be the dominant philosophy although it was not the Berkelean variety. But it was this basic tenet of Berkeley that figured into the revolt against idealism. Berkelean idealism leads to subjectivism and realism eventually arose as a reaction to subjectivism. G.E. Moore lead in the attack upon subjectivism with his essay "Refutation of Idealism" in 1903. Among other things Moore argued that the idealists did not distinguish between act and the object in sensation.

Eventually modern realism set forth its positive platform as well as its criticisms of other philosophies. It rejected naive realism because it did not seemingly explain the problem of error in

the senses. For example, how does one explain the contradiction between the vision when seeing a stick in the water, and the touch which feels it to be straight? Representationalism was rejected because it did not give a creditable view of the world. One cannot compare images with the world to see if the representation was adequate or false. Too much skepticism seems involved in it. Subjectivism was rejected because it could not explain how one could get behind the mind or consciousness to the "outside" world. This seemed to end in solipsism and one would say only that I and my ideas exist. To whom one would say this is not obvious.

In a positive direction, modern realism began with the attempt to explain the relation between the knowing process and the thing known. Eventually the movement was to split into two camps called the Neo-Realists and the Critical Realists. We will examine these two groups in some detail.

I. The New Realists

A group of philosophers led a common cause in setting forth what they described as The New Realism.² They argued for a common sense view that "the world exists independently of the knowing of it," as well as the belief that "the same independent world can be directly presented to consciousness and not merely represented or copied by 'ideas.'"³ A central issue for neo-realism was its "emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology."⁴ This means that although one way we know is a mental operation it does not necessarily follow from the process of knowing that the world is mental in nature. A realist may come to that conclusion on other grounds than the theory of knowledge. Mind or mental process is important, but the new realists would not follow Kant in the mind imposing order on the world. On Kant's ground it was charged that if mind were different than what it is in man, then "the world which we should then perceive and know might be quite other than our present world."⁵ In contrast, the new realists made much of perception. Space, for example, is known on the basis of perception rather than on the basis of rationalistic mathematics.

The matter of epistemology, seeking liberation from the idealist's philosophy of "to be is to be perceived," became the beginning and the basic point of emphasis of the new realists. In pursuing this liberation they returned to some of the tenets of naive realism, but with a defence, explanation, and elaboration to make it a viable option without the problems of naiveté, subjectivism, or skepticism. The epistemological emphasis can be seen in the first two subjects below.

A. Reality

The New Realists rejected materialism because it was nothing but a **monism**, or oneness of nature, and **spiritualism** because it was nothing but a monism of spirit. Thus reality must be understood as dualistic or pluralistic. Spaulding noted:

The realist, therefore, can accept no one quality or substance, no one 'stuff', either mind or matter, or some unknown or unknowable underlying entity, to which all other entities are reducible, and which they ultimately are, or of which they are manifestations. Rather, for

him, there are kinds that are irreducibly different, and there is an irreducible plurality of these kinds.⁶

He does concede that pluralism may involve relatedness between diverse things, but there is no hope of returning to a monism as seen in either idealism or naturalism.

Reality is known by scientific study. One knows the world about oneself by means of perception and analysis. Negatively, the new realists rejected knowing based on intuition, authority, or illumination.⁷ Placing themselves in the scientific community, the new realists called for a working relationship with the special sciences, i.e., biology, psychology, mathematics, and logic.

This approach, following the sciences closely, brought the new realists closer to the materialists camp in their interpretation of much of reality. The exception involved man's mind and values related to the mind. Biology, for example, was strongly regarded as mechanistic rather than involving any form of vitalism, purpose, or entelechy which could never be discerned by perception or experiments.⁸

In conclusion, the realist view of the total world involved both physical and mental possibilities. Negatively, they rejected naturalism because it did not have a place for ideas and concepts and idealism was equally offensive because it led to the "abolition of nature as an independent system."⁹

B. Man.

The view of man is crucial since it is man that is related to the theory of knowledge which assumes great importance for new realists. We have already noted that a simple materialistic view of man is to be rejected because there is no place for mind, and a simple idealistic position is rejected because there is no place for a material world. The new realists sought to link mind very closely with the nervous system, but in which case affirming both realities. The mind is not the nervous system, nor the nervous system the mind.

One new realist claimed that the mind is not discoverable by "an analysis of mental contents nor by self-intuition," but by "general observation." These general observations include such common mental understandings as that taking place in a store in the exchange of money for merchandise, or the verbal reporting that goes on between people when they talk with one another, or by observing the actions of the body as a whole as when one is looking at the moon.¹⁰

Perry further describes the relationship of the mental and the physical in the human being as the ability to handle both sense and abstract qualities. Thus he noted, "instead of conceiving of reality as divided absolutely between two impenetrable spheres, we may conceive it as a field of interpenetrating relationships"¹¹

Another realist, W.P. Montague, strongly rejects both the materialists and idealist positions. Arguing that the materialists regard consciousness as nothing more than neural responses in the

body, Montague complained that "they deny the existence of all that which is more certainly real than anything else, viz., my awareness of objects."¹² Moreover, he objected to the growing influence of behaviorism of his day. Behaviorism involves movements of the body and something in the body as in the nervous system. But there are many things involving no movement such as the square root of minus one, or past events like the life of Julius Caesar. Moreover, consciousness has for its thought events of the future which are not yet and non-existent. Montague developed other evidence against materialism and behaviorism and concluded that it was futile for these forms of naturalism to deny the reality of the psychical.¹³

The idealist, or panpsychists as Montague called them (all-mind), did not fare any better than the materialists or panhylists (all-matter). The idealist argues for mind as the ultimate reality, but mind is only known under the form of matter. So on the one hand, the idealists accept matter but turns around to deny matter. Moreover, it was argued that idealism's foundation is based on the invalid relationship that since only ideas are known, only ideas exist. The neo-realists argued that one must distinguish between the experience of knowing and the thing known. Hence both physical and mental aspects are valid. Before developing Montague's position in a positive way, it should be noted that he rejected what he called agnostic monism "which defines the physical and psychical as the miraculously parallel attributes or manifestation of substance or power whose nature is otherwise indefinable, solves no problem either scientific or metaphysical."¹⁴ Moreover, the dualist view advocated by Descartes in which two heterogenous entities--body and spirit--are brought together in an inexplicable relationship not only offers no "explanation of their interaction, but by its very terms it makes such interaction something that is miraculous if not impossible."¹⁵

In answer to these problems, Montague proposes what he calls Hylopsychism (matter-mind) to "indicate the special synthesis" which takes place in the interpenetration of the two. He wrote:

By Hylopsychism I wish to denote the theory that all matter is instinct with something of the cognitive function; that every objective event has that self-transcending implication of other events which when it occurs on the scale that it does in our brain processes we call consciousness.¹⁶

One may get the hint that consciousness is more than just the neural system. Some new realists point out that consciousness is not localized in the skull as it was widely believed in their day; rather consciousness is "out there" precisely wherever it appears to be. By "out there" is meant that wherever the human organism encounters an object, consciousness is in that cross-section. E.B. Holt said, "Consciousness is, then, out there wherever the things specifically responded to are."¹⁷ In a similar vein Perry noted that "consciousness is a relation into which things enter without forfeiting their independence."¹⁸ When one encounters a rose, the rose is not dependent upon the knower, and the rose is not in the knower's mind or neural system. The encounter is "out there" where the organism and the rose meet.

The new realists sought to give credence to the complexity of man's dimension--body and soul. In this they steered clear of the reductionism of the competing philosophies--naturalism and idealism.

The nature of man on the level of good or evil involves a less optimistic view in realism than in idealism. Idealism viewed man as good. Realism is more neutral. Man can be good and he can be very bad. Evil in the human community has been a brute fact and there is no need to whitewash it, or rationalize it away as is done in some forms of idealism. Man is a child of nature at the least, but may make great moral advances.

C. God.

The word "God" does not occur in the index of The New Realism, although it may occur in the book in a non-consequential way. Their great emphasis in that work was epistemology, rather than metaphysics. On this issue they were united, on metaphysics they were not. For their views about God we have to consult individually authored works. Some of the new realists were atheists, others tended toward a form of pantheism, and still others pursued a somewhat traditional theism. Montague comes closest to being a traditional theist but he does not accept the term for himself. Nevertheless, he rejected atheism as a completely negative theory. Atheism has no means of accounting for the presence of the Good in the world. Pantheism was regarded as unimportant because it lacks "value or personality, and hence indifferent to the weal or woe of living individuals."¹⁹ Polytheism is unimportant because it lacks the ultimate unity found in monotheism and is not intellectually satisfying.

For Montague, the only viable option is theism. But he has a problem with traditional theism since he believed it does not deal with the problem of evil adequately. He appealed to the ancient argument of many atheists:

If God were all good, he would wish to abolish evil; and if He were all-powerful He would be able to abolish evil. Therefore, since he doesn't abolish evil, it must be either because He won't or because He can't.²⁰

Montague felt that the problem of evil was as difficult for the theist as the problem of good was for the atheist. Some theists in emphasizing the power of God make him less moral than man, while others emphasizing the goodness of God make him finite and not able to accomplish the battle against evil. Trying to escape these dilemmas Montague expressed his belief in the following:

The God that I believe to be most probable is infinite and eternal like the universe which is His body, all-perfect in Himself, and in His Will to good, but limited in power by that totality of possible and actual beings which is within Himself yet not Himself, and which in what we may call evolution is undergoing the endless leavening and perfecting that such an infinite chaos would require.²¹

This brief credo needs some further explanation, particularly the last part. In an essay on *The Trinity--A Speculation*, Montague elaborates a view that gives meaning to the latter part of that statement. Admitting against the empiricists that he always felt the necessity of "going beyond the world to explain the world," he turned to the idea of the Christian trinity with a novel interpretation.

He spoke of "God the Father" as a "preconscious and prepersonal power expressing itself in the production of mere existential and subsistential being in maximum abundance."²² These beings make up the world. "God the Son" would refer to the collective, integrated personal unity that exists. The third phrase is God the Holy Spirit expressing itself in what we recognize as evolution, but "evolution interpreted as the working of God in that world which is within him."²³ This view of the world helps Montague to say that when God looked upon the world "it was to be made good" rather than the Biblical statement that "it was good."²⁴

Montague does not argue for God in the traditional classic proofs approach. Yet he believes that God is necessary to give meaning to the world. He believes that "ideals are eternal things."²⁵ While biology, physiology and physiological psychology supported some form of materialism in his day, chemistry and physics "make it more and more difficult to regard the material as the all-sufficient ground of the vital and psychical."²⁶ In his summation of these years of philosophical change, Montague exclaims, "There must be a God, a force or trend upward, to account for the more than casual amount of goodness in existence"²⁷ Enough of Montague.

A realist's approach to God would be followed along the same analogies as other objects. God is "out there" and not a figment of the mind. Like any other object a realist view would not require that God be known to be in existence. God exists whether anyone knows Him or not. If God is to be known, then he must be experienced, encountered as other objects are encountered. Religious experience then plays a significant role in a realist's view of God.

Moreover, a realistic view of God would include the following ideas: (1) God and man are not identified as one and the same. (2) God is above and beyond man. (3) God is personal and only a personal God can be known. (4) If God the unknown, the hidden God, is to be known, then He must make the initial move to come to man to reveal himself in some way. (5) Although the facts of the universe may point to God's existence, God and the universe are not different terms for the same thing. Knowing the universe in a scientific sense is not the same as knowing God.

D. Values.

Since the neo-realists stressed objective reality existing independently of being known, it could easily follow that values exist independently of being known. Perry noted, "finally, and this is our most important conclusion, all values whatsoever are absolute in the sense that they are independent of opinion."²⁸ In another place he argued that values are independent of judgements and he rejected a standard of good as that which anyone thinks good, as being "both dialectically and empirically untenable."²⁹ These views are urged against the widespread feeling that values are only related to desires and desires are relative. Rather, if something is good, then the fact cannot be made or unmade by any opinion about it. Moreover, the realists sought to escape the indictment of their own accusations against the idealists tradition of reading goodness and value into the world where these did not exist. Thus the realist sought to discover values rather than to read or project them into the world of nature.³⁰

What is the status or source of values? Some new realists relate these to God, but not all did. Those who did not, founded values in reason. E.G. Spaulding, believed that values are related to God. He wrote, "God is the totality of values, both existent and subsistent, and of these agencies and efficiencies with which these values are identical."³¹ Spaulding continued in saying that "God is justice and truth and beauty." These values are found in the world as well as in God. Values are both transcendent and immanent in the world and above it. The summary statement is reached that "God is Value, the active, 'living' principle of the conservation of values and of their efficiency."³²

The link between God and value is a close one, but God is not everything in the cosmos, as in the full-blown idealist tradition. There are dis-values, or evil. The new realists rejected the view that evil is non-existent, or ultimately a good. Evil should not be white-washed by saying that evil is necessary so that good can be known. Evil cannot be reducible to good. Evil is an "immediate and self-sufficient entity that, although it is opposed to, is not in the least dependent upon, good, although, of course, it is related to good" ³³ In the case of Spaulding and others, evil is dealt with in a theistic rather than pantheistic manner. Evil is not part of the Total which is all good, rather the pluralism of the new realists gave evil more existence than idealists did.

Montague took a more rational approach to values. He rejected hedonism as contradictory since one likes one action at one moment and dislikes it another moment. He also rejects the view of ethics which may be called "conscience ethic" based upon prudence, sympathy, and suggestibility.³⁴ Actions governed by this stance are actions born out of customs and authority commands (as of home or community). These may have some rational justification that is rational within the community but not out of it. The Aztecs sacrificed humans which was rational to them but not to outsiders. After analyzing ethical ideas based upon principles--acting regardless of consequences--and systems based upon "the good," the greatest amount of happiness without regard to principles, then Montague concluded that both alternatives are needed, rather than a defense of a one-sided system.

He prefers the term "perfectionism" which is defined to include actions based on both principle and end. A happiness or pleasure directed life has little regard for virtue, but a principle system has little regard for happiness. Perfectionism includes both virtue or principle and pleasure. The goal of this type of ethical system is "an increase of the substance of a life or a self, and that an integral component and infinitely the most important component of the self is that rational or spiritual nature of which conscience itself is an expression."³⁵

We now turn to the second group of realists who reacted against the neo-realists.

II. The Critical Realists

Following the appearance of The New Realism, another group of philosophers sought to set forth an alternative view of things. Their work was published in 1920 and involved seven men (Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, James Pratt, Arthur Rogers, George Santayana, Roy W. Sellars, and C.A. Strong). Their Essays in Critical Realism was an attempt to criticize not only the new

realists but also pragmatic and idealistic views. The central theme was strictly epistemology. Almost no other issue appears in the scope of the book. As far as metaphysics goes, it was admitted that a critical realist could be a "panpsychists, a metaphysical dualists, a Platonist, or an ontological idealists of some other type."³⁶ Consequently, one must look elsewhere for a development of the philosophy of critical realism as it relates to interests other than epistemology.

Since the basic platform centers on knowing, we will look briefly at their view of epistemology and then move to other works for a consideration of issues of metaphysics and values.

The Critical Realists rejected the view of the new realists and actually regarded the new realists as naive realists. Their rejection was on two principle points: (1) the new realists could not explain error and (2) their analysis of perception was regarded as inadequate. The Critical Realists sought to retain the new realists respect for the directness of knowing, but it was a mediated knowing, which is another way of describing an indirectness. Drake wrote:

Physical events send off their messages to us; our perceptual data appear at a later moment, and seem to be in the direction from us in which the object existed at the time when the message started. If, then, our perceptual data are existents, they cannot be the same existents as those from which the message came, because they have a different temporal-spatial locus.³⁷

The perceptual data are called "character-complexes (--essences), irresistibly taken in the moment of perception to be the characters of existing outer objects."³⁸ The character-complexes themselves don't have existence.³⁹ Perception then is the reception of these character-complexes caused by objects in space around us. In this sense we know objects "directly," but the objects themselves never get within our consciousness.⁴⁰ Durant concludes that this is the best that we can do in getting to know objects "and we might as well be content."⁴¹

Pratt, in the same work, speaks of a quality-group in perception and this is not the object known, but a tool for perceiving objects.⁴² There is no knowing without percepts anymore than there can be thinking without thoughts. The thought is not a hindrance to thinking, and the percept is not a hindrance to knowing.⁴³

The critical realists' maintained that their view was better to explain certain facts about knowing than the new realists could. Memory served as one example. If knowing is direct, how can memory "know" the past? Can one know the past directly? The critical realists said no. They argued that error was more explicable since they were not arguing for a direct knowing. Error was explicable because "data are directly dependent on the individual organism, not on the external object, varying in their character with the constitution of the sense-organs and the way in which these are affected and only secondarily and indirectly with the external thing."⁴⁴ Hallucinations, confusion of color, and other problems of error would be explained by the irritation of the brain, or abnormal eyes, etc. The data (caused by the object) are subject to the laws of psychophysiology.

How well did the critical realists succeed? Montague, the new realist, reflecting on this in 1940, conceded that both new realists and critical realists had problems. Critical realism did not make any advances on "the dualistic realisms of Locke and Descartes."⁴⁵ Critical realism still centered on skepticism⁴⁶ and reverted to "animal faith" that there was a relation between object and perception given in the data.

Even some of the critical realists admitted their problems. Sellars confessed in 1932 that they had oversimplified things. "It did not do justice to the complexity of the act of perceiving and did not see that perceiving was essentially interpretative in its nature."⁴⁷

Perhaps more useful and permanent are the material elements of the critical realists in their views on metaphysical issues. To that we now turn.

A. Reality.

Roy Sellars attempted to develop a Philosophy of Physical Realism which was published in 1932. For him, reality is not a humdrum single kind of physical reality. There is immense variety of material forms in the world ranging from "star-dust and the stripped atoms of incandescent suns to the primeval slime of the surface of this earth of ours and the intricate organization of human brains."⁴⁸

He rejected the idealist's contention that mind is higher and is a fairer sample of reality. Mind is part of reality as well as other dimensions--both are real. "Being can assume many forms, all equally real, though different."⁴⁹

One who is often linked with critical realists, but not included in the original work by that title, is a Britisher by birth, Alfred North Whitehead, later a professor at Harvard. Whitehead's views of nature involve bi-polarity between mind and matter. Both mind and matter are necessary for the other. He wrote, "The key to metaphysics is this doctrine of mutual immanence, each side lending to the other a factor necessary for its reality."⁵⁰ Bi-polarity is also seen in the relation between the permanence and becoming of the world. "The universe is dual because, in the fullest sense, it is both transient and eternal. The universe is dual because each final actuality is both physical and mental."⁵¹

Whitehead argued that much bad metaphysics grew up under the influence of Newton, Descartes, and others in the modern era while it neglected the contributions of Plato. He sees his philosophy as a fusion of these two different cosmologies. He combines the "eternal object" (Platonic form) with the process of becoming so that both permanence and process are accepted in his metaphysics. He noted, "The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal."⁵²

Whitehead deprecates any metaphysical Unmoved Mover and the Creator of theism and argues that these views have "infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity and Mohomatanism."⁵³ In contrast to the image of a divine Caesar type who fiats the world into

existence as a cosmic magician, or reducing God to a philosophical principle of the First Cause, he alludes to another way of viewing the universe as seen in the Galilean who

dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules nor is it unmoved, also it is a little oblivious to morals. It does not look to the future; for it finds its own reward in the immediate present.⁵⁴

This expresses quite a contrast to simple argumentation. Not only in this but in other ways Whitehead places an emphasis on feeling which transcends mere sensation, facticity, and science.

There is a sense in which he speaks of God as the beginning of reality, but it is not a chronological beginning that is stressed, rather it is a **basis of** beginning. "He is the presupposed actuality of conceptual operation in unison of becoming with every other creative act He shares with every new creation its actual world."⁵⁵ Another way of viewing this priority of God with reality is that God is not "before all creation, but with all creation."⁵⁶

If one keeps in mind the idea of mutual immanence that we began with, then Whitehead's set of antitheses makes sense, otherwise they appear contradictory. In these one can see some of the ideas developed above:

- (1) It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as the World is permanent and God is fluent.
- (4) It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World.
- (5) It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God.
- (6) It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that World creates God.⁵⁷

Further explanation will be given this last antithesis in the section on God, but mutual immanence is seen in all of these statements.

Whitehead has probably done a more successful job of working out the realistic theme of mind and matter than some of the other critical realists. His views have had a widespread influence particularly in religious philosophy.

B. Man.

The critical realists had no agreement on the nature of man. A man ranked among the critical realists, Samuel Alexander, regarded man as a combination of both physical and mental qualities. Rejecting behaviorism as it developed in his day, Alexander believed that the mind is more than the neural system in man although the neural system is required.⁵⁸ The quality of the mental is new and is to be explained on the basis of emergence. "Mind as a thing is a living being

with the mental quality or consciousness. Following this clue we may interpret life as an emergent from material existence."⁵⁹ Putting these combinations together with regard to man, Alexander wrote:

Life is thus intermediate between matter and mind. It is also material in that it is expressible (and we may hope may be expressed hereafter) in material terms, but it is not purely material life.⁶⁰

This places man in a half-way position between idealism and naturalism, or in other words, it makes man a combination of both. Man is not just matter, nor just mind, but both.

The critical realists were inclined to argue for man's freedom. This implies a rejection of a cause-effect view of man that was involved in crude naturalism. Alexander noted that "man is free, and his freedom has been supposed on one ground or another to separate him from the rest of creation."⁶¹ Alexander has an unusual way of describing freedom. Freedom is the enjoyment of or acceptance of acts arising from a cause and effect situation. Or, "freedom is determination as enjoyed."⁶² Even though Alexander sounds contradictory on freedom and determination, he concludes that "there is nothing in free mental action which is incompatible with thorough determinism."⁶³ Sellars likewise stressed freedom which must be granted to all people since men as individual personalities differ so.⁶⁴

Whitehead's view of man can be seen in several of his works, but most specifically scattered through the Adventures of Ideas. "Man is different than insect societies because he is progressive and they are not."⁶⁵ Man can make progress in a rather barbaric way but if man is to avoid decadence, boredom, and chaos he must have a "coordinating philosophy of life." Without a vision involving reverence and order, man lapses into meaninglessness. But man's philosophy, coupled with science, is the means of raising the general level of life. Man's difference from animals, and the difference it makes, is seen in Whitehead's view of theology. It has the role of showing that "the world is founded on something beyond mere transient fact, and how it issues in something beyond the perishing of occasions."⁶⁶

Man's difference from other creatures is seen in the matter of personal unity and identity. Personal identity as in Platonic, Christian, Cartesian, humanitarian, or common sense, is such a part of human tradition that philosophy seems futile without it. While Whitehead stresses the realm of man's spiritual existence and personal identity he declares that body and soul are fused together in common identity. In a scientific investigation one sees more body than soul, but the soul is equally important.

Man is located in space and Whitehead views man's existence as continuous with space all the way to the brain. He noted: "The truth is that the brain is continuous with the body, and the body is continuous with the rest of the world. We cannot determine with what molecules the brain begins and the rest of the body ends."⁶⁷

C. God.

The critical realists do not offer anything in their essays about the nature and issue of God. Outside the essays one can find works that incorporate their views about God. Sellars has a certain disdain for the role of God in metaphysics. He rejects an idea of God that makes God prior to the universe or a view that suggests creation. Anyone trying to advocate the idea of God is treated as a psychological problem who desires a "final and authoritative standard." He further asks, "Why should God be eternal if physical existence is not?" Out of this he concludes that "the universe is eternal and had neither beginning nor end."⁶⁸

Alexander is more interesting and unusual in his treatment of God. He does not offer proofs for God's existence. He believed that "no one now is convinced by the traditional arguments for God's existence."⁶⁹ What is more important then is the fact of experiencing God.

Alexander takes Space-Time as a means of accounting for things, including God. Space-Time gave birth to matter, life, and mind. Space-Time is now in the throes of giving birth to deity.

Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth. That the universe is pregnant with such a quality we are speculatively assured. What that quality is we cannot know; for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it.⁷⁰

He distinguished between an ideal view of God in which he talks about attributes such as deity, the identity of Space-Time with God, the whole world in his body, and similar features, but then seemingly contradicts this with the ideas that Deity is emerging and is not yet. Compare these statements: (1) "Now the body is the Universe and there is no body outside his."⁷¹ (2) "Thus there is actual infinite being with quality of deity; but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a nismus to deity."⁷²

The difference seems resolved for Alexander in what is required for religious experience over against intellectual consciousness. Man would not worship abstract Space-Time and requires more warmth in religious orientation. Religion requires concrete views right now and Alexander wants to allow for this but intellectually maintains that "God as an actual existent is always becoming deity but never attains it. He is the ideal God in embryo."⁷³

Alexander rejects a world soul. A world soul has actuality now, but Space-Time is not yet a reality. He also rejects both pantheistic and theistic categories for his views. If made to choose, it would be in the direction of theism. He tried to maintain both emphases. "God is immanent in respect to his body--" siding with pantheism--but "transcendent in respect of his deity"--siding with theism. His tendency toward pantheism is different from many pantheisms. Many identify the world as the body of the world-spirit. Alexander describes God's body as Space-Time itself. "His deity is located in an infinite portion of Space-Time."⁷⁴

Whitehead's view of God is more difficult to grasp than some of the other critical realists. First, God has a definite place in Whitehead's thought. God is not merely a means of explaining

things--he is central to thought. In some ways he seems tilted toward Eastern rather than Western thought in his view of God. The reason for this is that the East's pantheistic tendency stresses the process of things whereas the West has stressed fact which makes God more final and static.⁷⁵ But this can be misleading since Whitehead is not a pantheist in the ordinary sense of that word that God is all and all is God.

Second, there is the theme of process. Process is related to God in an unusual way. God is not static or abstract. He changes (grows?) as the world changes. Contemplate the following:

He is the presupposed actuality of conceptual operation in union of becoming with every other creative act The completion of God's nature into a fulness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God. He shares with every new creation its actual world⁷⁶

While change in relation to the world is described as process, Whitehead, nevertheless, uses some unchanging terms about God's nature. The two ideas--changing and unchanging--are placed side by side: "God's conceptual nature is unchanged by reason of its final completeness. But this derivative nature is consequent upon the creative advance of the world. Thus analogously to all actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature."⁷⁷

Third, Whitehead may not sound like a realist on his view of God, because of his stress on immanence, but he does fit the category. He speaks of God being **with** all creation,⁷⁸ being an actual entity,⁷⁹ and in a guarded sense of God's being the creator. His idea of God requires a lesser known term for describing it: *pan-en-theism*, which means that all is in God and has its existence relative to his. This is not pantheism since God is more than a sum of the parts of the world. Yet the world is immanent in God as he said in the antithesis quote above. At the same time Whitehead does not like the term "theism" because it is associated with a dictator image of God which is unchanging and static.

D. Values.

There is a tendency on the part of some critical realists to argue for a qualified objective stance on the nature of values. That is, values have an independent status regardless of what humans think about them. The critical realists are not willing to write values off as a mere fiction of the human desire.

Sellars, for example, opts for an objective view of values. A value is defined as "an object having the capacity to enter human life with certain consequences of importance to the self or to a social group."⁸⁰ But he does admit a subjective area in values in that they have to be enjoyed. But he is not willing to reduce values to mere psychological considerations.

He rejects the position that values are personal tastes by raising questions about understanding, education, and growth. One may not initially like Bach but if one makes an effort to understand what the musicians are seeking to accomplish, one may change one's taste. Along this

line he calls for a new attitude of reason and analysis over against impulse, taste, or dogmatism. In morality, this would mean

trying to trace out in detail the consequences of an act and to appreciate its effect on human life in the way of welfare and happiness, of seeking to gain sympathy for those people who have been repressed and misused by our social institutions. The keys to this new attitude would be love and knowledge . . . It stands for a process, a method, a procedure, for the use of reason and sympathy.⁸¹

The problem with a taste-oriented value system, or factualism as Sellars calls it, is that it discounts "development, increased insight, and creative understanding."⁸²

Although he argues for an objective point of view in values, he admits that values are always with reference to someone. A value can enter into someone's life, but without someone, there are no values. Values do change with circumstances and education. Even though values are rationally appreciated there are circumstances in which things of value are of no value. A death situation in a desert where water is absent makes gold of no value. Gold would be of value only if it could buy the means to life.

When there are differences in values or morals, Sellars suggests that the people involved should ask: (1) have I sufficiently examined all that is relevant to the judgment and (2) have I essentially the same aesthetic and moral nature as others? If there is a commonness on these issues he expects that there would be more common agreement in valuing. Part of the implication of this is that values have a "double-reference." What is good for me probably has a general application to people at large. If it is not true for them, it will probably be not true for me.

Alexander's view of values includes both objective and subjective stances. Using the analogy of a rose, he claimed that it is real, red, and objective whether it is known by me or not. But the rose is "not beautiful except for a contemplating mind."⁸³ In this regard he pushed the personal involvement in values. He noted: "Truth does not consist of mere propositions but of propositions as believed; beauty if felt, and good is the satisfaction of persons."⁸⁴ Beauty and appreciation are related to a community of minds. This simply means that there is "cooperation and conflict of many minds which produces standards of approval or disapproval." This relationship to approving minds does not make the values less real.⁸⁵ There has been a strange argument that if something is related to the mind, then it is less real, or unreal. He noted, "The mind is the highest finite empirical reality we know. Strange that its touch should be thought to de-realize its creation."⁸⁶

The element that makes an object bring forth collective appreciation is "coherence within the object of value."⁸⁷ "Coherence amongst wills" describes a way of looking at morality as it does in values, of beauty. As such there is a rational appeal in morality. Its rationality gives moral appeal a universal application. He noted: "This is the true universality of moral requirements, that they would be binding on any individual under such conditions."⁸⁸

A moral society is one in which the diverse passions of people are regulated so that there is a reasonable distribution of satisfaction for these passions. A coherent distribution leads to happiness, a misdistribution is called evil. Without a coherent distribution, one may suppose a turn to anarchy, or each man doing what he **feels** rather than **thinks** is right.

E. Criticisms.

Modern realism began as an epistemological movement in reaction to idealism and materialism. Consequently, the first criticisms must be related to the matter of epistemology. Realism has maintained that objects exist independently of being known. Two similar criticisms have come from the idealists and pragmatists. The idealist raises the question: how can you know something that exists independently of a mind? The pragmatist questions, how can one know independently of experience? The conclusion of these critics is that realism has to assume that objects exist out there as a part of his faith, common sense, or conviction.

Another criticism relating to the subject of knowing is that knowing involves more than looking at something. Knowing involves judgment. Without making judgments about the world, there is no knowledge. One may see things but not know what they are. A little child who has never seen a dog before is informed and taught by his mother when he first encounters one, by the words (or judgment conferred), "doggie, doggie." Meaning is imposed on the world by judgment which stresses the importance of mind ordering the world. The criticism implies that realism does not place enough emphasis on the priority of mind.

Other criticisms would have to be made in regard to a particular philosopher's views.

In the general area of metaphysics or reality, it is no problem to affirm that matter exists, but affirming that spirit or mind exists is more difficult. Realism has to affirm a spiritual existence based on rational argument rather than a scientific proof. If one bases his criterion of truth solely on scientific standards than this part of realism is weaker than the other part of the dualism, that is, matter.

The same problem could arise in connection with saying that man is more than body, or that God exists, or that values are objective. God's existence is not seen with the naked eye, and arguments for his existence make more sense to idealist than to naturalists. But it must be remembered that many realists who philosophized about God were also influenced by, or were, scientists themselves. As long as realism seeks to argue for a spiritual or mental element in metaphysics, then it inclines more to idealism than naturalism.

Realists who are believers in God appear in many ways critical of religion, but affirm quite a bit of information about God. Alexander's view of God appears quite detailed for a person who makes so little of revelation in religion. The same would be true of Whitehead. It would seem to require of a philosopher who claimed extensive knowledge about God that he give strong affirmation to a doctrine of God's self-revelation. If not, one is limited to a natural philosophy of

God. Is it possible to know as much as Alexander and Whitehead affirm about God without an extremely orthodox religious view of God's self-revelation.

Realism has the advantage of not being a reductionistic philosophy. It can affirm matter, body, and the material as well as the spiritual, the mental, and the immaterial.

The following chart may help compare and contrast the basic ideas of realism.

| Neo Realism | Critical Realism |
|--|---|
| Reality Dualism, mind and matter Pluralism, many kinds | Being assumes many forms (Mind,matter, other) Temporal and eternal (Whitehead) |
| Man: hylopsychism (mind-body) Body and soul Rejected behaviorism | Both mind-body being Man's difference from creatures based on Progress. |
| God: Some are atheists Some are theists Some inclined to pantheism | Process is a theme about God God the actual is struggling to become God the ideal Pan-en-theism—Whitehead—All is in God, but God is bigger than it all. |
| Values: Objective Have their status in God or reason | Objective, can be taught to rational minds |

One of the competing philosophies at the turn of the 20th century was pragmatism. It was a rival of realism, and has had an important influence in American thought particularly. To it, we now turn.

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⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 523.

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⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 521.

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CHAPTER XII

Pragmatism

Pragmatism is best regarded as a movement and spirit rather than a set of ideas. There is no simple doctrine that unifies it as in the cases of naturalism, realism, or idealism. Unlike these three philosophies, pragmatism is no longer an active movement. Its views and feelings have become common place among common people.

Pragmatism is an American philosophy that began in the 1870s although its leaders speak of it as a new name for old ways of thinking. Two stories are told about its beginnings. The first version relates the founding of pragmatism to the Metaphysical Club founded by Peirce and James at Cambridge in which the ideas were first set forth. The second version relates to Peirce's essay, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" which was published in 1878 in the Popular Science Monthly. Here the word and idea are expressed. Peirce is certainly credited with coining the word, but it is most assuredly William James who popularized the movement. While the beginning is related to the 1870s, James is credited with inaugurating the real movement in an address "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" in 1898.

Pragmatism in the mind of Peirce was something different than what it became in the thought of James. Peirce's innovation involved a **theory of meaning**. He was concerned--in making ideas clear--with the meaning of symbols and signs, or words. What do words mean? Peirce wrote this oft-quoted statement: "consider what effects which might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."¹ As an example for his idea he used the idea of transubstantiation in Roman Catholic thought. This is the belief that the wine becomes the literal blood of Christ in the Mass. Even though it is regarded as the real blood, it still looks, smells, and tastes like wine. There is no operational difference in saying that it is blood over against being wine. Thus Peirce concluded that it is nonsense to speak of it being blood. While a Catholic

theologian may want to quarrel with his example, it does illustrate what Peirce was seeking to do. Differences in meaning should be seen in differences of operations.

Peirce's views were never set forth systematically and he is not the best example of developed pragmatism. Nevertheless, Peirce seemed to be limiting the nature of knowledge to what may be either experienced by the senses or "proven" by the scientific method. In dealing with various methods to knowledge he singled out and rejected authority, a prioriisms, and Hegelianism for the scientific method. This meant he had severe reservations about metaphysical issues. In application of the scientific method he concluded that

almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish--one word being defined by other words, and they by still others, without any real conception ever being reached--or else is downright absurd; so that all such rubbish being swept away, what will remain of philosophy will be a series of problems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true sciences²

Peirce denied that pragmatism had any other goal than the clarification of ideas and words. He noted:

Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard words and of abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that statement.³

While this is a notable aspiration, the disclaimer about metaphysics is disarming because pragmatism under Peirce, James and Dewey had differing metaphysics, either by advocacy or denial. In application of the above sentence, the scientific method as used by Dewey led to a form of naturalism, while the use of the scientific method in the hands of James led to a pluralistic polytheism. Although Peirce may be the originator of the term and idea, he was eclipsed by William James in his influence. He changed the idea and molded pragmatism in his own image. Later he was succeeded in influence by John Dewey. Therefore, we will use James and Dewey as the two samples of pragmatic thought.

I. William James (1842-1909)

Brother of Henry James, the novelist, William James was born in New York and pursued a medical career in his studies but became professor of philosophy at first and then later professor of psychology at Harvard. James developed pragmatism beyond its meaning as set forth by Peirce. Instead of a theory of meaning, he carried pragmatism to a theory of **truth**. He noted that "pragmatism's primary interest is in its doctrine of truth."⁴ But it is truth in a practical vein. He noted that pragmatism is "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts."⁵ James distinguished himself from both the rationalists (idealists) and empiricists (materialists or naturalists) and disallows either alternative as adequate, but both need to be joined together. James

saw pragmatism as a mediating view joining the values of both philosophical camps.⁶ The practicality of pragmatism is seen in an address on the question of whether life is worth living? He concluded that life is worth the effort and if you believe it so, your belief will make it so. The practical effects of your views do affect your life and these consequences can be seen in James' views on the following subjects.

A. *Reality.*

James quoted with approval a statement of A.E. Taylor that "anything is real of which we find ourselves obliged to take account in any way."⁷ But we are forced to proceed and ask questions about the things of our experience. In terms of our experience as well as reason James concludes for a pluralistic view of the universe as opposed to a monism of mind or a monism of matter.

Pluralism is the idea that there is no single connecting entity or substance that runs through all the universe. In many ways the universe is chaotic. There is connection between some things, but experience is limited and contradictory when it comes to concluding that the world is all mind or all matter.⁸ The question of the nature of things can be decided on empirical grounds alone and so far one can conclude that "the world is One just so far as its parts hang together by any definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion fails to obtain."⁹ There is little possibility of seeing a connection between a bank account, quasars, the King of England, and the book that is being read. Pluralism means that one must take a census of the different forms of reality.

There are practical results of the differing views about reality. "The essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is ready made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future. On the one side, the universe is absolutely secure, on the other it is still pursuing its adventures."¹⁰ On James' view the world is "unfinished, growing in all sorts of places" especially in those areas where human beings are at work. The other option, materialism, is ruled out because there is the need of mind as an important ingredient in life. We can see more of this in the second heading on the subject of man.

Another practical implication of James' view of reality is seen in the differing views concerning how we got here. At best we can say only that the universe is, said James, and we cannot with certainty say how it got here. This question is one of the darkest of all philosophy. "All of us are beggars here, and no school can speak disdainfully of another or give itself superior airs."¹¹ As long as we look to the past there is no difference between spiritualism and materialism. We are here, life is here, and how it got here is difficult to answer. Accept either option and there is no difference in end results **to the moment**. But focusing on the future brings immediate significant differences. Given the simple facts of the world as the empiricists or scientists, or naturalists see them and you have a bleak picture of the universe running down, our sun becoming cold, and man and life disappearing. But in the pragmatic hypothesis of James, there is hope. God has the last word, and it is not a frozen universe but a warm abode of life eternal with Him.

It is to be noted at this point, to avoid confusion, that James sides with the rationalists in accepting God and mind, but rejects their monism of the Spirit. He accepts some of the empiricists

stress on science but believes in pluralism, rather than a monism of matter, and unlike the naturalist, believes in God. James believed that materialism denied the moral order in the universe as being eternal and giving up ultimate hope. The idealists affirmed an eternal moral order, but because of its monism of the Spirit it let loose of hope.¹²

James rejected the idealists monism for several reasons: (1) He believed that monism could not account for finite consciousness. If nothing existed but the Absolute Mind, there is no meaning of finite mind. Finite mind is swallowed up in the Absolute. (2) Monism has a serious problem with evil if only the Absolute exists. Evil cannot be taken seriously in a monistic world. For pluralism, the only problem is how to get rid of it and this was an accepted possibility. (3) Our perception sees the world as changing, and this change must be regarded as an illusion or mirage. Monism thus contradicts our senses. (4) Monism is fatalistic because everything is conceived to be necessary. This makes our sense of freedom illusory.

Monism appears to be hopeful, but its logical position leads to pessimism. James accepted meliorism rather than optimism or pessimism. Meliorism is the idea that the world is capable of being improved. Meliorism relates to novelty in the world. Meliorism is related to free-will of the human. If the world is necessary in its present form, there can be no change and no free-will to achieve change. If there is genuine free-will, there can be real progress and change to a better world. If we are inclined to reject these possibilities we must do so in contradiction to our sense.

Pluralism, defined positively, affirms meliorism, freedom, and novelty in opposition to a static, fatalistic world implied in both naturalism and idealism.

B. Man.

James rejected certain views of his time associated with Herbert Spencer which regarded man as the product of environment, circumstances, physical geography and ancestral conditions. In contrast, James argued the differences of man are due "to the accumulated influences of individuals, of their examples, their initiative and their decisions."¹³ Similarly, James rejected any version of evolutionary history which ignored the "vital importance of individual initiative" and which reduced man to a product of the most "ancient oriental fatalism."¹⁴

The power of conceptual thought is one of the distinguishing marks of man over the brutes.¹⁵ Man transcends the merely perceptual world about him. "The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally comes."¹⁶ Man's mind is not just a blank sheet of paper as the empiricists were inclined to hold. The very nature of mind is such that it cannot be "a reactionless sheet at all."¹⁷ In the same line of thinking James denies that consciousness is a "thing," but instead speaks of it as a "function."¹⁸ Man is conscious, but not a conscious.

James described mind as part of man's total makeup in a positive and negative fashion. Negatively, man is more than psychological reflexes. In an essay on reflex action and theism, James said that reflect psychology does not disprove rationality or God. The mind is "an essentially

teleological mechanism. I mean by this that the conceiving or theorizing faculty--the mind's middle department--functions exclusively for the sake of ends that do not exist at all in the world of impressions we receive by way of our sense, but are set by our emotional and practical subjectivity altogether."¹⁹ In another context James argued that the brain does more than merely produce thought as the materialists contended. The materialists argued that when the brain dies, the total "person" is dead. James rejected this and argued that the brain has other functions which he called releasing or permissive function and transmissive functions. But even if one granted the materialist contention that the brain produces consciousness, this is still the "absolute world-enigma."²⁰

Positively, James argued from the analogy of his own consciousness to the mind of another body. The existence of another mind is postulated "because I see your body acting in a certain way, its gestures, facial movements, words and conduct generally are 'expressive,' so I deem it actuated as my own is, by an inner life like mine."²¹

Man's belief about himself is important. He alluded to Chesterton who said that it is more important to know what a person believes about himself than knowing his financial condition.

There are two kinds of people, as James described them. First, the tender-minded are rationalistic, intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic and dogmatical. The tough-minded are empiricists, sensationaistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, and sceptical."²² In James, pragmatism gives the best of both views.

Two examples may help to make James' position clear. The tender-minded position accepted the fact of God's existence, but the tough-minded argued that God is not seen with the eyes. The pragmatism of James is not limited to the matter of sensation-perception. James argued for radical empiricism which he defined as follows:

To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its construction any element that is not directly experienced nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced.²³

Empiricism is restricted to one or more sense perceptions. Radical empiricism defines **experience** as something that may transcend mere sense perception. Hence a man can experience God that he cannot see.

Another example is free-will. Man's freedom has been questioned by a variety of people but especially the materialists of his day. James quoted Huxley who said, "Let me be wound up every day like a watch, to go right fatally, and I ask no better freedom."²⁴ But this, for James, is not really freedom. Without the implication of becoming worse by choice, freedom means nothing in Huxley's use. A pragmatic view of free-will means "novelties in the world, the right to expect that in its deepest element as well as in its surface phenomena, the future may not identically repeat and imitate the past."²⁵ Free-will means along with novelty the possibility of making the world a better place. Freedom is a theory of promise, like belief in God, and the theory of hope makes a practical difference in man's outlook about himself and the world about himself.

C. God.

James made a distinction between knowing about God and enjoying Him. Knowing is achieved by studying his Creation and requires a considerable labor, but enjoying God does not depend upon the considerable intellectual endeavors required to know about his creation.

On the matter of belief in God, James gave an address to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities on the topic of *The Will to Believe*. The essence of the address hinges on several points. First, scientists and others who claim to be empiricists--I-don't believe-it-unless-I-can-see-it-people--are not that consistent. He noted, "The greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on reflection; when left to their instincts, they dogmatize like infallible popes."²⁶ Second, we must believe truth and shun error as ideals but the chance of error must not keep one from choosing. James believed that choosing not to choose is a negative choice. Third, some issues do not have proofs connected with them. Moral questions fit this category as well as theological ones. Science cannot decide these issues, but decisions must be made and they are usually decided on the basis of the heart. Fourth, there are certain issues that are living, momentous, forced options. One cannot avoid them. The question of God is one of these options. Following Pascal's famous wager,²⁷ James sets forth the matter of possible gain of eternal life later, the good life now. Since the question cannot be decided scientifically, the answer must come in a pragmatic way out of the heart. Given the possibility of the truth of God as composed in the momentous, living, forced option, James concludes that "some participation of our sympathetic nature would be logically required."²⁸ Given these options, the will to believe is the natural outgrowth of the facts one faces in life.

There may be some confusion about the appeal or non-appeal to science in discussing God and religion. On the one hand, James said that science cannot decide the issue of God's existence, but on the other hand, he talks about scientific justification for religion. The difference can be explained in this way. God cannot be seen or examined by scientific methods, but there is scientific verification seen in the end result of religious practice. In his epic work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, he cited examples of people who were sick in mind and body and through the medium of commitment and new thinking they became well. The curing is the verification of the new religious commitment. This can be repeated by example after example. In this sense there is scientific verification. The practical truth of the matter is that "God is real since he produces real effects."²⁹

What kind of God does James accept? The answer is easier to give on what he doesn't accept than what he does. The negative side is important for he carried a running battle with the idealists about their conception of the Absolute. James rejected the Absolute as an idea of God because it was connected with monism. The implications of the Absolute means that freedom of man is denied, finite consciousness is in jeopardy, the problem of evil is insoluble, and a spiritual fatalism takes over. In a word, pantheistic forms of theology had no appeal to him.

On the other hand, he rejected materialism and agnosticism because they gave an answer to the world's questions that are "irrational to the practical third of our nature, and in which we can never volitionally feel at home."³⁰ Presumably the third part of our nature refers to the heart.

Positively, James is more difficult to fit into a theological mold. To begin, James firmly disbelieved . . . that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe. I believe rather that we stand in much the same relation to the whole of the universe as our canine and feline pets do to the whole of human life.³¹

Alongside of this is his affirmation that "it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality."³² This power is "not ourselves" but which "makes for righteousness" and which "recognizes us." He further noted that "in whatever other respects the divine personality may differ from ours or may resemble it, the two are consanguineous at least in this--that both have purposes for which they care and each can hear the other's call."³³

In his Varieties of Religious Experience, James concluded that one

becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion, get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck.³⁴

The More is encountered in our subconscious selves which removes the More beyond the simple sensory perception.

James' argument for God must not be seen as too restrictive. He does not fit the pattern found among Christians who argue only for God Incarnate in Christ as the true religion, although he speaks of himself as Christian. He confessed his inability to accept "either popular Christianity or scholastic theism" but still spoke of himself as a supernaturalist of the "piecemeal or crasser type."³⁵

This fairly liberal stance can be seen in his regard for feeling over doctrine. Religious response to God is seen in the area of feeling: theological formulas are secondary. By reducing religion to feeling James is able to declare that there is an unanimity in religion whether it be Stoic, Christian, or Buddhist. He maintained that there is no difference between these types on the issue of feeling or conduct. Consequently, he is not disposed to argue for a single religion as being the only true one.

When one recalls that he believed any religious hypothesis must not be rejected "if consequences useful to life flow from it," then James' pragmatism may be used to imply polytheism, idolatry, or a relativistic approach to religion.

D. Values.

James maintained that there is no ethical dogmatism that can be defended. Just as there is no final truth in physics there is no final truth in ethics. Ethical discourse begins with man and may or may not proceed to God. Without a human there is no good or evil to seek. If there is ethical truth it is supposed that there is a standard outside of the thinker to which he must conform. A single person in the world would not find anything above and beyond himself to seek conformity. This is as far as the materialist would go. James admits that the religions of humanity offer a basis for ethics as well as philosophy. But in addition to this admission he asks whether ethics without God will satisfy the questions answered in ethics with God.³⁶

Ethics with God will give a basis of obligation that an ethic without God does not have. But there is an additional factor. James sees this difference in "the easy-going and the strenuous mood."³⁷ The strenuous mood is seen in the "call" to overcome passion, fears, indignation and injustices. The easy-going mood is akin to moral slumbering. The relation between God and morality is described by James in the following sentence:

The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest.³⁸

James concluded that the idea of moral discourse is achieved more fully in a view in which a "divine thinker" exists.

On the matter of determinism and free-will, James casts his lot toward the free-will position. A world without chance would be an irresponsible world. But James appears to hedge his case a bit when he says that providence and free-will are not incompatible. He used an analogy of a chess master playing against a novice in which there are different un-determined moves, but in the end it is a foregone conclusion that the master achieves his goal.³⁹ Hence the world view incorporating a deity who has goals but within these goals are free choices that man has.

Related to the free-will emphasis is the idea of the meliorism of the world. Improvement is possible in the conditions of the world, and this raises hope within the human breast. Meliorism has a religious overtone as well as ethical. The possibilities of improving the world really do exist. The people who reject this are pessimists, while the optimistic feel the world's salvation is inevitable. Meliorism is based on the solid implication of responsibility in the world and concedes that improvement is possible, but not necessary, nor impossible.⁴⁰

E. Criticisms and Comments.

Some criticisms would be more striking if we had considered James' idea of truth. James advocates a form of relativism that appears shocking and misleading. James view of truth has been viewed in Chapter IV and we will not repeat those comments. The great strength of James' views relate to his view of reality and the practicality of his philosophy. James' rejection of monism is a plus in his favor. Whether one is required to opt for pluralism rather than dualism is questionable.

The only reason for a dualism is to give credence to the integrity of both mind and matter. James doesn't do more than this.

His view on God has both strengths and weaknesses. To speak of God and religious experience from an empirical framework is desirable, but James' reasoning may be used to give credibility to any religious system. Gods of all kinds are related to religious experience. James' argument may be used to "prove" the value of polytheism as well as monism in religious experience, even though James rejects monism on other grounds. While he was influenced by Pascal, James does not follow Pascal in arguing for one true religion.

James' emphasis on freedom and values is important both in his argument against the naturalists as well as having practical psychological value in common life. But he may be too rash in concluding that there is no final ethical system as there is no final truth in physics. Values are different than truths of physics. Values appear to be older and more stable than the truths of physics are unchanging. The ebb and flow of societies and their emphases on values point up the forsaking and returning to certain common values. Discarding values sounds like progress, but discarded values are frequently reclaimed because life needs certain kinds of values. The world and life seems to require some commitment to values for survival sake.

We now turn to our second example of pragmatism. He too was a popularizer and promoter of pragmatism.

II. John Dewey (1859-1952)

A native of Burlington, Vermont, Dewey began his philosophical career as an idealist but changed his views toward the end of the last century to that of naturalistic pragmatism. Dewey preferred to use the term "instrumentalism" to describe his brand of pragmatism.⁴¹

Dewey seems to have been read more by teachers than by serious professional philosophers. He is often obscure, contradictory, and lacking in historical accuracy. The brief story of Frederick Woodbridge illustrates this. Woodbridge asked Dewey, his life-time friend, a simple question like: "Is there not something about the past that never again changes? Surely the state before change begins cannot itself also change." Woodbridge described Dewey's answer: "Dewey defined and distinguished and qualified, in such a maze of dialectic, that not only I did not get any answer, I didn't even know where my question went to. And do you know, when he gets that way, he thinks he is being empirical."⁴²

In calling Dewey a naturalistic pragmatist above, careful attention should be given to the meaning of this term. Dewey was not a materialistic naturalist as described in Chapter IX. He shared much in common with James except for the ideas on religion. Dewey was an ardent foe of materialism as well as idealism. But he is not a realist in trying to make a dualism of the world. The world is not divided into two entities, mind and matter, or a monism of either mind or matter. This will be elaborated in our treatment of the various topics to which we now turn.

A. Reality.

Dewey's view of reality can be seen better, perhaps, if one contrasts his former beliefs as an idealist. He once believed in a universal consciousness or universal self. This placed him in the camp of the absolute idealists. He dropped this and instead of calling everything the universal consciousness, he took up the term nature and regarded nature as the sum total of everything. Nature is whatever is, including those refined activities of man we call mind or thought. The absolute of mind is traded for the absolute of nature.

Another contrast with his previous thinking concerns Being. Being was believed unchanging, above change. Dewey blamed Aristotle for starting the tradition that real Being is unchanging while inferior Being is changing. Dewey rejected this tradition and enshrined change as the nature of life and the universe. The real important people are not those who contemplate Being, but those who, like scientists and carpenters, change Being. "Change becomes significant of new possibilities and ends to be attained; it becomes a prophetic of a better future. Change is associated with progress rather than with lapse and fall."⁴³ Rather than being bad as tradition states, Dewey affirms change to be good. Change makes it possible to say that evil does not endure forever. In a practical way, the changes in memory dulls the loss of friends and loved ones.⁴⁴ Change also led Dewey to say that present life is to be enjoyed rather than serving as a passage way to a more stable form of experience. If changing events are not enjoyed, there is nothing else to enjoy. This makes change have some practical relation to life as Dewey views it. The change or process of change must be studied so it can be directed to fulfill man's desires.

Changes become a basic means of interpreting the world, and implies that the world is "uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and hazardous."⁴⁵ Moreover, "the world is precarious and perilous."⁴⁶ And "while unknown consequences flowing from the past dog the present, the future is even more unknown and perilous; the present by that fact is ominous."⁴⁷ Dewey goes out of his way to reject necessity or fixity in the world. "A world that has all necessity would not be a world of necessity; it would just be," said Dewey.⁴⁸

What is the nature of the changing world? The answer is that nature is all there is, but there are different functional characteristics about nature. Nature functions in some cases as matter and nature functions in other cases as mind. But neither matter nor mind are static entities opposite one another.⁴⁹ If Dewey could have had his way he would have placed a prohibition upon the use of terms like matter and mind. He believed that many problems of philosophy, particularly those related to dualism, would be solved, and would never have arisen if these dichotomies had not been used.

The different functions of nature can be seen in comparing man and the inanimate. The inanimate may be termed only physical. When the physical has other abilities and activities as "need-demand-satisfaction" then a compound word is made up--psycho-physical--to denote the additional properties that the physical has acquired. Thus conceived, nature functions one way and it is termed inanimate, and nature functions another way and it is termed human. In Dewey's mind this erased all problems of dualism in man's nature. Man is not half-mind-half-body as in a centaur,

but a single product of nature.⁵⁰ This view enables him to say that "the distinction between physical, psycho-physical and mental is thus one of levels of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural elements."⁵¹

Dewey's view of reality draws conclusions about traditional views on metaphysics, and Dewey is not hesitant in making this remark. He wrote, "A story composed in the interest of a refined type of enjoyment, ordered by the needs of consistency in discourse, or dialectic, became cosmology and metaphysics."⁵² It is no wonder that Dewey had little respect for the metaphysics of the past or present.

Dewey never really cast off the influence of his early philosophy of idealism. Nature seems to have a certain intelligence and rationality to give birth to the functions of mind. Pan-nature is used instead of pan-mind. This affinity to idealism can be seen in the view of man and experience to which we now turn.

B. Man.

Dewey's view of man is consistent with his view of nature. One sees a continuum of being in Dewey's thought. Man is different from other creatures only by degree, not by kind. In fact Dewey believed that "there is nothing which marks off the plant from the physico-chemical activity of inanimate bodies."⁵³ This closeness to nature is consistent with his total view. In a letter in 1946 Dewey wrote: "It is correct that I regard man as within nature, not set over against it. And I hold that no adequate philosophy can be formed without taking into account man's participation in nature."⁵⁴

How can one start making distinctions for man against other creatures? Dewey begins in noting the basic difference on man's part in preserving his past experiences in memory. These memories become stratified, expanded, transformed into customary thinking and ultimately become philosophy.⁵⁵ This difference in degree is seen in Dewey's discussion of the three plateaus of nature. The first plateau is matter which can be studied by physics. This is the inanimate level. The second plateau is life. Dewey groups plant and animal life together in spite of their qualities which are quite different. They have qualities in common, which is more important than differences. The third plateau "is that of association, communication, participation."⁵⁶ This level is capable of great distinction within it to account for the diversity of individuals. Although there are diversities of individual existences there are yet more "common properties, which define mind as intellect; possession of and response to meaning."⁵⁷

The natural question, then comes, what is mind? Answering in a negative way, Dewey rejects the traditional idea that mind is a thing, a noun, a substance.⁵⁸ Giving a positive answer, Dewey wrote:

we may say that the 'seat' or locus of mind--its static phase--is the qualities of organic action, as far as these qualities have been conditioned by language and its consequences.⁵⁹

The mind is the activities, the behavior of non-material processes.⁶⁰ The mind is not equated with the brain or the nervous system as in materialism, but the mind is activity. The mind can also be described as a characteristic way of interactivity which is not simultaneous but serial.⁶¹ The mind as activity cannot be possible without physical structures, but it is not the physical structures of the body anymore than walking is the same as legs. Mind and body are natural to one another as soil and seeds.⁶²

It is only a short step from mind as activity to the idea of experience which is important for Dewey's view of man. Dewey's view of experience involves man in reaction to his environment. In this regard, thought is problem solving often an outgrowth of trial and error.

Dewey sought to resolve the age old philosophical dualism between reason and perception. Reason could not account for the particular objects since it was locked up in the brain; perception could not account for the general (abstractions) since it worked only with particular things. Dewey sought to overcome this dichotomy in using the term experience to indicate the close connection "between doing and suffering, or undergoing what we call experience."⁶³ Experience is a bigger event than mere sight, or knowing. It included joy, sorrow, and suffering as well as sight and hearing. Since individual things as well as reason are part of nature, the controversy between rationalism and empiricism was regarded by Dewey as obsolete.

If activity and experience are basic, then the control of activity and experience would seem to produce a certain kind of person. Dewey affirmed this task when he discussed the role of social customs and laws. These are important for

creating individuals Individuality in a social and moral sense is something to be wrought out. It means initiative, inventiveness, varied resourcefulness, assumption of responsibility in choice of belief and conduct.⁶⁴

Such a view requires that social modifications be dealt with since self-hood is seen as a process. If one is to change persons, one must change the institutions that make them. Institutions can remain static and produce poor quality persons, or they can be changed to shape new and better individual types. Persons do not arise in isolation, and when people do isolate themselves, they are yet in company with "gods and spirits."⁶⁵ When institutions change for the better they produce better persons who in turn can change the institutions for better. The goal is "full education" in which each person shapes the "aims and policies" of his social ground according to his capacity.⁶⁶

By way of concluding this section, it can be noted that man is part of nature. Nature is in process. Man is in process. This reduces everything to a process "with no subject or object, not external, or internal."⁶⁷ If this be an adequate interpretation of Dewey, then what appears very person-centered initially, ends in a non-personal view of nature and man.

At the same time, Dewey's emphasis on experience has substantiated seemingly the idealist' contention that something must be in a mind to be known.

C. God.

Dewey has a most unusual approach to the issue of God and religion. He wrote a small work entitled A Common Faith, which would be better regarded as a common psychology or a common experience. He discarded most of what is regarded as religious for a new definition of the religious. He wrote:

Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal and against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality.⁶⁸

He described the experience of people who have achieved "unification of themselves and of their relations to the conditions of existence."⁶⁹ Moreover, the definition comes after attention is given to the "religious quality of experience."

Dewey rejected any form of supernatural structure or belief in religion. These are historical trappings that can be dispensed. He lists the conflicts between various religious ideologies and concluded that since all cannot be correct, none are. Nevertheless, there is something of value remaining in religion. One can get it if the doctrinal, moral, and ritual structures are overturned.⁷⁰ Theology arose from the simple faith that something "should be in existence" and this is changed "into the intellectual belief that it is already in existence." He noted:

When physical existence does not bear out the assertion, the physical is subtly changed into the metaphysical. In this way, moral faith has been inextricably tied up with intellectual beliefs about the supernatural.⁷¹

The mental game that man has played with his mind produces a religion that is nothing more than auto-suggestion or self-projection. Dewey admits this idea to be his use of the old theme that religion is born of fear.⁷²

One of the reasons for Dewey's reaction to religion is a wholesome one. He rejected the use of God to explain things that science has or may explain. This later became known as the God of the gaps. Dewey noted that since we do not know the relation between the brain, nervous system, and thought, then the appeal is made to the supernatural. He rightly protested the misuse of

God, but nevertheless, he went to the end and rejected God.⁷³

Dewey's goal in getting rid of religion is to focus on the religious. This is almost like getting the kernel out of the husk. The religious experience that Dewey opted for is related to the ideas of "accommodation, adaptation and adjustments."⁷⁴ Since there is no God who works for man, man must work for himself either in getting what he wants or stopping the wanting of it. The idea of accommodation is related to the imagination. If we imagine that we are in harmony with the Universe, we will be. The Universe is the product of generalizing our imagination. We experience only parts of the universe we imagine, or generalize our partial harmony into a complete harmony.

Dewey noted that "the idea of a thoroughgoing and deep seated harmonizing of the self with the Universe (as a name for the totality of conditions with which the self is connected) operates only through imagination"75 It seems that greater understanding and consistency would prevail if "nature" were substituted for "Universe." Man is religious in nature, and there is nothing outside of nature toward which he can direct himself.

Religion is now changed from a unique kind of experience to experiences of all kinds. In a similar way Dewey noted that "whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious, not that religion is something that introduces it."⁷⁶ The implication could be that the Marxists are just as religious as the Christians if there is a genuine insight introduced into thought, or if goals are met. Any humble person pursuing a vocation against many odds is doing a religious activity. Religion is not restricted to the church at all.

Dewey does admit the use of the word "God" but not in a personal sense of the term. God "denotes the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and action."⁷⁷ Further he wrote that "this unity signifies not a single Being, but the unity of loyalty and effort evoked by the fact that many ends are one in the power of their ideal or imaginative, quality to stir and hold us."⁷⁸ The relevance of this definition of God is that the goals of all humanity become unified. Dewey regarded his age as "distracted" and in need of such unifying ideas. This, it might be noted here, is another form of the God of the gaps which Dewey had renounced as a misuse of the idea of God. Another cash value use of the term of God or the divine was in protecting "man from a sense of isolation and from consequent despair or defiance."⁷⁹

In consistency with his views on God and the religious, Dewey dropped the old distinctions between sacred and secular. Everything becomes religious. This makes apologetics unnecessary since everyone is doing religious activity in worth-while things they do. The result is that:

the validity of justice, affection, and that intellectual correspondence of our ideas with realities that we call truth, is so assured in its hold upon humanity that it is unnecessary for the religious attitude to encumber itself with the apparatus of dogma and doctrine.⁸⁰

Another implication in this dropping of distinctions between the sacred and the secular, is that science emerges as more religious than religion. Dropping the doctrines of religion, religious activity is related to method not doctrine. Science is activity that is for the most part religious. But science is "not constituted by any particular body of subject matter. It is constituted by a method, a method of changing beliefs by means of tested inquiry as well as of arriving at them."⁸¹

Dewey believed that religion had created a crisis in values and scholarship. The crisis for these areas arose out of their relationship to the supernatural. The presumption is that if they are disconnected with the supernatural, the crisis will subside; values will be strong and scholarship in all areas will be integral.⁸²

In general, Dewey knocks the religions that claim the truth exclusively. The only real way for the churches to regain credibility is to give up their exclusive and authoritative position.⁸³ But he proposes another new exclusive that has finality. "There is but one sure road of access to truth--

the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and controlled reflection."⁸⁴

D. Values.

We can begin with Dewey's negative responses to previous ethical theory and practice. His rejection of past philosophy was strong enough that his critics spoke of his "sour attitude."⁸⁵

Past morality had attempted to find a solid, unchanging base for morality. Dewey regarded this as wrong for morality is related to the changing.⁸⁶ Past moral views tended to make the good a "single, fixed and final good."⁸⁷ Dewey rejected this and believed that the good is related to goals of the future as well as the individual's ability to analyze required decisions between alternative issues. Past individual's ability to analyze required decisions between alternative issues. Past morality involved a cataloging of rights and wrongs which could be detected and decided; Dewey saw morality in need of a method of inquiry so that action may take place following analysis.⁸⁸ Past morality was contemplative and Dewey argued that morality involved action. The general theme of problem solving may be seen to underlie his approach to values.

Further, Dewey argued, past morality made distinctions between means and ends in values, often called extrinsic and intrinsic values. The intrinsic values, or "ends" were things to be valued in themselves. Friendship is an intrinsic value. Extrinsic or means related to the use of objects or things to achieve the end. A typewriter is an extrinsic value for it is the means of achieving communication, a job, good grades, or other values. As a result of this distinction extrinsic or means were depreciated, or regarded as second-rate. This creates artificial divisions in the area of evaluation. The higher values become snob values while the lower values--while perhaps more common--become somewhat undesired. An example is the contrast between the value placed on "mental-vocations" as opposed to "menial-vocations." Dewey regarded this distinction as mistaken. In actuality, a garbage collector may contribute more "value" to a community than the county assessor, or college professor.

Past morality was commonly related to religious authority such as Moses or Paul, or church authority, or intuition, or imitation. But present morality, for Dewey, must be related to science. He believed his philosophy was one way of salvaging what was good in values from the past. Many of the past values are inappropriate for being accepted in a scientific age.⁸⁹

This leads to the natural question, what is morality? A moral good, answered Dewey, is accorded anything when it has the ability to "contribute to amelioration of existing evils."⁹⁰ This introduces a peculiar thought into Dewey's moral theory: the end does justify the means. While many moralists of the past denounced this principle as a Machiavellian term, Dewey defended it as a consequence of science. Science operates on the assumption that the end justifies the means. To put it in pragmatic terms, if it works, it is verified. This must also be accepted for moral theory.⁹¹

Morality also involves decision making. But morality is not one in its answer, but many: answers differing according to the "changing, moving, individualized goods and ends."⁹² Decision

making should be related to intelligence and this is where the burden of morality has been placed. Responsibility in morality is now placed firmly within the area of human intelligence rather than in other sources like the church, or intuition, or others.⁹³

Morality, for Dewey, became consequence oriented. Past moral theory cannot decide the future ethical consequences. Place decision-making and consequence orientation together in ethics and it seems natural to view ethics, not as something final, but an ever-enduring process. Growth of all values seems a part of Dewey's ethical outlook. The old virtues of honesty, justice, and temperance are not final ends to be sought but directions along the path to moral growth.

Like James, Dewey also opted for meliorism as the alternative position to pessimism and optimism. "Meliorism is the belief that specific conditions which exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in any event may be bettered."⁹⁴ Dewey rejected optimism because its attempt to explain the problem of evil was naive. Evil was often regarded as unreal, or an illusion, or some such rationalization. Pessimism was psychologically paralyzing and all future hopes of solving the world's ills were futile. Meliorism, on the other hand, affirmed that the world's evils could be identified and regarded as real. Moreover, they could also be eradicated by intelligent means.

Dewey's rejection of past standards of value raises questions about what should be in the future. Science is not equipped as a method to determine what **should** be. Dewey admitted this and wrote: "modern science made it clear that nature has no preference for good things over bad things; its mills turn out any kind of grist indifferently."⁹⁵ Science provides the means; values determine the ends. But even pre-determined goals have ambiguous consequences because many variables are not known in many analyses of decision making. For example, government urban housing projects had the desirable goal of adequate housing. Money, construction, planning and other factors went into these projects to provide housing, new environments, but the projects have often failed for many known reasons and probably for unknown reasons also.

Dewey's view of values has a peculiar built-in feature. Even if man projected goals born of his imagination, one cannot regard these any more than the matrix of nature. Man's imagination is still only part of the total reality--nature. By definition, this leaves one with nothing other than a naturalistic value until the definition of nature is challenged and changed.

His ethic is akin to the utilitarian ethic of Bentham and Mill. When one compares goods or values it is with a view of their efficiency, or one could say their utility to produce happiness. Dewey claimed: "The better is that which will do more in the way of security, liberation, and fecundity for other likings and values."⁹⁶

E. Criticisms and Comments

With reference to Dewey's view of reality the following can be asked: Is nature ever knowable as Dewey speaks of it? What is this nature that is changing, is precarious, and is everything? Grant that change is an important ingredient in nature, must one conclude that change

describes everything? Could there not be a combination of the changing and the unchangeable? Some things do not seem to change--the past, mathematics, and ideals. Moreover, Dewey's rejection of metaphysics has led him to misuse and distort the positions of his opponents on the issues of metaphysics.

With reference to Dewey's view of man's nature, he seeks to advance beyond the materialists in his description of man's makeup, but he is not convincing in his explanation of man's constitutional makeup. The claim that mind is behavior wipes out the mind-body problem of metaphysics, but it also wipes out satisfactory explanations of what mind is and how it functions. The mind is more profound than mere activity and behavior. His emphasis on experience has practically the same application as the old idealist's emphasis of not being able to transcend mind.

Dewey's views on God and religion are defined so vaguely that everyone is religious. When everyone is religious, no one is religious. Not only has Dewey emptied the word God of all meaning and content, but he has reduced religion to a meaningless word.

Ironically, Dewey was a great advocate of freedoms of all kinds, but one could pursue his pragmatic value--the end justifies the means--to all kinds of evil deeds.

The following chart may help for review and comparisons.

| | James | Dewey |
|---------|---|---|
| Reality | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. pluralism, many things 2. chaotic 3. Nature in the making | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Nature is all 2. change is key to understand nature 3. Nature is in the making |
| Man | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. man is a thinker, different from other creatures 2. Tender-minded vs. tough minded men. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Man is a continuum in nature 2. Association, communication, participation mark off man from creatures 3. Mind is activity 4. Man shapes and is shaped by environment. |

| | | |
|--------|--|---|
| God | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. God is important; radical empiricism of experience makes God justified. 2. The idea of God works 3. Believing gives optimism. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. God is rejected 2. Religion can be anything good one does. 3. no sacred-secular distinction |
| Values | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Man has a choice 2. Freedom is important 3. Meliorism—the world can be made better | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Values related to scientific method 2. the end justifies the means—verification 3. Meliorism--accepted |
| | | |

For Further Study

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Footnotes

¹Pragmatism: The Classic Writings, edited by H. Standish Thayer, New York: New American Library, 1970, p. 88.

²Ibid., p. 111.

³Ibid., p. 57.

⁴Ibid., p. 132.

⁵William James, Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907, pp. 54-55.

⁶William James, Some Problems of Philosophy, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911, p. 58.

⁷Ibid., p. 101.

⁸William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912, pp. 46-47.

⁹Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 156.

¹⁰Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 257.

¹¹James, Some Problems of Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

¹²Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 197.

¹³William James, The Will to Believe, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1899, p. 218.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 245.

¹⁵James, Some Problems of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 129.

¹⁶James, Some Problems of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁷James, The Will to Believe, op. cit., p. 129.

¹⁸James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁹James, The Will to Believe, op. cit., p. 118.

²⁰William James, Human Immortality, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1989, p. 21.

²¹James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, op. cit., p. 79.

²²Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 12.

²³James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, op. cit., p. 120.

²⁴Pragmatism op. cit., p. 120.

²⁵Ibid., p. 119.

²⁶James, The Will to Believe, op. cit., p. 14.

²⁷The wager is a bet. One cannot prove or disprove God's existence, but one has to make a decision, or a bet on whether he exists or not. See Chapter XVIII for a fuller exposition.

²⁸James, The Will to Believe, op. cit., p. 28.

²⁹William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, New York: Collier Books, 1961, p. 400.

³⁰James, The Will to Believe, op. cit., p. 126.

³¹Pragmatism, op. cit., pp. 299-300.

³²James, The Will to Believe, op. cit., p. 122.

³³Ibid.

³⁴James, Varieties of Religious Experience, op. cit., pp. 393-94.

³⁵Ibid., p. 404.

³⁶James, The Will to Believe, op. cit., p. 198.

³⁷Ibid., p. 211.

³⁸Ibid., p. 213.

³⁹Ibid., p. 181.

⁴⁰Pragmatism, op. cit., p. 286.

⁴¹Dewey was so conservative for a time that he wrote articles that appeared in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1886, yet a very conservative theological journal.

⁴²J.O. Buswell, The Philosophies of F.R. Tennant and John Dewey, New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, p. 456.

⁴³John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, New York: H. Holt and Co., 1920, enlarged edition, p. 116.

⁴⁴John Dewey, Experience and Nature, Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925, p. 71.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 42.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 43.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 64.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 74-75.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 254.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 261.

⁵²Ibid., p. 88.

⁵³Ibid., p. 253.

⁵⁴Buswell, op. cit., p. 464.

⁵⁵Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 1.

⁵⁶Dewey, Experience and Nature, op. cit., p. 17.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 272.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 75.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 291.

⁶⁰Buswell, op. cit., p. 267.

⁶¹Dewey, Experience and Nature, op. cit., p. 291.

⁶²Ibid., p. 277.

⁶³Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 86.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 194.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 206.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 209.

⁶⁷Buswell, op. cit., p. 395.

⁶⁸John Dewey, A Common Faith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934, 19th printing, 1966, p. 27.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 9.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 22.

⁷²Dewey offers no documentation or proof for his theory of the origin of religion. Many other things are not documented although these ideas have been around for a time. One of the general criticisms of Dewey is that he lays loose with the past. Concerning the church he wrote: "But the thing new in history, the thing once unheard of, is that the organization in question is a special institution with a secular community." Ibid., p. 61. But contra Dewey, the church was not accepted as anything special for 300 years.

⁷³Ibid., p. 76.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 15.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 24.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 42.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 43.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 53.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 44.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 39.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 29-30.

⁸³Ibid., p. 83.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 32.

⁸⁵Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit., p. vii.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. xiii.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 162.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 169-170.

⁸⁹Dewey, Experience and Nature, op. cit., pp. ii-iii; p. 437.

⁹⁰Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 172.

⁹¹Ibid., p. xxxix.

CHAPTER XIII

Existential Philosophy

Perhaps more than any other philosophy, existentialism is difficult to define. Calling it the philosophy of existence makes no great progress toward a definition until existence is defined. Moreover, existentialism seems to be associated with a famous name like Sartre and yet "he does not even represent . . . the deepest impulse of this philosophy."¹ Definition by identification with well-known names not only does not give content but may mislead because such a variety of names (and disciplines) are connected frequently with existentialism. Søren Kierkegaard (pronounced ker-ke-gor) is considered the father of the movement, but he probably would not claim Nietzsche, Heidegger, or Camus as his intellectual progeny.

Walter Kaufmann says that the common feature drawing the movement together may be its intense individualism.² But in a sense every philosopher is an intense individual but more particularly those giants of history such as Socrates, Pascal, Marx, and others. Can we legitimately group these under the heading of existentialism?

A thumbnail definition that is frequently given for existentialism is that it is a philosophy stressing human existence as opposed to movements that submerge man's existence. If the emphasis of distinction is placed upon man's existence, how is it different from humanism? It may be looked upon as a form of humanism, but humanism often stresses a rational, scientific attitude toward life. Existentialism, paradoxically, uses reason to denounce reason as well as the scientific enterprise because it depersonalizes humans.

The difficulty of defining existentialism encourages one to explore some of the themes and emphases. We will do this. It will help us to see existentialism as a philosophy that stresses one particular set of themes over against other philosophies stressing different sets of themes. If one is not too happy with this approach and other definitions, one may be pushed to say that an existentialist is anyone who says he is an existentialist. This is yet a problem since some

"existentialists" deny the use of the term for themselves although other philosophers classify them as such.

We will now turn to the seven themes that may be used to characterize an extended definition of existentialism.

1. Existence precedes essence.

Jean-Paul Sartre has written: "What is meant hereby saying that existence precedes essence? It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself."³ Thus man begins as a zero, a nothing, and then only becomes something. Hence man defines the meaning of his existence and beyond man there is no meaning to explain existence. Sartre also wrote: "Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfills himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life."

The statement that existence precedes essence means that there is no human nature or human prototype to which all men ultimately conform. The word essence is most generally associated with a common element in all humanity. But in Sartre there is no human nature which can be known--this would require the existence of God to know it--and men are all different. Man makes himself and if he doesn't, he does not arrive.

The sentence containing the phrase existence precedes essence has been described by Paul Tillich as "the most despairing and the most courageous sentence in all Existentialist literature."⁵ It is courageous in that man is the sole director of his destiny. It is despairing in that after all is said and done, life's meaning which I alone have made, may be, after all, meaningless.

But not all existentialists adhere to the idea that existence precedes essence, a fact which complicates the use of the theme in the definition. Gabriel Marcel noted, in his *Mystery of Being*, that he must diametrically oppose Sartre on the issue of existence preceding essence: "My existence as a living being precedes this discovery of myself as a living being. One might even say that, by a fatal necessity, I pre-exist myself."⁶ Marcel proceeds to show that man's existence is not an isolated phenomenon, but it is a gift that is developed through participation with other people--hence intersubjectivity. Instead of the Sartrean conclusion that Hell is other people, man cannot be without other people. Hence from Marcel's viewpoint, it is impossible to know oneself without the help of others. He concluded that Sartre's view is inadequate for framing a definition of one man let alone many men.

2. Existentialism is concerned with personality.

Modern existentialists have lived through many diverse attempts to restrict human freedom believed to be necessary for the development of man's personality. Berdyaev was a refugee of the Russian revolution, Sartre and Marcel experienced the occupation of France by the Nazis, Heidegger was for a time a supporter of the Nazi regime in Germany, Jaspers lived through the era

also and one may catalogue other men such as Tillich who fled to America. It is not strange that many have written profound works on the development of man as a person.

Berdyayev wrote: "Our conception of man must be founded upon the conception of personality. True anthropology is bound to be personalistic."⁷ Nietzsche's *overman* concept reflects his understanding of man's personality and the possibilities of self-transcendence. Kierkegaard's profound work, The Sickness Unto Death, depicts man's personality around the relation of the body to soul and the soul and body to God. Tillich's The Courage to Be analyzes the different personality types and their responses to despair. His basic concern is how man can be truly man.

Many existentialists are interested in man as a person, man in his freedom, man's coming to affirm himself--without coming to accept *carte blanche* anyone's system of philosophy. Systems of philosophy are particularly denounced because systems are said to emphasize the universal while the individual is frequently overlooked. The savage attack upon "The System" by Kierkegaard indicates something of the salvage activity of existentialism when it insists that it cannot build until the old foundations are torn away. Thus any definition of existentialism that deals with personality must also deal with the negative--those elements in life that negate personality.

Thus concern with man's personality means that Existentialism must move beyond an isolated interest in man's thinking ability. Man does think, but he is a willing creature, a fearing, anxious being, a desiring, imaginative being. The conclusion of Descartes that man exists because he thinks is not the full story. What does it mean to exist as a personality? This requires thinking, but thinking concludes for more than mere thought.

3. Existentialism is concerned with being.

What is Being? Existentialists answer the question differently, but it is a significant theme. Being is more than objective knowledge derived *via* scientific techniques. Marcel speaks of this as primary and secondary reflection. Primary reflection relates to mere scientific knowledge, but beyond this there is the search for Being which cannot be reached scientifically, yet it is related to experience. The significant experience that a person has, says Marcel, is related to other persons, or involves what he called inter-subjectivity. One begins to know Being in inter-subjective relationships. Marcel noted: "I concern myself with being only in so far as I have more or less distinct consciousness of the underlying unity which ties me to other beings of whose reality I already have a preliminary notion."⁸ In contrast to Sartre famous dictum "Hell is other people," Marcel asserted that one knows less about being from an egocentric perspective than from a perspective of knowing other persons. Nevertheless, Marcel related being personally to the knowing of one's personal spiritual existence.⁹ In a yet larger sense, inter-subjectivity may relate to God whereby man in prayer knows the being of God and being which he is himself.

Kierkegaard similarly spoke of man's being in an inter-subjective manner. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard spoke of the self as a relation to itself and to the Eternal self. Without both relationships (or inter-subjective experiences, to use Marcel's terms) man is not yet a self.¹⁰

Karl Jaspers wrote of being under the term Comprehensive. He noted:

Clearly being as such cannot be an object. Everything that becomes an object for me breaks away from the Comprehensive in confronting me, while I break away from it as subject. For the I, the object is a determinate being. The Comprehensive remains obscure to my consciousness. It becomes clear only through objects, and takes on greater clarity as the objects become more conscious and more clear. The Comprehensive does not itself become an object but is manifested in the dichotomy of I and object. It remains itself a background, but it is always the Comprehensive.¹¹

Other existentialists, Sartre and Heidegger, for example, get no further than man as the basic concept of being. It may be noted also that a narrow definition of being with reference to man would result in a smaller definition of personality.

4. Existentialism stresses man's bodily existence.

Kierkegaard's definition of man is that he is, among other things, a relation to a body. Generally, existentialists reject the ancient philosophical doctrine of the body as the prison house of the soul whereby escaping from the body is to be desired. For the more pessimistic existentialists escape from the body is an escape to no-where, non-existence, since life after death is rejected. For the optimistic philosophers the body takes on new importance as it relates to the immaterial element in man's existence.

Man confronts other bodies as a body. Man's whole world of feeling and inter-subjectivity is manifested through a body. The primary interest in the body for the existentialist is not on the analytical line in which the body is said to have this or that chemistry, subject to disease and filled with needs. Rather, using what Marcel called secondary reflection, one must speak of the body as my body which is possessive and intimate. "My body" implies a rejection of old-line philosophical questions of the body-soul relationship which were answered on the lines of parallelism or interactionism between two different things. In affirming my body, I lay claim to what cannot be claimed by anyone else.¹² By the same token I have responsibility for its sustenance, its discipline, and its self-control. To recognize the body is to recognize personal existence. The personal existence that emerges is that of a non-material sort that possesses or manifests itself in body. Marcel noted: "The self that owns things can never even in thought, be reduced to a completely dematerialized ego."¹³

The body occupies space in the world as it protrudes itself in space and is a kind of instrument for the self. As long as it is my body the existential view of the self will not degenerate into crass materialism.

It is to be noted that the conclusions reached about the body come from secondary reflection or a phenomenological description of man's everyday experience. Marcel, for one, regards this as vital and necessary for man's existence since living life spontaneously is to live life on a lower level. With secondary reflection, there comes a means of rising from one level of life to another.

This leads naturally to a comment about the quality of life that existentialists have advocated. As a rule it is not impulsively hedonistic; rather it has gone in the direction of self-discipline as can be noted in Marcel, Kierkegaard, and even Nietzsche, whose concept of the *overman* means that man transcends himself. He is in control of his body.

5. Existentialism is an analysis of man's world.

Man lives in a "broken world." His broken existence can be described from the standpoint of alienation. "Alienation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, psychological, psychopathological, and sociological, for it concerns the individual as well as the group."¹⁴ What has brought man to this point? In part, the history of the past one hundred years can offer some help in looking at the matter. During this time the world has seen vast technological changes as seen in space travel, satellite communication, heart transplants, and vast industrial and military complexes. Advancing technology--presumably for man's good--has come at the expense of humanity's **personal** advancement. Personality became submerged beneath massive production systems, men became alienated from nature in the asphalt culture of the city, men became alienated from one another, from meaningful community units, and meaninglessness of existence has come to the front as manifested in music, art, some philosophies, and the general appeal of the occult.

Alienation also has a specifically religious overtone in some philosophers who view not only the cultural problems that man faces as man, but also his alienation from God which is related to the cultural dilemmas man faces.

In consequence, existentialism raises a mighty protest against collectivism, whether it be in democratic conformism, or Marxist collectivism, or a military-industrial complex. It not only protests mass movements that deny or degrade personality but existentialists of all types attempt to show man a way back to his "authentic" self--whatever that may be in the specific philosopher's view. Since the crisis of technology is not in the past, but in the future, man is increasingly threatened with meaninglessness and non-being. Heinemann suggests two alternatives: (1) slavery under bureaucratic control in which man degenerates in brainpower and loses spiritual vitality, or (2) an awakening in man recognizing his spiritual existence as a basis of his struggle against slavery and advocacy of a world in which humanity is treated as human.¹⁵

6. Existentialism and the phenomenological method.

If existentialism has a method of investigation, it is in the use of phenomenology. Certain men are committed to the method of phenomenology rather than necessarily the philosophy of phenomenology. Lauer declared concerning phenomenology:

As a method it outlines the steps which must be taken in order to arrive at the pure phenomenon, wherein is revealed the very essence not only of appearances but also of that which appears. As a philosophy it claims to give necessary, essential knowledge of that which is, since contingent existence cannot change what reason has recognized as the very essence of its object.¹⁶

Sartre's large work, Being and Nothingness seeks to give a phenomenological description of being. Others like Marcel, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger are good examples of philosophers who employ the method of phenomenology.

7. Existentialism may be termed a literary movement.

Many of the existentialists are popular play-writers. Sartre is perhaps the best known in America as exhibited in his No Exit, The Flies, and The Respectful Prostitute. Lesser known are the plays of Gabriel Marcel.

In addition to the theater, novels and short stories serve as a literary means of conveying philosophical points of view. The simplicity of a play has more far-reaching impacts than an abstract philosophical treatise such as Sartre's Being and Nothingness.

A play or novel arouses reflective thinking in a way that an essay in philosophy would not. Moreover, Marcel says on this: "One might nevertheless say that it is the function proper to drama to arouse secondary reflection in us . . ."¹⁷

Not all existentialists have been literary people producing for the theater. Other styles such as allegory and journals played an important media for both Kierkegaard and Marcel.

These specialized approaches to communication must not omit the straight-forward direct communication of ideas along traditional philosophical methods of argumentation.

In summary, it is evident that a good definition of existentialism is difficult to produce because existentialism is, by the nature of the movement, against narrow, hard-bound classification. We now turn to our two examples of existentialism.

I. Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855)

Søren Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen where he spent most of his life. Inheritance brought independence for literary activities and he never held an academic post as did so many other philosophers. As the father of modern existentialism, Kierkegaard did not get full recognition until the twentieth century. As a religious existentialist, he attempted to reintroduce Christianity into Christendom. While contemplating at an outdoor cafe in Copenhagen he pondered his vocational calling. He mused that most people attempted to make life easier than it had been. His vocation would be to make life harder. He attempted to shake off the identification of Hegelianism with Christianity. He regarded Hegelianism as a perversion of Christian thought. History has borne out that assessment and many will agree with Copleston's remark over a century later: "I agree with McTaggart, who was not himself a Christian believer, when he points out that as an ally of Christianity Hegelianism is 'an enemy in disguise--the least evident, but the most dangerous.'"¹⁸ Kierkegaard was convinced that Hegel's thought was a subversion of Christianity and sought to expose it. He is important for many themes involving concepts of man's despair, dread, and

aesthetic, ethical, and religious man, but this would take us beyond the brief survey under our four headings.

A. *Reality.*

Kierkegaard has not left us a metaphysical analysis of existence or reality. Hence what may be put together will constitute conclusions from ideas impending upon such a metaphysic. We can mention certain implications of his thinking. First, in reference to knowing reality. He affirmed a "mild" empiricism, that is, the scientific method was of value in many ways, but its knowledge goes in the direction of impersonal laws and man may be reduced to a "manipulator of scientific instruments, a point of departure in the exploration of the material world."¹⁹ When the same method is applied to man and is regarded as the only way of studying man, then human values are lost.

Second, Kierkegaard rejected both naturalism and idealism as wild options in a world view. Naturalism, the idea that nature is the sum total of reality, is rejected because there is Being beyond the phenomena available to man's vision and scientific method. Idealism, the philosophy asserting an Absolute Spirit which is the totality of all, blurs the distinction between man and God. While he did not attempt to develop a metaphysic in actuality, Kierkegaard affirms a Christian realism in which both mind and matter are necessary elements for understanding the universe. Reality has derived its being from God, but matter and God are not interchangeable terms.

Third, reality and transcendence. "All contemporary existentialists agree that human existence is set off from non-human reality by the note of transcendence."²⁰ Even existentialists who deny the existence of God yet affirm man's potential transcendence of himself. But Kierkegaard stresses not just a pagan fulfillment of human capabilities or potentialities. Rather, man can transcend himself and experience the Transcendent. The Transcendent experienced by man aids in the transcendence of humanity's problems wherein man can become a new creature, a transformed rather than a reformed being. Transcendence usually means a casting aside of this world and its values, and there is this truth in Kierkegaard, but there is also a re-affirmation of human life now because the Transcendent has become incarnate in history. This incarnation of God in Jesus Christ declares that God is not unconcerned about human existence, nor is humanity so far beneath him that he is unmoved by it.

B. *Man.*

Man is one of the most important categories of Kierkegaard. His definition of man, although abstract, is vital to his thinking and is, indeed, related to the matter of transcendence above. "Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite."²¹ To put it another way, "The self as spirit is the natural synthesis of body and soul become conscious of itself and free with respect to itself."²² It may yet be said another way that man is "a synthesis of soul and body supported by spirit." The definition emphasizes the synthesis which relates man's existence to God.

Kierkegaard rejected the Hegelian definition of man as a being of possibility and actuality resulting in necessity; rather man is a "synthesis of possibility and necessity, leading to a novel and

inviolable actuality."²³ This distinction may seem a matter of words but Kierkegaard sought to keep man from submerging himself into divinity, and the emphasis on necessity stresses this.

Man standing as a synthesis before God means that cultural distinctions between rich or poor are meaningless since both the rich or poor stand in danger of losing their source of Life. Kierkegaard also rejected the snobbish attitude on the part of philosophers who play up the superiority of their own intelligence and look smugly down their noses at the ignorant. He appealed to the individual, dubbed "my individual reader," who may not be learned, but was capable of being a whole individual. Man can only be viewed as the single individual. Any comparison of man is rejected although comparison may be made between the individual and the man, Jesus Christ.

Man is not defined by the crowd or a cultural stance. Kierkegaard distrusted crowds and he coined a famous saying that the crowd is untruth. Although environment helps to mold man, yet man cannot be defined by environment. Every man has the power to leave the crowd and its influence over him, to become an uncommon man. The uncommon man is the free man and this liberation can come about only as man relates to God who enables this liberation.

Kierkegaard furnished a significant analysis of man's problem and condition. Man is sick unto death. His sickness? Despair!

Whence then comes this despair? From the relation wherein the synthesis relates itself to itself, in that God who made man a relationship lets this go as it were out of his hand, that is, in the fact that the relation relates itself to itself.²⁴

Man's sickness is not man's whole story. Loneliness is not man's original condition. His sickness indicates a drastic change from a past good health. Despair of infinitude reflects a man's desire to become infinite *via* phantasy but paradoxically the more one commits oneself to phantasy the more one loses of oneself. The despair of finitude reflects indifference to the realm of selfhood. The despair of possibility reflects the lack of necessity or the lack of a stable point of evaluation from which the self can be measured. The despair of necessity reflects the lack of possibility, or reflects the fruit of a fatalistic attitude toward existence. The despair of the sensuous man reflects the lack of willing to be one's real self. The despair over the Eternal admits the need for faith but dwells on the despair of weakness. The most adamant form of despair is that of defiance. Here the self rejects the synthesis, or relation with the Infinite, and seeks to be itself in spite of the Infinite.

Man's problem, or despair, for Kierkegaard, is related to the fact of sin. "Sin is this: before God, or with the conception of God, to be in despair at not willing to be oneself, or in despair at willing to be oneself."²⁵ Sin is not a few well-known vices; rather vices proceed from the spiritlessness of the self. Sin takes three forms: (1) the sin of despairing over one's sin, as seen in the example of the man who despairingly declares: "I can never forgive myself for it."²⁶ (2) The sin of despairing of the forgiveness of sins, meaning that one will not admit the possibility of the forgiveness of sins; (3) the sin of abandoning Christianity or declaring it false. When this is done, Kierkegaard maintains, no hope is left.

Kierkegaard concluded his work on despair by saying that existence is serious. The Incarnation is a serious act of God and as for man, "the seriousness in this seriousness is that everyone shall have an opinion about it."²⁷

C. God.

Kierkegaard's view of God is crucial for this whole system of thinking. Hence the view of Hegel, his opponent, is important. Hegel regarded the Absolute as the sum total of reality. This Absolute Spirit is a process of self-reflection taking place in man. Thus knowledge of man is a knowledge of God, and the Absolute knows itself in the self-reflection of man. This pantheistic view can hardly be identified with traditional theism, or philosophy of God's existence. But the matter was complicated in that Hegel regarded his philosophy as the absolute philosophy and Christianity as the absolute religion. Moreover Christianity stood or fell with his philosophy.

Kierkegaard rejected both the philosophy of Hegel as well as the identification of Hegelianism with Christianity. For our purposes, we will deal with only two issues in Kierkegaard's thought: religious knowledge and cultural religion.

In his Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard raised the question of knowledge in general and religious knowledge in particular. How can the Truth be known? Under the guise of the Socratic proposal, Kierkegaard elaborated the view of Hegel as a system in which knowledge is innate in man because he has the divine in him, or the Absolute comes to self-reflection in man. The role of a teacher--Socrates--is merely to ask the right questions to trigger the inward response of knowledge. Anyone--philosopher or charwoman--can be a mid-wife of ideas. No fees need be paid for the learner may also be the occasion for teaching the teacher. On Hegel's ground, since man is the self-reflecting process of the Absolute, man need only look within himself to secure a knowledge of the Absolute.

In contrast, Kierkegaard proposes another alternative. Suppose that the learner is ignorant, or is in a state of untruth, what happens then? Or, suppose that man is not the Absolute in a self-reflecting process. What is the role of the Teacher? If this is true, the Teacher becomes all important. Since the learner is in a state of Untruth he must also be given the condition for receiving the truth. But any teacher who can do this is more than an ordinary teacher. In this alternative the teacher is God. How does God appear on the scene? Kierkegaard's answer is found in the Incarnation, or the Christian idea that God took manhood to himself in the person of Jesus, the Christ.

The motivation for the incarnation is love. Love takes the initiative and seeks equality, but man and God are not equals. The incarnation does three things: (1) it makes a meaningful knowledge of God understandable, for God comes himself, (2) it makes redemption or reconciliation of man back to God possible, and (3) it preserves the idea of the holy which was demolished in Hegel's pantheism.

Kierkegaard's story of the anxiety of the king reveals some of these ideas in an allegory. The king was mighty and every nation feared his wrath. He had fallen in love with a commoner, but like all men he was anxious when it came to getting married. The thought that entered his kingly mind was this: "Would she be able to summon confidence enough never to remember what the king wished only to forget that he was a king and that she was a humble maiden?" The king was anxious lest she reflect upon this and rob her of happiness. If the marriage were unequal the beauty of their love would be lost. A number of alternatives could be suggested to the king. First, he could elevate the maiden to his side and forget the inequality. But there was always the possible thought coming into her heart that after all she was a commoner and he was the king. Such a marriage could be consummated but love would never be on the basis of equality. Second, should someone suggest that the king could display his majesty, pomp, and glory she would fall down and worship him, to be humbled by the fact that so great a favor was being bestowed upon her. To this the king would undoubtedly demand the execution of the person suggesting this as high treason against his beloved. The king could not enter into a relationship such as this. The kingly dilemma is solved in the third alternative; the king should descend and thereby give up his throne to become a commoner for the purpose of loving the maiden as an equal.

Kierkegaard then applied this story to the relationship between God and man. God could have elevated man into his presence and transfigured him to fill his life with joy for eternity. But the king, knowing the human heart, would not stand for this, for it would end only in self-deception. To this Kierkegaard said, "No one is so terribly deceived as he who does not suspect it."²⁸ On the other hand, God could have brought worship "causing him to forget himself over divine apparition."²⁹ Such a procedure would have possibly pleased man but it would not have pleased the king "who desired not his own glorification but the maiden's."³⁰ This is an impossible alternative also because of God's holiness. Regarding this Kierkegaard said,

There once lived a people who had a profound understanding of the divine. This people thought that no man could see God and live--who grasps this contradiction of sorrow; not to reveal oneself is the death of love, to reveal oneself is the death of the beloved.³¹

The holiness of God revealed to sinful man would have brought the destruction of man. Thus the alternative for bringing the union of God and man is the same as for the King.

Since we have found that the union could not be brought about by the elevation it must be attempted by the descent. In order that the union may be brought about God must become the equal of such a one and so he will appear in the lives of the humblest, for the humblest is one who must serve others. God will therefore appear in the form of a servant.³²

Thus the Incarnation and its meaning for religious knowledge.

The other item about religion is equally important. Hegelian philosophy permeated the Church of Denmark in Kierkegaard's day. To be born into the state and its church was the same as being born a Christian. A state church was suspect. This made the parsons--a term frequently used by him--royal functionaries. And royal functionaries have nothing to do with Christianity. He

rebelled against the identification of religion and Christianity. His Attack Upon Christendom is a sharp polemic upon a watered down version of Christianity. Unlike some existentialists who ignore or attack religion in general or Christianity in particular, he sought to criticize it from within, hoping to restore it to its apostolic, or original quality. In this he was interested in provoking thought on what it means to be a Christian. Does one express the essence of Christianity on the basis of attending the Sunday sermon, and submitting to certain religious rites in the church, i.e., baptism, confirmation, marriage and death? By no means, said Kierkegaard, to be a Christian is to be committed to Christ. Contemporaneity with Christ means that faith involves a living vital relationship with a living Savior. There are no disciples at second-hand, nor is there a cultural species of this religion. Nineteen hundred and some odd years later makes no difference from the perspective of the resurrected, living Christ.

The existential dimension of Christianity floods light upon other problems that concerned Kierkegaard. He rejected the use of "proofs" or arguments for God's existence since an argument loses its I-Thou involvement. The argument ends with an abstract God rather than the living God. By the same token, Jesus is not to be viewed speculatively or aesthetically. An aesthetic or admirer's stance toward Jesus involves no commitment. The demand of a revealed religion is for commitment, not speculation. The demand of revealed religion is for commitment, not admiration. Jesus came to make disciples, not philosophers.

Contemporaneity means that no historical person has the advantage over later generations. St. Peter's vital and important relationship was based upon faith or commitment, and not on the fact that he ate with Jesus upon occasion. A disciple is a committed one, not merely a historian of miscellaneous facts. The twentieth century disciple is on the same footing as the first century disciples--faith, no more, no less.

D. Values.

Kierkegaard can be misunderstood very easily when the area of values is considered. His own positive position is hard enough to understand without wildly interpreting some of his statements. He warned that his work is a "corrective" for the systems of Kant and Hegel and others. For Kierkegaard, values and ethical issues cannot be based upon (1) abstract universal laws, (2) humanistic standards of reason, and (3) social patterns as related to cultural studies. They are inadequate for many reasons which will become obvious in the summary statement below.

Kierkegaard deals with the issue in various books, but one example will point up his thinking. In Fear and Trembling Abraham of the Old Testament is asked by God to sacrifice his son Isaac on Mt. Moriah. According to the pagan customs of the day, Abraham could have done this as a religious service. But Hebrew value on human life was different, and Abraham treasured the only son of his old age. Since God commanded it, would Abraham have been regarded as a murderer?

At this point Kierkegaard distinguished between the universal and the absolute. The ethical is the universal and applies to everything, everyone, and every instance. The universal is identified with natural law, law of reason, or dictates of culture. If Abraham is judged on the universal, he

should be indicted for murder, rather than to emerge as a hero of faith. Where does the Absolute come in? The Absolute here is not in the sense of the Absolute of Hegel. The absolute is contrasted to the universal and the absolute is higher than the universal. What is the source of the universal? Is the universal personal? What is its authority? These questions point beyond the impersonal universal to the Personal Absolute--God. The authority back of the universal is God. Universals may have usefulness in ethical systems, but must not be separated from the authority of the lawgiver as it became in the ethical system of Kant.

The traditional question of medieval thought emerges here in Kierkegaard: is God the standard of the good, or is there a standard to which God must conform? Kierkegaard answered that God is the standard and could have dictated a different universal law if he so desired. This is the point of his question: is there a theological suspension of the ethical? Or, in other words, had Abraham really sacrificed Isaac at the command of God, would he have been a murderer? The context of this discussion would require a negative answer.

Real danger lurks at this point in misunderstanding Kierkegaard if the conclusion is reached that Kierkegaard is suspending ethical principles. The affirmation of the teleological suspension is to make this point: separation of the universal from the absolute, or the separation of the moral law from the law-giver is to create a new idolatry. The universal is the way it is because it expresses the nature of God. In other ways, it may be said, if man's purpose in life is the pursuit of happiness, or the fulfillment of the moral law, if anything other than God is the final end and goal of man, then a new idolatry is born.

Kierkegaard does not work out the manner in which the universal and the absolute could be related but his central point is that ethics must begin with God.

Kierkegaard is sometimes misused to advance the case for relativism and subjectivism in ethics. But his position is really an affirmation of objectivism--the good is known in the self-revelation of God. The typical options offered as alternatives have their problems. Humanistic ethics as well as cultural ethics are as subjective as their sources. Formalistic ethics--based upon the sense of duty--without the Commander behind the duty is idolatrous even though the system may be worthy of commendation. Kierkegaard would pity the man who pursued the good but lost God.

E. Conclusions and criticisms.

The philosophic mood of Kierkegaard's day has changed so that no longer is idealism the reigning philosophy. Yet he has much to say to the twentieth century that is still needed. His aim of re-introducing Christianity into Christendom was not successful, but many inroads were made. His concern for pressing issues of his day kept him from developing the full implications of his own thought. He did not develop a system, but then, it was system building that posed the problem in the first place.

Kierkegaard, like many others, with the exception of Marcel, stressed the individual at the expense of the community. A sense of community is not the same as the crowd, or the masses.

Even the Church as the community of God received less attention in his writings than it deserved, but then a reformer within the church has less good to say about it until the evils are rooted out.

While many existentialists drift toward pessimism, he does not. There is hope for the despairing man, the broken man. The nihilism of Nietzsche, the absurd world of Camus, or the make-shift world of Sartre are in basic contrast to the hope, the wholeness, and the Christian humanism of Kierkegaard.

We now turn to our second example of existentialism which is Friedrich Nietzsche.

II. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

Nietzsche was born October 15, 1844 at Roken, not far from Leipzig. He suffers from many diverse interpretations. He has been used as a "proof-text" for many diverse and contradictory ideas. Our treatment of Nietzsche will reflect that of Walter Kaufmann who, perhaps, has done more to bring integrity to Nietzsche studies than any other person.³³

A. Reality.

Nietzsche, like many other existentialists, did not approve of system building in philosophy. Adopting a single way of interpreting the world, whether it be Darwinism, idealism, or a religious view, was, for him, a childish and misleading endeavor. Systems usually began with unquestioned premises. In the Germany of Nietzsche's day the elaboration of a complete world view gave the impression of a monopoly on truth.

While rejecting a system, Nietzsche did write about some of the usual questions in metaphysics or a theory of reality. He could not accept the cosmic purpose involved in Hegel's thought, nor did he opt for a purely naturalistic world view related to the rising and increasingly influential theory of evolution espoused by Darwin. He rejected the theory of natural selection allowing that some selection does take place but "natural selection will not generate bigger and better philosophers, artists, or saints, but only bigger and better brutes."³⁴ Not only does natural selection not explain those eminent types as "philosophers, artists, or saints," but it fits into the category of a system, useful and true in some ways, but not meaningful as a whole.

At the time, Darwinism appeared to undermine teleology or purpose in the world, and Nietzsche agreed in this rejection declaring that if there is purpose in nature it needs the help of man to accomplish it.

Nietzsche came closest to a system in his advocacy of the "will to power." Be it noted that a system is a method of creating and explaining harmony, whereas the will to power explains continuing chaos. The "will to power" is not original with Nietzsche, but it has become a hallmark symbol of him. Moreover, it is usually misunderstood. Power--not will to power--first appears in the context of "world power, social success, making friends, and influencing people."³⁵ This power is exercised in an atmosphere of conforming whereby man neglects the cultivation of his own true

self for the success of a false self. This category of power Nietzsche rejected as decadent. The kind of power that is reducible to brute force as explained by Hobbes and others is not Nietzsche's idea of power although his would fit into this context. Nietzsche's power is explained in psychological terms as a psychological need which "men will strive to satisfy in direct ways if direct satisfaction is denied them."³⁶ This psychological application of a will to power and its subtlety may be seen in Nietzsche's rewriting of the words of Jesus: "He that humbleth himself wants to be exalted."³⁷ Jesus' words of Luke 18:14 were "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted."

Nietzsche's phrase, the "will to power" appears first in Thus Spake Zarathustra. He noted: "Where I found the living there I found the will to power; and even in the will of those who serve I found the will to be master."³⁸ The will to power is the underlying driving force for explaining all other activities whether it be will to knowledge (for the purpose of power) or will to acquire money (for power's sake) or any other ambition. Thus

the means of the craving for power have changed, but the same volcano is still growing . . . and what one did formerly "for God's sake" one does now for the sake of money . . . which now gives the highest feeling of power³⁹

Nietzsche saw the will to power as an explanation for the diverse actions of man seeking power in different areas. If the concept were left at this point without important qualifications it leaves the way open for fascism and other forms of tyranny. Nietzsche did make important qualifications on it. The will to power must be sublimated and controlled by reason. Hence, for Nietzsche, philosophy was "the most spiritual will to power."⁴⁰ The will to power as a basic ingredient of man's existence reaches its acme in the rational man who controls himself. It must be realized that the will to power is vitally related to Nietzsche's concept of the overman (Übermann); the man who overcomes himself. The will to power is primarily a concept for explaining man although the concepts can be seen in other areas of nature.

The will to power has been erroneously applied to a war-mentality. The meaningful war of Nietzsche is that of the man who struggles with himself to achieve perfection and "wars" against the weaknesses in his own nature and society.

B. Man.

Nietzsche rejected two important influences of his era: (1) Darwinism and (2) rising nationalism and racism. Darwinism appeared to reject the basic difference between man and animals. Thus if man is merely another primate, where is his essential dignity or worth? There is neither difference between man and the animals, nor between man and man. Since Nietzsche rejected the traditional idea of God's image in man whereby man is of worth, how can Darwin's decimated man return to worth? This was an important issue for Nietzsche since values had lost their anchor in God.

Nietzsche's rejection of Darwinism was based upon his beliefs that no transitional forms had been known and that there are limits in the types or extent of evolution. Moreover, evolution does

not bring progress or a higher man. Although man appears last on the evolutionary map, the last is not necessarily the highest. On the basis of evolutionary thinking man could be eclipsed by a "new" man. Nietzsche declared rather that "the goal of humanity cannot lie in the end (Ende) but only in its highest specimens."⁴¹ Man is the highest specimen only as he follows his potentiality to "raise himself above the animals."⁴² This means that not all of mankind is truly human. There is a greater gap between Plato and the common man than between the common man and the Chimpanzee.

There is in Nietzsche the same type of distinctions about man as in Kierkegaard although they differ on the frame of reference. There is man as he is, and man as he can become. There is nothing guaranteeing that man shall become, for Nietzsche, except man himself. The man who becomes his true self is the *overman*. The German word *übermann* has been erroneously translated "superman" rather than *overman* by some translators. The overman is related to the will of power in that the overman is the one who channels the will to power through reason to achieve self-perfection. Two of the key passages from Thus Spake Zarathustra contains these dramatic words:

I teach you the overman. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?⁴³

Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman⁴⁴

Nietzsche gave an example of one who epitomized the overman. Contrary to propaganda and the misuse of his works, it is not the warrior type. His example is Goethe. Here in this man is pictured a:

human being who would be strong, highly educated, skillful in all bodily matters, self-controlled, reverent toward himself, and who might dare to affirm the whole range and wealth of being natural, being strong enough for such freedom; the man of tolerance, not from weakness, but from strength.⁴⁵

Such a man is free. The man who perfects himself comes into joy. Nevertheless, achieving self-mastery is not only desirable, but it is also very difficult. In this way of self-overcoming man sets himself apart from other animals who have power but cannot achieve power over themselves.

The overman, or the one who overcomes man, concerns the philosopher, artist, and saint. Later he dropped the saints from this lineup. This is hardly the super race of Nazi propaganda which is sometimes twisted out of Nietzsche. Actually, Nietzsche was a vehement opponent of anti-semitism. His master race was composed of a "future, internationally mixed, race of philosophers and artists who cultivate iron self-control."⁴⁶

The stereotype that the "overman" was ruthless, blood-thirsty, and war-like displays a total injustice to Nietzsche. There is discipline of the will for those who will profit by it, but the overman is not without tenderness and mercy. Nietzsche wrote:

When the exceptional human being treats the mediocre more tenderly than himself and his peers, this is not mere politeness of the heart--it is simply his duty.⁴⁷

Should a man collapse on the street before Nietzsche or an overman, there is no possible way of rationalizing an excuse for inaction and lack of tenderness. The overman has both duty and compassion.

Perhaps the questionable element in the overman concept is the lack of universality in application of it to all men. Nietzsche believed that the "weak are incapacitated for ultimate happiness. Only the strong attain that happiness which all men want."⁴⁸

The second problem facing Nietzsche was that of the state. He satirized the rising nationalism as reflected in Bismarck's Reich and regarded the state as the archenemy of man. Nietzsche was not an anarchist, nor an advocate of democracy. Yet the state posed an enormous threat to man. It was urgent in Nietzsche's mind to come up with a new picture of man to replace the old theological one. It was urgent, for without man standing alone in a dignified meaningful state, he would succumb to the lure of idolatry of the state in which men will distrust each other, social structures will give way to the all-embracing control of the state.

C. God.

Nietzsche, the son of a Lutheran pastor, was confirmed in the Lutheran Church, but soon came to regard religion as "the product of the people's childhood."⁴⁹ Nietzsche has probably written more caustically about God than anyone else. Hollingdale stated the Nietzsche set forth three hypotheses that "offered naturalistic substitutes for God, divine grace and eternal life; instead of God, the superman, instead of divine grace, the will to power; and instead of eternal life--the eternal recurrence."⁵⁰

The passage entitled "The Madman" from the *Gay Science* is one of the widely quoted comments about the demise of God. The God that Nietzsche deals with mostly is the cultural deity. It is absurd to say that the ontological God, the Creator is dead. Rather Nietzsche did not believe in his existence at all. However, the cultural God that man has created can die. Nietzsche's madman declares, "We have killed him--you and I. All of us are his murderers God is dead."⁵¹ The cultural God decomposes. This God remains dead. It is primarily this God that Nietzsche deprecated.

Not only did Nietzsche reject the idea of God, but he was also critical of Christianity as he knew it, as well as of Jesus, whom he admired in some ways (calling him the first and only Christian) and rejected in others. There is much in common between the criticisms of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on the problems of Christendom. Kierkegaard's leap of faith--called for commitment and living, and although Nietzsche criticized faith as he understood it, he criticized the lack of commitment and living on the part of his contemporary Christians.

Nietzsche's view of religion was probably influenced by one of his students and later friend, Paul Ree, who pioneered a psychological approach to issues in philosophy. This may explain Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysics as a discipline born out of man's dreaming. Whatever the explanation, Nietzsche had little use for the traditional metaphysical questions, especially as they related to God and religion. In a letter to his sister who attempted to defend the Christian view, Nietzsche allowed that all religions are infallible in giving the adherent what he wants in a religion, but this gives no proof of its validity or truthfulness. Thus he concluded:

Faith does not offer the least support for a proof of objective truth. Here the ways of man part: if you wish to strive for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe; if you wish to be a devotee of truth, then inquire⁵²

Nietzsche's understanding of Christianity was probably inadequate, but he was truly perceptive in viewing the significance of Christ to that movement. He wrote to one of his friends, ". . . if you give up Christ, you will have to give up God as well."⁵³ In other words, a significant belief in God involves the implications of the Incarnation which Kierkegaard stressed.

Nietzsche's rejection of the cultural deity was serious and he perceived the involvements long before his contemporaries. In rejecting God he saw that the world was robbed of ultimate meaning. While he boldly took the step of declaring God's death, he sought to retain meaning for man and the overman is the result of his struggle.

D. Values.

As in other areas, Nietzsche has been misunderstood in the values he advocated. His concern was: how can there be values in a valueless world in which the cultural God is no longer alive? Nietzsche did not accept a naturalistic approach to ethics or a nihilistic view that rejected all values.

He was more thorough-going in his criticism and rejection of Christian values than his English or American counterparts who, despite rejecting the Christian theology, did not hesitate to cling parasitically to Christian values. He wrote:

They are rid of the Christian God and now believe all the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one's feet. This morality is by no means self-evident; this point has to be exhibited again and again, despite the English flatheads. Christianity is a system, a whole view of things thought out together. By breaking one main concept out of it, the faith in God, one breaks the whole; nothing necessary remains in one's hands It has truth only if God is the truth--it stands and falls with faith in God.⁵⁴

Nietzsche took the step consistent with his conviction and renounced not only all of Christian values but all other attempts in moralizing. "Expressed in a formula, one might say: all the means by which one has so far attempted to make mankind moral were through and through immoral."⁵⁵

Consequently, he called for a re-valuation of all values. This phrase means, for him, "a war against accepted valuations, not the creation of new ones."⁵⁶ He wrote:

Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of ultimate self-examination by mankind which in me has become flesh and genius. My lot is that I must be the first decent human being, that I know myself to be in opposition against the medaciousness of millennia.⁵⁷

But for all his atheism and his call for a revaluation of values, he did not repudiate values. Rather he affirmed them as part of his view of the overman. There are not new revolutionary values. He still praised honesty, intellectual integrity, courage, politeness, and self-discipline. Nietzsche yet agreed with other moralists of the past that self-perfection was the goal of man's moral endeavors. He even agreed with much in the Gospels despite his disdain for the New Testament in general. The ethic of self-realization in a genuinely humanistic sense may be used to describe his positive attitude toward values.

Nietzsche seemed to stake his distinct approach to values around the criterion of whether something is life affirming or life denying. Much of his criticism against contemporary ethical systems came because they were life-denying, and hence decadent. He was interested in the whole of man's existence. Like other self-realizationists he asked the question, what is the Good Life?

The Good Life is the powerful life, the life of those who are in full control of their impulses and need not weaken them, and the good man is for Nietzsche the passionate man who is the master of his passions.⁵⁸

Man as a passionate creature separated Nietzsche's ethic from the Stoic view and he thought also the Christian ethic. Ironically, there is more in common between biblical Christianity and Nietzsche's ethic than he was aware or willing to grant.

Nietzsche's rejection of contemporary Christendom came because it negated life, in his opinion. When one compares and contrasts cultural Christianity and biblical faith one can find much to agree with in Nietzsche regarding the "decadence" of Christendom. His contrast with Kierkegaard is evident at this point since Nietzsche did not carry on a program like the Dane to re-introduce Christianity into Christendom.

He stressed values that related to life now. While belief in immortality may be meaningful to some, Nietzsche alleged that it deprecated life now as opposed to the future perfection of man. But Nietzsche, as well as Jesus, exhorted a self-perfection now.

The immoralist, as he loved to call himself, is not without his negations although he stressed the affirmation of life in the body. He rejected hedonism, or a purely sensate approach to life. While there are bodily pleasures, they are to be integrated with and controlled by reason.

Like other existentialists, he treasured freedom, knocked conformity, and advocated self-discipline. The power of a state was determined by how well it could make room and allowance for those that did not conform. There must be freedom to question the accepted values on the part of the overman who has succeeded only in terms of self-discipline.

E. Conclusions and criticisms.

Nietzsche had much to say, but admittedly is not always well understood. Critically, there are some questions worth raising. He dealt with some metaphysical problems, but stops where one would like to see him really begin. Life is accepted. Is this all? He insisted upon asking questions about all hidden presuppositions: why not here also. Secondly, the problem with the validity of values still raises its head. Is the problem of relativism adequately dealt with? Is man--the creature capable of self-transcendence--the adequate ground of values? Which cultural man is the model of self-transcendence? Thirdly, now that man has no outside help from God to help achieve self-perfection, and admittedly since few measure up to a Goethe, is Nietzsche's alternative to nihilism a practical one for mankind? Can we all be like Goethe?

Fourth, since Nietzsche was doggedly determined to be empirical in his approach to philosophy, how is it possible to be empirical in advocating a view of man and ethics that has not been achieved? The status of values was not solved satisfactorily by Nietzsche and it is a problem for others also, not only the existentialists.

The following chart may help in sorting out the emphases of our two different examples of existentialism.

| | Soren Kierkegaard | Friedrich Nietzsche |
|----------|---|--|
| Rreality | Includes mind and matter Rejects idealism Rejects naturalism | Rejected Darwinism Advocates will to power |
| Mman | A synthesis of the finite and the infinite Man is a relationship Man is sick unto death | Rejected man as image or God, or an extension of the beast. "Overman" is the model Goethe is the example of the overman. |
| God | God is the teacher. Incarnation is important for religious knowledge | God is dead Cultural deity has lost influence. |

| | | |
|--------|---|--|
| Values | Values are founded in God Cultural values may reflect idolatry | Sought basis of values in man, not God God man is the master of his passions Nietzsche—the “immoralist.” |
|--------|---|--|

C

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CHAPTER XIV

Logical Empiricism

There are many strange sentences that men use. Compare these two: (1) Wheat is a major crop in Kansas, and (2) the fountain of youth is located in Kansas. Each has a subject, a verb, and a predicate. The first sentence is regarded as true in a matter-of-fact way. The second one may bring a smile or wrinkle to your face. Why the two reactions? Why is one regarded as true and the other as fiction? How can we speak of the non-existent in the same way as the existent? A vast literature involving the novel in its various forms depends upon the use of language implying its truth.

Nevertheless, there are other sentences that may be more serious and widely believed, but not so easily seen as false. The point is: the sentences themselves give no clues on whether they are true or false, or refer to something real or unreal. What can be said about all of this?

Some philosophers became intensely interested in the subject of language around the turn of the century. Naturally throughout the centuries of philosophy, thinkers had also been interested in precise meanings, clarification, and communication. At the turn of the century a variety of philosophers as well as other thinkers became interested in understanding the use and function of language itself. Bertrand Russell and Alfred N. Whitehead published their work, Principia Mathematica, which is regarded as a landmark work for the new direction that many philosophers would go for the next decade or two.

However, it was an Austrian, Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose inspiration and influence motivated a group of scholars known as the Vienna Circle, which was organized in the early 1920s.¹

Wittgenstein's work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was generally accepted by the Vienna Circle although it has some "mystical" or quasi-religious tendencies that were usually rejected by the Circle. Actually, it has been shown that Wittgenstein was not anti-mystical, nor anti-metaphysical in the sense that the Vienna Circle regarded him.

Philosophers have also called the Vienna Circle by the name of Logical Positivism. To help clarify the use of titles and names, it should be remembered that empiricism is a larger movement than logical empiricism. One may be an empiricist in the Humean sense without being a logical empiricist. The modern term often used to describe the heirs of this early movement is analysts.

Logical empiricism is quite different from traditional philosophy. It may help to understand the new style of viewing philosophy to contrast it with some of the things we have been seeing in other philosophies. We have been looking at metaphysical issues such as God, values, man, and the nature of reality. There has been diversity but in many instances these issues are regarded as legitimate. Now we are involved in a philosophical emphasis that regards all metaphysical issues, particularly, God, values, and the question of the human soul, as meaningless. How did it come about? What are the ingredients in such a position?

The study of the role and nature of language begins the movement. From the study of language and the analysis of syntax, structure, and form, it was concluded that there are two basic types of sentences only and none outside these types.

The first owed its definition to Wittgenstein. It was called a **tautology**.² Other philosophers called these logically determinate statements and they included all propositions whose truth or falsity can be determined solely on the basis of logic. As an example, "all bachelors are unmarried." This is a tautology. The statement is obvious once one thinks about it.

Tautologies, or logically determinate statements such as the above do have a problem with them. They may or may not refer to anything actually real in the world. There may or may not be any bachelors in existence at all. But the statement is true even if none ever exist. This type of statement appears to be limited to definitions, mathematics, or abstract areas without referring to the world of experience.

There is a secondary category of sentences, statements, or propositions that are concerned with the real world. The real world reflects the world of the senses. The term "factually determinate statements" was used by members of the Vienna Circle to describe the statements of experience. The truth of these statements is known only by appealing to fact.

Factually determinate, or statements arising out of experience are many, but the problem arose concerning how one could know what was really a factually determinate statement. As an example, God is good, is not a logically determinate statement. Is it a factually determinate one? By what means could one deal with a sentence like that? The answer came in the acceptance of the verification principle. A statement was true if one could validate it scientifically. But can the verification principle be applied to our statement, God is good? Since no one has ever seen God or

goodness, then it was believed such a statement was not merely false, but literally nonsensical. The drastic conclusion was reached that almost all of philosophy, religion, and ethics was of this nature. The body of literature called metaphysics, which included many forms of philosophy, religion, and ethics, was arbitrarily cut to shreds by virtue of the either/or definition of language. Since philosophy, religion, and values were certainly not logically determinate statements, and since neither of these disciplines could be regarded as an empirical science, there was no other category left but that of nonsense. All of philosophy, except where it deals with language analysis, is now to be discarded as nonsense.

Although the early writings of Wittgenstein were appealed to as inspiration for the movement, he was not the systematic philosopher that was needed to make application of the program. In due time a short work came into existence that did much of this. A.J. Ayer's work, Language, Truth and Logic, dealt with a general explication of the new philosophical stance. Ayer attempted to explain the verification principle. He wrote:

We say that a statement is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express--that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.³

But Ayer makes some reservations about the definition. He distinguishes between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. Writing before the space age, he regarded information about the other side of the moon as verifiable in principle, but not practical. Moreover, he distinguished between "strong" and "weak" verifiability. Strong verifiability was the claim to conclusive, almost absolute truth born of experience, and "weak" was a more probable truth-claim. Ayer opted for the weak view and believed that we are always talking about probability of truth in our claims. He believed that "A hypothesis cannot be conclusively confuted any more than it can be conclusively verified."⁴ But if statements can be sensibly verified one is justified in regarding them as true.

Since philosophy does not contribute ideas or meanings but merely has the role of analyzing to see if meanings are true, false, or nonsense, then it is more difficult to put together our customary format of the previous chapters. This can be done by way of negation and explanation, i.e., what is not accepted and why.

Ayer's book may serve as the brief example.

A. Reality.

The idea that there is a "super-sensible world which is the object of a purely intellectual intuition and is alone wholly real" was rejected by Ayer and others.⁵ The rejection is based on these words:

No empirical observation could have the slightest tendency to establish any conclusion concerning the properties, or even the existence of a super-sensible world. And therefore we are entitled to deny the possibility of such a world and to dismiss as nonsensical the descriptions which have been given to it.⁶

But Ayer does not go so far as to reject completely that which is non-sensible. Such things as "atoms, molecules, and electrons" do not appear as sensible, nor do the symbols that we use about familiar things such as table, chair, wheel. Although one cannot see these things it is reasonable to use them if they can be empirically substantiated.⁷

The result of Ayer's methodology leads to the conclusion that very little or almost nothing can be asserted about reality beyond the sensible description of it. The philosophical questions on whether reality is one or many is a nonsensical issue again. There is "no empirical situation" which could have any bearing on its truth.⁸ Ayer can only give a phenomenalist view of the world. One can describe what one sees and no more. Even then one can only admit the certainty of what one sees, but if it is described, then error can enter. Moreover, there is no possible comparison of what people see jointly to ascertain if there is identity between them, or if their statements compare with what is seen.

Logical positivism must be content with a scientific view of things. Ayer confesses that "philosophy is virtually empty without science."⁹ The view of reality found in positivism is another variety of naturalism.

B. Man.

The logical positivist's view of man arrives by way of rejection. Ayer rejected the realist's view of perception that there is a subject, act, and object. The subject is the substance of human nature that is supposed to "perform the so-called act of sensing," and the self as a substance is non-empirical.¹⁰

Further, Ayer spoke of self-consciousness, but not in the sense that a substantive ego is required. Self-consciousness is just the ability of the self to remember some of its earlier states.¹¹ What then is the self which is not substantive? Ayer spoke of the self as "a logical construction out of sense-experiences."¹² The self is not a thing, but a collection of sense-experiences. This is very close to Hume's view. Personal identity is linked closely with bodily identity. Bodily identity is defined by "the resemblance and continuity of sense-contents."¹³ He spoke of a man surviving the loss of memory, a change of character, and yet be the "same" man. A loss of body annihilates the idea of a man. It may well be questioned whether the word "man" refers to the same body in the loss of memory if it is complete. Nevertheless, Ayer pushed the implication of all this to reject life after death. This follows since bodily existence is the only type of existence he is affirming. A collection of sense-contents has nothing to survive beyond the sense-contents.

If the self is reducible to sense-experience, how can one talk about other selves? He reasons to the existence of other selves because the bodies he sees in sense-content appear to act and behave

like he does. Moreover, the experience of life is that we seem to communicate with these things that inhabit our world. It seems easy to conclude their actual real existence.

Beyond this, Ayer makes no claim for any metaphysical aspects about man's existence. Man is no image of God, or son of the divine. He is what one sees and can verify, and nothing more.

C. God.

There is a certain sense of fairness about the view of Ayer concerning God, at least at one point. If all talk about God is nonsensical, it is equally nonsensical for the atheist to assert that God doesn't exist. In a similar vein Ayer made it impossible to defend an agnostic view. Ayer claimed that "all utterances about the nature of God are nonsensical."¹⁴

Attempts in arguing for God's existence are rejected because one must take a leap from the argument to the conclusion that God exists. For example, one may argue that certain phenomena exists in the world and this requires one to believe in God. Ayer asks: does a belief in the world's phenomena (regularity, orderliness, etc.) express what is meant by the word God? Is God equivalent to regularity? No religious person would admit that this is all he is claiming for his argument about God's existence. If God is identified with natural objects, not much is being said about God.

Give Ayer his ground and he wins both ways. God is not the equivalent of nature, and if one is arguing for a super-sensible definition of God, one loses again. The super-sensible is not seen and Ayer concludes that one is talking about non-sense. This leads naturally to the "mystical" approach to God. The mystic says he knows God but he cannot discuss what he knows since it is ineffable, and indescribable. The mystic must submit his intuitive descriptions to the test of verification. But since he can't stand by his statement as they are not adequate to describe his experience, the mystic is only producing unintelligent statements. On top of it is the fact that his statement would not stand up to verification and all we really have from the mystic is "indirect information about the condition of his own mind."¹⁵

Give Ayer his grounds and he wins hands-down. The bigger issue is the limitation of the method of investigation by the principle of verification. The limitation can also be seen in the next topic.

Before we turn to the next topic of Values, it is interesting to note the near death experience of A.J. Ayer as described in the October 14, 1988 issue of the National Review. Ayer wrote: "The only memory that I have of an experience, closely encompassing my death, is very vivid. I was confronted by a red light, exceedingly bright, and also very painful even when I turned away from it. I was aware that this light was responsible for the government of the universe" ^{15a}

What kind of response and evaluation arises out of this for one of the most famous of atheists? He concluded: "My recent experiences have slightly weakened my conviction that my

genuine death, which is due fairly soon, will be the end of me, though I continue to hope that it will be. They have not weakened my conviction that there is no god."^{15b}

D. Values.

Logical positivism as expressed by Ayer disposes of values with more sophistication. He contended that ethical discourse fits into four main proposition-types.

First of all, propositions which express definitions of ethical terms, or judgements about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions. Secondly, there are propositions describing the phenomena of moral experiences and their causes. Thirdly, there are exhortations to moral virtue. And lastly, there are actual ethical judgements.¹⁶

Only the first type "constitute ethical philosophy." The second type are really in the domain of sociology or psychology. In other words, if I describe the experience of being mugged or robbed, this is to be studied by psychology or sociology as a discipline, and no judgements are needed in it about its rightness or wrongness. The third category of exhortation is nothing more than that of a parent who tells a child, "Be good on the way to school," "Don't lie to me," and other statements. These statements are not relevant to philosophy or science, or ethics. The last type of statement, actual ethical judgments, really do not "belong to ethical philosophy."¹⁷ Take an example: "It was wrong to gas the Jews in World War II." One may certainly prove to general satisfaction that Jews were gassed in that notorious era. But the phrase "it was wrong" cannot be so proven. What does a statement like this mean? The answer is that "it was wrong" expresses one's emotional reaction to what happened. "It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertion about them."¹⁸ There is no way of scientifically verifying "it is wrong," and for that reason ethics is just another word for nonsense.

The conclusion that is reached is that ethical statements are no more than pseudo-propositions. They are not saying anything sensible. One can only speak of how one feels about war, poverty, capital punishment, space exploration, exploitation of women and minorities, and other serious issues of the time. One may encourage others to feel the same way, but these are appeals only to feelings, or political expressions, and not to truth. Thus logical positivism relegates ethics as traditionally conceived to the discipline of sociology or psychology where feelings can be studied. Science cannot deal with feelings because feelings cannot be dealt with on the basis of verification.

E. Comments and criticisms.

There are many problems with positivism. Ten years after Ayer published his work a revised edition came out with some softening of his views. Many critics arose and one of the more interesting works was written by C.E.M. Joad.¹⁹ Joad directed his attention to the first edition because that is where the impact came from and the retractions are scarcely read by anyone but professional philosophers.

Joad charged the movement with a dogmatism as harsh as any.²⁰ Positivism claimed to solve many problems of philosophy, but the charge was made that "there is (not) a single instance of an analysis effected by logical positivists methods which has resulted in the solution of a philosophical problem which is an agreed solution" ²¹ Not only were there no solutions to the problems, but the problems were regarded as pseudo-problems. The nature of logical positivism was such that "it cannot help us to understand the universe, it cannot provide us with a synoptic view of the whole whose different departments are explored by the sciences and it cannot light up the dark places of the world."²²

Ayer's commitment to the principle of verification is examined by Joad. A statement is significant if one knows how to verify the proposition. This position of Ayer is announced without reason or justification. It is a dogma that is assumed. For a view of philosophy that claims to assume nothing metaphysical, the first assumption concerns the important method of the system. Not only is no evidence offered, but it is questionable whether evidence for the principle can be offered at all. Can one verify verification? One must accept the principle as valid on the basis of intuition which is a non-sensory experience of the mind which does not really exist.

Further, the verification principle ignores other important aspects of normal living. Joad argued that there are non-sensory experiences which occur and in which the verification principle has no application. The facts of history are reflected upon without images. Speculative deliberation in arithmetic that is done mentally is not sensory. Practical deliberations, i.e., questions one asks oneself about misplacing an object, or the potential moves and consequences of a move in chess, are also non-sensory. Other experiences such as moral temptation in which one contemplates an act, struggles internally with the doing of it, and the rejection of the action in moral victory, are likewise non-sensory. Last of all, Joad mentioned poems and music which involve images but they are transcended when one comes to a sense of their aesthetic sense of beauty.²³

The verification principle is questioned in another context. Is it a factually or logically determinate statement? It certainly does not seem to be a logically determinate statement or a tautology as Ayer described them. But neither does it fit the category of a scientific discipline. If Wittgenstein's and others are followed here, then the conclusion should be reached that the principle is nonsensical.

On the other hand, if it is accepted as a first principle, then positivism claims a privileged status for its principles that it denies to other systems of philosophy. It engages in metaphysics although it denies the legitimacy of metaphysics.²⁴

Ayer's view of the self also poses problems, essentially the same problems that Hume had. Denying the continuous substantive self, the self is composed of sense-contents. How does one know there are other selves who will listen to me? The ability to reason that there are is not scientifically grounded. Joad asked: "If . . . I never know anything but my own sense-contents, what possible right have I to take their occurrence as indicating or as being caused by or as being equivalent to somebody or something else."²⁵ Ayer's appeal to intuition for believing these facts make his position diluted.²⁶

Joad is very critical of the emotive theory of ethics advanced by the logical positivists in general and Ayer in particular. There is a sense of impatience with a system or approach that rules out such statements as

- (1) it is wrong to steal
- (2) it is wrong to gas the Jews
- (3) cruelty to children is wrong
- (4) murdering is wrong.

He charges that logical positivism paved the way for moral indifference and gives silent approval to almost any act of wrong by virtue of its attitude toward ethical discourse. Joad concluded:

In fact, I find it hard to resist the conclusion that if one really believed that the doctrine of Logical Positivism were true, there would be no bar of principle to the leading of that life which Plato called "democratic"--a Bohemian in art, a Laodicean in affairs, a skeptic in philosophy and religion, an inconstant in love and a dilettante in life.²⁷

Other Applications

It was generally concluded that verification in the scientific sense is detrimental to religious faith. Various responses are possible to this claim: (1) reject the faith, (2) reject the verification principle, or (3) seek a religious application of it. A number of writers have done work on number 3, and John Hick is one of the better known.

Hick appealed to verification in showing the validity of religious facts. His sense of verification is a personal one in that any verified fact requires the participation of someone in it. This raised the question of how public verification must be. Hick responded that the requirement of verification depends upon the subject matter. If a scientist predicts an ice age 30,000 years hence, and it does come about, though no human life may exist then, does this stand for verification?

Hick opted for the verification done by a single person although no one else may be involved in the verification process. Believing that everyone can does not require belief that everyone does verify a belief.

Hick spoke of falsification as well as verification. Some statements presumably cannot be verified. A statement like God exists is regarded as incapable of direct verification. Can you approach this issue negatively? Can one falsify the statement God exists? What would count against the statement God exists?

Verification and falsification appear to be two different sides of the coin, but this is not true. There are instances in which they appear to be both sides of the coin, but others in which they are quite unrelated. Hick used the example on the value of "ö" which has been worked out.

It does not contain a series of three sevens, but it will always be true that such a series may occur at a point not yet reached in anyone's calculations. Accordingly, the proposition may one day be verified if it is true, but can never be falsified if it is false.²⁸

In the case of life after death, this can be verified if it is true, but it cannot be falsified if it is false. So verification and falsification attempt to deal with different issues occasionally.

The main argument of Hick's view of verification about life after death depends upon the ideas associated with verification. Verification is personal, relative to certain subjects over others, related to conditional predictions about events in the future, and has relevance to the issue of God existing.

Hick spoke of eschatological verification which arises out of two experiences.

I suggest, two possible developments of our experience, such that, if they occurred in conjunction with one another (whether in this life or in another life to come), they would assure us beyond rational doubt of the reality of God as conceived in the Christian faith. These are, first, an experience of the fulfillment of God's purpose for ourselves, as this has been disclosed in the Christian revelation, and second, in conjunction with the first, an experience of communion with God as he has revealed himself in the person of Christ.²⁹

The fulfillment of the first is seen in the achievement of a quality of life as given in the character of Christ, involving eternal life as real life. Although this may not be fully realized now, it may be fulfilled in the future.

Hick noted that unless one goes further than this there is not adequate verification of God's existence. One may know that one lives in a future life, but this is not the same as knowing God. The answer is found in the Incarnation. Knowledge that God exists is seen in the Incarnation.

God's union with man in Christ makes possible man's recognition of the fulfillment of God's purpose for man as being indeed the fulfillment of God's purpose for him. The presence of Christ marks this kingdom as being beyond doubt the kingdom of God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ.³⁰

Hick regarded this verification as conditional as are other types of verification. I can say, "you can see my car if you will go into the garage," but not everybody wishes to see my new car. No one is compelled to check it out. Likewise, no one is compelled to check out the situation on God, but it is eventually verifiable. Time does not negate the principle of verification, and likewise, there is no time limit on it. Some hypotheses in science have existed for years before they were verified. By the same token the hypothesis of God's existence is eventually verifiable on a personal level.³¹

Hick's application of the verification principle to the issues in religion received a mixed response from writers favorable to religious ideas.³² If the validity of the verification principle is

admitted as a universal criteria, it might be more useful, but if the principle is questioned, circumscribed in its use, then Hick's application of it may not be that important.

III. New Directions

One of the more remarkable features of the development of logical positivism is seen in the change that took place in Wittgenstein's thinking. He came to abandon the narrow view of language expressed in the Tractatus. Yet in the Tractatus there was no frank condemnation of metaphysics that was characteristic of the positivists. Wittgenstein appears to have left some room for the mystical which is reflected in Bertrand Russell's disapproval in the introduction to the Tractatus. Fann argued that "Wittgenstein has never said and would never have said, 'Metaphysics is nonsense,' or 'the inexpressible (what cannot be said) is just nonsense.'"³³ What he did say was, "Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical." In other words, to attempt to present a metaphysical statement as a "scientific" statement is nonsense. To put it another way, to use the criteria of scientific verification for a non-scientifically verifiable statement is nonsense. In vindication of this, Wittgenstein is quoted as having a sympathy for metaphysical writings of the past as among the noblest productions of the human mind.³⁴ His favorite authors were Augustine, Dostoyevsky, and Kierkegaard--all fairly metaphysical in orientation.

Some of the statements of the Tractatus have been used to imply a negative view toward metaphysics, but they can be expressive of what some theologians have said all along. Compare: "It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental."³⁵ "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time."³⁶ "God does not reveal himself in the world."³⁷ These enigmatic statements could very well be understood in compatibility with the Christian view of things in which ethics is transcendental in its origin. A transcendent ethic would not be sociology, or culture orientation, but a norm given by God who would be the author of a normal lifestyle. Much of religion finds the solution to the riddle of life outside space and time, or rather in terms of God's will which transcends space and time. There has been a strong emphasis in modern theology that God does not reveal himself in the world, that is, in nature itself. If Wittgenstein's statements are taken literally, they are certainly not incongruous with some of modern theology. However, these statements of Wittgenstein do not require these interpretations for they are so brief and without full context, but they certainly could be used to support some of the positions described above.

Obviously, these propositions do not give much for a commentary on positive value and belief in God. They suggest the possibility that Wittgenstein was not entirely a positivist. Even if this is doubted, the next work of Wittgenstein that we will mention surely shows that language is not so limited as described by the positivists. A different view of language is presented in the last work of Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's book, Philosophical Investigations, was published after he died.³⁸ In this remarkable work about the nature of language he came to modify his earlier opinions and now asserted that "there are countless" kinds of sentences and even new kinds come into existence as

others become obsolete. He introduced the idea of "language-games" to indicate the forms of life and language activity. He wrote:

Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:

Giving orders, and obeying them--

Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements--

Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)--

Reporting an event--

Speculating about an event--

Forming and testing a hypothesis--

Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams--

Making up a story; and reading it--

Play-acting--

Singing catches--

Guessing riddles--

Making a joke; telling it--

Solving a problem in practical arithmetic--

Translating from one language to another--

Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying,

--It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of words and sentences, with what logicians have said about the structure of language.³⁹

Even though language is inadequate it is yet useful and meaningful. Can one describe the aroma of coffee? It can't be done; words to describe it are lacking. There is now the necessity of admitting that language is not limited to two forms as in the positivistic contention, but now has a multiplicity of uses. The rules of the game now are necessary to know the meaning attached to the words.

Kenny summarized: "For without the rules the word has no meaning; and if we change the rules it has a different meaning, or none."⁴⁰

What can the later Wittgenstein mean then for theological language about God? Certainly, Wittgenstein did not draw great conclusions in support of theological statements or language. Others have attempted to describe the nature of language about God in light of the total positivist movement. One such example is that of Frederick Ferre who admits that theological language does not have visual references. When I speak of God, I do not see God as I see a tree. Thus to talk about God means a different sort of language and meaning. Different rules apply to the words in this context over against those in a scientific setting.

Statements about God certainly refer to reality. If one means less than this, then real meaning about God is lost. Facts about God are important, but facts are related to the minds which receive them.⁴¹ Ferre introduced the idea of conceptual synthesis which is a "construct of concepts designed to provide coherence for all 'the facts' on the basis of a theoretical model drawn from among 'the facts.'" A "metaphysical fact," therefore, "is a concept which plays a key role within the system, without which the system would founder."⁴²

Ferre then offers the model of consistency, coherence and relevancy to experience, as the criteria for accepting metaphysical models. The model of language about God and the world include not only the material aspect of human existence, but the elements of personality which include will, purpose, wisdom, love, compassion and other human features of man's existence.⁴³ Putting all of these things together one arrives at a model that is more aesthetically satisfying to one's experience of the world than a mere positivistic view.⁴⁴

One of the leading language philosophers in America is Willard Van Orman Quine of Harvard University. Quine's most important book is Word and Object.⁴⁵ It is a book about language and the way language is used. The concluding section (56) of Quine's work may be used as the summary section on the intention of the book. Quine declares that "semantic ascent" becomes the philosophic direction for an analysis of language. Semantic ascent "is the shift from talk of miles to talk of 'mile.'"⁴⁶ The "talk of miles" involves such questions as a length of 1760 yards, or the distance between two cities on earth, or other similar questions. But the talk of "mile" means that one can talk about contexts in which words make sense and for what purposes the word may be used.

The advantage of this shift, says Quine, is that

it carries the discussion into a domain where both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz., words) and on the main terms concerning them. Words, or their inscriptions, unlike points, miles, classes, and the rest, are tangible objectives of the size so popular in the marketplace, where men of unlike conceptual schemes communicate at their best. The strategy is one of ascending to a common part of two fundamentally disparate conceptual schemes, the better to discuss the disparate foundations. No wonder it helps in philosophy.⁴⁷

With the shift in philosophy to the discussion about words, one can gain quickly the nature of the book--it is a discourse about how people in general and philosophers in particular use words. Quine's philosophy of language is the investigation of the ways in which words function in many facets.

Much of the material in Word and Object reads very much like a lesson in language syntax concerning the rules and limitations of parts of speech. Note the following examples:

1) Demonstratives, i.e., "this" and "that" relieve us from knowing specific names, "that river," "that child," "that woman," "that tree," etc.⁴⁸

2) Relative terms, like "bigger than," "part of," "brother of," function as comparative statements, or location statements as well as other functions.⁴⁹

3) "Identity" is expressed in English by those uses of "is" that one is prepared to expand into "is the same object as."⁵⁰

4) Abstract terms, often words ending in "ness," as in roundness, deal in qualities or attributes.⁵¹

5) Vagueness relates to the indeterminateness of language. Words are often used with a certain understanding but also with a certain fuzziness. A mountain appears to be a good word, but where does the mountain really start, at sea level, or the height above the normal terrain? Where does Lake Michigan end and Lake Huron begin?

6) Eternal sentences are those sentences "whose truth value stays fixed through time and from speaker to speaker."⁵² Such an example is "copper oxide is green."⁵³

7) Subjunction or if-clauses. Such clauses help the speaker to entertain or consider facts that may or may not be accepted or true. An example of this is seen in the following, "If Caesar were in command, he would use the atom bomb."⁵⁴

Quine covers many other functions of words in language use. One may read of modality, the double standard, synonymous and analytical sentences, observation sentences, nominalism and realism and many others.

There is little concern to relate the use of words to the object. Naturally, there are many words that are learned that way when a child is told "Mama" and the mother is there. The chief concern relates to the use of words within the confines of the language not the world apart from the language. Quine accepts the existence of physical objects because of the way in which physical object-terms function in our language, but it is left to the scientists to tell us whether there are wombats or not.

The advantages of semantic ascent are apparently more in Quine's mind than others. In a series of essays, Words and Objections, Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine, Quine answers his critics which are numerous. Noam Chomsky, among others, had written an essay criticizing Quine at certain points. Quine's reply is interesting especially when one considered the alleged gain in communication and agreement by semantic ascent.

Chomsky's remarks leave me with feelings at once of reassurance and frustration. What I find reassuring is that he nowhere clearly disagrees with my position. What I find frustrating is that he expresses much disagreement with what he thinks to be my position.⁵⁵

Semantic ascent has other kinds of problems that are seen in Chomsky's criticisms and Quine's reply. One of the most obvious concerns the nature of words to which one ascends. Dallas Willard has catalogued the various theories of word use in recent times. Are words "tokens" as F.P. Ramsey indicated, or a "type" as first used by Charles Peirce? Words are also designated "tokens" when referring to individual signs or "symbols" when referring to a class of tokens (Han Richtenbach).⁵⁶ The fact is, words appear to be just as mysterious and metaphysical as the entities or things about which Quine exhorts us to remain silent, that is, the metaphysical entities to which the words refer. There is no reason to assume that when it comes to words "both parties are better agreed on the objects." It is difficult to conceive of what such an agreement would be about, i.e., the meaning, use, referent, intonation, spelling, history, color, etc.

Conclusion.

In our sketch of the emphasis on language analysis, we have seen its development along the lines of the verification principle to the language games of Wittgenstein, and then finally to Quine in the contemporary era. There are several concluding observations. First, language gave up philosophical content for a technique of finding out when language referred to real things. Philosophy is transformed into a method without content of its own. With Quine philosophy of language turns to the use of words without concern for the referent.

Whatever extremes have been found in the movement, it is yet necessary, and has always been, to ask for the meaning of words, terms, and sentences. While avoiding the once strict limitations of the verification principle, thinkers will continue to examine terms for the sake of concise, meaningful communication.

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Footnotes

¹They included Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, Friedrich Waismann, Edgar Zilsel, and Victor Kraft--all being philosophers. Philip Frank, Karl Menger, Kurt Gödel and Hans Hahn were also in the group and were either scientists or mathematicians.

²Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1922, p. 99.

³A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, New York: Dover Publications, 1952, p. 35.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

- ⁷*Ibid.*, p. 136.
- ⁸*Ibid.*, p. 146.
- ⁹*Ibid.*, p. 152.
- ¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 122.
- ¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 126.
- ¹²*Ibid.*, p. 125.
- ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 127.
- ¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 115.
- ¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 119.
- ^{15a}A.J. Ayer, "What I Saw When I was Dead," *National Review*, Oct. 14, 1988, p. 39.
- ^{15b}*Ibid.*, p. 40.
- ¹⁶Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 103.
- ¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 103.
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- ²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 12.
- ²¹*Ibid.*, p. 26.
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- ²³*Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 72.
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- ²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 187.
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³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 86.

³⁵Wittgenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 185.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 187.

³⁸Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.N. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan Co., 1953.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 12e.

⁴⁰Anthony Kenny, *Wittgenstein*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973, p. 176.

⁴¹Ferre, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁴⁴Ferre surveys different proposals on the use of theological language. The student who is interested in the topic will find his survey useful.

⁴⁵Willard Van Orman Quine, *Word and Object*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 272.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁵⁵*Words and Objections. Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine*, edited by Donald Davidson, and Jaakko Hintikka, New York: Humanities Press, 1969, p.302.

⁵⁶Dallas Willard *Why Semantic Ascent Fails*, unpublished paper.

CHAPTER XV

Philosophies of the East

The Orient gives us some unusual ideas and terms. *Karma* and *samsara*, or transmigration are different and unfamiliar to many. There are different emphases in the thinking of the East. Instead of monotheism the East has polytheism in its more base form and monism or pantheism in its more sophisticated forms. Much of western thought stresses the individual and personality whereas the East deprecates the individual and personality with the aim of merging or achieving union with the world soul. The western traditional philosophy has been based upon rationality whereas the East has a strong emphasis on intuition. Western religion is related to revelation whereas eastern religion stresses contemplation. In western thought God is sought outside of man--out there--whereas in the East God is sought within--inside man. In the West this has been called the transcendence of God, and the view of the East is called immanence of God. In the west nature is to be subdued whereas the eastern emphasis on nature is a part of God. Many of the differences will appear as we look at some of the different oriental philosophies.

Our treatment here will be limited to Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Shinto. Japanese religion has been highly influenced by Chinese as well as Buddhist sources. Our main purpose is to see the nature of the ideas as they are connected with the founding leaders, as far as this is possible. It is fitting that we now turn to our first philosophy.

I. HINDUISM

Hinduism is difficult to define in a few words. It is not connected with a founder as many other religions are. In those cases it is convenient to say that Buddhism is the religion of Buddha, Judaism is the religion of Moses, and so on. But this cannot be done with Hinduism. We can define Hinduism in a general way as the great social and religious system of India that has grown up since the third century B.C. to the present.¹ There are no single orthodox doctrines that hold true for all. One can be a pantheist, an atheist, a polytheist, a monist, pluralist, or dualist. Hindus range

from intellectuals who are sophisticated monists to ignorant polytheists who make religious pilgrimages to wash in the Ganges River. We shall have to limit our treatment of Hinduism generally to the views reflected in the Upanishads. The Upanishads give the most sophisticated form of Hinduism and it is the inspiration for the views of several modern religious movements imported to the States as seen in the Divine Light Mission, the Transcendental Meditation movement, and other groups. We now turn to our four headings.

A. *Reality.*

The view of reality in the Upanishads, written about 300 B.C., gives a monistic view of the world. There is only one reality in the world, or that is the world.

The group of all being, whether material or spiritual whether in the form of man, beasts, or gods, heaven, earth, or hell, is an all-inclusive unitary reality, beyond sense-apprehension, ultimate in substance, infinite in essence and self-sufficient; it is the only really existent entity. This reality is commonly called *Brahma*.²

The attempts to define *Brahma* or *Brahman* in a positive way are not as many as the negative way. *Brahman* is "not conceivable, not changeable, not injurable . . . inaudible, invisible, indestructible, cannot be tasted, cannot be smelled, is without beginning or end, and greater than the great."³ The *Mundake Upanishad* describes *Brahman* as "invisible, incomprehensible, without genealogy, colourless, without eye or ear, without hands or feet, eternal, pervading all and over all, scarce knowable, that unchangeable one whom the wise regard as being womb."⁴

How is knowledge possible? If the nature of *Brahman* is unknowable, how is it known? The answer is that *Brahman* cannot be proved by "perception or reasoning, but is to be taken either on the basis of scriptural testimony (The Upanishads) or by direct and intuitive experience of the kind made possible by Yogic concentration."⁵ Scriptural basis here is yet related to intuition since there is no concept of a revelation from *Brahman*. If one speaks of revelation, it is intuition that is implied.

The Upanishads speak of the *Brahman* as the all-objective. Everything that is experienced by the five senses is *Brahman*. But the Upanishads also go further and declare that everything that is subjective is also *Brahma*; however, the subjective experiences are called *Atman*. This unity of *Brahman-Atman* is one of the great points of the Upanishads. *Atman*, or the internal experiences of feelings, self-consciousness, emotions, are in actuality identified with *Brahma*. This truth is implied in the statement, *tat tvam asi*, meaning, *that art thou*, and which points to the identification of the self with *Brahman*. One of the important stories in the Upanishads points to this truth:

Now there was *Shvetaketu Aruneya*. To him his father said: "That which is the finest essence--this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is *Atman*. That art thou, *Shvetaketu*.

"So you, Sir, cause me to understand even more."

"So be it, my dear," said He . "Bring hither a fig."

"Here it is , Sir."

"Divide it."

"It is divided, Sir."

"What do you see there?"

"Those rather fine seeds, Sir."

"Of these, please divide one."

"It is divided, Sir."

"What do you see there?"

"Nothing at all, Sir."

Then said he to him: "Verily, my dear, that finest essence which you do not perceive--verily, my dear, from that finest essence this great Nyagrodha (sacred fig) tree thus arises. Believe me, my dear," said he, "That which is the finest essence--this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Atman. That art thou, Shvetaketu."⁶

Later thinkers raised questions about the relation of the world to Brahman. Sankara in the eighth century A.D. believed that Brahman alone is real with the implication that the world is an illusion, *maya*, an appearance. Ramanuja in the eleventh century A.D. believed that the world is real and that it is a part of Brahman being like the body is part of the soul's existence. In either case the Upanishads view of reality is pantheistic and has all the problems of pantheism. Such problems involve: is evil real or an illusion? Is the universe growing and changing? If so, is Brahman growing and changing? Pantheism also implies a spiritual determinism quite akin to a materialistic determinism. There is the additional question about the nature of personality and its freedom and independence.

B. Man.

The self--in a monistic or pantheistic world--is a part of the whole. The Atman is identical with Brahman: that art thou! In this context it is obvious that the body of man is not the important part of his existence. The inner self is the key. One Upanishad says:

The Self (Atman) which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose desire is the real, whose thoughts are true, he should be sought, him one should desire to understand. He who has found out and who understands the self, he obtains all worlds and desires.⁷

If the true self is internal, what is there to say about the body that all can see and experience? One answer to this question is that man's nature is two-fold. There is the empirical, or the knowable part of man's nature, or as the Hindus would say, the *guna*-self. Behind this self and obscured by it is the real self, the *atman*. The *guna*-self or empirical self includes man's psycho-physical existence and life can be lived in this dimension without regard for the *Atman* or real self. The Bravagad Gita tells a story of a warrior, Arjuna, who raises questions about his role as a warrior and protests the killing of his cousins. Counseled by Krishna (who is an appearance of Brahman), Arjuna is told, "The dweller (Atman) in the body of everyone, O Bharata (Arjuna) is eternal and can never be slain."⁸

The goal of existence, however, is to get beyond the empirical self. The Socratic motto, know thyself, is not easy, and in Hinduism it is as difficult as getting to know Brahman. Since Brahman is known intuitively, Atman, or the internal self is known intuitively also. This intuitive knowledge is related to yogi, or a method of concentration with the goal of seeing (intuitively) that the essence of Brahman is really one with myself. This knowledge is not logical, rational, or empirical, but is born of intuitive insight. The end result of the yogi process is not merely knowledge, but *samadhi*, or the ecstatic mystic union of oneself with the whole (Brahman).

Man's existence in Hinduism has more theoretical regimentation connected with it than western views. Society is divided into four varnas, or classes: (1) Brahmins, or priests and teachers who are the religious leaders and savants of culture, (2) Kshatriya varna, or rulers, soldiers who protect the rest of society, (3) Vaishya varna, or the traders, farmers, artisans and business people, and (4) Shudra varna, the workers and servants.

The rationale behind these divisions is that society needs people suited to functions of society for a well-ordered society. The practical tragedy of the matter is that position is based upon class by birth rather than achievement. Since *varna* has been outlawed, some mobility is possible in moving upward. Until it was outlawed, however, caste restrictions were like segregation restrictions in the United States. Moreover, caste was linked with the doctrine of karma in which justification was given for one's birth and position. *Karma* or destiny was linked to man's present existence via the idea of reincarnation. As an example of this, if I am a Brahmin now it was because of good karma in my past existence. If I am an outcast now, it is because of my past bad deeds in a previous existence. I am merely reaping the results of a previous existence. Although the rational justification for social classes appears good, the practical results involved a sense of futility and pessimism.

Another aspect of human existence concerns the *ashrama*, or stages in life. A man pursues the stage of knowledge, or the life of a student in which all kinds of knowledge is learned for living. This stage may run to age 25. The second stage of life is the householder, or that period of life in which one works, raises a family, contributes to society's ongoing, and the third stage is retirement from society in which a man will retreat to the forest for the attainment of the fourth stage, sannyasin, achievement of the state of oneness with the universe or Brahman.

C. God.

India has an unusual sense of the divine. The innate pantheism leads to the conclusion that all is divine. The doctrine of *ahimsa*, or non-injury is the logical conclusion of pantheism. Everything is divine; everything is sacred, and nothing should be harmed. Cow protection is the best known consequence of this doctrine, but vegetarianism is another facet of Hinduism. Other animals are also sacred.

Pantheism tends to be impersonal and where it exists there is the result that the Whole is fragmented into parts, or to put it another way, polytheism is an outgrowth of pantheism.

Polytheism and pantheism often exist side by side. Polytheism gives the Formless an understandable shape and form. Krishna is regarded as an *avatar*, or appearance, of Vishnu who is an appearance, or *avatar*, of Brahman. Brahman is personalized in other god-forms. Brahman is expressed in Brahma, a creator-god, but who is seldom worshipped. Brahman is seen in Shiva, the destroyer who has many consorts, Kali, a spreader of disease, Durga, the patroness of the robber caste, Ganesha, the elephant-headed god and others. Vishnu, mentioned above, had many appearances such as Krishna, a tortoise, a boar, a man-lion, and others.

The practical outgrowth of polytheism is to view the gods as functional. Or, to put it another way, polytheism is a supermarket approach to deities. If you want help for a dying father, you take yourself to the worship and petition of Rama. If your problem is obstacles, then one turns to Ganesha, and if one has drought, sickness, famine, or whatever, there are specific deities to petition.

While there is idol-worship and polytheism, there is also the most sophisticated idealism in religious concepts. This form of pantheism is expressed in the Upanishads in which "Brahman is said to have created the universe and then entered into it."⁹ The basic pantheism we have discussed already in the views of reality and man. We will now turn to our fourth heading.

D. Values.

In a general way, the Mahabharata, a monumental body of literature, indicates that all persons without regard to caste or class should control their temper, be truthful, be forgiving, have children by one's legitimate wife, conduct oneself in purity, friendliness, and justice. The case of dependents is also enjoyed along with the doctrine of *ahimsa*, i.e., non-injury.

These values are important and are complemented by four basic aims of human existence that are outlined. The four aims are: (1) *dharmā*, or duty or moral law. Dharma is a difficult word to pin down, but it gives the idea of a "rule of action" or the way to live.¹⁰ Dharma has a personal and social dimension. In the personal sense it relates to morality, and in the social sense it may relate to settling disputes, or duties of the individual to the community. (2) *Artha*, or the means of life. The pursuit of wealth is not contrary to the Hindu view of things as long as one is aware of the futility of it all. The Mahabharata says,

What is here regarded as *dharmā* depends entirely upon wealth (*artha*). One who robs another of wealth robs him of his *dharmā* as well. Poverty is a state of sinfulness. All kinds of meritorious acts flow from the possession of great wealth, as from wealth springs all religious acts, all pleasures, and heaven itself. Wealth brings about accession of wealth, as elephants capture elephants. Religious acts, pleasure, joy, courage, worth, and learning; all these proceed from wealth. From wealth one's merit increases. He that has no wealth has neither this world nor the next.¹¹

An interesting contrast is that the love of money is the root of evil in the Christian view. Here the lack of money is the root of evil. Wealth and power are not important in themselves, but are the means of the enjoyment of life, or (3) *kama*.

Kama is the desire for pleasure and the enjoyment of the proceeds of wealth. The Kama Sutra defines *kama* as

. . . the enjoyment of the appropriate objects of the five sense of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting, and smelling, assisted by the mind, together with the soul. The ingredient in this is a peculiar contact between the organ of sense and its object, and the consciousness of pleasure that results from the contact is called Kama.¹²

The Kama Sutra is a tract upon the physical aspects of love, but there are tracts for the intellectual stimulation of love and literature. The pursuit of pleasure must be held within the bounds of society, but it is regarded as good.

The fourth aim, (4) *Moksha*, means release, liberation, emancipation, freedom or salvation. The first three aims of man's existence are good, but not final. Pleasure, wealth, and duty are not enough. As these three aims are sought simultaneously, so should be Moksha. Moksha defined negatively means release from the cycle of rebirth, and defined positively means the fulfillment of existence. The achievement of moksha involves being united with the World Soul, or Brahman.

The overall implication of the Hindu view of man, values, and its teaching about existence is that perfection is achievable by man himself. Even where devotion of a deity as in Bhakti Marga, a way of seeking release from the cycle of rebirth by devotion to a particular god like Krishna, it is yet the human devotion that counts. For in reality, the gods worshipped are no better off than the humans worshipping except their further progress along the way. The gods have insights, but they are still subject to change and the cycle of rebirth. In the final analysis, Hinduism is a philosophy of pantheism in which man is responsible for his own salvation. There is no "outside" help. It has to come from within, or it doesn't come at all.

E. Criticisms.

Hinduism has developed many interesting ideas through the centuries. However, there are certain questions that arise. First, the problems of monism or pantheism are great. The problem of evil raises its head immediately. Evil has to be regarded as unreal, or illusory. Because Brahman is everything, everything is Brahman, and all evil can be traced to It. Second, the matter of personality is at stake. The Upanishads foster the idea that ecstatic union with Brahman only comes when one gives up thinking he has individual existence. When one realizes that there is only Brahman-Atman then union with the World-Soul is possible. The problem is this: Brahman has caused something to be which must be negated for union to take place. The very thing that Brahman has brought into being is the obstacle to re-union with Brahman. It would seem more likely to conclude that since Brahman causes personality to be, it is good. Personality is good. Individualism is good. Otherwise, there appears a contradiction at the heart of what Brahman does and what man is.

Third, the matter of religious knowledge has problems. On what basis can one conclude that knowledge about Brahman is meaningful since Brahman does not speak to man. On what basis can

we conclude that intuitive insight is correct? If Brahman cannot be known, described, or revealed, why should any of the ideas be philosophically accepted?

II. BUDDHISM

Buddhism, the religion of about 400 million people in the Orient, may be regarded as a heresy of Hinduism. Buddhism accepts some Hindu ideas and rejects others. Buddha retained the ideas of *Karma* and *Samsara*, or transmigration, or re-incarnation of souls. He rejected the Hindu ways of salvation, the authority of the Vedas and other Hindu scriptures, and belief in the many gods of Hinduism. It seems evident that the Buddha--which means enlightened one--was not interested in the many religious and philosophical questions that we are interested in. Questions like the nature of reality, whether God exists, and the nature of life after death held little importance to him. Buddha makes no claim to be divine and he was nothing more than a remarkable humanist.

Unlike Hinduism which has no founder, we have a movement that begins with a significant person, Siddhartha Gautama (563-483 B.C.). Our primary purpose will be centered on his insights and only casually refer to developments later in the movement. But this raises an important issue: is it legitimate for a religious movement to depart from the founder's teaching? If a religion begins as a humanistic movement without belief in gods, is it legitimate for it to develop an elaborate polytheism later on? How does this reflect upon the founder's insight and authority? Buddhism does begin as a humanism and evolved later to belief and worship of many gods.

The life of Guatama is interesting and available in many works. We will forego recounting it and turn to the basic elements in Buddha's thought.

A. Reality.

The Buddhist view of reality is complicated because there are different emphases in the several schools that developed after Buddha. Buddha himself did not teach much on the subject. Two generalizations can be made. The Buddhists reject a substance view of reality like that seen in Hinduism. A spiritual substance like that seen in the idea of Brahman requires the ideas of permanence, identity, and unity. But the Buddhist view begins with the doctrine of *annica*, or impermanence. What emerges is a view of the world that is akin to atomism of ancient Greek materialism but without the causal implications of one atom causes the movement of another. Instead of cause and effect, the Buddhist speak of dependent origination which means that things "replace one another rather than cause one another."¹³ When I grow older it is a change that takes place, but it is not caused by men, or by youth, or anything else.

The second generalization is that for all practical purposes the view of reality inherent in Buddhist thought is a friendly form of materialism. The world exists, but it is in a state of change and impermanence. The world appears to have unity, but it actually does not. The view of impermanence will be found to have consistency with the view of man, to which we turn.

B. Man.

Buddha's view of man is similar to that of David Hume in modern philosophy. The similarity is based on the idea of process. Man is a composite of processes. The most visible process is the bodily processes. Mental processes are more numerous and are called *skandhas*. They include the feelings, conceptual knowledge, *sankharas* which include the instincts and the subconscious, and reason as related to value-judgments. When these processes are related and unified, one may say then that a man exists. When they disintegrate, one may say that man is no longer in existence. This is similar, it will be recalled, to what Hume said. If one has no perceptions, one may be said not to exist.

The nature of the self as impermanent raises the question concerning transmigration, or the passage of the soul from one body-life to a new body-life. How can that which is impermanent and will disintegrate at death pass over to another existence? This is answered poetically and metaphorically. A king's seal placed in wax makes an impression, but the ring or seal does not pass over, or transmigrate. One such story is that concerning King Milinda.

Said the king, (King Milinda), "Bhante Nagasena, does rebirth take place without any transmigration?"

"Yes, your majesty," rebirth takes place without anything transmigrating."

"How, bhante Nagasena, does rebirth take place without anything transmigrating? Give an illustration."

"Suppose, your majesty, a man were to light a light from another light; pray, would the one light have passed over to the other light?"

"Nay, verily, bhante."

"In exactly the same way, your majesty, does rebirth take place without anything transmigrating."

"Give another illustration."

"Do you remember, your majesty, having learnt, (sic) when you were a boy, some verse or other from your professor of poetry?"

"Yes, bhante,"

"Pray, your majesty, did the verse pass over (transmigrate) to you from your teacher?"

"Nay, verily Bhante?"

"In exactly the same way, your majesty, does rebirth take place without anything transmigrating."

"You are an able man, bhante Nagasena."¹⁴

In spite of the doctrine of impermanence, there is something permanent about man's existence since rebirth is a possibility. The cycle of existence is yet related to the doctrine of karma in which life continues on permanently, either out of Nirvana or in Nirvana. Conze defines Nirvana as

permanent, stable, imperishable, immovable, ageless, deathless, unborn, and unbecome, that it is power, bliss, and happiness, the secure refuge, the shelter, and the place of unassailable safety; that it is the real Truth and the supreme Reality; that it is the Good, the supreme goal

and the one and only consummation of our life, the eternal, hidden and incomprehensible Peace.¹⁵

In spite of a very permanent sounding view of Nirvana as defined by Conze, the belief of affirmation of a permanent self is the root of suffering. We will see more of this when we turn to values later.

C. God.

It is customary to regard Buddha as being very little interested in the question of God's existence. It is true that he rejected the Hindu idea of gods. Buddha reacted negatively against the Hindu God Brahma, different from Brahman, who prided himself on being the creator, on being uncreated himself, and on giving birth to all things. Buddha regarded these claims as vain and prideful. In a more positive way Buddha adopted an agnostic view on the question of a creator. In a practical way one may say that Buddhism, in its original form, was practical atheism.

But a religion without God or gods did not stay that way. The first step is seen in the adoration and worship of Gautama. Since the idea of reincarnation is part of the system, Gautama was believed to have existed before his birth in 563 and he came to earth out of compassion. The next step is seen in Mahayana Buddhism, one of the two major divisions in Buddhism, in which many saviour beings appear. The new savior beings, called *Bodhisattvas*, are of three kinds: (1) those who appeared in the past, like Gautama, and are no longer living, (2) those now serving in the present of whom the most popular is Avalokitesvara, and (3) those yet to come in the future like Maitreya.

To move from the practical atheism of the founder to the polytheism-like saviour beings of the later movement is quite a revolution. It gives two kinds of Buddhism. Once there was no prayer; now prayer is in. Once there was no outside help, now there are all kinds of saviour-beings to help. Once there was only meditation, now there is worship and prayer.

Which view of Buddhism is correct? Obviously they both are. The Mahayana Buddhist teach that Buddha taught several levels of doctrine based on the needs of the hearers. Both are regarded as correct forms of Buddhism by Mahayanists. The Hinayana reject this explanation.

D. Values.

The realm of living a practical life is where Gautama is most clear and important. He had struggled with the harsh realities of life and sought release from life's problems by means of tortuous self-discipline, but to no avail. Forsaking the route of self-mortification, he came to rest under a Bo-tree and there his enlightenment took place. His enlightenment concerned the causes and cessation of suffering. These simple views are summed in the Dear Park Sermon under the heading of the Four Noble Truths and the Eight-fold path. The Four Noble Truths are:

1) This, monks, is the Noble Truth of Suffering: birth is suffering; illness is suffering; death is suffering; presence of objects we hate is suffering; separation from objects we love is suffering; not to obtain what we desire is suffering. In brief, the five aggregates which spring from grasping, they are painful.

2) This, monks, is the noble truth of the cause of suffering; Thirst, that leads to rebirth, accompanied by pleasure and lust, finding its delight here and there. This thirst is three-fold: namely, thirst for pleasure, thirst for existence, thirst for prosperity.

3) This, monks, is the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering. It ceases with the complete cessation of this thirst--a cessation which consists in the absence of every passion--with deliverance from it, with the destruction of desire.

4) This, monks, is the Noble Truth of the Path which leads to the cessation of suffering: that holy eight-fold path, that is to say, right belief, right aspiration, right speech, right conduct, right means of livelihood, right endeavor, right mindfulness, right meditation.

The four noble truths appear obvious and simple, but some items need more emphasis than others. The second truth is, in some ways, logically prior to the first, namely, suffering is caused. Its most profound cause is desire, or thirst. Desire of things is the cause of misery. The more one desires the more potential misery one faces. If one has a large family of ten that is deeply loved, then the loss of ten members is greater than one. If one has no family, there is no loss. A life without wife, family, goods, houses, wealth and other possessions is a life without desire.

More profoundly, desire leads to the false conclusion that one is a self, or has a self. Thirst for existence merely perpetuates thirst, and there is no end to it, unless one seeks to deal directly with desire or thirst.

Desire is a basic problem of man's existence, but there is an internal contradiction to the problem of desire or thirst. Desire for getting rid of desire is yet desire. Thirst for getting rid of thirst is yet thirst.

The eight-fold path needs some amplification. (1) Right belief means accepting the four Noble Truths as the correct understanding of human suffering. It also implies the usual aspects of Buddhist prohibitions against destroying animals, stealing, lying, frivolity, illegal sexual relations, and other similar vices. (2) Right aspiration or purpose means that one overcomes the things in Right Belief listed above as well as other. Belief is not enough, it must take practical application. (3) Right speech indicates the elimination of lying, slander, profane talk, in a negative sense, and the incorporation of kind, gentle soothing words to people in a positive sense. (4) Right behavior or conduct is the achievement of belief and intention. Right behavior means the actual abstemious of sexual relations, destroying life and other deeds. (5) Right livelihood means that one secures his living in the right manner; it also means the proper use of one's time and energy. (6) Right effort means (A) effort to avoid bringing to one's mind new sources of temptation and evil thoughts, (B) the effort to overcome by sheer will power degenerative ideas that will harm one's progress, (C) the

effort to develop one's enlightenment, and (D) the effort to maintain the progress and maturity already achieved. (7) Right mindfulness or attentiveness concerns the self-mastery of one's total being, the body, feelings and mind. (8) Right meditation and concentration refers to the process of complete detachment from all objects and the concentration of one's being for the achievement of Nirvana. The eighth step assumes the end of karma and rebirth.

The four-noble truths and the eight-fold path contains common insight to the problems of living and how to live in dealing with these problems. Moralists of all ages and cultures have been acquainted with these insights. The different aspect in Buddhism is that it is set forth as a way of getting rid of the cycle of rebirth and attaining Nirvana. Buddhism, therefore, as Gautama formulated it, becomes a philosophy or religion of self-achievement.

E. Criticisms.

Buddhism is a remarkable summary of humanist aspirations. It has influenced several different cultures, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese. It holds the loyalty of almost half a billion people. At its best it is a search for the living of life now and escaping from the cycle of rebirth. Like Hinduism it is pessimistic and world-denying. It has the same problem of denying the real value of personality in that the universe caused persons to be and their individuality stands in way to their being united to Nirvana.

The concept of karma can mean destiny, but it also means bad news for one's attitude toward life. In both Hinduism and Buddhism, the law of karma works without recourse. There is no forgiveness and there is no mercy. Nor is God conceived in either Buddhism or Hinduism as a moral being who is interested in his creation. Even when gods are affirmed in later Mahayana Buddhism, they are not basically different from man. They are beings who have achieved merit but do not enter Nirvana.

Buddhism in its beginning may be described as a great humanistic movement. This is both a compliment and a condemnation. To claim that your destiny is in your own hands is a heady doctrine, but it is also terrifying. The sad truth is that humanity has tended to make a mess of itself.

III. CHINESE PHILOSOPHIES

In China we confront two major native philosophies. Taoism and Confucianism. There were lesser rivals as well as the later introduction of Buddhism into the country. For our purpose we speak only of the two. We will attempt to treat them together. Lao Tzu is often dated as being born around 570 B.C. The date of his death is unknown. He is the alleged author of the classic, Tao Te Ching. The customary dates on Confucius are from 551 to 470 B.C. The thought of both men had great influence upon China. Let's turn to the consideration of their views.

A. Reality.

(1) Taoism.

Taoism is pronounced as though it were spelled "dow-ism." It is easier to describe the universe from the Taoist view than the Confucian because much is said about it. Taoism is a metaphysics of nature. Following nature is a simple motto for life. Nature and the Tao are defined with reference to each other. The Tao, yet, is indefinable. The Tao Te Ching says,

The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao; the name that can be named is not the eternal name. The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth; the named is the mother of all things.¹⁶

The Tao is basic. All things must conform to the Tao and if they do not, although one might be successful for a time in going against the Tao, the ultimate end is destruction. The Tao says, "Man conforms to the earth; the earth conforms to the sky, the sky conforms to the Way, and the Way (Tao) conforms to its own nature."¹⁷ And "what is contrary to the Tao soon perishes."¹⁸

The Tao moves quietly and it is known by intuition. The Taoist model of government is that the less government the better. Both of these ideas are seen in these important statements from the Tao Te Ching.

The Way of Heaven is not to contend and yet to be able to conquer. Not to declare its will and yet to get a response. Not to summon but have things come spontaneously
Tao produces all things It produces them without holding possession of them and raises without lording it over them.¹⁹

The Tao is the model of life. Following the Tao brings harmony and fighting against it brings tragedy, because the Tao always gets its way ultimately. The Tao Te Ching says,

Nature is not benevolent; with ruthless indifference she makes all things serve their purposes, like the straw dogs we use at sacrifices. What is contrary to the Tao soon perishes. He who is self-approving does not shine. He who exalts himself does not rise high. Judged according to the Tao, he is like remnants of food or a tumor on the body--an object of universal disgust.²⁰

(2) Confucius.

Confucius held similar views to Taoism, about the Tao, but with decidedly different emphases. Taoism is more akin to naive romanticism, whereas Confucius is a practical rationalistic humanist. Nature is the model of the Taoist whereas human nature is the model of the Confucians. Yet Confucius could speak of the Tao which is also the ideal of life which included the virtues, social propriety, and music. The Tao gives the basis for government, for human relations and yet stands above government and human relations. The Tao ran through Confucius' philosophy, but he applied it differently than Lao-tzu. In Lao-tzu the Tao led to a simple society without social concerns. In Confucius, the Tao was a "vision of a cooperative world. It was the conviction that antagonism and suspicion, strife and suffering, were largely unnecessary."²¹

The concept of heaven in Confucian thought is similar to the Tao. Heaven is not equated with the Christian idea of the future life. Heaven is an impersonal concept which, in Confucius' mind, gave him approval for his actions. Creel says about Confucius, "He looked upon Heaven, however, as the author of his power, which had entrusted him with a sacred mission as the champion of China's culture."²² The threats of his enemies were discounted because Heaven was against them. The conviction that Heaven approved his action gave comfort in times of despair and a sense of vindication when he was wrongly accused. Heaven may be thought of as an "impersonal ethical force, a cosmic counterpart of the ethical sense in man, a guarantee that somehow there is sympathy with man's sense of right in the very nature of the universe."²³ One can see that it is easy to use Tao and Heaven interchangeably.

As a philosopher, Confucius was not interested in metaphysical questions that later philosophers dealt with. Questions about the nature of knowledge, how it is acquired, how would one know whether something is true or not, the nature of the way and how it is found, and similar questions are not treated by Confucius. Even if treated there would be no single answer since Confucius advocated a consensus opinion in many things, which grows out of the idea of a cooperative society. Metaphysics was not of great interest as we shall see when we look at the idea of God.

B. Man.

(1) Taoism.

Taoism views man and nature together. Man lives in the matrix of nature. Taoism is an example in ancient times of environmentalism. If the environment is good, man will be good, and the opposite is true. Life will be good and man will live well if he is in tune with the Tao. Just as the Tao is the way of peace, if man follows the Tao he will find peace. Lao-tzu's emphasis was primarily on the nature of the Tao and life according to it. When we look at the nature of ethics, among other things, it will be noted that man is a creature of desires. Yet the Tao is without desires. Desire--somewhat like Buddha's view--is the root problem of man's conflict, competition, and need for a moral code. If there were no desires man would not need a code of ethics or government.

(2) Confucius.

By contrast, Confucius said much about man. Confucius had definite ideas about man and the model of the superior man. The superior man was one who knew about names and duties, and whose action was motivated by *jen* (pronounced wren) and guided by *li*. The superior man was a model of the five constant virtues, self-respect, magnanimity, sincerity, earnestness, and benevolence. The superior man is modest, honest, a lover of justice, lives in good taste, and pursues the good because of the nature of good. Confucius was himself a model of the superior man. He said:

At fifteen I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty I stood firm. At forty I had no doubts. At fifty I knew the decrees of Heaven. At sixty my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At 70 I could do what my heart desired without transgressing what was right.²⁴

Confucius' view of man expressed optimism and freedom. He believed that man could achieve the goal of the model and man has the ability to do it. There is no fatalism in Confucius. This model and these ideas were expressed in Creel's summary: "The man who cultivates and practices virtue, who loves the Way and does his best to try to realize it in the world, he has fulfilled the whole duty of man."²⁵ Confucius believed that men of all classes were objects or persons of worth. They must be treated as persons, not things. This was revolutionary for his time. This equality is seen in the model of the cooperative state. Confucius himself was not awed by rank, power, or wealth. Distinctions were warranted between people who studied and were enlightened against those who were unthinking and ignorant. This emphasis on education was basic to Confucius' life, political program, and philosophy of man.

The goodness of man as an idea runs through the philosophy of Confucius and later Confucians. This simple view is applied in a political theory of moral political example. If a ruler is a good person, then from the top down people will begin to be good. He said, "If a country had none but good rulers for a hundred years, crime might be stamped out and the death-penalty abolished. How true this saying is!"²⁶ On another occasion he was asked by a ruler how he should rule. Confucius replied, "To govern is to keep straight. If you, sir, lead the people straight, which of your subjects will venture to fall out of line?" In another conversation he used the analogy of the wind and the grass. It is the nature of the wind, the ruler, to blow upon the grass (the people) which bends with the blowing.

Moreover, there is a good bit of idealism seen in the rectification of names, which means that a prince should be princely, a father should be fatherly, a child should be filially pious. You can live up to your calling.

C. God.

(1) Taoism.

There is nothing higher than the Tao. It is superior to all things and is before all things. The Tao is not transcendent in the sense of God in western thought. The Tao is impersonal and one does not worship the Tao; one meditates on it. The Tao does not respond to persons. One does not think of mercy or forgiveness coming from the Tao. One does not sacrifice to the Tao. The Tao Te Ching does not give us a religion. But some passages have been used to foster the magical phase of Taoism that was interested in alchemy and other areas. The irony of the movement is that Lao-tzu was eventually apotheosized (made into a god) and heavenly associates were created for him. Much of this came from imitation of the Buddhists. Some of the gods in Taoism were deliberately

fabricated for the express purpose of political saving of face. Scriptures were created, monastic groups organized, temples erected, and religious rites carried on for the sake of politics and competition against the influential Buddhists in China.

(2) Confucius.

The views of Confucius about God or gods is somewhat vague. Confucius left few statements on the matter. We are told that he deliberately did not speak about "spirit," the reason being that if one is not able to serve man, how can one possibly serve the spirits. Confucius did say that wisdom is "to attend diligently to concerns which are proper to the people; and to respect the spirits and maintain the proper distance from them."²⁷ His participation in sacrifices appears to have been out of a love for ceremony rather than actually believing in the value of the sacrifices.

He talked about Heaven rather than a personal deity by the name of Ti. Creel summarizes the attitude of Confucius about God.

Here is the key, then, to Confucius' attitude toward religion. He believed in it, apparently, but he was not much interested in it. It had to do with the realm of forces beyond man's control. But Confucius was interested in making over an intolerable world into a good world; what nothing could be done about did not concern him very much.²⁴

Although a thousand years after the death of Confucius an official state cult had grown up with sacrifices and prayers to Confucius, these things are foreign to the way Confucius regarded himself.

D. Values.

(1) Taoism.

The Tao Te Ching is concerned primarily with ethics as related to the Tao. There are certain ethical qualities to be emulated: humility, selflessness, genuineness, non-meddlesomeness, and similar virtues. This idea of *wu-wei*, or inaction, refers also to non-meddlesomeness. *Wu-wei* means to achieve without doing, and has several applications: (1) human relations-- ". . . if one does not meddle with others, human relations will fall as the Tao brings them to pass, naturally and simply. There will be spontaneous birth of true love, real kindness, simplicity, and contentment in the lives and relationships of men . . .;" (2) education-- "without going out of the doors, one can know the whole world. Without peering out of the window one can see the Tao of heaven. The further one travels, the less one knows. Therefore the sage knows everything without traveling; He names everything without seeing it. He accomplishes everything without doing it."²⁹ (3) learning-- "The student learns by daily increment. The Way is gained by daily loss. By letting go, it all gets done;"³⁰ (4) government-- "Tao is eternal, inactive, and yet it leaves nothing undone. If kings and princes could hold fast to this principle, all things would work out their own reformation."³¹

Too much government leads to bureaucracy. Too many laws make people into criminals. The key to inaction's success is eliminating the desire which causes conflict and competition, leading to the necessity of laws and government. The ideal community is sketched in the Tao Te Ching.

Make the people's food sweet, their clothes beautiful, their houses comfortable, their daily life a source of pleasure. Then the people will look at the country over the border, will hear the cocks crowing and the dogs barking there, but right down to old age and the day of their death, they will not trouble to go there (and see what it is like).³²

In summary, the Tao Te Ching presents an idyllic pastoral view of ethics that is optimistic, but unsuccessful in application to Chinese politics.

(2) Confucius.

Confucius centered his ethical ideas around four ideas: *li*, *hsiao*, *yi*, and *jen*. (A) *Li* means propriety, courtesy, religion, rites, reverence, ritual and ceremony as well as a well-ordered society. For our purpose here *li* may be understood as the form, the facade, or course of proper action. It was important for Confucius and he explained to a ruler once that "li is the greatest. Without li, we do not know how to conduct a proper worship of the spirits of the universe or how to establish the proper status of the kings and the ministers, the ruler and the ruled, and the elders and the juniors . . .".³³ Within the context of *li* one can see Confucius' principle of reciprocity: "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others." This so-called Silver Rule is not the same as the Golden Rule. Confucius was asked: "What do you think of repaying evil with kindness?" which would have been more true to the Golden Rule. He replied, "Then what are you going to repay kindness with? . . . Repay kindness with kindness, but repay evil with justice."³⁴

Li relates to the Five Relationship also. They are:

Kindness in the father, filial piety in the son,
Gentility in the eldest brother, humility and respect in the younger,
Righteous behavior in the husband, obedience in the wife,
Humane consideration in elders, deference in juniors,
Benevolence in rulers, loyalty in ministers and subjects.³⁵

The conclusion of Confucius was that where these five relationships are actualized according to *li*, there a harmonious society will result.

(B) *Jen* (wren). If *li* is the form, then *jen* is the motivation for action. *Jen* means magnanimity, benevolence, human-heartedness, goodness. It is the motivation for virtue and if a man has *jen* he will live according to *li*.

(C) *Yi*. *Yi* means righteousness. This is the sense of doing right because of the commanding quality of right itself. As a general rule Confucius believed that right should be pursued as a matter

of principle and not for profit. Nothing was higher than the claim of right with the exception of one situation. If a member of one's family committed murder, would a son shield the father or turn him over to the state. In this case, shielding--the priority of the family loyalty--seems to be the view of Confucius, although one must not push this too far.³⁶

(D) *Hsiao*, or filial piety. This involves reverence for one's family, parents first of all, and then other members according to their respective positions. Loyalty to the family has been one of the trademarks of Confucius' thought. Examples of it are seen in many of the conversations of Confucius. Once he said:

Whilst thy father lives look for his purpose, look how he walked. To change nothing in thy father's way for three years may be called pious. He that can feed his parents is now called a good son. But both dogs and horses are fed, and unless we honor our parents, what is the difference.³⁷

The sense of family solidarity is so intense that one may say that a child never becomes of age in China. The father is the authority both in life and in death. The worship and reverence of ancestors continue the influences of the dead fathers to the present living.

E. Criticisms.

Both Taoism and Confucianism have had great influence on Chinese culture. As philosophies they are not altogether opposites. They both share the idea of the Tao with different applications. We will look at each separately. (1) Taoism lacks depth and insight concerning the nature of the Tao, how it is known, and why it should be followed. To follow nature, or the Tao, is not much more than saying, whatever is, ought to be. It is unfortunate that Taoism arose as a religion later which is contrary to the Tao Te Ching and the views of Lao-tzu. The ethic of the Tao Te Ching is interesting as far as it goes, but it does not have the appeal of the rationalism of Confucius.

(2) Confucianism is much better in its approach to humanism. The rationality of Confucius' views explain why it triumphed over its other rivals including Taoism and ruled China for over 2000 years. But the questions of the human heart are left unanswered and require the entry and contribution of Buddhism to give Chinese life a more adequate religious answer. Confucianism leaves unanswered the questions of life after death and the existence of God. The naive optimism of Confucius' ethic is something that gets to the heart of every romantic person who asks: why can't mankind live in harmony? The analysis of man in both Confucian and Taoist views is inadequate. The problem of evil, and the misery of man need more complete and serious attempts at explanation than one can find in either Confucius or Lao-tzu.

IV. JAPANESE SHINTO

Japanese thought has been influenced by two "foreign" sources, Buddhism and Confucianism. It is difficult to keep a clear perspective on what is specifically Japanese. Writing

was introduced to the Japanese by the Chinese as well as politics and ethics. Shinto, however, is native to Japan and although it was influenced by Buddhism through the centuries, our concern here is with Shinto as it is understood in Japan today.

A. *Reality.*

Shinto has a mythology expressed in the Kojiki (712 A.D.) and the Nihongi (720 A.D.). There is a succession of deities prior to Izanagi (the Male who invites) and Izanami (the Female who is invited). The couple give birth to the Japanese islands by procreation. The last deity born to them is Amaterasu and her younger brother Susano-o-no-mikoto, a mischievous trouble-maker. Later Amaterasu sent her grandson, Ninigi-no-mikoto to bring peace to the Japanese islands. "Ninigi's grandson, Jimmu Tenno, became the first ruler of the Yamato clan and the founder of the Imperial Family still reigning."³⁸ The myth also describes other deities born who become the Japanese people.

The myth does not give an indication of other peoples of the world. It is the basis of the sense of superiority expressed in Japanese history and yet prevalent in current newspaper editorials in Japan.

The myth stresses the goodness of the world, a world in which progress is made from chaos to order, to harmony and unity. All reality is alive in some way. Reality includes the kami (gods) as well as nature in general.

The myth affords an explanation for the corporate attitude in the Japanese view of reality. Not only is there a relationship with the living, but there is a relationship with the dead. The living now recognize the dead. The dead return annually at the Bon festivals and are honored. Reincarnation is not a Shinto doctrine as in Buddhism, or Hinduism. The dead are honored and in turn bestow their blessing on the living.

While the myth itself describes nature from a fairly polytheistic viewpoint, it is not too far from a mild pantheism. The term "mild" is used because there is not a world soul embodying the earth as a reality as Brahman and the world are identified in Hinduism.

B. *Man.*

The common word for "man" is *hito*. Man is not only a child of kami, but he will become a kami. It is possible even to describe man now as a kami. The distinction of contrast between man and kami is hard to draw.³⁹ Man owes his life to the kami, to his ancestors, and man is conceived in thought as good, not as having lost a primordial existence. Man is a direct biological descendent of the kami.

There is no doctrine of original sin as in the West, "no end of the world, no day of final judgement, no souls waiting for deliverance from the stains of sin, and no need for a savior."⁴⁰ Thirty-three years after death the soul becomes a kami, a state of happiness, and assumes the role of protector of the family.

The soul of a baby enters the body of the fetus four months before birth. It is now a human being. This explains the easy attitude toward abortion. If there are no stirrings in the womb, the fetus is not viewed as a living being.

Shinto has not stressed individualism, but the "being-in-community." A person is raised in a community and decisions are made on the basis of community, ancestors, parents, family, peers, the corporation, the University, and the state. Professor Ono has written, "Man is born with a purpose, a mission, in life. On the one hand, he has the responsibility of realizing the hopes and ideals of his ancestors. On the other hand, he has the inescapable duty of treating his descendents with even greater love and care, so that they too realize the hopes and ideals of the ancestral spirits. Reverence for ancestors must never be neglected. It is the only way in which man's life can be lived which will fulfill the reason for his coming into this world."⁴¹

Man's life has been more structured in Japanese society than Western societies. There is strong emphasis placed on "harmonious integration (wa) of group members."⁴² This integration takes place within the group to which one belongs, not across groups. The individual has little chance to learn sociability with people in general or in other groups. It would be awkward for a politician to have a conversation with a professor. There is little communication between intellectuals of various disciplines.

Japan has been a man's world and still is in many ways. Women could not climb the sacred mountain of Fuji until 1868. They are still prohibited from other sacred areas, mostly because of menstrual impurity. The ideal goal for a woman is to marry, raise a family, and care for her husband. Boys have been spoiled from youth up and the wife is supposed to continue this role in marriage.

Man has a responsibility toward the kami, his ancestors, and society, but when it is understood that man and the kami are the same, there can be no worship in the Western sense, only reverence and respect. Shinto is a racial religion, linked closely with the Japanese customs and ways of thinking. The central focus is the kami.

C. God.

The word kami means god. What is a kami? The most oft-quoted description is that of Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) who confessed ignorance on the subject but then continued with one of the most elaborate definitions in writing.

I do not yet understand the meaning of the term, kami. Speaking in general, however, it may be said that kami signifies, in the first place, the deities of heaven and earth that appear in the ancient records and also the spirits of the shrines where they are worshipped. It is hardly necessary to say that it includes human beings. It also includes such objects as birds, beasts, trees, plants, seas, mountains, and so forth. In ancient usage, anything whatsoever which was outside the ordinary, which possessed superior power or which was awe-inspiring was called kami. Eminence here does not refer merely to the superiority of

nobility, goodness, or meritorious deeds. Evil and mysterious things, if they are extraordinary and dreadful, are called kami. It is needless to say that among human beings who are called kami the successive generations of sacred emperors are all included. The fact that emperors are also called "distant kami" is because, from the standpoint of common people, they are far separated, majestic, and worthy of reverence. In a lesser degree we find, in the present as well as in the ancient times, human beings who are kami. Although they may not be accepted throughout the whole country, yet in each province, each village, and each family there are human beings who are kami, each one according to his own proper position. The kami of the divine age were for the most part human beings of that time, and because the people of that time were all kami, it is called the Age of the Gods (kami).⁴³

Sokyo Ono agreed with Motoori's description and added, "To put it succinctly, the deities of Shinto are not supernatural absolute beings, but rather spiritualizations of all things in the Universe."⁴⁴

There are said to be eighty myriads of kami. This is the Japanese way of describing innumerable existences. The better known kami venerated in the more than 80,000 shrines is about 2,500. Kami come and go in the minds of people.

One may readily see the contrast of views about God from that in the West. Shinto is not monotheistic. There is no Supreme being, only beings; no Creator, but creators in a limited sense, and no creation *ex nihilo*.

Belief in kami varies from the country to the city, with the rural areas having a greater positive response to accepting kami belief. Science and education have made inroads against believing in the kami. Secularism has increased to the point where one prominent Shintoist complained, "We are raising a nation of atheists in Japan."⁴⁵

D. Values.

The lack of an ethical system has created considerable feuding in the past between Chinese and Japanese scholars. The Chinese ridiculed the Japanese for lacking a system, a set of rules, and regarded the Japanese as little better than barbarians. The Japanese defended themselves by maintaining that only a decadent people needed an ethical system. The Japanese lived natural lives that conformed to virtue without the necessity of having to teach it.

Shinto ideology is that "man by nature is inherently good, and the world in which he lives is good. This is the kami-world . . . That by which good and evil can be distinguished is the soul of man. This distinction is made possible by the help of the kami."⁴⁶

In light of the above, there is no set of commandments, a la Ten Commandments, nor is there a prophet or legislator in the manner of Moses.

Japanese society is geared to a relative morality. The Ancient myths centered on civil wrongs relating to agriculture such as the breaking down of division of rice fields, filling up irrigation ditches and the like. Shinto itself does not condemn adultery or dishonesty as an absolute. There are sayings like "even a thief may be 30 percent right."⁴⁷

The situation ethic may be seen in the experiences of WW II when Japanese were taken prisoner. "Some men asked to be killed, `but if your customs do not permit this, I will be a model prisoner."⁴⁸ These men helped in locating ammunition dumps, military targets, etc.

Loyalty has been a prime virtue in Japanese history, but some of this comes from Buddhist influences in the Bushido code: loyalty to the Emperor, to the ancestors, family, corporation. This is expressed in the concept of *bun*, or portion. A person is a fraction, a part, a share of society. One's *bun* may involve the idea of reciprocity, or the word *on*. Reciprocity involves gift-giving as well as other sacrifices that one may make for the ancestors or family.

Japanese have been known for honesty. What accounts for it? "The deep concern for one's honor and still more so the honor of one's family is also a very effective substitute for a list of do's and don'ts. `Honor is the only tie that binds the Japanese to the ethical world."⁴⁹

To achieve honor fulfills a sense of destiny, to fail in honor has frequently lead to suicide.

E. Assessments.

It is difficult to assess another culture as an outsider, but there are some questions one raises. The first area relates to the fundamental issue of reality--the kami. The kami are little different than humans, and while respect is to be given to all humans, veneration and worship is not warranted. Without doubt people do pray and seek the favor of the kami, and this creates the ultimate issue of idolatry. From a Western stance one should not worship a product of one's hands, a creature, something that is not ultimate.

Many Westerners have also adopted a situation ethic and this poses few problems to them. But there are others who view the lack of a normative ethical code as a serious problem.

The chart on the following page may help to sort out the different emphases of the four views of the Orient.

V Islamic Philosophy

Moahmmed ibn Abdallah ibn Abd al-Muttalig (570-632) was born in Mecca and is the founder of the religion called Islam. The details of his life can be read elsewhere. Our concern here it to put together a portrait of the ideology based on our four headings, Reality, Man, God, and Values. The sources will be the Qur'an and the Hadiths (traditions).

There is a real problem regarding the history of Islam and Mohammed as well as the Qur'an. There are no contemporary documents from the alleged time of Mohammed. No record of Muhammad's reported death in 632 appears until more than a century after that date. Check the last paragraph below on Assessments.

A. Reality. The basic beginning point of reality is that it is created by Allah according to the Qur'an. "Surely your Lord is God, who created the heavens and the earth in six days, then sat Himself upon the Throne, covering the day with the night it pursues urgently and the sun and the moon, and the stars subservient, by His command." (7.054 Arberry Translation) However, in another sura we have a different statement. "Say, 'What do you disbelieve in Him who created the earth in two days, and do you set up compeers to Him? That is the Lord of all Being.'" (41.009) Yet another verse says, "And He set therein firm mountains over it, and He blessed it, and He ordained therein its diverse sustenance in four days, equal to those who ask." (41.010)

Apart from the uncertainty about how long creation took, there is a contingent dualism for reality. Allah is said to be eternal and the world is created.

B. Man. Man is created. "We created man of an extraction of clay, then We set him, a drop, in a receptacle secure, then We created of the drop a clot then We created of the clot a tissue then We created of the tissue bones then We garmented the bones in flesh; thereafter We produced him as another creature. So blessed be God, the fairest of creators!" (23.012-014) Another verse indicates similar ideas. "He is the knower of the Unseen and the Visible, the All-mighty, the All-compassionate, who has created all things well. And He originated the creation of man out of clay, then He fashioned his progeny of an extraction of mean water, then He shaped him, and breathed His spirit in him. And he appointed for you hearing, and sight, and hearts, little thanks you show." (32.006-009)

"Mankind, fear your Lord, who created you of a single soul, and from it created its mate, and from the pair of them scattered abroad many men and women; and fear God by whom you demand one of another, and the wombs, surely God ever watches over you." (4.001)

The story of man's creation is re-told many times in the Qur'an. In some ways it is similar to the story in Genesis in the Bible, but there is a strange twist. The Qur'an tells of the creation of man, but then Allah commands the angels to bow to Adam. All of the angels did so, except Iblis (Satan) who argued that he was better than Adam. Iblis claimed that he was created of fire, but Adam was created of clay. For this refusal Iblis was banished from Allah's presence. (7.010-014)

The actual creation of man is described in various ways. Sura 22.005 says, "O mankind! If ye are in doubt concerning the Resurrection, then lo! We have created you from dust, then from a drop of seed, then from a clot, then from a little lump of flesh shapely and shapeless, that We may make (it) clear for you. And We cause what We will to remain in the wombs for an appointed time, and afterward We bring you forth as infants, then (give you growth) that ye attain your full strength. And among you there is he who dieth (young) and among you there is he who is brought back to the most abject time of life, so that, after knowledge, he knoweth naught."

Sura 23.012 declares "verily We created man from a product of wet earth." Sura 23.014 continues, "then fashioned We the drop a clot, then fashioned We the clot a little lump, then fashioned We the little lump bones, then clothed the bones with flesh, and then produced it as another creation." (Pickthall) A different Sura gives a different picture, "So let man consider from

what he is created. He is created from a gushing fluid that issues from between the loins and the ribs” (86.005-007-Pickthall).

From the Muslim perspective, man is born sinless and innocent. There is no implication of Adam's sin and the rest of the human race.

The Qur'an indicates that Allah could have kept mankind from sinning if he wanted to, but did not. Sura 32.013 claims “And if We had so willed, We could have given every soul its guidance, but the word from Me concerning evildoers took effect: that I will fill hell with Jinn and mankind together.

Man's duty is to observe the commands of Allah. There is no relationship between Allah and people as that between a Father and a Son. Allah is only concerned about obedience and hates evil doers.

“Allah hath blighted usury and made almsgiving fruitful. Allah loveth not the impious and guilty.” (2:276)

Man faces the judgment day that Mohammed began preaching early in his career. This judgment will depend upon man's deeds. Sura 021.047 says, “And We set a just balance for the Day of Resurrection so that no soul is wronged in aught. Though it be of the weight of a grain of mustard seed, We bring it. And We suffice for reckoners? Sura 25.070 says, “Save him who repenteth and believeth and doth righteous work; as for such, Allah will change their evil deeds to good deeds. Allah is every Forgiving, Merciful.”

The judgment day concerns who will be in hell. The answer of Islam is that 99% of the people will be in hell. (Sahih al-Bukhari 4.567). Allah is the one who decides, not the person, 007:178 “He whom Allah leadeth, he indeed is led aright, while he whom Allah sendeth astray - they indeed are losers”

The story about the female part of the human race is even more dismal. “Narrated Abu Said Al-Khudri, “Once Allah's Apostle went out to the Musalia (to offer the prayer) of Id-al-Adha or Al-Fitr prayer. Then he passed by the women and said, “O women! (Give alms, as I have seen the majority of the dwellers of Hell were you (women) they asked, “Why is it so, O Allah's Apostle?” He replied, “You curse frequently and are ungrateful to your husbands. I have not seen anyone more deficient in intelligence and religion than you. A cautious sensible man could be led astray by some of you.” The women asked, “O Allah's Apostle, what is deficient in our intelligence and religion?” He said, “Is not the evidence of two women equal to the witness of one man?” They replied in the affirmative. He said, “This is the deficiency in her intelligence. Isn't it true that a woman can neither pray nor fast during her menses? The women replied in the affirmative. He said, “This is the deficiency in her religion.” (Sahih Bukhari 1.301, Sahih Bukhari 2:541) There are several other hadiths that deliver the same message about women. (Sahih Bukhari 1.28; Sahih Bukhari 2.541.

Ironically, Mohammed declared that women are inferior in their intelligence, in their value as a witness, and now these statements are circular in nature. Unfortunately, the women are good Muslims who believed what he taught and could not reject his reasoning.

C. God.

Islam professes to believe in monotheism, one deity whose name is Allah. Allah means “the God.” Who is the God of Islam. This is controversial at least to non-Muslims. Mecca, the home of Mohammed, was a polytheistic center involving the worship of 360 gods and goddesses.

In the beginning of his role as a prophet Mohammed described himself as a warner who preached about the judgment of God to come. After the move to Medina Mohammed became a “relentless warrior intent on spreading his religion by the sword.” (Ali Dashti, 23 years, a study of the prophet career of Mohammed, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda publishers, 1994, p.81)

After a period of time Mohammed returned to Mecca with an army and took it. He went to the Ka’ba , destroyed the idols and announced that henceforth there would be the worship of one God. He did not announce a new deity but only one. Was it one of the 360 gods of Mecca’s past or was it the God of the Bible. Muslims seek to align their belief in God with the Bible, but the events of the entry into Mecca raises other questions. It is known that the god Nannar was a popular deity in Mecca.

- A. “Allah was known to the pre-Islamic Arabs and it was one of the Meccan deities.” (H.Gibb, Encyclopedia of Islam, I. 46)
- B. “The origin of the name Allah goes back before Mohammed” Along with Allah, however, they worshipped a host of lesser goes and ‘daughters of Allah.’” (Anthony Mercattante, The Facts on File Encyclopedia of World Mythology and Legend, I.41)
- C. “There is no reason, therefore, to accept that Allah passed to the Muslims from the Jews and Christians.” (Caesar Farah, Islam: Beliefs and Observations, p. 28)
- D. “According to Middle East Scholar E.M. Wherry, in pre-Islamic times, Allah-worship, as well as worship of Baal, were both astral religions in that they involved the worship of the stars, the sun and the moon.” (A Comprehensive Commentary on the Quran. P.36)

The monotheism of Islam is compromised by the doctrine that the Qur’an is uncreated and eternal. The vast majority of Muslims who follow the teachings of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (c.855) accept the concept that the Qur’an is uncreated and eternal. It is not Allah, but having the attributes of eternity and being uncreated makes it another God.

E. Values

In addition to the belief in one God whose prophet is Mohammed, there are some practices that a Muslim should do. One must pray 5 times a day facing Mecca. Zakat is the giving of alms. The Qur’an describes this, “The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah, and (for) the wayfarer, a duty imposed by Allah. Allah is Knower, Wise.” (9:060)

Another pillar of Isalm is the pilgrimage to Mecca. “Perform the pilgrimage and the visit (to Makka) for Allah. And if ye are prevented, then send such gifts as can be obtained with ease, and shave not your heads until the gifts have reached their destination. And whoever among you is sick or hath an ailment of the head must pay a ransom of fasting or almsgiving or offering.”(2:169)

The last of the five pillars is to fast for the month of Ramadan. “The month of Ramadan in which was revealed the Qur’an, a guidance for mankind, and clear proofs of the guidance, and the Criterion (or right and wrong). And whosoever of you is present let him fast the month, and whosoever of you is sick or on a journey, (let him fast the same) number of other days.” (2:185)

There are a number of mandates in the Qur’an which relate to values. Many of these are very negative and harsh. James Arlandson has cataloged them as follows:

*"Anyone who accuses someone else of sexual sin must bring four witnesses, if not, he gets eighty lashes. (24.4)

*Husbands are a degree above their wives in status (2:228), reliable hadiths say that the majority of the inhabitants of hell are women due only because of their "harshness and ingratitude," not because of their numerical majority around the globe.

*A male gets a double share of the inheritance over that of a female. (4.11)

*A woman's testimony counts half of a man's testimony because she may "forget"(2:282) Reliable hadiths say this law is based on the "deficiency of a woman's mind."

*A wife may remarry her ex-husband if and only if she marries another man, they have sex, and then this second man divorces her. (2:230)

*Mohammed has special marriage privileges (as many women as he desires), which only he enjoys. (33.50)

*A Muslim man may be polygamous with up to four wives (4.3)

*Mohammed gets twenty percent from his seventy-four raids and wars in ten years (8.1,41).

*Mohammed bought off converts (9.60).

*Husbands may hit their wife or wives. (4:34)

*Mature men may marry and consummate their marriage with prepubescent girls (65.4).

*Slavery is endorsed. Mohammed himself traded in slaves and owned black slaves, and Muslim men may have sex with slave-girls. (47.4; 4.24;23.5-6; 79.29-30)

*Sexual sinners must be whipped (24.2) and sound hadiths say adulterers and homosexuals must be executed.

*Critics of Islam and Muslims may be killed (33.59-61)

*The Qur'an endorses the massacre of Jewish men and pubescent boys and the enslavement of the women and children. (33.25-27).

*Jihadist buy status in this life and in the afterlife (4.74; 4.95-96; 9.38-44; 86-87, and 111.; 61.19-11)

*Polytheists in the Arabian Peninsula had to convert or die. (9.5)

Mohammed is the first to launch his own Crusade long before Europeans responded with their own. (9.29) http://www.answering-islam.org/authors/arlandson/saud_dialogue2.htm

While many of the above features relate primarily to Muslims there are laws that relate to non-believers, whose status was called Dhimmitude or Zimmis as below. This is regarded as protection money from Muslims and they have to pay an extra tax to have this protection.

1. Zimmis are not allowed to build new churches, temples, or synagogues. They are allowed to renovate old churches or houses of worship provided they do not allow to add any new construction. "Old churches" are those which existed prior to Islamic conquests and are included in a peace accord by Muslims. Construction of any church, temple, or synagogue in the Arab Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) is prohibited. It is the land of the Prophet and only Islam should prevail there. Yet Muslims, if they wish, are permitted to demolish all non-Muslim houses of worship in any land they conquer.
2. Zimmis are not allowed to pray or read their sacred books out loud at home or in churches, lest Muslims hear their prayers.
3. Zimmis are not allowed to print their religious books or sell them in public places and markets. They are allowed to publish them and sell them among their own people, in their churches and temples.
4. Zimmis are not allowed to install the cross on their houses or churches since it is a symbol of infidelity.
5. Zimmis are not permitted to broadcast or display their ceremonial religious rituals on radio or television or to use the media or to publish any picture of their religious ceremonies in newspaper and magazines.
6. Zimmis are not allowed to congregate in the streets during their religious festivals, rather, each must quietly make his way to his church or temple.
7. Zimmis are not allowed to join the army unless there is indispensable need for them in which case they are not allowed to assume leadership positions but are considered mercenaries.
Source: Samuel Shahid, Rights of Non-Muslims in an Islamic State, www.answering-islamd.org/NonMuslims/rights.htm.

The rules above relate to those in dhimmitude. There are even more restrictive dhimmitude rules for Jews. These rules have been in force for centuries and one of the recent examples comes from Persia in the 1880's.

1. The Jews are forbidden to leave their houses when it rains or snows (to prevent the impurity of the Jews being transmitted to the Shiite Muslims)
2. Jewish women are obliged to expose their faces in public (like prostitutes).
3. The men must not wear fine clothes, the only material permitted them being a blue cotton fabric.
4. They are forbidden to wear matching shoes.

5. Every Jew is obliged to wear a piece of red cloth on his chest.
6. A Jew must never overtake a Muslim on a public street.
7. He is forbidden to talk loudly to a Muslim.
8. A Jewish creditor of a Muslim must claim his debt in a quavering and respectful manner.
9. If a Muslim insults a Jew, the latter must drop his head and remain silent.
10. It is forbidden to build fine edifices.
11. It is forbidden for him to have a house higher than that of his Muslim neighbor.
12. It is forbidden for him to leave the town or enjoy the fresh air of the countryside.
13. A Jew suspected of drinking spirits must not appear in the street; if he does, he should be put to death immediately.
14. Weddings must be celebrated in the greatest secrecy.
15. Jews must not consume good fruit.(Source: Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi, Madison,NJ: Fairleigh-Dickinson Press, 2005, p. 336)

There are a number of other restrictions on Jews but this gives one an indication of the hatred for the Jews which began with Mohammed in Medina.

E. Assessments

Thirty years ago one hardly knew or heard of Muslims in the US. Since 9/11 and the attacks on USA facilities in various parts of the world, we have become aware of Islam. There are a number of concerns.

First, Western culture as we have known it is under attack. Western civilization with its emphasis on freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom for women, and freedom of thought are at risk with the growing militancy of Islam.

Second, Islam is not a religion of peace. It is peace only for the Muslims in a Muslim culture. There is a paradoxical statement that a “good Muslim is a bad Muslim, and a bad Muslim is a good Muslim.” Osama bin Laden is the example of the bad Muslim who is the good Muslim.

Third, women are the big losers in the Islamic culture. In some Muslim cultures they are denied education as under the Taliban, in other cultures they may have an education but not be able to use it. Their subordinate position deprives them of legal redress in rape cases, in

inheritance, in freedom of movement, in those countries where they cannot go out of the house without their father, brother, or close relative. In many Muslim cultures female circumcision is practiced on young girls.

Fourth, in its history Islam has been anti-scientific except in the area of astronomy, needed for correct prayer times, and math. The zero was not invented by Muslims but by Indians. Muslims transmitted the works of Greek authors in philosophy, medicine, and science, but did not make progress because the only knowledge worth teaching was in the Qur'an.

Fifth, there have been several volumes published denying the historical person of Mohammed. What the Modern Martyr Should Know: Seventy-Two Grapes and Not a Single Virgin: The New Picture of Islam by Norbert G. Pressburg, Robert Spencer, Did Mohammed Exist? and The Quest for the Historical Muhammad by Ibn Warraq. They conclude that there is no historical evidence from the period of time that Mohammed is said to have lived, and traditions arise many decades later with conflicting stories.

Sixth, Islam has not been subjected to historical criticism as has Judaism and Christianity. Dr. Jay Smith has a video made in Hong Kong and more information can be seen on it. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQ611NSxfCk>

Muslims believe that Muhammed was born about 570 to a mother named Aminab. He was born in Mecca and in 610 he began receiving revelations in Mecca which are the more friendly revelations, but in 622 to 632 he received what are called the Medinan revelations. He returned to conquer Mecca in 630 and died in 632 possibly by poisoning.

Problems:

“None of this was written down during the time of Muhammad at all. None of it was written down in the same century as Muhammad. None of it was written during this period following Muhammad. The first person to write down the story of Muhammad, the Sira, is named Ibn Ishaq who died in 765. We don't have Ibn Ishaq's material. It doesn't exist today. We are only told about it by this man, Ibn Hisham who died in 833, in the ninth century.

“Everything we know about Muhammad, what he did, what he was doing in Medina, what he was doing in Mecca, ...the entire classical account about who Muhammad was and how Islam began, is first written down in the ninth century.”

Muhammed's sayings are even more problematic. If you want to go to Muhammed's sayings you need to go al-Bukhari who died in 870. He is the first man to write down what Muhammed said. It is said that 600,000 sayings were

given to him, and he threw out all but 7400 sayings. It was written down 249 years after Muhammed's death. "If you want to get the other hadiths, like Sahih Muslim or Ibn Dawood, or even Al-Tirmidhi, they all come after al-Bukhari. Did Islam began as we have been told? Is there a city of Mecca? Was this the original holy city? Did the Qibla originally face Mecca?

Conclusions from these questions:

First of all, they say that the first Arab inscription referencing Muhammed does not exist until 691. There are no references to Muhammed in any Arab sources prior to 691. The first reference to a religion called Islam is not until 691. It is first introduced on the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.

The first reference to Mecca, THE CITY OF MECCA is not until 741 (think about that) There is no reference to that city anywhere in the century that he lived and the first biography, as already seen, within Islamic sources until 833. But there were Arabs conquering cities but never called Muslims . They called themselves Saracens, Hagarenes, Ishmaelites, or Muhajiroun. They were nomadic.

Guess when she (Dr. Patricia Crone) found the first reference to Mecca in any documentation.

It was on the Apocalypse of pseudo-Methodius Continuato Byzantia Arabica written in 741.

Muhammad died in 632, was born in 570 supposedly in the city that no one ever heard about before.

And for over 100 years after Muhammad's death, there is no reference to this city at all.

The first map that you will see Mecca finally displayed on it is not till 900 AD, that's the 10th century

Why do all the Qiblas face Petra for the first 100 years, then are confused the next 100, and aren't standardized to Mecca until 822, 200 years too late?

Take a look where Petra is. (video map)

It's right in the center of all the trade.

So, what is Petra?

Well, it was the sanctuary of the Umayyads.

It was a sanctuary before that of the Nabateans.
 The Nabateans were ones that controlled Petra.
 When you go to Petra today, you will see.
 It's where there are tombs and temples. And it was the center of Nabateans.
 The Nabateans were there from the second century BC.
 They controlled that whole area.
 They were the ones that give us Arabic.
 Arabic language comes from the Nabataean language.
 The name for God in Arabic is Allah.
 Allah is a Nabataean god.
 Allah is the name of the Nabataean god.
 They are seen as their superior god.
 Also, Hubal is another name.
 It's another formal name for Allah.
 Interestingly, the Nabataean Allah has a wife named al-Lat and al- 'Uzza.
 Whoo, do, do, do, do, do, which means Allah has a wife.
 I had no idea, which means the Nabataean Allah is a pagan god and a polytheistic god.”

Islam is not a historical religion. The facts indicate a polytheistic religion that has evolved over centuries from a false pagan religion.

The following tables will have to summarize the different views.

| | |
|----------|----------|
| Hinduism | Buddhism |
|----------|----------|

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>Reality: Brahma-Atman One universe spirit Nature is illusion</p> <p>Man: tat tvam asi-that art thou Man is one with Brahma Man must seek union with Brahma</p> <p>God: all is divine All is brahma-atman Pantheism leads to polytheism</p> <p>Values: non-injury, ahimsa Dharma-moral law followed for Moksha,release</p> | <p>Annica-impermanence Matter is changing Friendly materialism</p> <p>A composite of skandhas Man is impermanent—reincarnation also Goal is nirvana</p> <p>Practical atheism Later Buddhism has savior beings.</p> <p>Desire is cause of suffering Nirvana is state of non-desire Four noble truths and the eightfold path</p> |
| Taoism | Confucianism |
| <p>Reality: Tao is basic Tao equals nature</p> <p>Man: Desire is man’s problem Ancient environmentalism Man is basically good</p> <p>God: Nothing higher than Tao No worship of Tao</p> <p>Values: model of wu-wei Inaction Laissez-fairie</p> | <p>Tao is important Heaven rules world Non-metaphysical</p> <p>Confucius interested in superior man Li and Jen important for determining good man Man is basically good</p> <p>Believed in will of “heaven.” Non-religious</p> <p>Li, Hsiao, yi, jen</p> |

| | |
|----------|---|
| Shinto | |
| Reality: | Matter is born of the kami Japanese people are good All living beings have an affinity |
| Man: | Man is born good Man is a being-in-community vs. individualism Structured society |
| God: | Many kami Polytheistic pantheism. People become kamis 33 years after death. |
| Values: | No “system” of ethics Relativism Group oriented ethic Honor is key to morality |
| Islam | |
| Reality: | Allah created the world in 2 or 6 days Reality is a dualism with Allah eternal and the world created. |
| Man: | Allah created mankind Man is born sinless and innocent Majority of women will be in hell because of ingratitude to husbands |
| God: | Strict monotheism, strong rejection of Christian trinity. Debate on who Allah is, moon god or God of the Old Testament The Qur’an is uncreated and eternal |
| Values: | Muslims pray 5 times a day, give alms, pilgrimage to Mecca once in a Lifetime, if possible, fast at Ramadan. Jihad, convert the infidel, or kill the infidel, or reduce the infidel to Subordinate position of dhimmitude. |

For Further Study

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Footnotes

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Chapter XVI

Post-Modernism: the New relativism

Post-modernism is an emphasis in thinking that has been influenced by literary scholars who claimed that language does not refer to anything generally. Words have no objective meaning and cannot give us objective truth. Language is a cultural creation and reflects what people have done. The implication is that people have constructed language for the purpose of creating power for themselves over other people.

The Declaration of Independence has been used as an example: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights' that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The Post-modern mindset is suspicious of language. So meaning is sought behind the text, hence the term deconstruction. The Declaration talks about all men are created equal, but women are excluded. All are to have liberty, but Thomas Jefferson owned slaves, and women were not allowed to vote for a long time, and slavery did not end until after the Civil war. On the surface the document appears a noble work of human thought, but from the Post-modern mindset it is a power document giving rights to some, but deny them to others.

One might ask: what would have happened if there had been no Declaration of Independence? Would women have equality with men? Would slavery have been rejected? It was on the basis of the document that slavery was rejected. What would human rights be now without the Declaration of Independence?

One of the ironies of post-modernism is this: they say there is no objective meaning in words, but they insist that everyone else understand them. Post-modernism gives us a new relativism and it has become the permeating influence in our universities. As such we can look at certain major effects of the philosophy.

I. Relativism concerning truth

1. All truth claims are rejected because they are regarded as a "cover up for power plays." (Veith, Postmodern Thought, p. 56) Post-modernism rejects reason as a means of establishing objective truth, science is under attack because it claims to have objective truth, and the truths of philosophy and theology are suspect.

Since there is no objective truth, how can one describe claims to truth? Knowledge is regarded as information arranged in different paradigms. We have had the term "paradigm shift" which gives one different ways of accounting for the so-called "facts."

Let me give you a simple example of two different paradigms that relate to the modern controversy one reads about in the newspaper. If you toured the Grand Canyon the naturalist there would tell you that the Canyon came about over a period of 10 million years or so due to water and wind erosion. That is an explanation based on the idea that change takes place over a

long period of time. If you were to hear a young earth geologist talk about the grand canyon, he might tell you that this massive canyon came into existence in a catastrophic event due to an earthquake or some similar event not too long ago, certainly not 10 million years. The point is this: the paradigm that one adopts determines how the "facts" are to be interpreted.

Postmodernism seeks to dismantle the paradigm of modernism. Modernism involves some of these features: There is a rational conscious self (and all people are like this) that knows itself and the world thru reason, or rationality and this is objective knowledge. (2) By investigation this rational self can acquire knowledge about the world that is true regardless of who acquires it. The knowledge of science is regarded as true and unchanging, if it is true in the first place. (3) This knowledge generally leads to progress and can be analyzed by science (rationally) and improved.

These and other ideas are rejected by post-modernism. Truth does not exist because we are only talking about competing stories. The old stories are regarded as stories used to put the elite into power. The new stories are designed to put the "marginal" groups into power. Those who have been excluded from power--"women, homosexuals, blacks, Native Americans, and other victims of oppression"(Veith, p. 37) are to be put into the center of the new paradigms, or stories. Afro-centrism is to replace "Euro-centrism" as the pinnacle of civilization. Patriarchal religions are to be replaced with matriarchal religions, Yahweh is to be replaced with Sophia, the materialistic view of nature is to be replaced with Gaia.

If we concede that the old stories were wrong, what makes the new stories right? Since there is no ultimate truth, there is only a struggle for power. Post-modernists are not looking for truth, they are looking for power. Post-modernist have given up the search for truth for the search for power and influence. They have given up rationality for intimidation.

2. If we give up truth and the search for truth it will come back to haunt us. We have a profound distrust of politicians, and we know they are telling everyone what each wants to hear. But if we look at this on a personal level we can see the implications for the broad picture. If a child tells a parent one thing and has decided to do another thing already, the parent does not want the child to lie. The child would not want the parent to lie to it. You and the banker both want to agree on the amount of money you have in the bank. If the trooper says that you were doing 60 in a 30 mile zone, and you were only doing 30, you would think it malicious to give you a ticket when you are innocent. Doing unto others as you would have them do unto you....means telling the truth, being trustworthy in truth.

If truth is rejected in the home, there is no trust. If truth is rejected in the business place, there is no trust. If truth is rejected in government, there is no trust. If truth is rejected in religion, there is no trust.

3. Truth is first of all, a person, I am the way, the Truth....said Jesus. Truths are important because He is a God of truth. Jesus said, "..but whoever lives by the truth comes into the light, so that it may be seen plainly that what he has done has been done through God." (John 3:22) He told the woman at the well in Samaria that those who worship God must worship in Spirit and in truth. (John 4:25) It does make a difference which camp one is in. Jesus said,"If you hold to my teaching, you are really my disciples. Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free."(John 8:31-32)

There are people who don't want the truth, they enjoy the power they have and do not want to give it up even for the truth. This is illustrated in the encounter of Jesus with the Pharisees "As it is, you are determined to kill me, a man who has told you the truth that I heard from God. Abraham did not do such things."(John 8:40) What is happening in cultural relativism is only another example of the truth of Jesus' words, Jesus said he would give us another counselor, " the Spirit of truth. The world cannot accept him, because it neither sees him nor knows him. But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you." (John 14:17) Jesus prayed for his followers and indicated that God's word is truth: "Sanctify them by the truth; your word is truth".(John 17:17)

The book of Romans has a serious indictment about the history of man and it has implications with regard to post-modernism. Mankind "exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served created things rather than the Creator--who is forever praised. Amen."(1:25) Christians are to live " by setting forth the truth plainly (so that we)may commend ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God."(I Cor. 2:4)

Christians are commanded to humility in their claim for truth. We are to speak the truth in love, that we will in all things grow up into him who is the Head, that is, Christ."(Eph 4:15) There is no basis for going to war with people who disagree with you.

You must keep in mind that many reject truth in the world today. They will say, that is true for you, but it is not true for me. Jesus responded to Pilate about the nature of truth, " I came into the world, to testify to the truth. Everyone on the side of truth listens to me."(John 18:37) If they don't listen to Jesus, they won't listen to you. But you must stand firm for truth.

II. Relativism concerning morality

1. It seems like one can prove anything from polls. In one poll it is claimed that 66 percent of Americans" believe that there is no such thing as absolute truth." (p.16) Among young people between 18 and 25, the number is higher reaching 72 percent claiming they do not believe in absolute truth. More alarming is the part of the poll relating to evangelical Christian and 53% of those claim that there are no absolute truths.(ibid) An absolute truth is that which does not change from culture to culture, or from person to person, or from time to time. If a statement is true in 800 BC it will be true in 3000 AD.

2. How did such an attitude toward relativism in morality arise?

The Post-modernists view reality as something that humans have constructed with their language. Morality is a product of our language and does not refer to anything objective. Moreover, since language is an expression of power the old morality was seen as a power play by some over others, men over women, straight people over homosexuals, free over slaves, etc.

3. Since there is no objective reality, as in the Christian view that God is Creator and Moral Legislator, one makes moral decisions based on feeling or desire. No one has a right to criticize my decisions, my choices, and my desires. On the other hand, the postmodernist wants approval for their actions regardless of what they are. Because of this, the cardinal virtue of the postmodern age is tolerance. Even tolerance may not be enough since acceptance is desired. The Homosexual agenda wants their lifestyle regarded as an alternative lifestyle on par with the heterosexual lifestyle. Should you reject their lifestyle, you are being homophobic, judgmental, narrow minded, dogmatic, arrogant in claiming you only have the truth. "The only wrong idea is to believe in truth; the only sin is to believe in sin." (Ibid.p. 196)

4. There is an unusual turn in postmodern morality. PM can speak of collective guilt while minimizing personal individual guilt. The person is a product of the culture and its language. My membership in this group-culture, involves me in guilt for things that I have no involvement with. White people are made to feel guilt over the way our ancestors treated the Indians, slaves, women, and while people should be involved in redressing these past injustices. Some of these people who are descendants want compensation for the suffering of their parents, but they have not suffered themselves. (p.,197)

This does pose a serious problem. If there are no moral absolutes why should PM think that any wrong has been done? If justice is only a language fiction, why should we compensate people for something that is not really wrong? Calls for justice for all people is only another display of power. One power group over against another power group.

5. What are the consequences of relativism in morality? It leads to chaos in society. Think of the change from the past. The Pill became a symbol of freedom for women. The pill detached sex from children, then from marriage, and then people lived together without getting married, then women wanted to have children without a husband, and the breakdown of the family came about. Along with the promiscuity came the AIDs plague, and when this threatened people they turned increasingly to "virtual sex" in pornography, phone sex, and the computer. This is the final dehumanization of sexuality.

Sexuality is not the only casualty. One young woman said: "I belong to the Blank Generation. I have no beliefs. I belong to no community, tradition, or anything like that. I'm lost in this vast, vast world. I belong nowhere. I have absolutely no identity." (p.72)

This describes many people who have lost their directions, their stability, and meaning. The book of Judges gives an example of a very relativistic view in the Old Testament. "Each person did that which was right in their own eyes." Modern anthropologists built upon the idea that diverse cultures are valid and came to the same conclusion. In modern times a philosophic emphasis called logical positivism claimed that moral standards cannot be verified by science. In this case, since the idea of wrongness in the statements like "rape is wrong" cannot be verified, then I can only talk about my "feelings" that rape is wrong. If someone "felt" that rape is ok, there is no scientific verification for that. This movement reduced morality to emotive (or feeling) statements. Such an approach can only lead to relativism in ethics. If pushed to its conclusion, people can do what they feel like and this leads to relativism.

6. Jesus' words "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" are words for stability. Jesus talked about building a life. (Mt.7:24) "Therefore everyone who hears these words of mine and puts them into practice is like a wise man who built his house on the rock.
25 The rain came down, the streams rose, and the winds blew and beat against that house; yet it did not fall, because it had its foundation on the rock.
26 But everyone who hears these words of mine and does not put them into practice is like a foolish man who built his house on sand.
27 The rain came down, the streams rose, and the winds blew and beat against that house, and it fell with a great crash."

If there is no foundation in Christ your world will increase in its chaotic nature and your world will come crashing down around you. (Frankl's book, *Man's Search for Meaning*, still gives valid advice to our generation, and particularly the PM's. "If you have a why, you can endure any How.")

III. Relativism in Religion

1. The scientific age stressed the need for verification for belief. If something could be verified scientifically, one was justified in declaring it true. If something could not be verified, then the statement was regarded as a product of one's emotions and beliefs. One could not reproduce miracles scientifically, so they were out. This meant that the Virgin Birth of Jesus, the resurrection of Jesus, his miracles, and basic reliability of the Bible was questioned. This became known as modernism, or liberalism, and this attitude permeated the seminaries and eventually the churches. Main-line churches declined in growth, because it is easy to reason that since the Bible is not true, there is only psychology and social responsibility preached from the pulpit and it is easier to sleep in on Sunday morning.. The conservative churches rejected liberalism and they have continued to grow because they are preaching the Truth of the Scripture.

2. PM rejected the idea of truth altogether and this led to greater variety in the approach to religion. Instead of searching for truth, PM leads one to search for what feels good. One may say "I really like that church," Or, one can say, "I really like the idea that God is love. But then what about things you don't like, as "I don't like the idea of Hell." The same attitude is expressed by members of the cults, "The Maharishi is really cool." "Transcendental mediation gives me a natural high."(Veith, p. 193)

How do you respond when someone preaches about something you don't like? I don't like someone telling me I am a sinner when I really am a sinner, , but recognizing the truth of that statement leads to finding forgiveness in God's presence. If I deny that I am a sinner, there is no help for me. Just as long as I deny I have a medical problem, cancer, or whatever, there will be no help possible.

3. Relativism in religion is a blunt disregard for people in any religious tradition. However, remember this line from Ravi Zacharias, "it is more likely that all religions are false than that all religions are true." They cannot all be true. Hinduism believes that everything is god, Zen Buddhism rejects god altogether, Jainism rejects the gods, Islam believes in one God and it is debated who this god is, and Judaism and Christianity believe in the God of the Bible. It is not an attitude to tolerance to say to a Muslim that all religions are the same. Certainly Islam and Hinduism are in two different mind-sets and they cannot be reconciled. If you are tolerant, you should show respect, but it is a lack of respect to both the Hindu and Muslim to say that their religions are the same.

People are inclined to say that all religions are the same, "If they are, it seems rather unnecessary to go into the middle of Asia to get one." (Chesterton) If they are all the same, why do post-modernist reject Christianity? If you proceed to do the PM thing and say that Hinduism is true for you and Islam is true for him, then this does not work either, because the Muslim believes that the Hindu is a polytheist and idolater, both of which are condemned by

the Koran. The postmodernist who claims that all religions are the same is really an idolator.... If people call you intolerant, the response should be that you don't want to be an idolater as they are, because they may be worshipping something that is not God.

4. The New religions of the age have affinities with PM.. PM believes that reality is created by your mind, and in Hinduism and Buddhism reality is an illusion also created by the mind. Neither of these groups function on the law of non-contradiction. Something is either true or it is false, it cannot be both true and false at the same time. Veith says, "The New Age religions are, of course, little more than a revival of old paganism. Behind the craze for horoscopes, E.S.P., and channeling lurks old-fashioned divination, magic, and demon possession. With the eclipse of Christianity, primitive nature religions come creeping back in all of their superstition and barbarism. These are, of course, adjusted to the contemporary imagination. Feminists, in reacting against "patriarchal" religions such as Christianity, try to restore goddess-worship. Environmentalists stress how the whole planet constitutes a single interdependent ecosystem. It is as if we are all individual cells in a larger organism, a living being long worshiped as Mother-Earth, the goddess Gaia.... "The revival of goddess worship may relate to homosexuality as well as to feminism. Scholars have shown how in ancient times homosexuality was associated with goddess worship. Many ancient religions also practice infanticide. Whether or not abortion is a form of Molech worship, its acceptance signals a profound shift away from the presuppositions of a transcendent ethical religion back to a darker, more barbaric ethical consciousness." (p. 200)

5. What does the Bible say about all this. Jesus said: "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life, and no one comes to the Father except through me. (John 14:6) This puts the Christian faith in a position of claiming truth. This truth is important for your future destiny. It is not a matter of whether you like it or not, of whether it feels good or not, but is it true? The followers of Jesus preached:(Acts 4:12) "Salvation is found in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given to men by which we must be saved." Again, I may not like this, but it is the Christian gospel, and it is possible for all peoples to have salvation thru Jesus. I Peter 2:3, says, "The Lord is not slow in keeping his promise, as some understand slowness. He is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance."

From the Christian view of things, it is not possible to say Christianity is true for you, but not for me. Any other option is a rejection of the truth of Christianity and deliberate ignoring of God's gracious coming to mankind in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. To turn away from Him is to turn away from everlasting life. Turning from Him is a step toward idolatry.

Conclusion

1. How do you find yourself today?. How much has the influence of the world permeated your thought patterns, your morality, or lack of it. Have you come to the conclusion that there is no truth in the world? Have you come to conclude that any religion is good as long as someone believes something. Have you come to accept the idea that any belief system works. Many times people talk about being relevant. Relevancy is always changing. But consider the statement by Simone Weil, "***To be always relevant, you have to say things which are eternal.***"

The eternal God has spoken. He offers you the opportunity to become a new person in Jesus Christ. He offers unchanging hope. He gives everlasting grace. He calls you to be transformed by the renewing of your mind by the power of his Holy Spirit. Jesus said, "

Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will never pass away." (Mt. 24:35) He gives us the choice of living in a world that is going to pass away, and a world that is going to endure in His presence forever. What will you choose? Do you need to make a new beginning today to do the same? Ask God to transform your mind and renew your way of thinking so that you are God's person, not the world's lackey?

CHAPTER XVII

Values/Ethics

The area of values takes on a difficult, intangible, but highly important dimension of human life. Values appear to exist only in the realm of the human species. Man alone passes laws to defend the weak, preserve works of art in expensive museums, and argues against the destruction of life. The realms of values and ethics lift man from the frank barbarism and savagery of a sub-human existence. True, man relapses, but then he stands condemned in his relapse precisely because of values.

The status of values is a frequently debated subject. Are values objective so that all people can recognize them? Objectivity of values means that works of art are great and classic regardless of whether anyone recognizes them. This stands in contrast to the subjectivity of values which means that values are only a matter of personal taste and differences. In this case values are like foods--some like ice cream and yet there are people who do not. Advocates of both positions have existed in the past and present with hybrid views in between. The various positions sketched in the following pages will point to a spectrum of thinking running from relativism dealing with subjectivity to more objective systems of ethics.

Ethics is the discipline concerning what is of moral worth. The word "ethics" comes from the Greek language and refers to character and is related to custom or habit. It doesn't help much for a definition of ethics. Traditionally, the discipline of ethics has been concerned with moral norms, the good life, or the life that should be sought. It may be described as a normative discipline--what life ought to be--in contrast to a descriptive discipline like sociology or anthropology which describes life as it has been lived. Increasingly, ethics has been turned into a discipline without norms that are applicable to all people. This will be seen in the first approach to decision making that we will examine.

1. Relativism.

a. Cultural Relativism.

Cultural relativism began about the fifth century B.C. with the Sophists. One of their most famous teachers, Protagoras, expressed this law simply and succinctly in the saying: "Man is the measure of all things--of what he is, that it is, and what is not, that it is not." No standard exists other than man, and that can be broken down to each individual being a law unto himself. There are no universal principles of right and wrong. One may do one deed now and the opposite deed in a

similar circumstance at another time. Both are right. Essentially, relativism is the idea that whatever is, is right.

Support for this view is sought in the modern era in anthropological studies as The Golden Bough of Frazer and other works. This appears to give scientific support to cultural relativism. Cultures vary in many ways and a norm is hard to find. In a superficial way one can make a defense of relativism.

Criticisms of relativism become complicated. For example, it is argued that relativism appears plausible on the surface, but beneath the surface there are important strata of moral laws common to **most great cultures**. This is true in spite of small pockets here and there who practice things like the Eskimo practice of lending wives to visiting males. In contrast to this limited practice of the Eskimo, there are no great societies that allow a man to have any woman anytime he wants one. Great cultures have common rules for the regulation of the sexes and although it may have been chauvinistic, it was not a relativistic view of things. The common idea of man is that murder is wrong, and no society allows for indiscriminate killing. Relativism can only be pushed so far. Even among thieves there must be honor and integrity toward the limited group or they could not survive.¹ Ethel M. Albert has written, "All societies forbid and punish murder, incest, adultery, theft. All reward or require caring for one's family, helping others, assuming responsibilities, doing as you would be done by."² As a further expansion of Albert's comments, one can find a list of laws common to many diverse cultures in C.S. Lewis's The Abolition of Man.³ These laws reflect Hindu, Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Egyptian, Babylonian, Norse and Chinese cultures as well as sophisticated pagans like Cicero and Terence.

If these insights be granted, then relativism appears to be a superficial approach to the study of culture and ethics.

b. The relativism of logical positivism.

Logical positivism (cf. chapter 14) gives us another form of relativism. This is the result of tying truth claims to the principle of verification, and the arbitrary division of language into precise categories. A.J. Ayer's work, it will be recalled, distinguished four types of propositions used in ethical discourse. (1) "Propositions which express definitions of ethical terms," i.e., what does it mean to speak of the good, just, wrong, etc. The attempt to define terms is the only legitimate domain of ethical philosophy. (2) There are propositions which describe the phenomena of moral experiences. If I tell you of the frightening experiences of being mugged I describe something that I disapproved of. This type of subject belongs to the discipline of psychology or sociology because they are concerned with the human psyche. (3) Exhortations to moral virtue are the third type. Exhortations--Don't smoke! Don't drink! Be careful driving to work!--are designed to bring about a certain action depending on the relation to the exhorted person. They are impressive when made by a parent to a child, but less so when made by an adult to an adult. Exhortations do not belong to any science since no discipline could deal with them in a factual way. Neither do they belong to philosophy or ethics, as Ayer viewed it. (4) Actual ethical judgments, the last type, are nothing more than value judgments seeking some agreement. Value judgments--it is wrong to use drugs, it

is wrong to kill, commit adultery, etc.,--cannot be verified and in Ayer's view are not genuine statements. One may say with truth that "he committed murder" but one cannot say scientifically "it is wrong to commit murder." Since "it is wrong" cannot be verified in a scientific way, these statements merely reflect my emotions and feelings and they are not genuine propositions. My emotions are expressed in my statements but your emotions may be counter to mine. Who arbitrates? No one! This is the relativistic point of logical positivism. There are no objective points of ethical theory concerning right and wrong.

We have earlier considered the problems of logical positivism and will not restate the criticisms here. There are a few minor points to be made concerning the application to ethics. It is inconsistent. It insists that there are no standards, but makes relativism a standard. It denies that there are opposites in moral judgments. But more seriously, it denies that there are bad or wrong actions. Certainly child abuse is not morally defensible, and the proper care of a child is better than the physical abuse and degrading of a child. To say that proper care and physical abuse are equally good involves some kind of twisted thinking.

2. Conscience.

Just a step up from relativism is the appeal of conscience for moral guidance. Immediately, we have a problem of defining conscience. It has been defined as the "voice within," the voice of God, the voice of the community, the internal voice reflecting one's upbringing. Sometimes it has been equated with intuition, that almost indefinable experience of humans in which they "just know something to be the case." Regardless of how conscience is defined, the real question about it is-- can it be a moral guide? Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) thought so and wrote:

There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principle of his heart as well as his external actions; which passes judgements upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns his, or the doer of them, accordingly. (Sermon II)

Conscience as a moral guide has seldom been expressed so succinctly. Each man has the moral barometer within.

Criticisms of conscience are easy to come by. First, conscience varies from culture to culture. It is not a uniform guide. It has similar problems associated with the advocates of cultural relativism. A Moslem boy has a Moslem conscience just as a Christian setting produces a Christian one. Second, kept in its religious setting, it does not come off as a useful means of moral decision making. The Bible does say quite a bit about conscience, but never that it is an authoritative decision-maker. Man's conscience is too easily warped, squelched, and blinded by many problems. In the religious context moral decisions are based upon the commands of God, not upon conscience. The adage, let your conscience be your guide, is quite foreign to the Bible. Conscience can be enlightened, made more sensitive, but only in the religious context of the command and Spirit of

God. Last, conscience is not an objective guide. Nor, can it be made "public." I cannot see your "conscience-decision" in the same way that I can comprehend and understand a decision based on reason.

3. Pleasure (and Happiness).

The ethics of pleasure is ancient. It has a modern expression in the Playboy philosophy. Various names have been used to describe it. It has been called hedonism, eudaemonism, epicureanism, and a more modern term utilitarianism. Hedonism or the ethics of pleasure is very simple. The good is identified with pleasure and the bad as identified with pain. In simple application, actions which give pleasure are good, and actions which bring pain are bad. The modern poster slogan--if it feels good, do it--expressed a hedonistic sentiment.

Pleasure, however, is not easily definable, and is ambiguous. It also varies from person to person. Pleasure is often connected with the senses, whereas the word happiness is more frequently related to mental or spiritual serenity. It is difficult to avoid switching from one term to the other in a discussion of the ethics of pleasure. This is seen in J.S. Mill's definition. He said:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.⁴

In addition to the difficulty of defining pleasure there is the matter of the extent of pleasure. Am I interested only in my own pleasure, or is my pleasure and happiness linked to society? Individualistic hedonism claims that one's individual pleasure is all that counts. Universal hedonism claims that pleasure is inter-linked and promotes the motto, "the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people." Universal hedonism was also known as utilitarianism. The word utility was used to describe the ability of an action to bring pleasure to the do-er.

Examples of individualistic hedonism can be seen in ancient times. Aristippus (435-356 B.C.) taught that the sense pleasure of the moment is to be sought rather than gambling on the uncertain pleasures of the future which may not come about. Mental pleasures were not as important as the sense pleasure. Epicurus (342-270 B.C.), in contrast, allowed for mental tranquility as a pleasure and the pleasure of one's total life was more significant than intense pleasures of short duration. This led Epicurus to emphasize the importance of health, moderation, as well as peace of mind. Epicurus gave some sage advice in terms of pleasure and desire: Either get what you want, or quit wanting it. Both will give you pleasure.

The better known modern philosophical hedonists were Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and J.S. Mill (1806-73). Bentham believed that pleasure and pain were directives in life, but his was a general social hedonism. Happiness is related to society as a whole. The pleasure of many people is more important than the pleasure of a few people. Bentham also attempted to measure or evaluate pleasure quantitatively. His critics called his views a pig philosophy and the defender of

Bentham came in the person of J.S. Mill. Mill introduced quality into pleasure and allowed intellectual pleasures were more important than sense pleasures. His famous statement was: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." Mill's position twists the Hedonistic ideal. If there are differences in pleasure, if some are better than others, than it is for a reason, and reason is an appeal to a standard that is not pleasure itself.

There are many problems with the ethics of pleasure. Philosophers have raised all kinds of objections against hedonism. (1) Pleasure does not bring happiness. The pursuit of pleasure may be the most empty pursuit of human existence. The pursuit of pleasure may be what Pascal called a "diversion," the covering over, or ignoring the reason for human existence, the unwillingness to face the facts of life. (2) There is no way of measuring pleasure, or knowing how much pleasure an act will bring. Many are the innocent comments, "It was not as much fun or pleasure as I expected." (3) There is no norm for pleasure. What gives pleasure at age 19 may change radically at age 65. Tastes change due to education, health, and culture. If a norm is sought in an ethical system, hedonism does not give much. (4) The hedonism of the modern era is often egoistic, rejecting personal attachments, binding loyalties, and responsibilities such as the home, family, and serious romance. (5) A criticism raised against utilitarianism involves an unusual hypothesis. Suppose that they are right in terms of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. Suppose a utopian state could be brought into existence--food, shelter, harmony, and the needs of mankind would be met in terms of health and all the conditions of happiness--with the provision that one man be retained in involuntary torture with his life sustained miraculously not being able to terminate the torture. If all could be happy at the expense of one--would a utilitarian agree to it? Presumably not, since the happiness of all is an equal happiness involvement.

These criticisms must not be taken to overrule a necessary and important place of pleasure and happiness. There is nothing wrong with happiness--the problem is where happiness is sought and in what ways. In most ethical systems there is a place for pleasure and variation. The fact that I secure pleasure in writing this book is compatible with most ethical systems. If I secured pleasure at the expense of my family, or the abuse and exploitation of other people, then the system itself has little to say in counter-acting my pleasure, with the exception of utilitarianism. While the ethics of pleasure certainly appeals to our senses, it is too anarchic to be of value in setting forth a norm for decision making.

4. The Ethics of Power.

An ethic of power is an adaptation of the ethics of hedonism centered in the pleasure of one person ruling over the many. One person has pleasure at the expense of all others in varying degrees. Ethics of power is sometimes called naturalism in ethics or the idea that might is right. The familiar conclusion that many reached about the end of World War II and the Nürenburg trials expresses this ethic: "If the other side had won, they would have tried our leaders and done the same thing to us." Right is on the side of the winner--whoever it is.

One prominent analysis of this comes from Plato in which Thrasymachus argued for the ethic of power against Socrates. Thrasymachus argued that right "is to act in the interest of those who are more powerful than yourself."⁵ The corollary of this is that the one in power does right. Thrasymachus argued that the laws of the land reflect the ruling party. A despot makes autocratic laws, a democracy makes democratic ones. Laws are made in the interest of the ruling group. Moreover, Thrasymachus argued that injustice is more useful and profitable than justice. He gave a number of examples. The unjust man who enters into a contract with a just man will always have more when the partnership is dissolved than the just man will have. The unjust man always pays less income tax and other kinds of taxes than the just man. He spoke of running for public office. The unjust man will take advantage of the office and do injustices on a large scale and get away with it, while the just man will suffer many ways. His friends will criticize him for being just to them and he loses in terms of his business he must forsake while he pursues public office. It pays to be unjust and most men would be unjust if they knew they would be able to get away with it. An old joke illustrates the principle argument in Thrasymachus. A Russian Jew once told a Polish Jew, "When one dishonest Czar cheats some other Czar, it is called High Policy; when one dishonest Prime Minister cheats another one, it is called High Diplomacy; when one dishonest banker cheats another one, it is called High Finance; when one dishonest merchant cheats the public, it is called Trade, but when a housewife walks out with a pair of pretty earrings, it is called robbery and she is speedily deported to Siberia." "Well," mused the Polish Jew, "She was probably condemned not for shoplifting, but for clumsiness."

In modern times the ethic of power is reflected in Darwin's survival of the fittest and more particularly the exposition of it by Herbert Spencer. Friedrich Nietzsche is sometimes erroneously interpreted in this way. Revolutionary ethics of all sorts argue from the basis of power.

A modern amalgam of pleasure, power, and reason is seen in the views of Ayn Rand, novelist and philosophical advocate of rational self-interest. She proposes three virtues as a guide to living: (1) reason, the basis of knowledge, (2) purpose, the basis of happiness, and (3) self-esteem, the basis of the worth of living. These three are the basis for the following exposition of virtues.

- 1) rationality--nothing takes precedence over thinking
- 2) independence--yours is the responsibility of judgements, there is no substitute for you.
- 3) integrity--you cannot fake your own consciousness, and there should be no breach between soul and body.
- 4) honesty--recognize that the unreal is unreal; obtain nothing by fraud.
- 5) justice--every man is to be judged for what he is, both good and bad. This judgement is by you.
- 6) productiveness--recognition of the fact that you choose to live and remake the earth in one's values.
- 7) pride--you are your own highest value, and like all of man's values, it has to be earned.⁶

The emphasis on rationality coupled with selfishness makes the system of Rand difficult to categorize. The selfish emphasis relates it to hedonism and to the ethics of power. The emphasis on rationality places it in a later relationship. But on selfishness, she wrote, "The most selfish of all

things is the independent mind that recognizes no authority higher than its own and no value higher than its judgement of truth."⁷ Selfishness is expressed in the trader concept, "A trader is a man who earns what he gets and does not give or take the undeserved."⁸ If you cannot give, you should not get. The weakling, the rotter, the liar, the failure, and the coward should suffer for their condition. Welfare-ism is out and rational self-interest is in.

Rand's views have appeal to the vanity of the human ego. But is man as rational as she believes? Is man as independent as she hopes? There are other criticisms that we have no room for concerning her understanding of religion and the nature of capitalism as well as the relation between religion and the rise of capitalism.

Now for a few criticisms of the ethic of power in general. It is hard to criticize the ethics of power because tyrants are not rational. The only thing a tyrant respects is counter force. If rationality be granted, then one may consider a number of things. (1) Socrates argued that injustice creates division, hatred, and fighting, and human needs are not met. If all humans have their own needs met, then justice prevails and harmony with it. (2) He also argued that tyranny is contrary to man's basic needs. After the necessities of life, man's nature requires nothing more. The tyrant is a person who does not know himself and his needs as a human being. (3) The ethics of power involves a false assumption that happiness can be achieved by power. The most powerful rulers have frequently been the most unhappy. (4) If reason is admitted, then religion poses some other considerations concerning human life and its relation to God. God wills regard for human life, and there is no divine right of kings, let alone tyrants. This raises the question about man's nature and his needs and brings us to the system of ethics called self-realization.

5. The Ethics of Humanism, or Self-Realization

Is it possible to develop an ethic based on man's general understanding of his own nature? The ethics of humanism or self-realization affirms this possibility. The first question to answer is: what is a self? The first real model of this ethical system was that of Plato. Man was analyzed by Plato and understood as a tripartite being. Man is composed of reason, passion or spirit, and appetites.

Using the model of the ideal state, there is an order in man and the state. The first principle is reason which is to rule man's body and life. The second element or principle is passion or spirit. An example of passion or spirit is the anger expressed in oneself for giving into a desire. Plato described Leontius who felt a desire to look at some dead bodies and at the same time abhorring the thought. He gave in to the desire and was angry at himself for so doing. Passion or spirit frequently allies itself with reason, or the rational principle. The third principle, the irrational or appetitive, is related to hunger, thirst, and other pleasures and satisfactions.⁹

The order of this view of man is important. If it is inverted or perverted then in-harmony reigns. In a similar manner Plato argued that if a cobbler were to be the ruler of the state chaos would result. Everything in its place is important. The cobbler is important for shoes, but not for

statecraft. Reason is to rule man's life. The man ruled by the appetites or the passions is a man living in an inharmonic state.

Something more is linked to this analysis of man. There are four Greek virtues, called the cardinal virtues. Each of the first three virtues is related to the principles of man's existence. Linked with reason is the virtue of wisdom. Wisdom is the proper and right use of one's rational principle. Linked with spirit or passion is the virtue of courage. Courage involves the control of one's passions or the use of one's passions as the courage of a soldier, or the enthusiasm in one's work. Linked to the appetites is the virtue of temperance. Appetites are good in their place and under the control of temperance and rationality. Too much food is dangerous as is too little food.

The fourth virtue, justice, has no single parallel, but is related to all three. Justice means that each part or principle has its legitimate dessert. The harmonious functioning of the three principles in relation to one another then brings fulfillment. The graph indicates this:

| | |
|-----------|--------------------------------|
| Reason | Wisdom |
| Passion | Courage |
| Appetites | Temperance |
| Justice: | everything getting its own due |

Plato concluded that the just man, the man of self-realization, would never be guilty of making off with the state's silver or gold, he would never be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery, of breaking faith, or agreements, or adultery, or irreligion. The reason being that he knows--rationally--what is right and will do the right.

The ethic of Plato is one of the finer examples of the humanist ethic. Various systems have been inspired by Plato and many of them are in the idealist tradition or by philosophers that are sympathetic to idealism such as personalism and pragmatism. There is much that is noble in the aspirations of self-realization. But there are very few well-rounded individuals who live rationally and the society in which we live is not as well-ordered as Plato conceived. His was a utopian view and in a utopia everyone is angelic. But a world filled with revolution, strife, tyranny, and chaotic people is quite different from the Republic.

The twentieth century has brought two World Wars and threats of more, along with minor wars. Disillusionment with man's progress and self-realization has been raised in various circles. There are criticisms that may be looked at briefly. (1) Is man the standard of right or wrong? Is man the measure of all things? Doesn't this allow more for relativism than a standard of ethics for all people? (2) Can simple rationality save one from the complexities of decision making? Given Plato's belief in God would it not involve Him in some further relationship for ethics? (3) If a different analysis of man prevailed--as in the Marxist view--then the ethical precepts come out differently. Therefore, is the view of Plato correct? It would be contested by many.

6. The Ethics of Duty (Formalism).

A step further in looking at ethical systems may be seen in the person of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and the ethics of the categorical imperative. An ethic that decides goodness on the basis of motive is a formal ethic. Doing the good for the sake of the good and no other reason is important. Kant's ethic began with the aim of establishing "the supreme principle of morality."¹⁰ The foundation of his ethic is "the good will," or the act of willing. He wrote, "It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will."¹¹ The usual elements in life such as power, wealth, honor, and health need to be vitally related to the "good will" to keep them from corruption. Going further Kant claimed that it is not the result of an action or the means that is to be stressed, but the motive in the deed. The deed is "good through its willing alone."¹²

Willing a good deed and the sense of duty are related. One must not do a good deed from wrong motives. A merchant has one price for his goods to all customers, but it is for business reasons rather than from principles of fair dealing. Such an act is not done from duty but from business expediency.

Similarly, duty is done for duty's sake, and not for the purposed result from the action. Proceeding from this sense of high duty Kant set forth a categorical imperative, which is a type of action done for duty sake rather than as a means to something else, i.e., gain, love, etc. He noted that there is "only a single categorical imperative and it is this: `Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.'"¹³ The categorical imperative has three applications or three formula. The first one is expressed in a similar fashion as the categorical imperative. It is called the formula of the law of nature: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."¹⁴ Four illustrations are given by Kant, but one will be enough for illustrating this principle. Suppose a man finds himself in hard times and needs to borrow money. He knows he cannot pay it back within a fixed time, and he knows that he will not get it unless he promises to make a definite payment at an early time. Can he lie and say he will do what he knows he cannot do? When he asks: is lying right? then the obvious answer is no. He cannot will that everybody lie and deceive. He cannot universalize his action and so he must reject lying.

The second application of the categorical imperative is called "The formula of the end in itself." It is: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."¹⁵ In the case of our example above, lying to the banker would be merely another way of exploiting or using him as a means, and not regarding him as an end. Prostitution serves to illustrate the dual application of the principle. One who goes to a prostitute is exploiting her, and at the same time the prostitute does not treat herself as a person in the full sense of self-dignity.

The third application is more vague and not stressed as much as the first two. It is called the formula of autonomy. Kant wrote of it as "the supreme condition of the will's conformity with universal practical reason--namely, the Idea of the will of every rational being as will which makes universal law."¹⁶ No illustrations are used for this, but it means that one abides by laws made by

oneself and which are universal. Heteronomy is the rule by other laws presumably not universal, but which are made by someone else.

Kant visualized the possibility of an ideal, a kingdom of ends where all live in regard for people as people.

Kant's ethic has had a great influence in western thought and it is one of the noble attempts at searching out the basis of values. But there are some problems with it. (1) One criticism concerns the categorical imperative, or the sense of duty. Duty does not have content. We should do our duty, but what is the nature of our duty? (2) How does one resolve conflicting duties, i.e., should you leave family to serve the nation? If life is hard and your family is starving, should one steal to preserve their life? (3) Some good things cannot be universalized. Welfare and celibacy are two examples. Welfare is good when the majority of the people are working, but it cannot be universalized. (4) The good will or intention needs more than Kant gave it. It needs good means as well as good consequences flowing from it. The housewife is not helped much if her good china is broken by a well-intentioned friend helping with the dishes. (5) The fulfillment of duty has an ambiguity: if the Gestapo knocked on your door and asked, "Are there any Jews here?" If you were a Kantian you would have to say yes. If duty is done without regard to consequences, life may turn terribly cruel. Is there not greater duties to save life and serve humanity over against perpetuating tyranny?

Some of the good features of Kant's ethic are a secularized version of the Christian ethic, and to that we now turn.

7. The Christian Ethic.

The Christian ethic has suffered more caricatures than other ethics. A poem sums up this negativistic-stereotype:

My parents told me not to smoke, I don't, I don't.
Or listen to a naughty joke, I don't, I don't.
They made it clear I must not wink at pretty girls,
Or even think about intoxicating drink, I don't, I don't.

To dance or flirt is very wrong, I don't, I don't,
Some play at cards the whole night long, I don't, I don't,
I kiss no girls, not even one, I do now know how it
is done, You wouldn't think I'd have much fun,
I don't, I don't.

Unfortunately, the religious ethic appears to many as a set of "no-no's." This is a mis-reading of the Christian ethic.

The Christian ethic is something different. One can see this in the following comparisons. In actuality, there are only three types of ethical systems when they are all boiled down: (1) naturalistic--a view that is individualistic, egoistic, and pleasure or happiness oriented; (2) idealistic--views associated with Kant or self-realization ethics. It is an ethic based on reason, duty, or an analysis of man's nature, and is essentially man-centered. (3) The religious ethic is an ethic retaining some of these emphases but with the starting point of God, not man, nor nature. Emil Brunner raised a complicated question about the nature of ethics. Is there an ethic

in which morality is seen in its purity
in which one is free from irrationality and is yet grounded in something which is higher than human reason;
in which the Good is both the highest sense human, and yet in the highest sense Divine
in which the good and evil are clearly distinguished from one another, without merging again into one at an innermost point;
in which the opposition between good and evil comes out as clearly as possible, yet without rending humanity into two separate metaphysical halves,
in which the individual is taken seriously, yet not at the cost of the community,
in which the community is taken seriously, yet not at the cost of the individual,
in which physical well-being is not denied in order to exalt spirituality
in which spirituality is not deprecated as a merely accompanying phenomena of the physical,
in which an answer absorbs all knowledge which unveils and removes all the errors which manifest itself in the contradiction of the opposing views,
in a word, does the Christian faith give the answer, the only answer, and the whole answer to the ethical problem?¹⁷

Brunner affirmed that Christian faith does give the best answer to the problem of ethics. The reason for this claim is that Christian ethics begins with a transcendent source of the good, namely God. The difference in ethical systems may be compared to a group of musicians who tune up together on any pitch that sounds right. They can play together but the contrast is obvious when a standard A is sounded.

The Christian ethic begins with God. Ethics and worship cannot be separated. There is no ethic apart from worship and commitment. The Ten Commandments begin with "I am the Lord, Therefore, you shall" The authority behind the Ten Commandments is God. Their validity starts with God. Because God is, he wills the Good.

The content of God's will is directed toward community. God created mankind out of love and his will is socially oriented, a community. There is no service for God which is not related to the service of man.¹⁸ The hermit, the isolated saint, the solitary contemplator who leads a private life runs counter to the will of God.

It was said above that ethics cannot be separated from worship, and it must now be said that ethics cannot be separated from doctrine. There is a particular Christian doctrine--the Incarnation--which points up three items for ethics: (1) Knowledge of God's will is seen eminently in the Incarnation and God's will is wholly a will for humanity. (2) The Incarnation points up the

possibility of becoming truly human for it involves a recovery from sin and weakness and strength for overcoming. (3) The Incarnation involves reconciliation and forgiveness which is not only the source of recovery from sin, but also preventing ethics from being legalistic moralism in which no mercy or forgiveness is shown.

For a definition, Christian ethics is human living as commanded by Divine Command and Conduct.¹⁹ Divine Conduct is motivated by love and the two great commandments that sum up all others are: Love God with all your heart, soul, and strength, and love your neighbor as yourself. Now we must ask, what is love? The English word covers several ideas and is used so loosely that Charles Whitman set at his typewriter on August 1, 1966 and wrote, "I've decided to kill Kathy tonight. I love her very much." The next day he expressed his "love" of humanity by gunning down more than two dozen from a University of Texas tower. Is it possible to destroy a life you love?

The Greek language has given us three different words that are translated by our single word love. These words carry important distinctions in trying to understand the commands to love God and man. First, there is *eros*. Eros is erotic love, romantic love, love between a man and woman. It cannot be commanded. It is known intuitively and grows up spontaneously. Second, there is *philia*, referring to the love of a friend for friend. This refers more to **liking**. I love or like a friend and the rest of mankind falls outside of my liking or this type of love. This is also spontaneous, known intuitively, and cannot be commanded.

Third, there is *agape*. Agape is what God commands and it describes his love toward man. God's is a non-calculating love. It is not a tit-for-tat deal between humans. Love expresses itself without seeking gain. Love does seek reciprocity, a response, but it involves the welfare and wholeness of humanity. God loves the unloving, and unlovely, and seeks to bring wholeness to their lives. When God commands man to love (agape) it is a love involving respect, helping where help is needed regardless of the relationship, and love is not bounded by boundaries of any kind. Love extends even to one's enemies--love your enemies--meaning you don't need to like them, but love helps, desires that even the enemy be truly human, and be helped as all humans need help.

The positive commands of God are two: love God with all your heart--God has certain rights and respect and reverence are due Him. The Ten Commandments speak of these as reverence for Him, His Name, and his day, and the family. Men also have certain rights, and love reverences these rights. They are rights to respect, property, a wife, a good name, and life. These rights are preserved positively in agape, and preserved negatively in the second table of the Ten Commandments.

Love is universal in its application, in all circumstances, and at all times. Love overrules the harshness of duty, and prohibits the legalism of moralism. Love is founded in God, but is an ethic for man. Love gives pleasure but is not mere pleasure. Love is not wishy-washy. Love is responsible to human needs over against the rationalizations of reason. Love as an ethic is not adverse to commandments, but fulfills their intention. Love also involves forgiveness--a virtue that almost no other system of ethics advocates.

The Christian ethic involves many other things, but this serves as a basic model which may be developed further. If the problem of relativism is to be overcome fully, the most significant way seems to be in an ethic borne of God's self-revelation. This is the claim of the Christian ethic. It is especially significant that Confucius, Buddha, and Lao-tzu did not claim to bring a revelation from God, and in pantheistic Hinduism there is no revelation, only meditation. The Judeo-Christian ethic is built upon God's self-revelation.

The Christian ethic has other advantages. The Christian ethic gives content to conscience. Consciences vary from culture to culture. The conscience of the Christian is to be determined by the Word of God. It is only in this fashion that conscience can be said to be a guide in moral decision making.

The Christian ethic also gives meaning to pleasure and happiness. The ethic of the Bible is not against wholesome pleasure and the gift of happiness is something that comes from God. Jesus claimed to come to give the life more abundant. There are different views between a secular ethic and the Christian ethic concerning what the good life is all about, but the judgement of the Christian ethic is that life must be more than sensations. Life must have a quality to it that comes from a relation to God. The gospel is the good news of salvation, deliverance, and healing. In reality, an ethic of pleasure finds its greatest fulfillment in the Christian ethic.

Similar comments may be made concerning humanism, or the ethic of self-realization. What is the real purpose of human existence? The Christian ethic gives a different view than Plato did; Plato's self-realization involves only an earthly view of existence. The Christian ethic claims earthly and heavenly fulfillment.

The ethic of duty really needs the Christian idea of agape to give it vitality. Christian ethics has its duties, but it is not duty for duty sake. It is duty for God's sake. It is obedience out of love.

These are some implications of the Christian ethic with regard to other systems. There are some other advantages to the Christian ethic. (1) It gives a solid basis for criticizing culture. The prophets of the Old Testament and religious reformers have always appealed to the Word of God over against decadent cultural practices. (2) By virtue of accepting criticism, progress can be made for the individual-in-community. (3) The standard of God's ethic is, to use Karl Barth's phrase, an impossible-possibility. It is impossible to achieve perfection, but in all circumstances it would be possible to do better. This prevents the smugness of a moral system like that of Ben Franklin, as well as retaining a challenge to higher moral achievement.

There are some questions raised about the religious ethic. First, the question of God's existence is raised. Can one prove that God is and has spoken. The second question is raised in regard to which religion is true. Both of these questions can be dealt with in a rational, but not scientific way. Various writers have treated them elsewhere and we will not go into that exposition.²⁰

8. Conclusion.

We have surveyed the major types of ethical systems. These still influence vast segments of the world's cultures. Understanding the system helps to understand why people do the things they do. It appears obvious that our regard is for the Christian ethic. While not everyone accepts it for varying reasons, it offers the finest way of solving ethical problems as well as giving a solid basis for decision making. It offers decisions related both to man and God.

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- ⁷The New Intellectual, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
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- ¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 88.

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¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 86. Many of the points here follow Brunner.

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CHAPTER XVIII

Belief in God

(Some Aspects of a Philosophy of Religion)

As philosophy encourages deep thinking about the meaning of life, one can hardly escape the serious issue concerning God. Belief in God in some form or fashion is almost universal. There have never been any truly atheistic cultures. There have been many religious cultures of different kinds. This is not to say that all of them are good and without problems. Religion *per se* is not all good. Many evil things have been done in the name of God as well as science, custom, or whatever. Any argument for the value of religion or God is not an argument for vindicating the excesses done in the name of God or religion. But philosophy does not begin with the many beliefs as diverse as they are. Philosophy is more concerned with the **reasons** for the beliefs rather than a description of the beliefs. Philosophy raises the pertinent question: is there any justification for believing in God? Our primary concern in this chapter is just that question. In ancient times few people doubted the existence of God. In modern times many people do. We will seek to cover the reasons given for belief in God as well as the arguments used against that belief.

We must, first, define a few words. The first one is God. *Theos*, a Greek word has come to mean a Being who is personal, intelligent, able to achieve his purpose, who is also Creator and Redeemer. Belief in this kind of Being is called theism. Theism is opposed to atheism which is the belief that God does not exist at all. Agnosticism is another Greek word that assumes a position of not being able to know any way or the other. Theism must not be confused with pantheism either. Pantheism is the idea that God is all and all is God. A general tendency of pantheism is to draw some analogy of comparison between the soul and the body of man. The soul is in the body, and similarly, God is the soul of the body of the world. Pantheism doesn't really mean anything different from the world. Pantheism substitutes a spiritual determinism for a materialistic determinism. There is no real problem of knowledge of God in pantheism, in one sense, for in knowing the world and oneself, one has a knowledge of pantheism. Moreover, pantheism is not usually intelligent. Intelligence occurs solely within the living fragment of itself--man.

Our questions about God then become this: what evidence or reason is there to believe that there exists an intelligent being who is not identified with the material world? Is there a Transcendent Being? Why has man come to believe in such a Being?

There are some answers given to this that relate to man's early belief in God. Some psychiatrists have argued that belief in God or gods is a projection of man's fears. Primitive man was driven by fears and the idea of worshipping some unknown being occurred to him to allay these fears.

Immediately, one can see some problems. First, unlike people of modern historical times, we have no documents to warrant such retrospective psychic examination. One may analyze a person like Luther through his writings, and make some sense, but not **pre-historic** man. Second, primitive people were generally considered ignorant, but the worship of any god is a fairly sophisticated idea and hidden or invisible beings are not easy to assume. Third, in this practice one

is taking modern twentieth century reactions and evaluations and imposing them on a culture which is very little known.

Various other theories are available for consideration such as religion arising in despair of magic or belief in God arose as primitives attempted to explain the unexplainable. Welhelm Schmidt has proposed that belief in God arose because man once knew God and this knowledge was subsequently corrupted by adaptations to changing cultures, levels of commitment and degeneration. Schmidt has received a mixed reception among scholars in the area. His view has many commendable features, but as far as the pre-historical religion goes, we must admit that "we know, in fact, nothing certain about the origin of religion and its primitive stages."¹

Regardless of how belief in God arose, the question facing us now is: what is the basis for belief in God to continue? Here one sits in the contemporary world. Here is the world one sees-- people, things, ideas. But God cannot be seen. There are two options about God. Either God is hidden or he is not. If he is hidden, what is there today that compels a belief in his existence? The answers to this question may be placed under three headings: (1) natural theology, (2) experiential-pragmatic examples, and (3) revelation. The first two answers fit more closely into philosophy, and the third answer involves religion.

I. Natural Theology.

Is it possible to learn anything about a Transcendent Being from nature itself? Does nature itself, as I examine it, lead me to the conclusion that a God exists? Natural theology sums up the conclusions that one learns from nature. There is a long tradition of philosophers who have believed that natural theology is meaningful. The Catholic tradition from Aquinas in the 13th century A.D. to the present has been the most forceful. Those who argue negatively, that is, there is no knowledge of God possible from nature are of several varieties. Atheists certainly fit into this category. But there are people who believe in God but who do not accept the arguments from nature about God's existence. Immanuel Kant rejected a number of arguments based on nature, but presented a moral argument for God's existence. Some Protestant theologians, John Baillie and Karl Barth along with the American philosopher Gordon H. Clark, fit into this category of rejecting the use of the arguments. All of these affirm a strong belief in God on other than arguments drawn from the facts of nature.

The strongest arguments against belief in God have, of course, come from the atheistic camp, and those generally critical of religious belief as in the example of David Hume. We will now turn to sketch the arguments drawn from observations about nature.

A. Cosmological Arguments.

The arguments we will use are drawn from Thomas Aquinas who adapted them from Aristotle. They will need some adaptation for modern use. There are three variations on the argument.

(1) The argument from motion.

Aquinas wrote:

It is certain . . . that . . . some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because there would be no first mover Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.²

The argument needs careful reading. Things must be started in motion by a self-existing Mover. We can look quickly to the criticisms raised against it. First is the question of stopping the motion series with God. Second is, why cannot a series be infinite or eternal? Let's take the argument in reverse order. Why can't a series be eternal? It depends on the type of series one is talking about. Aquinas would admit that an infinite series in numbers or motions would be possible. This may be described as a horizontal series. But it is a vertical series that does not go on to infinity. The existence of man is caused by another, and that by another and so on. This would be a horizontal situation. But once I am grown and independent of my parents there is yet a dependency I cannot escape. I cannot live without air, water, and similar things. This kind of vertical series cannot go on to infinity. It comes to an unmoved Mover.³

Even though it is admitted that a horizontal series to infinity would be possible that may have its problems if one gets away from numbers which are infinite. A numerical series only exists in the mind whereas an infinite series of motion in reality does not. The argument, since it has been drawn from nature, should also take some consideration of nature as it is presently understood. If we can depend upon one leading view in cosmology, we can trace motion back to a cause beyond which we cannot go--the original mass of energy which exploded into space giving motion to gases that became matter and subsequently the planets and systems as we know them. If the Big Bang theory can be accepted there is no infinity of motion. If there was no moving matter once, then the series must stop and be dependent upon something else. Beyond that we cannot go in terms of the Big Bang theory. One could easily postulated God.

The second question, why stop the motion series with God? is more crucial. The atheist wants to stop with the motion seen in the world without seeking a first mover. He argues that the argument is contradicted by demanding a first mover. He seems willing to accept motion without an explanation that is eternal, and different from the things in motion. In doing so the atheist must conclude that the world is eternal itself. Matter does exist and needs no explanation beyond itself. But Aquinas accepted the argument that something is eternal. What is it? God or matter? Again, appealing to the Big Bang theory we can say that matter **as we know it is not eternal**.

(2) The second argument is called the argument from efficient causes. Aquinas wrote:

In the world of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known . . . in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself . . . if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect . . . Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first sufficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.⁴

This argument is similar to the first way, but it uses a different mode. The same questions are raised about it as the first. Therefore, we will not repeat the points.

(3) The third argument is called the argument from contingency. Aquinas wrote:

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to be corrupted and consequently, it is impossible for them to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which can not-be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything can not-be, then at one time there was nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now, there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist begins to exist only through something already existing Therefore, we cannot but admit the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.⁵

This argument may be rephrased and still retain the same intention by using the reconstruction of Buswell: "If anything does now exist, then either something must be eternal, or something not eternal must have come from nothing."⁶

The important argument in Aquinas' thinking was the third one, and the two others merely amplify it. Argument three as well as the other arguments lead to the idea of a necessary being. Bertrand Russell, Anthony Flew and other critics of the argument confess that they have no idea of a necessary being. But this is a confession held strictly about God as a necessary being. They indeed believe in a necessary something but that is the material world as it is experienced. Since something cannot arise from nothing, matter must be regarded as eternal, and that is a necessary being even for the atheist.

The argument cannot simply stop with a necessary being, either mind or matter, but must involve the aesthetic aspect of the question: did matter produce mind, or mind produce matter? Evolutionary theory is used often to support the priority of matter over mind. But this poses the cosmic question of the origin of life from non-life. Matter as we define it now and know it scientifically is not creative. Mind is creative, but we know it only experientially from the vantage point of a body. Even then there is yet the mystery of how a mind initiates and brings action through a body. Does our argument make more sense if we conclude for a Being who is Mind and who creates, or a Being that is matter and un-creative? Mind must be the more aesthetically satisfying conclusions.

B. Teleological Argument.

The teleological argument is the most popularly known of the arguments, but apparently not the most important one with Aquinas. The argument is known as the argument from design, or argument to a designer. About it Aquinas wrote:

we see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end . . . Hence it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move toward an end, unless it is directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence . . . Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end, and this being we call God.⁷

This argument is applied by its advocates to the microcosm, the cosmos, and the macrocosm. The snow flake and the blood cell are two examples of a microcosm that illustrate intricate design. In the cosmos of man's experience and being the eye has been singled out as an amazing illustration. The retina alone has 144 million separate entities in it. The eye appears as something designed, not as a result of chance, or slow development. If it developed over a long period of time there is no reason why each part stayed in existence until the other necessary parts were developed. It does not appear the result of a sudden mutation. The conclusion is reached that it has been designed by a designer.

The macrocosm is used also to illustrate the seeming designed aspect of man's existence. Spaceship earth appears more and more unique and precarious as we explore space. We have an atmosphere that precludes our being bombed by meteorites. Thinner air would not burn out meteors before they hit the earth. Our rotation on the earth is such that we have liveable temperatures. Slower rotations would alternately freeze us at night and burn us in the day. Our position in reference to the sun is such that we have enough heat but not overheat, and the same is true with cold. Other features could be used in illustration of this idea of design in macrocosm.

The basic conclusion is that a designer brought this into being, and in Aquinas' words, this being is God.

We must now look at the criticisms of the argument to a designer. The most perceptive critic of the argument in the history of philosophy is David Hume, in the eighteenth century. Anthony Flew follows much of Hume's thought in the twentieth century. Hume raised the following objections.

(1) An infinite designer cannot be concluded from a finite design. To put it another way, "Similar causes prove similar effects and similar effects similar causes."⁸ The intent of the criticism is well-taken, but there is a sense in which the precept could be modified in terms of modern physics. The principle concerning the loss of energy in nature would require a greater cause to achieve the lesser effect. Such a conclusion would require a greater being to create the world than the effects, but even this would not require an infinite God. In fairness, however, to Aquinas, the argument only speaks of God whose infinity is not learned from this argument as from the third argument, and then it would be possible to appeal to God's self-revelation for the idea of infinity.

Even Hume admits that the argument may give basis for concluding for a being who has a certain measure of power and intelligence.

(2) The second objection--Hume argued that the world may be compared more truly to a vegetable or animal rather than a watch or a machine.⁹ Regardless of either of these models, they all indicate design. If the world is a vegetable, it is an unusual vegetable that has design manifested in its being. The same would hold true for an animal. There is nothing sacred and necessary about the analogy of a machine. The makeup of both animal and vegetable is both complex and genetically designed. Neither of these models serves to get to an infinite or eternal solution if our physics concerning the origin of the earth is at all meaningful. Hume's analogies in his objection are outdated.

(3) Hume rejected the idea of a necessary existent. "There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it."¹⁰ Speaking of the being of anything as a general term, there is the absolute necessity of conceiving something as necessary. Actually, there are two necessities. First, from Hume's vantage there is the necessity of a necessary material world. This is Hume's alternative to a necessary God. But even the world is not the only necessary if we rule out a Creator. There is, a more fundamental necessary that we cannot escape. We must conceive of the necessity of space. We can--granting our existence somehow--conceive of empty space without anything in it. We cannot conceive of absolute nothing--no-thing. Space is necessary. If space is necessary, why should it be unreasonable to think of God as necessary since matter as we think of it has a beginning. Actually Hume does not really base his entire case on this as he claimed. The real issues are that God cannot be seen, and the problem of evil. We will speak of these shortly. If my observations about space are correct, then Hume's comments about a necessary existence as having no meaning are nonsense.¹¹

(4) The real heart of Hume's objection concerns the matter of chaos in a designed world. To put in another way, if this is a designed world, why do people suffer? Hume appealed to Epicurus' old question and regarded it as unsolved. Summing up Epicurus, Hume wrote about evil and God:

Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent? Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent? Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?¹²

Some options have been proposed to solve this issue before and after the time of Hume. Some, like Brightman, have argued that God is finite and good and is struggling to overcome evil and will do it. Others, as reflected in Christian Science and other pantheisms, regard evil as an illusion and there is only good in the world. Yet others, like Gordon H. Clark, argue that God is the cause of evil.¹³

A more sober view is to question the formulation of the question of Epicurus. In a similar fashion Edgar Brightman has asked: "Can one believe in a God who allows evil to exist?" The implication of the question is that God is good and powerful and must therefore put evil out of the way. But this turns God into a cosmic policeman who must--absolutely must--do something about

the wrong that people do. It is seemingly alright if the wrong involves other people. But the question is also more important in this fashion: "Can one believe in a God who does not allow evil to exist? Neither Hume or anyone would survive if God did what they demanded of him--namely, not allow evil to exist.

This raises the question about the nature of the goodness of God. If God did judge as Hume requests, would God still be good? Presumably a God who judged would be bad. Either way God cannot win, and Hume cannot lose.

Is the goodness of God in his patience or in his swift judgement? Anthony Flew used this analogy of a father and insisted that a father would do things that God doesn't do. A father would heal his child who is sick and God as father does not. This story is touching and indicting, but there are other stories that suggest a hands-off situation more profound. A father loves his son, but for the son's growing up he gives him more and more freedom to make mistakes for the son must be on his own. The growing freedom may involve hurt and even the risk of death and self-destruction, but a true father gives the son the freedom to be himself. It may even be the choice of the son to involve himself in activities that mean certain death. The protest of the father is of no avail. One may lock up a drug addict son and seek to return him to normalcy, but as soon as the son is out he defies everyone who cares for him and returns to his destructive activities. The father loves and seeks to help, but the son will have nothing of it. God is like this also and there is a true expression of "tough-love" in the earthly as well as the heavenly father. The father is happy when the son follows the path of goodness, righteousness and fellowship with him. The human father also grieves when his son goes wrong. Can the father meaningfully force the son to his ways? Obviously he has the power to do it--certainly God does--but will he use it? Really?

The problem of evil will not be solved in a syllogistic fashion as created by Hume or Brightman. It is too complex and difficult. Their options as proposed are not the correct options. They are only traps. Any formulations of the problem will have to consider God's patience, man's freedom, and the wisdom of not using power or force.

A few miscellaneous comments are in order concerning other issues in Hume and Flew. One basic underlying issue is that God is not seen. Given the grudging admission of Hume "that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence"¹⁴ we still do not see this being, only the effects of such a one. This is not enough to erect anything on. It has no comparison to the matters of verification as in science.¹⁵

Flew's formulation of the issue of God abounds in some unusual and unnecessary formulations which call forth unnecessary demands, and then just simple abuse against his opponents. Some examples may help. Flew seeks to define God as creator in a way that man has no freedom of will.¹⁶ He defined God as omnipotent with the implication that man has no freedom and the logical necessity that the problem of evil must be whipped. It is true that he quoted several creeds for support, but the idea of omnipotence is not necessarily true for Christian theology. More appropriately, God is able to achieve his will and purpose which permits freedom, evil, as well as redemption.

Another problem in Flew is his use of the term "universe" in which he wants to see a God who is outside of the universe. What does the universe mean? Is not Flew asking for a view of another universe. Is this required in any theology? A transcendent God is not outside the universe, but only He is not identified with any material of it. God is not the earth or sun, or the stars, although theism believes that he created them. God must be within the confines of space and in that sense God is not outside of the universe, but within it. While I might argue for the existence of God I would not want to define Him as being outside the universe as I understand the term. Another example of the abuse--not logic--of Flew is seen in his comment that Roman Catholics have more juvenile delinquents than anyone else.¹⁷ (It should be noted that Flew eventually rejected his atheism and became a theist accepting the intelligent design arguments.)

We will return to Flew when we consider other types of arguments, but we need to make a general comment or two about the nature of arguments for God's existence. Arguments for the existence of God are probability arguments, that is, the probability is that a being or God of some kind exists. All arguments are probability arguments and that is as far as the argument can go.¹⁸ They are not sufficient for religious experience. The arguments without anything else would offer a very impoverished theology. Next, there are other people who reject the arguments because of the nature of their own philosophical systems. Kant is an example of this. Without going into his philosophy here, a comment of James Collins may be appropriate:

The special Kantian analysis of the proofs for God's existence was intended not only to refute these particular arguments but also to expose the impotence of natural theology as a whole.¹⁹

But Collins also indicated that unless one accepts Kant's theory of knowledge, his refutation of the proofs are fallacious.

Another observation about the proofs is that one may make certain demands that would rule out the arguments. If one requires that God be seen as in the science lab, then the arguments do not give us that possibility. Last, the arguments need closer relationships to what we know presently about the nature of the world. With that we will turn to the last of the rational arguments.

C. The Ontological Argument.

This is the only rational argument that exists--that is, it does not begin with the visible world, but with a rational idea. Formulated by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) the argument can be summarized in a simple sentence: "There is that than which a greater cannot be conceived."²⁰ Three simple statements indicate the scope of the argument:

Man has an idea of a perfect being.
Existence is an attribute of perfection
Therefore, a perfect being must exist.

It is in this form that the argument has been most widely attacked. Not only in Anselm's day but Aquinas and Kant rejected the argument because existence is not an attribute of perfection. An idea of a perfect 100 dollar bill in your wallet does not bring it into existence. Because of this fallacy, it is generally concluded that the ontological argument is of little value.

However, a defense of the argument has been made by Norman Malcolm. He argued that there are two arguments in Anselm. The first form of the argument is that rejected by Aquinas and others. The second form involved the phrase "necessary existence as a perfection." Thus, a necessary being is greater than if it does not necessarily exist. Within the definition of God as eternal, one logically sees the necessity of his being. Malcolm summarized the argument as follows:

If God, a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, does not exist then He cannot come into existence. For if He did He would either have been caused to come into existence or have happened to come into existence, and in either case He would be a limited being, which by our conception of Him He is not. Since He cannot come into existence, if He does not exist His existence is impossible. If He does exist He cannot have come into existence (for the reasons given), nor can He cease to exist, for nothing could cause Him to cease to exist nor could it just happen that He ceased to exist. So if God exists His existence is necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists.²¹

The evaluation of the argument of Malcolm wind up being criticisms of logic. They focus on the process of reasoning and there are both supporters and opponents of the argument. What so few admit is the idea of a necessary being beyond the boundaries of the material. Again, the idea of a necessary being is rejected, but all philosophers must affirm necessary being of some kind. The debate is over what it is: God or Matter.²²

D. The Kalam Argument

The Kalam argument is outlined as follows:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The Universe began to exist
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

This argument recognizes the need for an explanation for the existence of the universe. It is the nature and purpose of classic philosophy arguments simply to state the problem, not to propose a systematic answer. Since we have already considered some answers from the sciences and found them lacking, there is only one other "cause" to consider. The Kalam argument points to the conclusion of an eternal God who creates not only the universe but life and time. Man is said to be the apex of God's creativity because he reflects, in some small way, the rationality of his

Creator.¹ This argument takes on greater importance with the appearance of the Big Bang theory in physics in the modern era. Philosophers who have accepted the eternal nature of the universe are now faced with new data from physics and cosmology in which the universe has a beginning point. The cause for this beginning point needs an explanation. There are significant parallels between the Big Bang and the story in Genesis concerning creation.

We must now proceed to the second division of arguments for the existence of God.

II. Experiential-Pragmatic.

The title of this sub-division is designed to cover several types that have little in common except they relate to man's personal experience, need, or practice. Beyond that the title serves no purpose other than as an organizing device. The first argument is the moral argument.

A. Moral Argument.

As noted above, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) rejected the arguments of both Aquinas and Anselm, but he believed in God and did not wish to give up the idea of a Supreme Being. In his Critique of Practical Reason, he formulated two arguments that are similar. The first argument concerns the immortality of the soul which cannot be proven at all, but is, for Kant, a necessary idea. The argument is summed as follows: Man lives under a moral law which requires perfection. Since man does not achieve it in this life, immortality is required that the duty of man may be fulfilled in meeting the demands of the moral law.²³

Some practical questions may be raised about Kant's first argument. First, there is no visible moral law in nature and it may seem arbitrary to speak of one as Kant did. Second, why should man be given time to make up his failure? Without some Christian understanding of life after death, why postulate man's survival at all? Third, why not let the judgement about man's failure stand and simply say that he lost out in the race? Fourth, Kant ruled out forgiveness and grace and places life after death on performance which is contrary to Christian values.

The second argument may be summed as follows: Happiness should coincide with the degree of morality. Unfortunately it doesn't, yet man has a duty of pursuing the good. Then Kant said:

Now it was our duty to promote the highest good; and it is not merely our privilege but a necessity connected with duty as a requisite to presuppose the possibility of this highest good. This presupposition is made only under the condition of the existence of God, and

¹ William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, **Theism, Atheism, and the Big Bang cosmology**, New York: Oxford U. Press, 1993.

this condition inseparably connects this supposition with duty. Therefore, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.²⁴

One of the objectionable features of Kant's argument is that it is a use of God that is certainly contrary to the Biblical model of God. God is useful only for undergirding morality for Kant. Beyond that it is questionable whether God serves any use in Kant's view of things.

Another example of the moral argument is that of Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924) who drew on the idea of a standard of truth in all disciplines. Even though a discipline is floundering around in half-truths, there is an ideal to which it hopes to attain in truth. Rashdall argued that:

the Moral Law has a real existence, that there is such a thing as an absolute Morality, that there is something absolutely true or false in ethical judgement, whether we or any number of human beings at any given time actually think so or not. Such a

belief is distinctly implied in what we mean by Morality.²⁵

Since a moral ideal cannot exist in material things, or in the mind of any one individual, Rashdall concluded that "an Absolute moral idea can exist only in a Mind from which all Reality is derived."²⁶ Consequently, morality leads to the conclusion that God exists.

The success of Rashdall's argument does not depend upon whether people follow a moral standard or not. Obviously many do not.

B. The Argument from Personal Experience.

This argument builds on the fact that religious experience is well-nigh universal. Elton Trueblood wrote:

The fact that a great many people, representing a great many civilizations and a great many centuries, and including large numbers of those generally accounted the best and wisest of mankind, have reported religious experiences is one of the most significant facts about our world.²⁷

This argument is designed to indicate that experience of people leads to the conclusion that God exists. But it is one of the weaker arguments and has some problems with it. It proves more than a theist would like to argue for. How can one distinguish between the religious experience of a Muslim, Buddhist, Jew and Christian? All have religious experience and all should be accorded some truthfulness or validity according to the implications of the argument. The argument can be used to argue that all religions are the same and are of equal value.

If the argument is to be defended it might be supplemented with a detailed anthropological study as seen in Schmidt's "High God" idea in which the different religions could be traced to a

common source of the idea of God. Perhaps then the argument would have some value for the theist. Without some restrictions and further limitations it is not of great value.

Another type of the personal experience argument was set forth by A.E. Taylor who used an analogy of art and music which has objectivity. Think of a concert in which many people attend. There are levels of response. The man who comes because his wife coerced him responds negatively. The musician probably has the best appreciation and response to the music, at the same time both critically and aesthetically.

Taylor argued that life is somewhat like the concert or beauty in nature. There is something "out there" that calls forth a response. Men differ in their responses, and because some do not see Him one is not justified in concluding that He does not exist. Aberrations there may be in religion, but the overwhelming repetition of religious experience throughout the ages lends support to the argument.

Objections exist and the following may be noted. (1) This argument lends support for all kinds of religious experience and is not easily limited to the theist. (2) The object of religious experience is never known. Is it really God that one experiences or some lesser being? (3) Theism would admit the importance and usefulness of experience in religion, but it would not be just any old experience that would be regarded as legitimate. It has been shown that hallucinogenic drugs produce a sense of awareness of the world around, but the production of the experiences does not validate the use of drugs. The drugs can destroy and bad religious experience can do likewise.

In the spirit of P.T. Forsyth, we can say that there is an authority for experience, but not authority in the experience. Forsyth meant that religious experience has its place, in relation to other things, but by itself it does not give authority for any conclusions about the truthfulness of God, gods, or whatever.

C. The Argument from Practical Use.

The argument from practical use is one that appears impressive at first, but then assumes some severe problems. The practical use argument is that belief in God works. It has a certain practicality that results do follow from belief. William James noted examples of people who were sick in body and mind, but through commitment and conversion they became well. The conclusion to be reached from this profound experience is that "God is real since he produces real effects."²⁸ This is impressive when someone says, "I used to be . . ." and now I am a changed person. It is difficult to argue with that.

In a similar manner James argued that atheism has little help against pessimism, cynicism, and futility, whereas theism has much to offer in offsetting them.

The argument proves too much and raises serious questions for the theist. First, a change of thinking will help most people. If you believe you are capable and confident you will probably work better in that direction. If you believe you are incompetent, you may help yourself in that

direction. Second, it proves the truth of many kinds of gods. The polytheistic Hindu gets psychological help in his piety as well as the monotheistic Muslim. There is some value received, or neither would do what they do. Are they worshipping the true God? That can't be decided on the basis of the argument. In light of these points it may be considered the most ambiguous of the arguments although it does make a point indicating that belief can affect how one lives.

D. The Wager.

Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) set forth an argument that is unusual in its nature and compelling in many ways. It has also been a focal point of criticism based on oversight or ignorance.

Pascal is often classed as a fideist, that is, a person who says one cannot argue for God's existence, but one must accept it on faith. One statement of Pascal often quoted is the following:

If there is a God He is infinitely incomprehensible since having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is, or if He is.²⁹

Pascal does not call forth the traditional arguments. But his statement above must not be taken to say that theists are unreasonable. Reason cannot decide the issue of whether God exists or not. This does not preclude some other way of knowing about God. The point for the moment is that man is confronted with two alternatives: God is or He is not. Pascal then noted:

Reason can decide nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions.³⁰

The wager is then set forth and may be outlined as follows:

If I bet that God is:

1. and he is . . . eternity is gained.
2. and he is not . . . nothing is lost (yet a good life may be gained in light of believing in God).

If I bet that God is not:

1. and he is . . . eternal life is lost.
2. and he is not . . . nothing lost, except if a wild life has been chosen, which by its nature is self-destroying.

Therefore, the betting man, the reasonable man will bet on God.

Initially, Pascal indicated that life has its choices and it makes a difference now how one lives--affirming or negating life. This is seen at a deeper level with God. The Biblical God set forth the alternatives: life or death, therefore, choose life. Choose the way of life that affirms life. It is

not an argument that proves the existence of God. It shows profoundly the choices and their relevance.

Some criticisms have been raised against the wager and one of the most common is the matter of side-bets. If one bets on God--which God? What about a side bet with Vishnu, Allah, as well as the Christian option? Pascal covered the matter of side bets in his comments on the nature of a true religion.³¹ Pascal placed before us three criteria for a true religion:

1.It must teach the hiddenness of God: "God being thus hidden every religion which does not affirm that God is hidden is not true and every religion which does not give the reason of it, is not instructive."³²

2.The true religion must explain the misery of man. "That a religion may be true, it must have knowledge of our nature. It ought to know its greatness and littleness and the reason of both."³³

3.The true religion must teach how man can know God who is hidden or give the remedy for his alienation and misery. "The true religion, then, must teach us to worship Him only, and to love him only. But we find ourselves unable to worship what we know not, and to love any other object but ourselves, the religion which instructs us in these duties must instruct us also in this inability; and teach us also the remedies for it."³⁴

If we apply these views of Pascal to the major religions of the world, it becomes possible to see the matter of the side-bets in a new light; there is no reason for side-bets. First, pantheistic Hinduism is out for it is the nature of pantheism to identify nature and God. There is no difference between nature and God. It becomes meaningless to talk about God in any usual sense of the term, when one is really talking about nature. God is not hidden. He is the bug, tree, cloud, or man, and other beings. Second, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism are not viable options because classical Buddhism is not a religion about God at all, Confucianism did not begin as a religion, and neither did Taoism. They were humanistic philosophies and none of their classical or original expressions require worship. Their degeneration into religions were not commanded by the founders. This is also true for Buddhism. None of these have anything meaningful for the issue of theism.

This leaves three other major options: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Judaism and Christianity have a unique relationship. Judaism offers a knowledge of God based upon God's self-revelation. Only God can reveal God. This is the meaning of Pascal's despair of reason. Judaism affirms that God has revealed himself, but the problem with Judaism is an interpretation problem: it has not been true to its own internal witness. Judaism spoke hopefully of a coming Messiah but did not recognize Him when he came. Pascal's Pensee 555 may be applied to Judaism:

All who seek God without Jesus Christ, and who rest in nature, either find no light to satisfy them, or come to form for themselves a means of knowing God and serving Him without a mediator.³⁵

He also concluded that:

We know God only by Jesus Christ. Without this mediator all communion with God is taken away Apart from Him, and without the Scripture, without original sin, without a necessary mediator promised and come, we cannot absolutely prove God, nor teach right doctrine and right morality³⁶

In other words, knowledge of God came through God beginning in Judaism, and reached its climax in the Incarnation--God coming Himself to reveal Himself in human understanding. What began in Judaism reached its fulfillment in the Incarnation.

The issue of Islam assumes another dimension. Islam claims to build on Judaism and Christianity. It presumes to be the successor to two religions. As long as it claims a continuity with the two religions, it has to reckon with the contradictions involved in the claim. There is nothing in Judaism or Christianity to call forth another religion **beyond** the Messiah. Judaism promised a Messiah, Christianity claims to be built on the Messiah; but Mohammed is neither a Messiah nor a promise of Christian fulfillment. When it became obvious to Muslim scholars that the Bible did not prophesy the coming of Mohammed, they then claimed that Jews and Christians conspired to corrupt the Scriptures deliberately. The Christian Scriptures speak with finality about God's last word to man in terms of the Incarnation. After God has come, anything else is an anti-climax.

This covers the major religions of the world in brief. As a matter of side-bets, then on Pascal's grounds there are none to be placed. The only real bet is on God-Incarnate. Only Christianity offers a mediator--a means of helping man to know the hidden God and experience redemption from his misery.

III. Revelational-Historical.

The idea of revelation is not usually considered by philosophers as having merit. When one considers the objections of philosophers later, this will be more evident. For now, we must consider the argument. It is one that is specially related to the Judeo-Christian tradition but culminating in the person of Jesus, the Christ.

The claim is made by and for Jesus Christ that He is of the same nature of God, equal with God and come from God. His life is a parable of love, filled with deeds of kindness, healing and compassion. He raised the dead, gave sight to the blind, and did what no other person has done. In consistency with his claim of equality with God is the intense monotheism that he taught as well as was believed by the Jews of his day. Neither He nor they believed that every man is a sub-unit of the divine nature. He was condemned for his claim to equality with God and his claim of being the Messiah of Israel. The crucifixion took place and brought disappointment to his followers. If the death had been the end of the story no purpose would be achieved in these details. But three days later, the resurrection took place as Jesus foretold and out of this event Christianity was born. Jesus was seen after the resurrection by Mary Magdalene, then by the "other Mary," by Cleopas and

another person on the road to Emmaus, Simon alone, then the ten together, then eight days later with the disciples now including Thomas who doubted before, then the seven beside the Sea of Galilee and to "above five hundred brethren," then to James, the last appearance at the Ascension, and finally at the appearance to the Apostle Paul.

The resurrection becomes the capstone of the Christian belief and it becomes the cardinal element in the claim that Jesus is the Son of God, or God Incarnate.

All of this is not limited to the era of Jesus. It is a climax of many things before Him. First, it is related to the messianic promise extending back through centuries of Old Testament history. The prophets speak of a coming Messiah. Jesus said of that claim: I am He.

Second, it is related to the acts of God in the Old Testament. Belief in God in Israel made a difference. God said, "Let there be . . ." light, earth, a people of God, an exodus from Egypt's slavery, a promised land, victory over the Canaanites, a kingdom of David, prophets to call forth judgement on the people's sin, and fulfillment of these prophetic denunciations, and let there come forth from Bethlehem a Messiah.

Third, in terms of Jewish apocalyptic belief in Jesus' day, the resurrection is the key for identifying the Messiah with God and in the Messiah is revealed God and his word.

Fourth, it is related to the miracles of Jesus. Miracles are not ethical principles, but historical events related to real people in real life situations. A miracle is a direct act of God that transcends the normal functions of nature. The resurrection is the beginning point of miracles and other miracles have their reference point to it. If it is true, they make sense. Miracles are projected in the Old Testament as well as the New. The plagues of Egypt, the crossing of the Sea, the parting of the Jordan, and other miracles took place at the right time by command of God. It would have been a falsifying situation if Moses had said: The Jordan will part, but it did not do so.

Fifth, the credibility of the resurrection and life of Jesus does not get lost in centuries after the fact when legendization can take place. In contrast to legendization processes, the documents about the life and resurrection of Jesus came into existence before 70 A.D. with many of these as early as ten years after the resurrection occurred. Compare this with the centuries after the life of Buddha and others. The enemies of Jesus were yet alive and could well contest the events.

These kinds of facts caused C.S. Lewis to conclude:

A man who was merely a man and said the sort of things Jesus said would not be a great moral teacher, He would either be a lunatic--on a level with the man who says he is a poached egg--or else he would be the Devil of Hell. You must make your choice. Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse. You can shut Him up for a fool, you can spit at Him and kill Him as a demon; or you can fall at his feet and call Him, Lord and God. But let us not come with any patronizing nonsense about his being a great human teacher. He has not left that open to us. He did not intend to.³⁸

This argument is based on the historical events of the past. The credibility of witnesses and their motives may be examined. The matter of deliberate falsification is out because there is nothing to gain: only loss of life. Probability is enhanced by one other element of the Christian view of things: the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The facts alone are not everything. One does not believe by facts alone. The witness of God's Spirit is expressed in the statement that "no one can confess 'Jesus is Lord' unless he is guided by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12:3 TEV). The facts are important and necessary but the ultimate conviction of their truth is related to God's Spirit.

Sixth, Visions and Dreams of Jesus in the Muslim World.

There is an interesting issue of events that are taking place in the Muslim world that relate to the question of God's existence and the reality of the realm of the Spirit. Muslims are having dreams and visions of Jesus. Some of these are in a person's sleep, others occur when the person is wide awake. A shining bright light of a person appears in a dark room. The person experiencing this feels a great sense of love by Jesus, they have a great feeling of peace, and they know their sins are forgiven. In many dreams the words of command are "Follow me," but in others there are questions and answer in a conversation. Many of the Muslim people do not know what it all means and they start searching for a believing Christian or a Bible to read more about Jesus.

The dream may appear many times day after day until they begin to do something to discover its meaning. The person who has this vision or dream has a feeling of being loved, a sense of peace floods their lives, and they want to know more of this person. There are thousands and thousands of people who have had dreams and visions and men and women are coming to Jesus. Even imams are having the dreams and coming to faith in Jesus.

Aishe was in Mecca in a tent preparing for bed. "A Man in a gleaming white robe—something other than a dishdasha—stood over her. She glanced behind Him at the tent and saw that He had not cut an opening to get in. He raised a hand as if in greeting but also to calm her. No one else stirred.

"Light from the Man's clothing seemed to flow into her body. Her first thought had been that some cleric had sought out her family—or more frightening, perhaps just her. Yet an unearthly warmth emanated from this Man. She instantly knew He loved her deeply. And in that instant, she also knew who He was. Jesus stood in her tent. He stepped backward and ducked as if stooping to exit the tent's doorway. As He faded through the side, the girl glimpsed His eyes. Come with Me, they seemed to say." A month later visiting a relative she discovered that she was also having dreams or visions of Jesus.(Tom Doyle, Visions and Dreams, p.65) She came to faith in Jesus.

These are private experiences that are bring huge changes in the person's life. Some people have had to flee their homes, their families, and friends, because of the commitment to Jesus. Their lives are at stake. They are willing to die for their experience with Jesus.

As a result of this they become followers of Jesus and forsake Islam. It is very dangerous to leave Islam, but they are willing to do it because of the overwhelming love found in that vision or dream.

That is the argument of *Revelational-Historical* in its summary. We now turn to the objections. The most critical objections to the idea of self-revelation come from Hume and Flew. Let's look at some of them.

First, the idea of a miracle. Hume has a celebrated essay on miracles in which he maintained "a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion."³⁹ Flew himself avers:

The heart of the matter is that the criteria by which we must assess historical testimony, and the general presumptions which alone make it possible for us to construe the detritus of the past as historical evidence, must inevitably rule out any possibility of establishing, upon purely historical grounds, that some genuinely miraculous event has indeed occurred.⁴⁰

Flew, in the spirit of Hume, indicated elsewhere in his book that the theist seeks to maintain a position in which nothing can count against his belief in God. But here we have a turnabout--Flew and Hume are maintaining that there is nothing that can be, or will be accepted as evidence for miracles, let alone God. If one is close-minded on the issues and rejects out of hand anything for the alternate position, there is not much that can be done to bring together a dialogue which Flew maintains he desires.

The second objection is one that has relevance to all of the arguments. That issue is verification. Verification is the norm for Flew and others. It has the ring of scientific authority and brings the question into his framework: can you see, feel, touch, hear or taste God? If you cannot, you are talking nonsense.

One has to admit straight out that verification of God in this manner cannot be done. If verification is restricted in this manner, many other things are also meaningless. The intangibles--truth, love, justice and the realm of values--are all meaningless on the standard of empirical verification.

Verification is important for science, but even there it has its problems. Which theory of verification do we accept? There are several variations. If verification means reproducibility of an experiment, there is a variation of this in religion. A scientific experiment implies that everyone who wants to can follow certain steps and when this is done certain results will happen. In theology, the same holds true. If you follow certain steps and make certain commitments, then this will happen. By this means you will come to know God. This has been the underlying a basis of all mission programs in which people are converted in any religion. That is one kind of verification but it is not seeing God with the naked eye. On the other hand, there are things in science that are never seen, but are called verified.

Speaking about God is somewhat like speaking about pain. We can describe it publicly and even invent words about it. But we never see the pain. Yet we know what other people mean as a general rule when they talk about a pain here or there in their body. We can talk about God, share common experiences, and all these are meaningful, but we don't see God with the human eye. It is not the intention of the arguments to bring this about. The arguments give a reasonable indication that God is. But even the arguments are not enough, granting that they are valid without question. They may point in the direction of God, but we cannot be happy with an "inferred" God. What is needed is an encounter, a meeting with God.

It is highly interesting to note that Flew has recently renounced his atheistic position and affirms a belief in God. He has not become a Christian but a theist and would affirm a view of the universe related to intelligent design, not Darwinism.

IV. Conclusion.

The search for God is one of the most important issues of life. If God is, then it is important to seek out the most important Person in the universe. It may be obvious that the author's sentiments fall into the direction of the Christian faith. One basic reason for this lies in the Christian idea of Person. Anything less than a Person is not worthy of the search. God defined as energy, or force is impersonal and could not involve worship. God defined as Mover or First Cause does not demand any more than an intellectual nod of the head. But God as Person would be significant. If God is Personal, then it does not seem fantasy that He who creates would also communicate. The Judeo-Christian faith as a view offers an aesthetically satisfying view of God. Only God as Person can reveal God.

The July 2008 issue of Christianity Today had a summary article by William Lane Craig on the arguments for the existence of God. I have extracted the types of arguments and philosophers who have defended them in contemporary times. The article is more extensive in dealing with the arguments. My purpose in including these excerpts is to give the reader a number of names concerning the different arguments for further exploration where there is interest.

The cosmological argument.

Versions of this argument are defended by Alexander Pruss, Timothy O'Connor, Stephen Davis, Robert Koons, and Richard Swinburne, among others.

A simple formulation of this argument is:

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3. The universe exists.
4. Therefore, the explanation of the universe's existence is God.

The *kalam* cosmological argument.

This version of the argument has a rich Islamic heritage. Stuart Hackett, David Oderberg, Mark Nowacki, and I have defended the *kalam* argument. Its formulation is simple:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The teleological argument.

The old design argument remains as robust today as ever, defended in various forms by Robin Collins, John Leslie, Paul Davies, William Dembski, Michael Demmon, and others. Advocates of the Intelligent Design movement have continued the tradition of finding examples of design in biological systems. But the cutting edge of the discussion focuses on the recently discovered, remarkable fine-tuning of the cosmos for life.

The moral argument.

A number of ethicists, such as Robert Adams, William Alston, Mark Linville, Paul Copan, John Hare, Stephen Evans, and others have defended "divine command" theories of ethics, which support various moral arguments for God's existence. One such argument:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
2. Therefore, God exists.

The ontological argument.

Anselm's famous argument has been reformulated and defended by Alvin Plantinga, Robert Maydole, Brian Leftow, and others. God, Anselm observes, is by definition the greatest being conceivable. If you could conceive of anything greater than God, then *that* would be God. Thus, God is the greatest conceivable being, a maximally great being. So what would such a being be like? He would be all-powerful, all knowing, and all-good, and he would exist in every logically possible world

William Lane Craig is research professor of philosophy at Talbot School of Theology. His website is reasonablefaith.org

For Further Study

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⁴Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

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⁷Ibid., p. 27.

⁸David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1957, p. 21.

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¹⁰Ibid., p. 58.

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³¹My first encounter with the side bet issue was in Richard Popkins class at the University of Iowa, but for documentary purposes it is implied in Flew, op. cit., pp. 185, 1987.

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CHAPTER XVIII

Some Ingredients of a Christian Philosophy

We have surveyed many facets of philosophy and it may have occurred to the reader to ask: What difference does it really make? One of the first assertions is that of frustration concerning the diversity of opinion. This may lead to pessimism concerning whether any answers are worth the effort. It does make a difference. We live according to the way we really think. This last phrase is underlined because of the problem of hypocrisy and duplicity that is seen among humans. They may profess a belief in order to avoid public embarrassment, but inwardly they deny the belief. They may give lip-service to regarding everyone as equal but their real actions are based on private unexpressed beliefs.

The relation between beliefs and actions may be seen in the following statements. The militant Marxist is bent on putting his beliefs into practice and bringing about a world re-made on the basis of his beliefs. The devout Christian stresses his concern for bringing converts to God. The Jew who believes that Judaism is a non-missionary religion will certainly not evangelize. The capitalist who regards Marxism as a world threat supports “right” causes for making the world safe for democracy. The people who believe it doesn’t make any difference—overtly or actually—do not involve themselves in anything. If our beliefs are vital and living, then our lives relate to our convictions. If not, then probably not.

We have seen many options in the philosophical arena. The question probably comes: which option will I adopt. It may be that the super-market approach to philosophy has some

appeal. This means that one takes a little here from naturalism, a little from idealism, a little from existentialism, and so on. The supermarket, or eclectic approach recognizes that no philosophy has a total concern on the market. It also recognizes that some philosophes exist because they are reactions against neglected themes in previously existing philosophies.

In the following pages I would like to put together some ingredients of a Christian philosophy. This will be incomplete and only suggestive, but it puts up some of the emphases needed in a Christian view of the world.

A Christian view of the world would have to deal first with epistemology.

I. Theory of Knowledge

Christian philosophy is not reductionistic about its theory of knowledge. It does not adopt the Moslem saying that what is not in the Bible (Qur'an) is not worth knowing. Rather the world is God's world and knowing all about it is a legitimate and useful enterprise. Consequently, a Christian theory of knowledge affirms all the ways of knowing that we have examined. There are ways of knowledge relevant to different things to be known. The scientific method is no problem for the Christian philosopher. His only concern is that the theory of knowledge does not become so reductionistic that it disallows knowledge of God. Christian philosophy stresses the importance of empiricism for knowing the perceptive world. But it is a knowledge related to interpreting the world—hence reason is important. Even intuition maybe useful at times concerning scientific discovery as well as the emphasis on apprenticeship.

But the most unusual feature of the Christian view of knowledge is the insistence upon the idea of God's self-revelation. If one is to know God meaningfully, then knowledge of God has to come from God. We may reason to some higher being, to conclude that a God exists, but this knowledge is inadequate. What is required is a knowledge of God as Creator and Redeemer, not as first cause or unmoved mover.

Knowledge about God must come from God. This requires that God declares himself to mankind at significant points. God must speak through communication that is understandable to men and in a way that is clear. Knowledge about God adds an ingredient to our total understanding of the world. If God exists we have knowledge about a spiritual dimension to reality.

This new dimension to an understanding of reality is something that Christian philosophers must insist on. As such it has a relationship to idealism, realism and other philosophies incorporating a spiritual dimension.

Having stressed the importance of epistemology to Christian philosophy, we can now turn to look at four headings that we have employed in previous chapters.

A. Reality

A Christian view of reality may be related to a number of philosophies. There are Christian philosophers who relate their thinking to personal idealism, or process philosophy in which all things are in God (pan-en-theism) or Christian existentialism. My own preference would be Christian realism. Why? Christian realism lends credence to the contingent dualism seen in experience—matter and mind. Man is a reflection of the universe of mind and matter. Christian realism sees God as the Creator of the material world. God is not the world, not its soul, not merely a first cause, but Creator who stands over against the material world under his care and control. Christian realism keeps one from merging matter into mind; in this case it keeps one from being pantheistic. It also keeps one from merging mind into matter as seen in the case of naturalism.

Reality is a creation of God and is his spoken deed. Reality comes from the being of God, but as a spoken word stands outside the person so the creation takes existence over against God.

Even though Christian realism would insist upon the distinction in seeing the world as mind/matter, God/world relationship, it would yet have sympathies for the emphases in idealism that relate matter ultimately to Spirit or Mind.

B. Man

The Christian view of man is that he is both mind and matter. Man is created in the image of God and is a special creature in all the creation. This is one reason why murder is wrong. Murder is a crime against the image of God. There are three ideas about man which Christian philosophy must retain.

First, man is made or created in the image of God. This places man in a unique relation to God. This disallows a materialistic or naturalistic explanation of man's existence as seen in evolutionary theory. Man is created as a living soul.

Second, man is a being who has alienated himself from God. The sin of man against man, beast, the creation and against God is written large in the history of man. In spite of this dismal evaluation, man has reason not to despair. That reason is related to the third idea.

Third, man can be restored, renewed, redeemed and reconciled to God. This idea is important for alienation and rebellion are not the last word. God comes seeking man and forgives. This seeking of man is the story related to us from the first episode in the Bible to the coming of Christ, the Son of God, in the New Testament. It is then incorporated into the Gospel which is commanded to be proclaimed to all the world.

These three ideas are basic to a Christian view of man. It should be emphasized that all humans—without regard to distinctions—are created in the image of God. Denials of this are really subtle forms of atheism.

C. God.

The existence of God sets off Christian philosophy from various forms of naturalism. Christian philosophers do not deal with God in the same way that a theistic philosopher would. One may believe in God and not be a Christian philosopher. It is in this sense that Pascal wrote, “The God of the philosophers is not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” The difference? The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is a revealing God. The God of the philosophers is only known by effects, or conclusions to arguments. Knowledge about God depends significantly on God’s self-revelation. This takes two forms: (1) through the prophets of the Old Testament and then (2) in the Incarnation—God takes human form in the person of Jesus, the Son of God.

The nature of God has already been discussed somewhat in chapter 9, but there are some characteristics we need to emphasize here.

God is Spirit is the fundamental idea about the nature of God’s reality. Philosophers have struggled for centuries in attempting to make this idea plain. The Bible doesn’t do much better because the nature of God is infinite and eternal and these words are hard to grasp. Negatively it means that God is not matter of any physical kind. Positively, it means that God’s nature is greater, higher, and qualitatively different from anything we know about the physical world.

God is love—agape—becomes the controlling idea of God’s activity. There is a world because God loves. There is life and man because God loves. There is redemption and reconciliation because God loves. There is also sin and alienation because love allows the errant being to go his way.

D. Values

Christian philosophy sees values as founded in God. He is the creator and as such has an intimate knowledge of how life should be lived. His commandments are life affirming. Man has freedom to reject his commandments, but that rejection is life-denying. God’s commands involve obeying for that is the way of life. Rejecting or disobeying is not only to deny life, but to accept irrationality as the model of existence.

Values are more than ethics. Values are expressed in art indicate creativity. As God has been creative, so man can be creative. Christian culture has been expressed in a variety of ways in the past and present. This is not to say that all artistic expressions are of equal merit. But there is a basis of developing the sciences, the arts, the humanities, and other areas with all the depth of enthusiasm one can muster.

Values are also reflected in the role of education. Christian philosophy places a premium on education, because it relates to health, to the good life which flows from the abundant life of God.

The good life as a concept developed in centuries of thought can be accepted and expanded from the Christian perspective. In common with other people, Christians appreciate friendship, creative work, achievement, family happiness, aesthetic creativity, and other elements of a good life. But adding to this the Christian philosopher stresses agape to God and man. Agape as a Christian idea holds out the possibility of change in man, renewal, redemption, and forgiveness with one another as well as before God.

Values as related to ethics places the source of the good in God. God, not culture, is the comparative point of human action. These are starting points for a Christian philosophy. While many others can be added very little could be taken away and yet claim to be Christian.